The Future of UK Debt Restructuring

By Jennifer Payne (University of Oxford – Faculty of Law)

In the UK, a number of different mechanisms exist which can be used to restructure the debt of viable but financially distressed companies. This paper assesses the debt restructuring mechanisms currently available to companies in English law and considers whether reform is needed. In particular, the paper analyses the reform proposals put forward by the UK Insolvency Service in July 2016, which recommended: (i) the introduction of an option to cramdown whole classes of creditors using a single restructuring mechanism (something which can only be accessed at present using a scheme of arrangement combined with administration); (ii) the introduction of a restructuring moratorium akin to that which is attached to administration at present, together with a new ability for companies to prevent creditors with “essential contracts” from terminating them on the basis of insolvency alone; and (iii) the introduction of provisions designed to facilitate debtor-in-possession financing, something notably absent from the current UK regime. These reforms will need to be introduced with skill and care in order to ensure that the potential benefit they can bring to financially distressed businesses is balanced appropriately with the constraints that they impose on existing creditors’ rights. The aim of the Insolvency Service’s proposals is laudable, and it is argued that reform of the UK regime is needed. In particular, the introduction of a restructuring moratorium and a cramdown facility would be beneficial. Making these changes would provide English law with a stronger and more effective debt restructuring procedure. Furthermore, such changes are required if the UK wants to remain competitive in a global market.

The full article is available here.

The Sun Is Setting: Is It Time to Legislate Pre-Packs?

By John Wood (Lancashire Law School, University of Central Lancashire)

In the UK, pre-packaged administrations (“pre-packs”), while few in number, receive widespread attention due to the controversial outcomes that they often produce. The pre-pack process seems to have gained much exposure in recent years, but it is by no means a new concept. The negative reputation that pre-packs have resides with the lack of transparency that surrounds the process, in addition to connected parties purchasing the old company. Such an outcome leaves many creditors frustrated with both the lack of information received and the diminutive monies recovered for what they are owed.

Due to the sustained criticism of pre-packs, the British government reviewed the process to detect weaknesses in the UK’s company law framework and to ensure that the UK remained a competitive and attractive place to conduct business. This led to the Graham Review (“Review”), which made six recommendations that have since become somewhat essential to the survival of pre-packs as a non-legislative procedure. Ministerial pronouncements have put the profession on notice that, unless they take proper steps to produce substantial compliance with the Review’s findings, then legislative power will be exercised. While no further action has been taken, the Review appears to have attracted widespread support. The Review proposes non-legislative action, but the article examines whether, over time, legislation will become inevitable. What is therefore required is a balanced evaluation and critique of the Graham proposals—one that is capable of providing some form of yardstick against which to test the quality of any legislative initiatives which may be taken in the future.

The full article, published in 67 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 173 (2016), is available here.

Recharacterization of Debt as Equity in the Fourth Circuit

posted in: Cramdown and Priority | 0

By Gabrielle Glemann (Hughes Hubbard & Reed)

In an unpublished opinion in August, In re Province Grande Old Liberty, LLC, Case No. 15-1669, 2016 WL 4254917 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 2016), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals shed some light on the circumstances under which a court may recharacterize debt as an equity investment, effectively subordinating the claim.  The issue before the Fourth Circuit was not one of first impression — the Fourth Circuit had long recognized that a bankruptcy court’s equitable powers include “the ability to look beyond form to substance,” and had previously articulated the factors to consider in evaluating a request for recharacterization. See Fairchild Dornier GMBH v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Dornier Aviation (North America), Inc.), 453 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2006). The Fourth Circuit decision is notable however, because the court looked beyond the facts giving rise to the underlying claim at issue and ultimately to the economic substance of the entire context of the transaction.  In Province, the creditor whose claim was at issue was a company owned by insiders of the debtor.  The creditors’ claim was based on a loan that was used by the debtor to settle other obligations.  The court held that the settlement agreement was the “substance of the transaction” and a basis for recharacterization, notwithstanding the fact that the creditor was not a party to the settlement agreement.

The full memo is available here.

Beyond Options

posted in: Cramdown and Priority | 0

By Anthony J. Casey (University of Chicago Law School) and Edward R. Morrison (Columbia Law School)

Scholars and policymakers now debate reforms that would prevent a bankruptcy filing from being a moment that forces valuation of the firm, crystallization of claims against it, and elimination of junior stakeholders’ interest in future appreciation in firm value. These reforms have many names, ranging from Relative Priority to Redemption Option Value. Much of the debate centers on the extent to which reform would protect the non-bankruptcy options of junior stakeholders or harm the non-bankruptcy options of senior lenders. In a new paper, “Beyond Options,” we argue that this focus on options is misplaced. Protecting options is neither necessary nor sufficient for advancing the goal of a well-functioning bankruptcy system. What is needed is a regime that cashes out the rights of junior stakeholders with minimal judicial involvement. To illustrate, we propose an “automatic bankruptcy procedure” that gives senior creditors an option to restructure the firm’s debt or sell its assets at any time after a contractual default. Under this procedure, restructuring occurs in bankruptcy, but sales do not. Sales are either subject to warrants (which give junior stakeholders a claim on future appreciation) or are subject to judicial appraisal (which forces senior lenders to compensate junior stakeholders if the sale price was too low). Our proposal can be seen as an effort to design a formalized restructuring procedure that borrows from traditional state law governing corporate-control transactions. We show that this procedure minimizes core problems of current law—fire sales that harm junior stakeholders, delay that harms senior lenders, and the uncertainties generated by judicial valuation, which are exploited by all parties.

The full paper is available here.

Senator Reed Introduces Study Bill to Assess Systemic Risk Impact of “Bankruptcy-for-Banks” Reforms

On December 6, Senator Jack Reed introduced a bill aimed at establishing a more informed basis for regulatory and policymaking action on financial institution bankruptcies. The bill would mandate bi-annual reports by financial regulators on key issues in the resolution of financial companies under the Bankruptcy Code, such as potential reforms to the safe harbors for repos and derivatives, strategies for mitigating the systemic impact of financial company bankruptcies, risks embedded in the “single point of entry” strategy (particularly if it is tried and fails), and sources of liquidity for a financial company in bankruptcy. Overall, the bill calls for regulators to make a big picture assessment of how various bankruptcy reforms would affect systemic risk, drawing attention to weaknesses in some of the policy proposals in this area.

The bill also would also amend bankruptcy court procedure for financial firm bankruptcies. Most notably, it would revise the Bankruptcy Code to give the Federal Reserve and other regulators standing to be heard in financial company bankruptcies. Additionally, the bill would provide for the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, jointly, to propose five potential trustees for the financial company, with the United States trustee selecting the final appointee from this list. Finally, the bill would require the Supreme Court to issue a rule establishing a procedure for appointing a bankruptcy or district court judge with appropriate expertise to preside over the bankruptcy resolution of a financial company.

The Roundtable’s full update on the bill is available here.

(This post was authored by Rebecca Green, J.D. ’17.)


Related posts on legislative reform proposals are available here and here. The Roundtable has also posted previously on policy issues surrounding “bankruptcy for banks” reforms. For example, see Morrison, Roe & Sontchi, “Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors“; Roe & Adams, “Restructuring Failed Financial Firms in Bankruptcy“; and Lubben & Wilmarth, “Too Big and Unable to Fail.”

Federal District Court Reinstates Fraudulent Transfer Challenge to Lyondell LBO

posted in: Avoidance | 0

By Richard G. Mason, David A. Katz, and Emil A. Kleinhaus (Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz)

In situations where leveraged buyouts prove unsuccessful, and the companies subject to the buyouts file for bankruptcy, it is not unusual for debtors or creditors’ committees to seek to challenge the LBOs on fraudulent transfer grounds.  In recent years, however, it is has become increasingly difficult to mount such challenges — at least in certain jurisdictions — as a result of judicial decisions that have broadly applied the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” for securities transactions to protect LBO participants from fraudulent transfer liability.

In a significant set of decisions, the District Court for the Southern District of New York has reinstated a fraudulent transfer claim to recover approximately $6.3 billion in distributions made to Lyondell Chemical shareholders in connection with Lyondell’s 2007 leveraged buyout. The decisions demonstrate that, despite the broad reach of the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor,” LBOs may still be subject to challenge on fraudulent transfer grounds where the seller’s management is alleged to have acted with the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors.

The full memo is available here.

Awaiting the Second Circuit’s Decision in Marblegate

posted in: Workouts and Pre-Packs | 0

We anxiously await the Second Circuit’s decision in Marblegate, which was argued earlier this year. John Bessonette of Kramer Levin briefly summarizes the stakes:

“Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act provides that ‘the right of any holder of any indenture security to receive payment of the principal of an interest on such indenture security . . . shall not be impaired or affected without the consent of such holder . . . .’ Various plaintiffs used this provision this past year to successfully challenge out-of-court restructurings in Marblegate and Caesars. In both cases, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York held that § 316(b) not only protects the formal legal right to receive payment under an indenture, but also restricts non-consensual out of court debt reorganizations, even where no express terms of the indenture are violated.

“However, neither case provided a limiting principle for when out-of-court restructurings violate § 316(b), and plaintiff firms are now taking advantage of this murkiness. In the last year, three lawsuits challenging distressed exchange offers have been filed by retail holders of unsecured bonds. Each lawsuit involves an exchange offer made to qualified institutional buyers by a distressed energy company, and retail bondholders who object to their bonds being subordinated to the secured bonds issued to QIBs as part of the exchange.

“The cases are still pending and it remains to be seen whether the courts will clarify the ambiguity around § 316(b). Meanwhile, this obscure provision of the TIA will occupy a more prominent role in out-of-court debt restructurings and serve as a new weapon for plaintiffs challenging such restructurings.”

His full memo is available here.

The Roundtable has issued multiple posts on the Marblegate litigation and the Trust Indenture Act. Mark Roe wrote what the appropriate limiting principle should be for courts when invalidating exit consent transactions under section 316(b) of the Act. He further argued that courts alone cannot solve the fundamental problems: The SEC must also act. The Roundtable also covered the 28-law-firm white paper on how courts should handle that section. See our archives for more.

Too Big and Unable to Fail

By Stephen J. Lubben (Seton Hall University School of Law) and Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. (George Washington University Law School)

Financial regulation after the Dodd-Frank Act has produced a host of new regulatory tools for resolving failures of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). The explicit goal of this new “resolution” regime is to enable SIFIs to go bankrupt without a government bailout, just like other businesses. In our paper, forthcoming in the Florida Law Review, however, we express significant doubts about the new regime’s ability to work as advertised.

The “single point of entry” (SPOE) strategy, which focuses all resolution efforts on a SIFI’s parent holding company, addresses a very stylized, even hypothetical sort of failure. We believe that it is unlikely to work during a global crisis that involves multiple failing SIFIs operating thousands of subsidiaries across dozens of national boundaries.

The Federal Reserve’s “total loss absorbing capacity” (TLAC) proposal is closely tied to SPOE. It would require SIFI holding companies to issue large amounts of debt securities that can be “bailed in” (converted into equity) in a resolution proceeding to make the holding company solvent again. In our view, TLAC debt will also create a new, more opaque way to impose the costs of SIFIs’ financial distress on ordinary citizens, because retail investors in brokerage accounts, mutual funds, and pension funds are likely to be the largest TLAC debtholders.

We propose several strategies for forcing SIFIs and their Wall Street creditors to internalize at least some of the costs of the enormous risks they create. Among other things, mutual funds and pension funds that invest in TLAC debt should disclose the bail-in risks to investors and should include in their offering materials “black box” warnings similar to those already used in selling junk bonds to investors. In addition, each SIFI should describe its resolution plan on a web page that also contains a straightforward discussion of the risks TLAC debtholders are taking on—risks that creditors and counterparties of operating subsidiaries are unwilling to assume. Only with such disclosures can the hazards of TLAC debt be appropriately priced by the market.

The full paper can be found here.

 

Falling Cities and the Red Queen Phenomenon

posted in: Municipal Bankruptcy | 0

By Samir D. Parikh (Lewis and Clark Law School) and Zhaochen He (Lewis and Clark College)

Cities and counties are failing.  Unfunded liabilities for retirees’ healthcare benefits aggregate to more than $1 trillion.  Pension systems are underfunded by as much as $4.4 trillion.  Many local government capital structures ensure rising costs and declining revenues, the precursors to service-delivery insolvency.  These governments are experiencing the Red Queen phenomenon.   They have tried a dizzying number of remedies but their dire situation persists unchanged.  Structural changes are necessary, but state legislatures have failed to respond.  More specifically, many states have refused to implement meaningful debt restructuring mechanisms for local governments. They argue that giving cities and counties the power to potentially impair bond obligations will lead to a doomsday scenario: credit markets will respond by dramatically raising interest rates on new municipal and state bond issuances. This argument – which we term the paralysis justification – has been employed widely to support state inaction.  But the paralysis justification is anecdotal and untested.

This article attempts to fill a significant gap in the literature by reporting the results of an unprecedented empirical study. Our study aggregates data for every general obligation, fixed-rate municipal bond issued in the U.S. from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2014, over 800,000 issuances in total.  By employing multivariate regression analysis, we are able to conclude that the paralysis justification is a false narrative.  Municipalities located in states that offer meaningful debt restructuring options enjoy the lowest borrowing costs, all other things equal.  This article removes one of the largest obstacles to financial relief for many cities and counties. We hope to encourage recalcitrant state legislatures to enact the structural changes their local governments need desperately.

The full article is available here.

Municipal Borrowing Costs and State Policies for Distressed Municipalities

By Pengjie Gao (University of Notre Dame), Chang Lee (University of Illinois at Chicago), and Dermot Murphy (University of Illinois at Chicago)

Recent high-profile municipal default cases in Detroit, Puerto Rico, and various cities in California have underscored the importance of state laws for dealing with default proceedings, or even preventing default from occurring in the first place. However, the effects of these laws, or lack thereof, on municipal borrowing costs remain unclear. Does unconditional state support for distressed local municipalities lead to lower local borrowing costs? If so, are there tradeoffs?

The authors address these questions by examining differences in distress-related laws and statutes across states. Some states have proactive policies in place that activate when their local municipality is exhibiting signs of fiscal distress (“Proactive states”). Meanwhile, other states allow unconditional access to the Chapter 9 bankruptcy procedure, with no laws in place for dealing with distressed municipalities (“Chapter 9 states”).

The authors find that these differences significantly affect local borrowing costs. In particular, Proactive states have lower borrowing costs and significantly lower yield reactions following default. Furthermore, Proactive state yields are less sensitive to economic conditions because of the implicit insurance that becomes particularly valuable when economic conditions are weak. There is also a significant contagion effect in Chapter 9 states that does not exist in Proactive states, in that a default in a Chapter 9 state is more likely to lead to higher yields for other bonds located in that state. However, the authors also provide evidence that borrowing costs at the state level are somewhat higher in Proactive states because of the partial transfer of local credit risk to the state.

The full article is available here.

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