Loan to Bond Substitution: An Empirical Analysis on the Functioning of the Substitution Channel for Eurozone Firms

By Francesco Ruggiero (University of Naples Federico II)

This paper contributes to the literature by enhancing the understanding of the link between bank debt and bond market debt in the Eurozone. This implication is particularly important for small firms that usually rely heavily on bank loans, and are likely to be excluded from the credit market during crises. In this paper, I find that firms based in the Eurozone can substitute bonds for loans in response to changing credit conditions. But the substitution is only partial, and firms will end up raising less funds than needed. Despite the bank centric feature of the European financial market that encourages firms to rely a lot on bank loans, bonds still serve as a substitute to loans. Firms in the Eurozone choose to substitute bonds for loans especially in periods in which the banking sector is in distress or the central bank implements policies to enhance credit.

The comparison with the U.S. firms (provided as benchmark) requires an in-depth analysis on the relative roles of the banking system and the financial market in Europe and the U.S. The divergence in results might indicate that policies enacted by the Fed in the U.S. might not be the best fit for European system. European Central Bank (“ECB”)  should thus tackle similar problems differently. In principle, the central bank’s expansive monetary policies should have affected bank lending positively as well. The reason why it did not work as expected along this transmission channel is that  the banks tend to hoard extra liquidity received from the ECB to deal with potential  sudden shortages in the future.

The full article is available here.

 

 

Courts As Institutional Reformers: Bankruptcy and Public Law Litigation

Kathleen G. Noonan (University of Pennsylvania), Jonathan C. Lipson (Temple University—Beasley School of Law), and William H. Simon (Columbia Law School)

Wags sometimes ask: What is chapter 11 good for?

In a new paper, we show that, among other things, it provides a template that both legitimates and explicates Public Law Litigation (PLL), civil class action suits against public agencies such as police departments and prison systems. These are among the most controversial disputes that courts face; often criticized, and widely misunderstood. Analogies to chapter 11 practice show how critics err, and how PLL works.

We make three basic points. First, we show that both bankruptcy and PLL, which share roots in the federal equity receivership, are judicial responses to collective action problems that other institutional mechanisms (e.g., markets or electoral politics) cannot or will not address.

Second, we show that courts in neither context “run” the organizations in question. In both types of case, management (of the debtor or agency) remains in possession and control, subject to judicial and stakeholder (e.g., creditor or plaintiff) oversight.

Third, chapter 11 and PLL both operate at the organizational level, through “restructuring.” For chapter 11, this will usually involve a plan of reorganization. The PLL analogue is a settlement agreement in a consent decree. Like plans, consent decrees typically reflect negotiated improvements in operations designed to increase the agency’s chances of success.

Critics of PLL sometimes claim that courts commandeer public instrumentalities, exceeding their expertise and authority. But this is no truer in PLL than it is in chapter 11 reorganization. Rather, judges in both spheres facilitate consensual resolutions that seek to balance stakeholder participation against managerial discretion.

This matters because the Trump Administration has vowed to “deconstruct the administrative state,” which implies a reduction in the amount and quality of public services. Increased PLL would be a plausible response.

If that happens, courts should focus not on whether they can supervise the restructuring of public agencies, but how to do so more effectively. We show that the chapter 11 system can provide helpful guidance.

The full article is available here.

Justice Scalia’s Bankruptcy Jurisprudence: The Right Judicial Philosophy for the Modern Bankruptcy Code?

By Megan McDermott (Lecturer, University of Wisconsin School of Law).

The late Justice Scalia is best known among mainstream audiences for his originalist approach to the Constitution, as well as his polarizing views on various civil rights issues. But anyone who has cracked open a bankruptcy casebook also knows Justice Scalia for his many contributions to the bankruptcy field — both through sturdy majority opinions in interpretive cases like Timbers, Nextwave, and Radlax, and through his biting dissents and concurrences in watershed decisions like Dewsnup and Stern.

My recent article, Justice Scalia’s Bankruptcy Jurisprudence: The Right Judicial Philosophy for the Modern Bankruptcy Code?, seeks to both quantify and qualify Justice Scalia’s contributions to bankruptcy law. I show that during his three decades on the Court, Justice Scalia wrote in more bankruptcy cases than any other justice (followed closely by Justices Stevens and Thomas).

I also identify four predominant themes that emerge from Justice Scalia’s bankruptcy oeuvre: (1) a holistic approach to the Bankruptcy Code; (2) a commitment to textualism, regardless of outcome; (3) disdain for legislative history; and (4) a desire for clear boundaries regarding the scope and authority of bankruptcy courts.

Finally, the article explores the impact of his jurisprudential legacy on the bankruptcy field. Of particular note are the ways in which Justice Scalia’s approach often favored ordinary consumers over creditor interests. I conclude that while Justice Scalia did not always live up to the ideals that he advocated, he nonetheless offered a unifying vision that fits well with both the purpose and the design of the Bankruptcy Code.

The full article is available here.