Financial Experts in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies: Unique Situations from Common Assignments

By Allyn Needham, Shipp, Needham & Durham, LLC

needhamWhen disagreements arise in Chapter 11 bankruptcies, debtor and/or creditors’ counsel may seek financial experts to provide information relative to their positions. While engagements of economic experts may cover a broad spectrum of analyses, these engagements generally fall into two areas: determining the appropriate interest rate for the repayment of a secured claim and the liquidation and/or fair market value of certain assets or the bankrupt business as a whole.

The assessment of interest rates and appraising the value of a business are assignments not limited to bankruptcy work alone. Most financial experts are familiar with the methods required to perform these tasks. However, even in the application of these basic analyses, Chapter 11 bankruptcy may present unusual assignments.

This article discusses two unique situations that may arise from common assignments. The first is the application of the cramdown interest rate model when a creditor makes an 1111(b) election. An 1111(b) election allows an under secured creditor to be paid its total allowed claim (both secured and unsecured). This impacts the interest rate and its application toward retirement of the claim. The second considers the concept that the “highest bidder may not be the best bidder” when selling a bankrupt business. The best bid may not be the highest bid due to differing prices, terms, contingencies and impact on the local economy (e.g. closing a business or location) in the competing bids.

To read the full article see here.

Bankruptcy Code With No Repo Safe Harbor — An Evaluation

By Jeffrey Murphy and Lee Smith of Dentons

The ABI Reform Commission recommended that the safe harbors under Section 555 and 559 of the Code be revised to return to their pre-2005 contours and, specifically, that the safe harbors exclude mortgage warehousing, which is a short-term revolving credit facility extended by a financial institution to the loan originator. We believe that excluding mortgage warehousing transactions from the safe harbors will increase “contagion risk” and also reject the Commission’s assertion that mortgages, in comparison with other safe-harbored asset types, are “illiquid” investments based upon our experience with mortgage loan trading.  The largest banks, and ever increasingly, the largest investment funds, are major participants in the mortgage markets as originators, buyers, and market makers (the same cannot be said of, say, municipal bonds), and the financial crisis started with a subset of the mortgage markets: subprime mortgages.

We are not persuaded that repo financing contributed to the excesses of the credit boom of the mid-2000s, nor do we believe that the Bankruptcy Code safe harbors for the liquidation, termination or acceleration of repurchase agreements are to be indicted for causing “runs” on debtors that knowledgeable market actors will not restructure.  To the contrary, mortgage repos are a crucial component of healthy housing markets, and fairness requires that debtors relieved of their margin call obligations by a bankruptcy filing not have options to satisfy their obligations while the repo buyers are exposed to all the market risk.

For our full analysis of the ABI recommendation, please see here.

A New Fulcrum Point for City Survival

posted in: Municipal Bankruptcy | 0

By Samir D. Parikh, Lewis & Clark Law School

ParikhMunicipalities face daunting fiscal challenges that threaten debt repayment and undermine basic service delivery.  Policymakers and scholars have struggled to formulate meaningful restructuring options.  Up to this point, the literature has focused on federal bankruptcy law and the options available under Chapter 9.  But this resource-draining process is not the fulcrum point for any meaningful solution.  Indeed, for the vast majority of distressed municipalities, the lever of municipal recovery will not turn based on the solutions that have to date been offered.

In an article forthcoming in the 2015 William & Mary Law Review, I attempt to radically shift the municipal recovery debate by arguing that state law is the centralized point at which officials can exert the necessary amount of pressure to gain concessions from key creditor constituencies.  I propose a comprehensive system that (i) identifies pressured municipalities at a time where measured adjustments are sufficient to create sustainable viability, and (ii) shepherds distressed municipalities through a dynamic negotiation structure in an effort to capture Chapter 9’s primary benefits without the costs, inefficiencies, and constitutional quandaries.  Animating this proposal is a more nuanced understanding of the Contracts Clause that allows a municipality to explore unilateral contract modification in an effort to facilitate consensual agreements with creditor constituencies.

My proposal offers systemic rehabilitation at a time when a new approach is desperately needed.  The full version of the article is available here.

For previous posts on Municipal Bankruptcy see here and here.

A Constitutional Review of the Draft ‘Macron’ Law Introducing Shareholder Eviction under French Law: The Revolution that Didn’t Happen

By Sophie Vermeille, Jérémy Martinez & Frank-Adrien Papon

In a politically controversial attempt to modernize the French economy, French Minister of the Economy Emmanuel Macron had passed a sweeping law earlier this year, reforming many areas of French business law, including bankruptcy law.  For the first time under French law shareholder removal from decisionmaking will be available for decisions affecting the future of a distressed company.  This law is a step in the right direction to force shareholders to absorb the company’s losses and allow new shareholders to invest fresh money.

Unfortunately, the French government failed to use modern, world-class economic standards to govern a shareholder removal under the new law.  First, by retaining an antiquated trigger of liquidity crisis instead of actual insolvency, the law fails to consider the enterprise value of the company as the proper economic basis to recognize that shares have become worthless, an essential element to provide legitimacy for their removal.   Second, by requiring that a judge justify their removal by finding a “public necessity” to avoid a risk of “serious loss to the economy”, the law offers a weak constitutional safeguard for property rights, a loosely defined public interest standard, and little guidance for a judge to avoid arbitrary decisions and political pressure. This lack of economic and conceptual basis has unfortunately transformed a genuinely potentially useful attempt to reform French law into an inadequate and possibly even unconstitutional new law.

To read the full article see here.

Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain

posted in: Cramdown and Priority | 0

Editor’s Note:  Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, by Mark Roe and Fred Tung, was selected as one of the ten Best Corporate and Securities Articles of 2014. This “10-best” list reflects the choices of academic teachers in this area from more than 560 articles published last year. The article was the subject of a Bankruptcy Roundtable post on April 8, 2014 at its time of publication. It was the only bankruptcy-based article on the “10-best” list. That list can be found here.

By Mark Roe, Harvard Law School, and Frederick Tung, Boston University School of Law

Roe 124tungprofileIn “Breaking Bankruptcy Priority:  How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain,” recently published in the Virginia Law Review, we question the stability of bankruptcy’s priority structure. Bankruptcy scholarship has long conceptualized bankruptcy’s reallocation of value as a hypothetical bargain among creditors: creditors agree in advance that if the firm falters, value will be reallocated according to a fixed set of statutory and agreed-to contractual priorities.

In “Breaking Priority,” we propose an alternative view. No hypothetical bargain among creditors is ever fully fixed because creditors continually seek to alter the priority rules, pursuing categorical rule changes to jump ahead of competing creditors. These moves are often successful, so creditors must continually adjust to other creditors’ successful jumps. Because priority is always up for grabs, bankruptcy should be reconceptualized as an ongoing rent-seeking contest, fought in a three-ring arena of transactional innovation, doctrinal change, and legislative trumps.

We highlight a number of recent and historical priority jumps. We explain how priority jumping interacts with finance theory and how it should lead us to view bankruptcy as a dynamic process. Breaking priority, reestablishing it, and adapting to new priorities is part of the normal science of Chapter 11 reorganization, where bankruptcy lawyers and judges expend a large part of their time and energy. While a given jump’s end-state (when a new priority is firmly established) may sometimes be efficient, bankruptcy rent-seeking overall has significant pathologies and inefficiencies.

The paper is available here.

A Third Way: Examiners As Inquisitors

By Daniel J. Bussel, UCLA School of Law

BusselThere is a buzz concerning bankruptcy examiners. Recently in such cases as ResCap, Dynegy and Tribune, and perhaps now in Caesars, examiners have played a decisive role in resolving major Chapter 11 cases involving avoiding power claims.

“Litigate or settle” is the dispute resolution choice generally available in US bankruptcy courts. But there is another way: An inquisitorial model of justice in which an active and informed neutral investigates the facts and then assesses and applies the law to resolve a legal dispute. Chapter 11 examiners are peculiarly suited to introduce this inquisitorial process into a Chapter 11 case. In particular, Ken Klee, serving as examiner in the Tribune case, and a series of post-Tribune investigations show that inquisitorial methods make sense in certain large bankruptcy cases involving complex legal disputes (rather than financial or operational problems). Indeed Tribune and its progeny suggest that the inquisitorial experiment has already begun.

A Third Way: Examiners As Inquisitors looks at examiner methodologies in Tribune and the few post-Tribune examiner cases. It assesses the method’s comparative advantages (fact-finding accuracy, nonpartisan experts, freedom from artificial evidentiary constraints, transparency and legitimacy) and disadvantages (lack of finality, expense, delay, risks to reorganization efforts, risk of overzealousness, due process concerns) and suggests that in the absence of a countervailing business exigency demanding exclusive focus on reorganization, the Tribune model may offer a superior alternative for resolving contested avoidance claims. Indeed, large Chapter 11 cases may be an ideal proving ground for inquisitorial methods more broadly.

For more see A Third Way: Examiners As Inquisitors, 90 Am. Bankr. L. J. __ (forthcoming 2016), available here.

Bankruptcy Examiners in Chapter 11

By Jonathan C. Lipson, Temple University—Beasley School of Law, and Christopher Fiore Marotta, KPMG

Lipson MarottaBankruptcy examiners have long been a controversial feature of chapter 11—and remain so in recent cases such as Caesars Entertainment. Section 1104 of the Bankruptcy Code requires one if sought in large cases ($5 million+ in debt) or if “in the interests of creditors.” Congress created the position as a check on the reorganization process, since neither the SEC nor trustees typically provide oversight. Yet, system participants grouse about their costs and potential to disrupt negotiations. The ABI’s reform proposal would eliminate them.

In a recent paper, we study their use in a sample of 1225 chapter 11 cases from 1991-2010. We find that, despite the Code’s “mandatory” language, examiners are exceedingly rare, being sought in about 9% and appointed in 4% of cases. About half were very large cases, with far more than $5 million in debt, so most requests should have been granted—but they weren’t. The factors that Congress thought should matter most—such as fraud or incompetence—don’t.

What predicts whether an examiner will be appointed? Timing and location: an early request in a case outside Delaware is nearly twice as likely to be granted than otherwise. Yet, contrary to conventional wisdom, we also find that examiners correlate to better outcomes, including in post-bankruptcy earnings and headcounts.

We explain why examiners are so rare, and suggest a way to use them more frequently and economically.

For the full article see here.

Supreme Court Permits Bankruptcy Courts to Issue Final Judgments with Parties’ Consent

By Harold S. Novikoff, Douglas K. Mayer, Ian Boczko, Emil A. Kleinhaus, and Alexander B. Lees of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz

The Supreme Court’s latest decision regarding the power of bankruptcy judges to resolve claims between bankruptcy estates and their creditors is Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, handed down on May 26, 2015. In its landmark 2011 ruling in Stern v. Marshall, the Court held that bankruptcy judges have limited authority under Article III of the Constitution to determine claims asserted by an estate against creditors. However, Stern left open the question, which has split lower courts, whether parties can nonetheless consent to bankruptcy court adjudication. In Wellness, the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy litigants may waive Article III rights, and suggested that parties may forfeit untimely objections to a bankruptcy court’s lack of authority.

For a fuller analysis and summary, click here for our memo on Wellness.

Restructuring Failed Financial Firms in Bankruptcy: Selling Lehman’s Derivatives Portfolio

By Mark J. Roe, Harvard Law School, and Stephen D. Adams, Ropes & Gray LLP

adams-stephen-200 Roe 124Lehman Brothers’ failure and bankruptcy led to the deepest part of the 2008 financial crisis. Yet, while Congress reformed financial regulation in hopes of avoiding another crisis, bankruptcy rules, such as those that governed Lehman’s failure, have persisted unchanged. When Lehman failed, it lost perhaps tens of billions of dollars of further value when its contracting counterparties terminated their financial contracts with Lehman.

Bankruptcy must be able to market salable parts of the failed institution’s financial contracts portfolio at other-than-fire-sale prices. Current law prevents this marketing, however. It allows only two polar choices: sell the entire portfolio intact (currently impossible in bankruptcy and only narrowly viable under Dodd-Frank) or allow for the liquidation of each contract, one-by-one (which worked poorly in Lehman). Bankruptcy needs authority, first, to preserve the failed firm’s overall portfolio value, and, second, to break up and sell along product lines a very large portfolio that is too large to sell intact.

Congress and the regulators favor bankruptcy for financial resolution. Yet, bankruptcy law has neither been fixed nor even updated here since the financial crisis. We here outline one critically needed fix: authorizing bankruptcy to break up a large derivatives portfolio by selling its constituent product lines, one-by-one, instead of a Lehman-style close-out of each contract, one-by-one.

This article is forthcoming in 32 Yale Journal on Regulation. A full draft of the article can be found here.

For related pieces discussing safe harbors, see here and here.

Chapter 15 Recognition in the United States: Is a Debtor “Presence” Required?

By Daniel M. Glosband, Goodwin Procter LLP, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The University of Texas School of Law

Glosband_M_Daniel WestbrookIn a recent case, In re Barnet, 737 F. 3d 238 (2d Cir. 2013), the Court held that section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code bars a foreign bankruptcy proceeding from recognition under Chapter 15 unless the debtor in the foreign proceeding also has a presence in the United States. The Court professed to use a plain meaning rule, but its plain meaning approach and its conclusion that section 109(a) applied to recognition were inappropriate for several reasons:

1) since the term “debtor”  is defined differently in Chapter 15 than in section 101(13), it cannot have a “plain” meaning for Chapter 15 purposes;

2) while it is plain that section 103(a) applies Chapter 1 to Chapter 15, the way in which section 109(a) functions in relation to Chapter 15 is not straightforward and requires a structural analysis that the Court sidestepped;  and

3) the Congressional mandate in section 1508—which requires that, in interpreting Chapter 15, courts shall consider its international origin and the need to promote an application that is consistent with the needs of international insolvency practice—requires flexibility, not rigid literalism.

Section 109(a) should not apply to recognition of a foreign proceeding. The Barnet decision represents a stubborn adherence to literal statutory interpretation when the statutory provisions at issue prima facie were not susceptible to literal interpretation and when Congress instructed courts to look beyond the statute for guidance in harmonizing Chapter 15 with the Model Law.

This is a brief summary of a much longer article forthcoming in the International Insolvency Review. For the full article see here. Copyright © 2015 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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