Insider Trading: Are Insolvent Firms Different?

By Andrew Verstein (Wake Forest University School of Law)

Are insolvent firms different from solvent firms with respect to insider trading law and policy? One difference is the level of regulation of trading in the residual claims of the firm. In solvent firms, the residual claims are equity securities, and equity securities are subject to the full ambit of trading restrictions. In insolvent firms, non-equity claims are typically residual claims that are subject to less stringent regulation precisely because they are not equity and they may not even be securities. As a result, insider trading regulations apply with lesser force to the most economically significant and informationally-sensitive interests in an insolvent company. Insolvency is therefore deregulatory.

While insolvency deregulates, it also expands the reach of other aspects of federal insider trading law. That is because bankruptcy law creates new roles and new duties. Since insider trading law hinges on duties, these new relationships expand the coverage of insider trading restrictions.

I consider these tradeoffs in a forthcoming article, and I offer two tentative conclusions.  

First, we should not rush to close the “loopholes” in insider trading law that open with regards to the residual claims. Deregulating insider trading is a Faustian bargain—greater price accuracy at the risk of lesser liquidity, fairness, and managerial integrity—but we should be more willing to accept the bargain with respect to insolvent firms than solvent ones.

Second, we should be solicitous of efforts to shield members of creditors’ committees from extensive insider trading regulation because these creditors occupy a position without analogue in the solvent firm: they both receive and contribute material, nonpublic information. Traditional insider trading law theory may not have the resources to manage a two-way flow of information, requiring new and accommodating thought.

The full article is available here.

Three Provocative Business Bankruptcy Decisions of 2018

By Michael L. Cook (Schulte, Roth & Zabel LLP).

The appellate courts have issued at least three provocative, if not questionable, business bankruptcy decisions in the past six months.

Lakeridge:  In March, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court avoided the substantive merits of a 2016 split decision by the Ninth Circuit that had permitted a Chapter 11 debtor to manipulate the reorganization plan process.  Despite the Court’s narrow holding approving the Ninth Circuit’s “clear error” standard for reviewing a bankruptcy court’s fact findings, four Justices wrote two separate opinions challenging the Court’s limited review of the Ninth Circuit’s stunning decision in the face of a powerful dissent.

In re Anderson:  The Second Circuit, on March 7, 2018, held that an asserted bankruptcy discharge violation was not arbitrable due to a conflict between the Federal Arbitration Act and the Bankruptcy Code.  Two months later, though, the Supreme Court stressed that it had rejected every effort to “conjure” conflicts between the Arbitration Act and a raft of other Federal statutes.

In re Temptnology:  the First Circuit, on January 12, 2018, in a split decision, wiped out the rights of a trademark licensee, explicitly rejecting a 2012 decision by the Seventh Circuit.  The First Circuit’s majority opinion relied on a heavily criticized 1985 Fourth Circuit decision, premising its  holding on the primacy of Federal bankruptcy law over Federal trademark law and distinguishing between a statutory breach and a common law breach.

The losing parties in the First and Second Circuit cases filed petitions for certiorari in June, 2018.  Given the Circuit split in one case and the later Supreme Court arbitration ruling in the other, both cases warrant Supreme Court review.

The full article is available here.


We at the Bankruptcy Roundtable will take a break from posting this August and hope that you too will be able to get away from your desk at work. We’ll be back after Labor Day.

Insider Status and U.S. Bank v. Village at Lakeridge

By Ronit J. Berkovich and David Li (Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP).

The U.S. Supreme Court, in U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. ___ (2018), offered plenty of hints on an important topic while simultaneously ruling very little about it.  In chapter 11, whether a creditor qualifies as an “insider” can have enormous implications on a range of issues, including plan confirmation, fraudulent transfer and preference analyses, and severance payment and employee incentive/retention plan (KEIP/KERP) approvals.  Lakeridge involved a dispute as to whether the bankruptcy court properly determined in confirming a plan that the sole impaired accepting creditor (the romantic partner of one of the debtor’s officers) was not a “non-statutory” insider.  If the creditor actually were such an insider, then the chapter 11 plan should not have been confirmed.

In granting cert to hear the case, the Supreme Court expressly declined the opportunity to address whether the Ninth Circuit articulated the correct legal test to determine if a person qualifies as a non-statutory insider.  Instead, the Supreme Court granted cert only to answer the narrow question of whether the Ninth Circuit applied the correct standard of review to the lower court’s determination.  Justice Kagan, writing for the Court, kept to that script by simply affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision to apply a clear error standard of review.  Concurrences by Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor, however, each acknowledged shortcomings in the legal test the Ninth Circuit applied and each appeared to invite lower courts to consider alternative approaches.  As a whole, Lakeridge provides little binding guidance, and practitioners can expect further development in non-statutory insider law by the Courts of Appeals.

The article is available here.