"COULD PROBLEMS AT MF GLOBAL HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED?"

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Could Problems at MF Global Have Been Anticipated?

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As summarized by Heckinger in Till et al. (2018), “on October 31, 2011, the broker–dealer (B/D) and futures commission merchant (FCM) firm of the MF Global Group (i.e., MFG, the group, and all its parts) collapsed, causing substantial financial distress to its customers, many of whom were small investors or hedgers such as farmers, ranchers or commodity merchants such as grain elevator operators. About $1.6 billion of customers’ funds were not immediately available for liquidation proceedings due to the apparent misallocation of customer funds, which were not segregated from firm accounts, and the use of the funds to fund proprietary trading, which resulted in the encumbrance of such funds.”

Four years later, “recovery and distribution actions of the respective bankruptcy trustees and administrators appointed to liquidate the firm made all customers whole, depending on the jurisdiction and particular MFG business entity. Other creditors such as vendors or suppliers of services to MFG received around 95 percent of the value of their claims,” wrote Heckinger in Till et al. (2018).

But back in the Fall of 2011, futures market participants were caught off-guard when MF Global filed for bankruptcy. Essentially, this episode educated industry participants that customer protections in the U.S. commodity futures markets had been more ambiguous than expected. That said, there are a number of reforms that have been undertaken to help prevent future MF Globals.

This article takes the position that a number of red flags existed as far back as 2007, regarding the firm’s financial weakness, which could have served as a warning to those investors relying on MF Global as a fiduciary. In discussing the MF Global debacle, this article will cover the following seven areas: (1) a brief background on the firm will be outlined; (2) warning signs will be identified; (3) the firm’s final week will be recalled; (4) the response of regulators and bankruptcy trustees will be noted; (5) the shortfall in customer segregated funds will be described; (6) the CFTC’s charges and settlement will be mentioned; and (7) later reforms will be summarized.

Background

Before its bankruptcy filing, MF Global Holdings Ltd. provided execution and clearing services for (a) exchange-traded and OTC derivatives products, (b) non-derivative foreign exchange products, and (c) securities in the cash market. Please see Figure 1 on the next page.
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Figure 1
MF Global’s Lines of Businesses

![Diagram based on figure in MF Global (2007), page 33.]

The firm had a worldwide client base of 130,000 accounts and operated in 12 countries on more than 70 exchanges. “Although a niche player on Wall Street, MF Global was a force on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). It had 3 million futures and options positions with a notional value of more than $100 billion. Its customers made up 28 per cent of the trading volume on the CME,” noted Gapper and Kaminska (2011).

Warning Signs

Prior to the firm’s spin-out from its parent company in 2007, MF Global’s business could be characterized as “dull normal.” During the spin-out of MF Global, parent company Man Group burdened MF Global with (arguably) an enormous short-term debt load, relative to the firm’s profitability. We can see how large this debt load was from one of the company’s publicly available financial statements. Please see Figure 2 on the next page.
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Excerpt from MF Global Ltd. Form 10-Q as of December 31, 2007

The spin-out occurred just before the onset of the global financial crisis, making it uncertain throughout 2008 how the firm would be able to refinance its short-term debt. Also because of a rogue trader incident, the firm was in a precarious capital situation. That said, MFG was eventually successful in refinancing its short-term debt by the end of 2008. We can see how weak the firm was relative to other FCM’s from examining data available on the CFTC’s website. From CFTC data, one can examine each FCM’s excess net capital, divided by customer funds. Using this metric, MF Global was the 6th weakest Futures Commission Merchant amongst the 151 competing firms of the time. Please see Figure 3.

Figure 3

Net Excess Regulatory Capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A/O Date</th>
<th>Adjusted Net Capital</th>
<th>Net Capital Requirement</th>
<th>Excess Net Capital</th>
<th>Segregated Funds*</th>
<th>Customers’ Required Excess Net Capital</th>
<th>Excess Net Capital / Customer Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05/31/2007</td>
<td>$811,103,464</td>
<td>$402,913,253</td>
<td>$178,190,211</td>
<td>$8,384,461,426</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06/30/2007</td>
<td>$605,217,511</td>
<td>$364,381,766</td>
<td>$240,835,745</td>
<td>$8,235,565,803</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/31/2007</td>
<td>$535,142,778</td>
<td>$427,261,012</td>
<td>$107,881,766</td>
<td>$9,290,407,496</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/31/2007</td>
<td>$645,473,966</td>
<td>$414,600,708</td>
<td>$230,873,258</td>
<td>$9,889,773,129</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/30/2008</td>
<td>$640,913,963</td>
<td>$509,842,535</td>
<td>$131,071,428</td>
<td>$13,007,347,859</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/31/2008</td>
<td>$771,508,907</td>
<td>$417,502,089</td>
<td>$353,766,818</td>
<td>$9,689,689,771</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/30/2008</td>
<td>$792,290,749</td>
<td>$443,840,666</td>
<td>$338,450,083</td>
<td>$9,684,731,983</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/29/2008</td>
<td>$608,963,888</td>
<td>$456,329,713</td>
<td>$152,634,175</td>
<td>$10,566,911,049</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03/31/2008</td>
<td>$771,508,907</td>
<td>$417,502,089</td>
<td>$353,766,818</td>
<td>$9,689,689,771</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/30/2008</td>
<td>$792,290,749</td>
<td>$443,840,666</td>
<td>$338,450,083</td>
<td>$9,684,731,983</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
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<td>$9,684,731,983</td>
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<td>$10,566,911,049</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>07/31/2008</td>
<td>$771,508,907</td>
<td>$417,502,089</td>
<td>$353,766,818</td>
<td>$9,689,689,771</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/31/2008</td>
<td>$495,665,616</td>
<td>$328,485,943</td>
<td>$167,179,673</td>
<td>$7,270,301,248</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* These figures only include funds “required” to cover margins. As of February 2012, the CFTC now also releases the total assets in customer accounts, according to Prezioso (2012).

** Source: MF Global (2008).
MF Global’s business model became in particular jeopardy, starting in 2008, during the compression of yields available in fixed-income investments. Note the table in Figure 4, which is excerpted from another publicly available MF Global financial statement.

**Figure 4**
An Illustration of MF Global’s Problematic Business Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Dollars in millions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net (loss)/ income attributable to MF Global Holdings Ltd.</td>
<td>$ (81.20)</td>
<td>$ (137.00)</td>
<td>$ (49.10)</td>
<td>$ (69.50)</td>
<td>$ 188.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As a futures commission merchant, the firm had strongly relied on income from the investment of customer collateral for its profitability. A FCM is allowed to credit back to customers only a fraction of the income the FCM earns on customer collateral. The firm was profitable in 2007, but then lost money for the following 4 years. As covered in Till (2013), we can see also how dire the trend was for MF Global’s profitability from the June 4th, 2012 MF Global Inc.’s bankruptcy trustee report. Figure 5 on the next page shows how dramatic the drop-off in interest income for MF Global was as short-term interest rates were set to near zero in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. This chart covers the period, September 2007 through June 2011.
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Figure 5
Drop-Off in Interest Income after the Global Financial Crisis

[Diagram showing interest income and federal funds rate]

Source: Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, Attorneys for James W. Giddens, Trustee for the SIPA Liquidation of MF Global Inc. (2012b), Annex A.

In 2010, MF Global hired Jon Corzine as its CEO. Corzine’s background included a stint as the Chief Executive Office of investment banking and securities firm Goldman Sachs, and four years as the governor of New Jersey, as well as a partial term as U.S. Senator. Nonetheless, in Congressional testimony in December 2011, a few weeks after MF Global went bankrupt, Corzine admitted that he had little expertise or experience in the operational aspects of MF Global (Corzine, 2011). The CEO’s plan was to eventually convert the futures broker into an investment bank, a near impossibility, especially given the firm’s precarious capital situation and troubled business model. Thus, the CEO’s task became how to make the firm profitable as soon as possible.

Corzine devised a strategy to enter into a large-scale, leveraged, proprietary trade on “peripheral” European bond markets in an attempt to ensure the firm’s profitability in the face of a challenging environment for its business model. MF Global’s stated balance sheet exposure to European bond markets became larger than that of the exposure of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley combined, as shown in Figure 6 on the next page.
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**Figure 6**
Stated Sovereign Exposure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Stated Balance Sheet Exposure*</th>
<th>Exposure as a % of Q End Equity</th>
<th>Exposure as a % of Q End Assets</th>
<th>Quarterly VaR Average</th>
<th>VaR as a % of Q End Equity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MF Global (MF)</td>
<td>S6.4 B</td>
<td>460.6%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>$3.0 M</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citigroup (C)</td>
<td>$13.5 B</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>$184 M</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldman Sachs (GS)</td>
<td>$1.9 B</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>$101 M</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferies (JEF)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$12.7 M</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP Morgan (JPM)</td>
<td>$14 B</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>$94 M</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan Stanley (MS)</td>
<td>$2.0 B</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>$145 M</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*as measured under a firm’s internal approach

Source: Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, Attorneys for James W. Giddens, Trustee for the SIPA Liquidation of MF Global Inc. (2012b), p. 89.

The structure of how MF Global was able to enter into this leveraged trade with such little capital is illustrated on the next page in Figure 7, which is drawn from MF Global Holdings Ltd.’s bankruptcy trustee report of April 4th, 2013.
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Figure 7
End-to-End Structure of MF Global’s Euro RTM Transaction

This figure diagrams how MF Global carried out its leveraged European sovereign-debt trades, focusing on the various financing relationships in doing so.


Notes: “MFGI” is an abbreviation for MF Global Inc., “an indirect subsidiary of MF Global Holdings Ltd.”

MFG UK is an abbreviation for MF Global U.K. Limited, which “was the MF Global entity that was a member of the clearinghouses in Europe.”

The “Euro RTMs” were trades in European sovereign debt, which, in turn, were “financed through repurchase to maturity transactions.”

“On the dates MFGI entered into the various Euro RTMs, it recognized a gain in the amount of the difference or spread between (1) the effective interest rate received by MF Global on the debt securities and (2) the repurchase rate (or the financing rate) paid by MF Global to the counterparty. MFG UK recognized a gain in the amount of the markup for its role as counterparty to both MFGI and the clearinghouses. The trades were held by MFGI so that it, rather than MFG UK, bore the risk of default or restructuring of the sovereign debt.

On July 1, 2010, MFGI and MFG UK entered into an investment management agreement related to the Euro RTM trades, which provided that MFG UK would identify market opportunities related to the sovereign debt of certain European governments. Pursuant to this agreement, MFG UK received 80% of the consolidated net revenue of such transactions, while MFGI received 20% of the revenue, held the trades, and took the risk that the sovereigns would default or restructure their debt.”

The financing for purchasing the bonds was done through MF Global’s UK subsidiary. UK law effectively allows more opportunity for leverage by broker-dealers than US law, which is apparently why the transaction was executed in London. The bond trade was also documented in MF Global UK’s Special Administrator report (KPMG, 2011). The rationale for executing this trade was that the interest rate offered by the short-term “peripheral” European bonds was much higher than their financing rate; and
the bonds seemed to be good risks since they were backstopped by the European Financial Stability Facility, which in turn was financed by members of the eurozone. The problem was that MF Global had very little capital to sustain any meaningful mark-to-market fluctuations.

Before the firm’s downward liquidity spiral, the bond trade’s mark-to-market materially improved MF Global’s profitability, as discussed in the MF Global Inc.’s trustee report of June 4th, 2012. But astonishingly, the firm did not have a plan for how to exit these trades if the firm became stressed and would not be able to make margin calls. This particular fact is covered in an MF Global Board of Directors’ presentation from the summer of 2011 that is accessible through the New York Times’ website.

Final Week

At the end of October 2011, in rapid succession, the firm experienced a credit downgrade and announced worst-than-expected earnings, leading investors, clients, and creditors to doubt the sustainability of the firm’s business model. At that point, MF Global rapidly liquidated some of its European bond bet; attempted to meet additional margin calls that resulted from its ratings downgrade; and attempted to meet customer redemptions as clients left the firm en masse.

One interesting question from this case is as follows: how could a seemingly functional firm collapse in a week? This is the type of question that also comes up with the Bear Stearns and Lehman bankruptcies of 2008. Roe (2011) has argued that an aspect of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides the explanation. A bank may choose to provide repo financing for a weak counterparty since the bank is allowed to seize collateral quickly if the weak counterparty goes bankrupt, so the bank does not have to worry about the creditworthiness of the counterparty. Normally when a firm is going bankrupt, creditors cannot immediately seize assets because the effort is to protect the company so that it can reorganize successfully. Once banks lose confidence in a weak financial firm and quickly terminate repo financing, the weak firm spirals quickly into bankruptcy.

A second interesting question from this case is as follows: why in late October 2011 did the firm have worst-than-expected earnings? Its $186.6 million loss during the 3rd quarter of 2011 was its worst ever. The explanation here has to do with an aspect of U.S. accounting conventions. According to Worstall (2011) and Weil (2011), most of the loss came from writing down deferred-tax assets. “Basically this item represented the money MF [Global] had thought it would save on taxes in the future, assuming it would be profitable,” wrote Weil (2011). When a company has losses, one can carry forward those losses, and net them against future profits, thereby paying less taxes in the future. This future ability to pay less taxes is counted as an asset: a deferred-tax asset. By writing off the firm’s deferred-tax assets, that is basically admitting that there is no visibility for the firm to become profitable in the foreseeable future. In the earnings announced on Tuesday, October 25th, 2011, MF Global wrote off its deferred-tax assets, which signaled that either the firm or its accountant did not see profitability on the horizon. The company’s credit downgrade and worst-than-expected earnings immediately set off a liquidity crisis.

During later hearings before a U.S. Senate committee in April 2012, Chicago Mercantile Exchange Executive Chairman Terrence Duffy pointed out that MF Global’s bankruptcy trustee “had said that the
company had a liquidity crisis, and their increases went from $200 million to $900 million on their margin calls. That money had to come from somewhere, and if there’s a liquidity crisis, where was that money coming from?” On June 4th, 2012, the MF Global Inc. bankruptcy trustee definitely showed that MF Global had dealt with its liquidity crisis through using funds from futures customer accounts (Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, 2012b). One week after MF Global’s liquidity crisis began, in the morning of Monday, October 31st, regulators lost confidence in the firm when it was unable to reconcile its books and satisfactorily explain a significant shortfall that had been discovered in the firm’s customer segregated accounts. This shortfall was without precedent in the history of the futures industry (United States House of Representatives 2012). A potential deal for another firm to buy MF Global collapsed, given the shortfall in customer segregated accounts.

The Response of Regulators and Bankruptcy Trustees

On October 31, 2011, MF Global’s holding company declared bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code; and the Broker-Dealer/Futures Commission Merchant subsidiary was put into liquidation in a Securities Investors Protection Act proceeding. The legal procedures, though, which cover the liquidation of securities firms, can potentially be interpreted such that they conflict with the legal procedures that were designed for the bankruptcy of futures firms. Normally, a futures firm is put through another type of bankruptcy process where there are explicit procedures that are customized for futures firms. This was not done for MF Global. Again, the firm was put through a process designed for securities firms. That said, there is a credible body of law that futures customers should have priority over all other claimants (Corcoran (1993) and Melin (2012).) But it did take 5 weeks for the MF Global Inc. trustee to publicly verify this.

An inspector general report on the CFTC’s actions was released in May 2013. One gets a sense of the shock that there was actually a shortfall in customer segregated accounts. Accordingly, it was only at about 5am on Monday, October 31, 2011 that a decision was made to put the company in bankruptcy and have a trustee become responsible for the company. Also, given that MF Global was regulated by so many different international regulators, there was an enormous coordination problem amongst regulators during the firm’s final weekend.

Within the United States, MF Global was regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission as a broker-dealer and also by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as a futures commission merchant. According to Collins (2012), the decision to put MF Global through a bankruptcy process that had been designed for securities firms “baffled futures industry participants who felt it would delay customers being made whole.” Added Collins, “futures regulators in the past had gone to court to fight for jurisdiction when an asset freeze would be adverse to futures industry customers.”

Starting on October 31, 2011, MF Global customers’ funds and futures positions were frozen on and off for days. Astonishingly, “[w]hen the MFG bankruptcy was filed, nobody appeared in court to represent the interests of customers, or to oppose the claims of creditors whose interests were directly adverse to customers,” observed Bry and Jaffarian (2012). Within days of the bankruptcy, the trustee did work with the CME and the CFTC to move customer positions and some of the margin associated with these accounts to other FCMs (Collins, 2012).
The trustee responsible for liquidating MF Global Inc. had to go through “a steep learning curve regarding futures operations,” reported Collins (2012). It turns out that protections under the Commodity Exchange Act conflict with the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, so in the past regulators had moved customer positions and margins from weak Futures Commissions Merchants to healthy FCMs before the weak FCM declared bankruptcy. This did not happen in the case of the MF Global bankruptcy, which is a key reason for the chaos surrounding its bankruptcy.

In summary, the firm just did not have enough capital for its various lines of business. As cited in Stewart (2012) during the summer of 2011, the Assistant Treasurer of MF Global Inc. in Chicago “became worried about the firm’s growing liquidity needs and where the cash would come from.” She wrote in an email in August 2011: “Why is it I need to spend hours every day shuffling cash and loans from entity to entity?”, describing the process as a “shell game,” reported Stewart (2012). Figure 8 on the next page illustrates how money was continuously loaned from entity-to-entity.
On June 27th, 2013, the CFTC charged that:

“MF Global [had] unlawfully used nearly one billion dollars of customer segregated funds to support its own proprietary operations and the operations of its affiliates …. [Former MF Global CEO Jon] Corzine bears responsibility for MF Global’s unlawful acts. He held and exercised direct or indirect control over MF Global and Holdings and either did not act in good faith or knowingly induced these violations” (CFTC, 2013).

On January 4, 2017, Corzine settled with the CFTC and paid $5 million to settle claims from the case. The regulator also set a lifetime ban on him personally trading other people’s money in the futures industry.

**Reforms**

Regarding reforms, the CFTC “approved new NFA rules that cover foreign accounts; controls on the use of excess segregated funds; and reporting and recordkeeping requirements,” according to CFTC (2012). In addition, the NFA approved a requirement for “each futures commission merchant … to provide its Designated Self-Regulatory Organization … with view-only access via the Internet to account information.
for each of the FCM's customer segregated funds account(s) maintained and held at a bank or trust company,” announced NFA (2012).

Conclusion

This article provided examples from publicly available financial reports that demonstrated MF Global's financial weakness, dating back four years before its bankruptcy, which as time went on indicated that the firm’s business model was likely not viable. Even so, this observation does not excuse unlawful practices. As covered in Till and Heckinger (2017), MF Global effectively (and arguably unlawfully) used customer funds in large-scale proprietary trades that the firm ultimately could not fund, leading to its chaotic bankruptcy.

Endnotes

The author presented an abbreviated version of this paper during presentations at (1) ESSEC Business School’s Energy and Commodity Finance Research Center (France) on June 12, 2017; (2) the Commodity and Energy Markets Conference at Oxford University on June 15, 2017; and at (3) a Cass Business School (City, University of London) Finance Research Workshop on June 16, 2017.

Ms. Till’s ESSEC Business School lecture is available for viewing at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=--cZVVPparPk

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