Genco: Dry Bulk Shipping Valuations No Longer Anchored to Discounted Cash Flow Method

posted in: Valuation | 0

By Gabriel A. Morgan, Weil Gotshal LLP

PITCH_Morgan_Gabriel_22091Discounted cash flow analysis is a mainstay among the valuation methodologies used by restructuring professionals and bankruptcy courts to determine the enterprise value of a distressed business. Despite its prevalence, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently concluded that the DCF method was inappropriate for the valuation of dry bulk shipping companies. In In re Genco Shipping & Trading Limited, Case No. 14-11108 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July  2, 2014), the bankruptcy court explained that the DCF method is of limited use when projections of future cash flows are unreliable or difficult to ascertain.  The bankruptcy court then found that accurate cash flow projections did not exist for Genco because dry bulk shipping rates are difficult to forecast due to the volatile nature of the dry bulk shipping market.  Interestingly, the bankruptcy court concluded not just that accurate projections were unobtainable in the case of Genco, specifically, but also for dry bulk shippers, generally.  The bankruptcy court observed that the DCF method is inappropriate for the dry bulk shipping market because it is volatile and highly fragmented, has low barriers to entry, and little differentiation exists among competitors, causing charter rates to fluctuate with supply and demand and making revenues unpredictable.  Although the bankruptcy court merely applied existing law to the facts of the case, the decision in Genco could serve as precedent for the valuation of companies in other segments of the shipping industry, and other industries, that experience significant volatility in rates.

The full discussion can be found here.

Emerging Economies and Cross-Border Insolvency Regimes: Missing BRICs in the International Insolvency Architecture

By Steven T. Kargman, President, Kargman Associates

SK-Roslyn (July '14) (1) Many of the world’s major advanced economies are subject to some form of cross-border insolvency regime, such as Chapter 15 in the United States. However, despite this clear and important progress in the adoption of cross-border insolvency regimes among many advanced economies, there appears to be a glaring gap in the international insolvency architecture. Specifically, very few of the major emerging economies – and, in particular, none of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) – have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency or otherwise enacted effective alternative regimes for handling cross-border insolvencies.

With their growing integration into the global economy, these emerging economies may face a rising number of cross-border insolvencies at some point in the coming years. Nonetheless, while the current absence of cross-border insolvency regimes in major emerging economies may not represent an immediate problem in the next few years, it may pose challenges for the international insolvency framework over the longer term given that these economies are playing an increasingly important role in the global economy.

This two-part article, originally published in 2012-2013 in Insolvency and Restructuring International, reviewed the status of the adoption among major emerging economies of comprehensive insolvency regimes along the lines of the UNCITRAL Model Law and outlined possible pathways that emerging economies might pursue that could lead to the adoption of such cross-border insolvency regimes in these jurisdictions. The article also explored intermediate steps that emerging economies might adopt as a means of growing more comfortable with the concepts that are central to any meaningful cross-border insolvency regime.  Such intermediate steps might serve to pave the way ultimately for the adoption by these emerging market jurisdictions of a more comprehensive cross-border insolvency regime.

Part I of the article (September 2012) can be found here and Part II (April 2013) can be found here.  (This article was first published in Insolvency and Restructuring International, Vol. 6 No. 2, September 2012 and Vol. 7 No. 1, April 2013, and is reproduced with the kind permission of the International Bar Association, London, UK © International Bar Association.)

Mind the Gap: Supreme Court Partially Resolves Procedural Uncertainty Created by Stern v. Marshall

By Paul Hessler, Aaron Javian, and Robert Trust, Linklaters LLP

On June 9, 2014, in a highly anticipated decision Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, Chapter 7 Trustee of Estate of Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court partially resolved the procedural uncertainty created by the Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall. In Stern, the Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 157, which in relevant part defines certain matters as “core” or “non-core,” and authorizes bankruptcy courts to finally adjudicate “core” matters, but only to issue findings and conclusions subject to de novo review in “non-core” matters. The Stern Court held that Article III of the U.S. Constitution prohibits Congress from vesting bankruptcy judges with the authority to finally adjudicate certain claims that it had statutorily designated as Javian, AaronLinklaters LLP“core,” such as state law avoidance claims. The Stern Court did not, however, address how bankruptcy courts should proceed in such cases. The Supreme Court considered that procedural question in Executive Benefits and held that with respect to “core” claims that a bankruptcy judge is statutorily authorized but prohibited from finally adjudicating as a constitutional matter, the courts should deal with such claims as they would in “non-core” proceedings; that is, by issuing findings and conclusions subject to de novo review by district courts.

The Supreme Court’s holding makes clear that a wide-range of bankruptcy-related disputes that were previously heard and decided by bankruptcy courts must now be submitted for de novo review by district Trust, RobertLinklaters LLPcourts. This additional layer of judicial involvement could make bankruptcy litigation more cumbersome and casts doubt on the well-established expectation of the bankruptcy court system as the single, consolidated venue for adjudication of all matters related to a debtor’s bankruptcy case. Importantly, the Supreme Court did not decide, and it remains to be seen, whether parties can consent to a bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of core matters that otherwise fall outside of a bankruptcy court’s constitutional authority under Stern. The full memo can be read here.

Revisiting the Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts

posted in: Workouts and Pre-Packs | 0

Author: Carlos Berdejó, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles

Economic theory suggests that corporate law should enable parties to contract freely in order to promote their best interests, leading to socially optimal arrangements.  This is particularly true for corporate bonds, which are governed by detailed indentures and held by large, sophisticated investors.  However, the Trust Indenture Act, which for 75 years has regulated the terms of U.S. public corporate debt, contains numerous mandatory rules, including a prohibition on collective action clauses (CACs).  A CAC allows a qualifying majority of bondholders to modify the interest rate, maturity and principal of an outstanding bond issue in a manner that binds all bondholders, including those who may prefer to hold-out to extract a larger payment.  This longstanding prohibition limits the ability of firms to restructure their debt via private workouts and can exacerbate the costs of financial distress by unnecessarily forcing issuers into bankruptcy.  Most countries other than the U.S. do not prohibit CACs and afford parties flexibility in choosing the qualifying majority that may amend the core terms of a bond issue.

My article, Revisiting the Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, examines contracting choices in Brazil, Chile and Germany, countries that have recently enacted reforms affecting their bond markets, including changes in restrictions on CACs.  I find that not only do market participants embrace increased flexibility with respect to CACs, but that interest rates decrease as a result, lowering the cost of capital for issuers.

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[Related Work Note: The work in Revisiting the Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts provides evidence relating to the argument made in Mark Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 Yale L.J. 232 (1987), that the prohibition unwisely impeded out-of-bankruptcy recapitalizations and channeled some parties’ incentives towards coercive restructurings that would not have been needed if straight-forward votes were allowed.  That article can be found here.  More generally, academic bankruptcy theory has focused on the extent to which contract terms should be respected by law, inside and outside of bankruptcy.  See Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J. of L. & Econ. 595 (1993), available here.  –Stephen Adams, Editor]