By Rohan Ganduri (Goizueta Business School, Emory University)
In April 2005 Congress expanded the range of bankruptcy safe-harbored repurchase agreements (repos) to include mortgage-related securities with the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). The rationale behind this provision was to prevent a chain of failures among financial institutions by granting derivative counterparties an exemption to the automatic stay, thereby allowing them to close out their positions.
In “Repo Regret?” I show that there were unanticipated adverse consequences of BAPCPA, which exacerbated the growth of risky mortgage credit in the U.S. economy. BAPCPA affected the funding of non-bank mortgage originators, which fund their mortgage origination business primarily through short-term revolving lines of credit, typically secured by the originated mortgages. However, after BAPCPA, short-term secured loans were cloaked in repurchase agreement (repo) terms consistent with the bankruptcy code. This was because a repo lender has greater protection in bankruptcy, although a secured loan and a repo are economically equivalent.
Furthermore, safe harboring eliminated any long-term risk associated with a drop in the collateral’s value at liquidation. Lower exposure to the collateral’s risk drove down funding costs for non-bank originators and also reduced the incentives of short-term funding intermediaries to screen the mortgages that the non-banks placed as collateral to obtain funding. This increase in funding and lax screening led to the growth of risky mortgage credit.
Conferring seniority on derivative counterparties does not eliminate risk, however; it transfers the risk to other investors. In the case of BAPCPA and the mortgage market, the seniority accorded to repo lenders transferred the long-term credit risk associated with the holding of mortgage-related collateral entirely to the end mortgage-backed security (MBS) investors.
To the extent that greater defaults, due to increased origination of riskier mortgages, have externalities and spillover effects that cannot be internalized by the MBS investors by demanding higher yields, the cost of awarding seniority to derivative counterparties may outweigh its expected benefits.
The full article is available here.
For previous Roundtable posts on the safe harbors, see Morrison, Roe & Sontchi, “Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors“; Janger & Pottow, “Implementing Symmetric Treatment of Financial Contracts in Bankruptcy and Bank Resolution“; and Lubben, “Lehman’s Derivatives Portfolio.”
We at the Bankruptcy Roundtable will take a break from posting this August and hope that you too will be able to get away from your desk at work. We’ll be back on September 5th.
By Yue Qiu, University of Minnesota (will join Temple University as Assistant Professor of Finance on August 1st, 2017)
In this paper, I study the strategic role of debt structure in improving the bargaining position of a firm’s management relative to its non-financial stakeholders. Debt structure is essential for strategic bargaining between management and non-financial stakeholders because it affects the ease of renegotiating debt contracts and thus the credibility of bankruptcy threats. Debt structure, not necessarily debt level, is shown to be adjusted as a response to an increase in non-financial stakeholders’ negotiation power.
Using NLRB labor union elections as a laboratory setting and employing a regression discontinuity design, I find that passing a labor union election leads to larger creditor dispersion in a firm’s outstanding debt. In particular, union certification leads to an increase in the ratio of public debt to total assets and a decrease in the ratio of bank debt to total assets in the following three years after elections, whereas there is no significant change in the level of total debt. Moreover, the syndication size of newly issued bank loans increases while creditor ownership concentration decreases once the vote share for unions passes the winning threshold.
Further analyses confirm that the debt structure adjustments after union certification are more likely driven by strategic concerns of management rather than more constrained access to bank loans. Finally, I also show that the degree of wage concessions is strongly related to a firm’s debt structure using the airline industry as an empirical setting.
The full paper is available here.
By Steven L. Schwarcz (Duke University School of Law)
This Roundtable post is based on the author’s forthcoming article, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and English Governing Law, scheduled for publication in a symposium issue of the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial and Commercial Law (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2952776).
Unsustainable sovereign debt is a serious problem for nations as well as their citizens and creditors. It also is a threat to global financial stability. The existing “collective action clause” contractual approach to restructuring that debt is inadequate. At the same time, a multilateral framework, such as a convention or treaty, is not currently politically feasible. Recent research shows a drastic rise in sovereign debt litigation by holdout creditors, suggesting the urgency of finding solutions.
This article proposes a novel legal framework, focusing on governing law, for restructuring unsustainable sovereign debt. Because a significant percentage of sovereign debt is governed by English law, the UK Parliament has a unique opportunity to modify that law to include the legislative equivalent of perfect aggregate-voting collective action clauses in all English-law governed sovereign debt contracts. That not only would facilitate the fair and equitable restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debt; it also should ensure the continuing legitimacy and attractiveness of English law as the governing law for future sovereign debt contracts.
The article also proposes and examines the text of a model law that Parliament could consider as a basis for its legislation. Additionally, the article explains why, even absent Parliamentary enactment, a model-law approach could contribute to the incremental development of sovereign-debt-restructuring norms.
The full paper is available here
By Seth Jacobson, Ron Meisler, Carl Tullson and Alison Wirtz (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP)*
Over the last several decades, the enforcement of intercreditor agreements (“ICAs”) and agreements among lenders (“AALs”) that purport to affect voting rights and the rights to receive payments of cash or other property in respect of secured claims have played an increasingly prominent role in bankruptcy cases. On certain of the more complex issues that have arisen in the context of a bankruptcy, there have been varying interpretations and rulings by the bankruptcy courts. Some courts have enforced these agreements in accordance with their terms, while others have invalidated provisions in these agreements on policy and other grounds. Still others seem to have enforced agreements with a results-oriented approach.
In this article, we examine three recent leading cases: Energy Future Holdings (“EFH“), Momentive, and RadioShack. These cases addressed whether the bankruptcy court was the proper forum for intercreditor disputes, the ability of junior creditors to object to a sale supported by senior creditors, and whether an agreement providing only for lien subordination restricts a junior creditor’s ability to receive distributions under a plan of reorganization.
These leading cases illustrate three trends. First, bankruptcy courts are increasingly willing to insert themselves with respect to disputes among lenders that affect a debtor’s estate, thereby establishing that the bankruptcy court is the proper forum for interpreting ICAs and AALs. Second, the courts are applying the plain language of ICAs and AALs to the facts of the case to reach their conclusions. And, finally, senior creditors appear to continue to bear the risk of agreements that do not limit junior creditors’ rights in bankruptcy using clear and unambiguous language.
The full article is available here.
*Seth Jacobson is a partner and global co-head of the banking group at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. Ron Meisler is a corporate restructuring partner, Carl Tullson is a corporate restructuring associate and Alison Wirtz is a banking associate at Skadden. They are all based in the firm’s Chicago office. The opinions expressed in this article are solely the opinions of the authors and not of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.
By Sergio J. Galvis (Sullivan & Cromwell LLP)
As a result of the Argentine sovereign debt crisis and ensuing holdout litigation saga, the pari passu (or ranking) clause became a source of great consternation in the international sovereign bond market. Specifically, Judge Griesa’s holding that Argentina had violated the pari passu clause by refusing to pay creditors who had not participated in the nation’s earlier debt exchanges, and the accompanying requirement that Argentina had to pay those holdout bondholders, led to uncertainty in the market regarding the leverage holdouts could exercise in sovereign debt restructurings going forward. Concern was expressed over the ability of sovereigns to succeed with voluntary exchange offers premised on the threat that the restructuring sovereign would default on payments due to non-participating bondholders. This article evaluates the impact of the court’s decision in the Argentine litigation to date, including subsequent court decisions that have helped reinforce the view that the equitable holding in favor of the holdouts in the Argentine saga is a narrowly prescribed outcome that is unlikely to be repeated absent extraordinary circumstances. It then examines the adoption of improved ranking clauses and collective action voting clauses in recent issuances of sovereign debt in the effort to bring greater certainty to market participants and facilitate efficient restructurings in the future without the need for extra-contractual restructuring mechanisms and remedies.
The full article is available here.
For other recent Roundtable posts related to sovereign debt, see Lubben, “Sovereign Bankruptcy Hydraulics“; Gulati and Rasmussen, “Puerto Rico and the Netherworld of Sovereign Debt Restructuring“; and a Cleary Gottlieb update on Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy.
By James Michael Blakemore (Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP)
In “Pari Passu Undone: Game-Changing Decisions for Sovereigns in Distress,” which appears in Issue No. 3 of the “Cleary Gottlieb Emerging Markets Restructuring Journal,” published by Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Michael Lockman and I examine a recent decision in White Hawthorne, LLC v. Republic of Argentina, No. 16 Civ. 1042 (TPG), 2016 WL 7441699 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016), regarding the hotly litigated pari passu clause.
Following an economic catastrophe in the early 2000s, the Republic of Argentina successfully restructured the vast majority of its more than $80 billion of debt, exchanging new bonds for those on which the crisis had forced default. In February 2012, Judge Thomas P. Griesa of the Southern District of New York, based on a boilerplate provision in the defaulted bonds known as the pari passu clause, enjoined Argentina from servicing its restructured debt without simultaneously making ratable payments to holdout creditors who had refused to participate in the exchange. This interpretation was unprecedented and, given the pari passu clause’s ubiquity in sovereign debt instruments, threatened to reverberate far beyond the specific facts of Argentina’s case. For nearly five years, anxious sovereigns and market participants were left to ponder the scope of these rulings. Most basically, would a sovereign debtor’s decision to pay some but not all of its creditors, taken alone, violate the pari passu clause?
Judge Griesa has now answered this crucial question. Following Argentina’s announcement, in February 2016, of a global proposal to settle its defaulted debt, a group of hedge funds brought suit, arguing in part that Argentina’s settlement with other creditors violated the pari passu clause. In White Hawthorne, Judge Griesa disagreed. The Court’s opinion confirmed that, absent aggravating circumstances—Judge Griesa mentioned specifically the “incendiary statements” and “harmful legislation” of Argentina’s former government—a sovereign debtor may pay some of its creditors and not others without running afoul of the pari passu clause. The decision does much to clarify the limits of the pari passu clause and deals a serious blow to creditors who would interpret the clause broadly to undermine future sovereign restructuring efforts.
The full article is available here.
 The firm represented the Republic of Argentina in the matters described in the article. The views expressed here are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the firm or its clients.
By David L. Eaton (Kirkland & Ellis LLP) and Aaron J. David (Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP)*
When faced with a Chapter 15 foreign representative seeking discretionary post-recognition relief on behalf of a foreign debtor, courts have struggled to decide whether the requested relief falls under § 1507(a), referring to “additional assistance” and subject to the factors enumerated in § 1507(b), or under § 1521, affording “appropriate relief” under the balancing test in § 1522. Because both provisions seem to enable courts to provide discretionary relief, but subject to different standards, courts and commentators have lamented the difficulty of assessing “where section 1521 ends and where section 1507 begins.”
In our view, the problem is illusory. We revisit Chapter 15 in light of the “language and design of the statute as a whole” to argue that § 1507 has been misinterpreted. On our reading, §1507 is not, itself, a source of discretionary relief, but rather sets out principles to guide courts in granting any discretionary relief, including under § 1521. Specifically, § 1507(a) allows courts to employ applicable non-bankruptcy law in fashioning discretionary relief, and § 1507(b) imposes standards that preserve pre-Chapter 15 jurisprudence governing such relief. Interpreting § 1507 this way clarifies that § 1521 is the true source of discretionary relief, but that it should be employed against the background principles of § 1507.
The full article was published in the ABI Journal and is available here.
*David Eaton is a recently retired partner of Kirkland & Ellis LLP. Aaron David is an associate at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. The article reflects the views of authors, and does not represent the views of Kirkland & Ellis or Paul, Weiss.
The House of Representatives’ passage first of the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act (FIBA) and then of the Financial CHOICE Act last Thursday has made bankruptcy for banks and the fate of Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) a live issue again. Both FIBA and the CHOICE Act would add a “subchapter V” to chapter 11 to resolve financial conglomerates in bankruptcy. Unlike FIBA, however, the CHOICE Act would also repeal the OLA, leaving bankruptcy as the only option for handling the failure of a financial conglomerate.
Several academics, former regulators, and practitioners, including several contributors to the Bankruptcy Roundtable, have recently published op-eds weighing arguments for and against replacing the OLA with bankruptcy. Support for adding tools to the Bankruptcy Code is widespread. Commentators differ, however, on whether bankruptcy, by itself, can address the systemic risk concerns that prompted the creation of the OLA and on whether it would be useful to have a bankruptcy procedure more robust than subchapter V.
Stephen Lubben contends that without a mechanism for providing liquidity to financial institutions—the usual providers of funding for companies in chapter 11—the Bankruptcy Code cannot effectively handle a widespread financial crisis. Mark Roe emphasizes that economic stability requires having the OLA and related structures to allow subchapter V to succeed (through regulatory coordination with international authorities and supervision over financial institutions to ensure that they have the capital structures to facilitate a subchapter V resolution). The OLA is also needed in case a subchapter V reorganization fails, as subchapter V is not a general bankruptcy authorization but, instead, a mechanism to use the 48-hour “single-point-of-entry” restructuring strategy in bankruptcy. This point renews some of the arguments Roe and David Skeel expressed earlier on ways subchapter V should be strengthened, such as by the addition of a regulatory trigger and a means to deal with an inability to complete the resolution within 48 hours.
Finally, Sheila Bair and Paul Volcker argue that having the OLA as a backstop for a failed bankruptcy makes government bailouts less likely, as the OLA provides regulators with the tools to wind down a failed financial institution in an orderly fashion. In contrast, Stephen Hessler argues that the Bankruptcy Code, amended along the lines of subchapter V, would promote both market discipline and financial stability. A bankruptcy judge applying well established precedents and rules in a subchapter V case would combat moral hazard more effectively than the OLA, which grants regulators significant discretion to treat similarly situated creditors differently.
(By Rebecca Green, Harvard Law School, J.D. 2017.)
By Bruce Grohsgal (Delaware Law School, Widener University)
The House recently passed the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017 (FIBA). FIBA’s provisions are incorporated into the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, passed by the House last week, which would repeal Dodd-Frank’s receiverships for failing financial institutions that pose risk to the financial system. The Senate may soon consider both bills.
FIBA creates a subchapter V of chapter 11 for financial institutions. Only the holding company will file. In the first 48 hours of the case, it will transfer certain assets—consisting primarily of its equity in its subsidiaries and its derivatives—to a newly-formed bridge company. It will leave behind pre-designated “bail-in debt,” mostly unsecured term obligations owed to 401ks and pensions and shorter term unsecured trade debt.
In my view, however, FIBA is unlikely to result in an effective restructuring. First, because of FIBA’s 48-hour deadline, individual determinations likely will not be made with respect to the hundreds of thousands, if not millions of repo, derivatives, and other qualified financial contracts. Instead, the entire book of financial contracts—the “bad” along with the “good”—likely will be transferred to the bridge company. The bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over the bridge company and its property—and the restructuring—ends on the transfers.
Second, the bridge company must assume 100% of the debt secured by any property transferred—without any write down, even if the property is worth less than the claim—and all liabilities owed on the derivatives and repo transferred. These statutory provisions may weaken the bridge company’s balance sheet and imperil its ability to obtain financing.
Though the Federal Reserve’s total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) rule includes “clean holding company” requirements to facilitate restructuring, the rule does not adequately address these balance sheet ills that FIBA creates. The clean holding company requirements apply only to eight U.S. global systemically important banks, and do not reach dozens of $50+ billion banks or nearly 5,000 other FIBA-eligible financial institutions. Moreover, TLAC does not prohibit secured borrowing even by those eight bank holding companies, though undersecured borrowings by those eight banks may be limited by TLAC’s regulatory capital requirements. But at a time of declining asset values and a ramp-up to a subchapter V filing, it is likely that many previously fully secured loans will have become undersecured. FIBA will require the bridge bank to either assume the unsecured portion of the debt or lose the collateral to the lender.
FIBA’s bankruptcy proceeding makes a run by the bridge company’s derivatives and repo counterparties more likely. If the bridge company’s balance sheet is weakened by the wholesale assumption of qualified financial contracts and by the assumption of debt above asset value, then the bridge company’s ability to obtain new financing may be diminished. Actions against the bridge company and its assets are not stayed under FIBA. As a result, when repo lenders and other counterparties require post-transfer haircuts and margin payments, and the bridge company is unable to obtain new funding, the run on repo and derivatives will continue.
The text of FIBA is available here. My testimony on FIBA before the House Judiciary’s subcommittee is available here. The text of The Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 is available here. The “clean holding company” requirements of TLAC are at 12 CFR § 252.64, and the TLAC final rule release is available here.
By Kose John (New York University & Temple University), Mahsa S. Kaviani (Temple University), Lawrence Kryzanowski (Concordia University), and Hosein Maleki (Temple University)
In this study, we document that the strength of creditor protection influences corporate debt structures. Using data from 46 countries, we find that managers choose more concentrated debt structures and use more bank debt relative to other debt types in countries with better creditor rights protection. The choice of more concentrated debt structures in the face stronger creditor rights is made for two main reasons.
First, more concentrated debt structures increase the probability that a firm can successfully renegotiate distressed debt with its creditors. Therefore, concentrated debt structures can reduce expected bankruptcy costs.
Second, better creditor protection reduces the creditors’ monitoring incentives. The managers can form more concentrated debt structures to boost the monitoring incentives of creditors when creditor rights are strong. This monitoring is beneficial for the firm, as it results in higher firm value by reducing the problem of risk shifting (investment in high-risk, negative net present value projects by managers when a firm has risky debt outstanding).
We confirm our cross-country findings in a difference-in-difference analysis of corporate debt structure’s response to creditor rights reforms in Brazil, France, Italy, and Spain. The results are robust to various controls, alternative dependent variables, endogeneity concerns, and alternative estimation methods. Our sample consists of 25,700 unique firms and spans from 2001 to 2014.
The full article is available here.