Cram-down interest rates in controversy

posted in: Cramdown and Priority, Valuation | 0

By Maxwell Tucker of Squire Patton Boggs

The correct method to determine the adequacy of the “cram-down” interest rate offered under a contested Chapter 11 plan remains subject to debate.  Most bankruptcy courts first cite the “prime plus” formula set forth in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004)(plurality opinion), then refer to various risk factors that may require an upward adjustment from the prime rate.

The recent bankruptcy court opinion issued in In re Couture Hotel Corporation, found in my blog post linked here, provides an excellent roadmap for parties contesting cram-down interest rates.  The debtor’s Chapter 11 plan proposed to repay the loan with principal and interest amortized over thirty (30) years, and proposed that interest shall accrue at the rate of 4.25% interest per annum.  The lender objected to the plan, contending that an interest rate in excess of 10% was required.  Both parties offered expert testimony in support of their contentions.

For reasons explained in the opinion, the bankruptcy court disagreed with each expert’s testimony.  The sixty-two page Couture Hotel opinion, rich in fact findings, provides detailed reasons for the court’s rejection of the respective experts’ risk adjustments, while refraining from giving an advisory opinion as to what interest rate would be adequate.

New AIRA Standards on Distressed Business Valuation

posted in: Valuation | 0

By Michael D. Pakter, Gould & Pakter Associates, LLC

Michael_D._PakterGiven the increasing number of professionals who are performing business valuation engagements, the Association of Insolvency & Restructuring Advisors approved Standards for Distressed Business Valuation (“AIRA Standards”), effective March 1, 2014, to improve the consistency and quality of practice among its members.

In Part 1 of a 2 part article, the author submits that the selection of applicable valuation standards is impacted by the valuation analyst’s professional certifications, his or her association memberships and credentialing, the asset, business, or interest being valued and the applicable forum. The author provides an overview of the AIRA Standards on distressed business valuations and shares views on what standards business valuation professionals should consider in a distressed business valuation engagement.

In Part 2 of the 2 part article, the author discusses some of the unique issues regarding valuations of distressed businesses relating to engagement development, procedural steps in the business valuation engagement, and generally accepted valuation approaches. The AIRA Standards note that traditional valuation methods may require significant adjustments to reflect the unique financial or operating issues associated with a firm in distress, the legal context of the valuation and the intended purpose of the valuation.

The author concludes that despite the widespread use by business valuation analysts of a specific company risk premium in a “build­up” or “capital asset pricing model” there remains limited academic research on quantification of specific company risk premiums, which generally remains in the realm of the financial analyst’s judgment.

To read the full article see Part 1 and Part 2.

The Weakest Link in Intercreditor Agreements Breaks Again in Momentive

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By Lawrence Safran, Mitchell A. Seider, Keith A. Simon, and Adam J. Goldberg of Latham & Watkins LLP

Intercreditor agreements among secured creditors with respect to common collateral are often limited to lien subordination, as opposed to claim subordination. The agreement governs each secured creditor’s rights over the common collateral, without imposing claim subordination, which would require junior creditors to subordinate their claims and turn over all of their recoveries, whether or not derived from proceeds of collateral. Intercreditor agreements that provide only for lien subordination typically include a reservation of rights for junior creditors to retain all of their rights as unsecured creditors; however, the formulation of this reservation varies from agreement to agreement, and the exact language used can be critical in a court’s analysis.

The recent decision in In re MPM Silicones, LLC, Case No. 14-22503 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (Momentive) reflects the emerging trend of courts to narrowly interpret restrictions on junior creditors in these intercreditor agreements, where the restrictions are ancillary to the distribution of the common collateral’s value. In Momentive, the Bankruptcy Court found that the general reservation of rights as unsecured creditors serves to “ameliorate obligations that [junior secured creditors have] undertaken elsewhere in the agreement.”

This article explores recent case law arising from disputes over intercreditor agreements before bankruptcy courts, the issues and rulings in Momentive, and lessons that market participants should draw from the decision.

To read more, click here.

Bankruptcy Court Approves Non-Market Cramdown Rate on Momentive Secured Creditors

posted in: Valuation | 0

By Adam C. Harris and Karen S. Park of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP

A recent decision from the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York provides guidance on the “fair and equitable” requirement as it relates to secured creditors in a so-called “cramdown plan.” Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides the means by which a Chapter 11 debtor may obtain confirmation of a plan of reorganization over the objection of a dissenting class of creditors, including secured creditors.  To cram down a plan on a class of secured creditors, the plan must be “fair and equitable” to that class.  One way to meet the “fair and equitable” requirement is to provide that the secured creditors retain their liens and receive deferred cash payments having a present value equal to the allowed amount of their secured claims.

In In re MPM Silcones LLC, 2014 WL 4436335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), the Bankruptcy Court held that the interest rates on secured claims in a “fair and equitable plan” should be derived using a formula that starts with a “risk free” Treasury rate for similar duration instruments, and adds a risk premium generally in the range of 1%-3%.  Importantly, the Bankruptcy Court rejected the objecting secured credtiors’ arguments that the interest rates should be based on the market, i.e., the rates that would be charged to the same debtor entity for a loan having the same terms and duration by a third party lender.

The Bankruptcy Court’s ruling has been appealed.  If upheld, the decision could have far-reaching implications for distressed debt investors as well as on the availability and pricing of capital for borrowers.

Please find a full-length version of the article here.

A New Risk to Bankruptcy Sales – Unwinding of the Sale Due to a Bad Faith Filing

posted in: Valuation | 0

Authors: Lenard M. Parkins and Karl D. Burrer of Haynes and Boone, LLP

Parkins_Lenny HeadshotBurrer_Karl headshotRecently, the Eleventh Circuit rendered its decision in the Wortley v. Chrispus Venture Capital, LLC case unwinding a four-year old sale order based on a finding that the underlying bankruptcy case was filed in bad faith. The decision injects a new risk for buyers of distressed assets – the potential reversal of a sale order years after the closing of the transaction.

While the Wortley opinion clearly provides that a finding of “bad faith” with respect to the filing of a bankruptcy case can result in its dismissal (even) years later, it is unclear whether the holding requires the unwinding of all sales that transpired prior to dismissal of a bankruptcy case subsequently deemed to have been filed in bad faith. As a general matter, a dismissal for a bad-faith filing is a matter of court discretion under section 1112(b) – not a matter of jurisdiction.  Further, section 349 seems to provide that dismissals are not per se intended to unwind sales to good faith purchasers in a bankruptcy case. Accordingly, it can be argued that the Wortley holding should be limited to circumstances in which the purchaser is also the party found to have unclean hands with respect to the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.  Notwithstanding this analysis, the decision will require a new (and potentially amorphous) aspect of diligence for bankruptcy purchasers: the original motivation for the bankruptcy filing.

See here for a more detailed discussion of the Wortley decision.

Genco: Dry Bulk Shipping Valuations No Longer Anchored to Discounted Cash Flow Method

posted in: Valuation | 0

By Gabriel A. Morgan, Weil Gotshal LLP

PITCH_Morgan_Gabriel_22091Discounted cash flow analysis is a mainstay among the valuation methodologies used by restructuring professionals and bankruptcy courts to determine the enterprise value of a distressed business. Despite its prevalence, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently concluded that the DCF method was inappropriate for the valuation of dry bulk shipping companies. In In re Genco Shipping & Trading Limited, Case No. 14-11108 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July  2, 2014), the bankruptcy court explained that the DCF method is of limited use when projections of future cash flows are unreliable or difficult to ascertain.  The bankruptcy court then found that accurate cash flow projections did not exist for Genco because dry bulk shipping rates are difficult to forecast due to the volatile nature of the dry bulk shipping market.  Interestingly, the bankruptcy court concluded not just that accurate projections were unobtainable in the case of Genco, specifically, but also for dry bulk shippers, generally.  The bankruptcy court observed that the DCF method is inappropriate for the dry bulk shipping market because it is volatile and highly fragmented, has low barriers to entry, and little differentiation exists among competitors, causing charter rates to fluctuate with supply and demand and making revenues unpredictable.  Although the bankruptcy court merely applied existing law to the facts of the case, the decision in Genco could serve as precedent for the valuation of companies in other segments of the shipping industry, and other industries, that experience significant volatility in rates.

The full discussion can be found here.

Valuation Methodologies: A Judge’s View

posted in: Valuation | 0

Author: the Hon. Christopher S. Sontchi

There are a variety of methodologies to determine the value of assets that are routinely presented to bankruptcy courts: (i) asset-based valuation, (ii) discounted cash flow or “DCF” valuation, and (iii) relative valuation approaches, which include the “comparable company analysis” and the “comparable transaction analysis.”

This article explains in layman’s terms each of the methodologies and how they are used to reach a conclusion as to value.  An asset based valuation generally calculates the liquidation value of individual assets and aggregates them to arrive at a firm value.  DCF valuation calculates the value of any asset from the present value of expected future cash flows from it, which, in turn, rests on the proposition that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow.  Relative valuation involves the pricing of comparable assets, standardized using a common variable such as earnings, cash flows, book value, or revenues.  The conclusion rests on the selection of the valuation metric, e.g., EBITDA, and the similarity of the companies or transactions used.  The conclusions from each of the methodologies are generally blended to arrive at a conclusion of value.

The article closes by noting that bankruptcy judges have become familiar and comfortable with the DCF, comparable companies and comparable transactions methodologies, which are often referred to as the “standard” methodologies.  Departures from the standard methodologies or how they are calculated must be explained to the judge.

This article was published in the American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review (20 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 1 (2012)) and is available online here.

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