By Charles M. Oellermann and Mark G. Douglas (Jones Day)
The ability to avoid fraudulent or preferential transfers is a fundamental part of U.S. bankruptcy law. However, when a transfer by a U.S. entity takes place outside the U.S. to a non-U.S. transferee—as is increasingly common in the global economy—courts disagree as to whether the Bankruptcy Code’s avoidance provisions apply extraterritorially to avoid the transfer and recover the transferred assets.
Several bankruptcy courts have addressed this issue in recent years, with inconsistent results. For example, in In re Ampal-Am. Israel Corp., the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that the avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not apply outside the U.S, disagreeing with other courts both within and outside its own district. The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, however, held to the contrary in In re FAH Liquidating Corp., where it held that the presumption against territoriality did not prevent a trustee from avoiding an overseas transfer.
More recently, in a pair of adversary proceedings commenced in the chapter 11 case of Arcapita Bank, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that the “presumption against extraterritoriality” did not defeat claims against foreign banks under sections 362 and 542 (while also ruling it need not decide whether sections 547 and 550 apply extraterritorially because it concluded that the challenged transfers occurred within the U.S.).
Taken together, these recent decisions further muddy the waters on an issue that has become increasingly prominent as the volume of cross-border bankruptcy cases continues to grow.
The article is available here.
By Shana A. Elberg, Amy Van Gelder, and Jason M. Liberi (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP)
In recent years, some courts have become critical of the doctrine of equitable mootness, a judicially created abstention doctrine — unique to the corporate bankruptcy world — that allows appellate courts to dismiss appeals from a bankruptcy court’s confirmation order if the relief sought on appeal threatens to unwind a complex debtor reorganization previously approved by the bankruptcy court. The doctrine promotes finality of confirmation orders, encourages the global consensual resolutions often crucial to complex reorganizations, and protects third parties that have justifiably relied upon the bankruptcy court’s confirmation order or transactions effectuated pursuant to that order.
Despite significant concerns expressed by courts regarding the impact of the doctrine on parties’ fundamental appellate rights, equitable mootness persists in some form within every circuit that has jurisdiction over bankruptcy appeals. Thus, plan proponents and objectors alike must be aware of its implications on contested plan confirmation proceedings and prepared to act quickly to advance their interests following plan confirmation.
This article provides a brief overview of the doctrine of equitable mootness, its application by appellate courts, and key considerations for bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy practitioners faced with contested plan confirmations and subsequent appeals.
The article is available here.
By Richard Levin (Jenner & Block LLP)
The bankruptcy courts and their appellate courts continue to explore issues of interest to practitioners and academics. This quarterly summary of recent developments in bankruptcy law covers cases reported during the third quarter of 2017.
The Second Circuit adopted the use of a market rate to determine cram-down interest rates in a chapter 11 case. It also disallowed a secured lender’s make-whole, although without deciding whether a make-whole should be generally disallowed as unmatured post-petition interest. (In re MPM Silicones (Momentive)) In contrast, the Houston bankruptcy court allowed a make-whole in a solvent case, but also without reaching the post-petition interest issue. (In re Ultra Petroleum)
The Delaware bankruptcy court clarified its jurisdiction to approve a third-party release in a settlement implemented through a confirmed chapter 11 plan, holding that plan confirmation is a core proceeding, so Article III limits do not apply. (In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC) The Delaware bankruptcy court also reconsidered, and disallowed, a merger agreement termination fee after termination of the agreement. (In re Energy Future Holdings, Inc.)
Bankruptcy courts increasingly approve of the idea that under section 544(b), the trustee may use the longer reachback periods of the Internal Revenue Code and the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (In re CVAH, In re Alpha Protective Services). And the Ninth Circuit has ruled that for the trustee to pursue an avoidance claim against the United States, section 544(b) does not require a separate sovereign immunity waiver. (In re DBSI, Inc.)
Finally, the courts have been sympathetic to attorneys in allowing their fees. (In re Stanton; In re Hungry Horse, LLC; In re CWS Enterps., Inc.) Less so for investment bankers. (Roth Capital Partners)
By Ronald Mann. Published by SCOTUSblog and re-posted with permission.
Perhaps a week with only two cases on the argument calendar gave the justices more time to prepare than normal. They certainly seemed to come to the argument in Merit Management Group v FTI Consulting with a strong predisposition about how to decide the case.
As I explained in more detail in my preview, the case involves the “avoidance” powers of the bankruptcy court, which generally permit the court to recover (“avoid”) dubious payments that bankrupts make before their bankruptcy filings. The provisions are intricately drafted, with numerous detailed exceptions – excellent terrain for law-school exam questions! This case involves a “safe harbor” exception that protects transactions in the securities industry; that provision bars recovery of any “settlement payment” made under a “securities contract” if the payment is made “by or to” a financial institution. The transaction here involved a transfer of assets between parties that were not themselves financial institutions; to make the transfer, the assets had to pass through a financial institution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit has held for many years that those “conduit” payments are protected from avoidance; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit in this case disagreed.
From the earliest moments of the argument, it seemed clear that the justices were skeptical of the 2nd Circuit’s position. (…)
The remainder of the post can be found here.
Oral argument took place on November 6, 2017. The transcript is available here. The roundtable previously posted the Amici Curiae Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors, an article by Ralph Brubaker on the meaning of § 546(e), and a roundup of law firm perspectives on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Seventh Circuit’s decision on May 1, 2017. Petitioner Merit Management Group, LP’s opening brief was subsequently filed, along with the Respondent’s brief, and Petitioner’s reply. Additional amicus curiae briefs were filed by Opportunity Partners, L.P., Various Former Tribune and Lyondell Shareholders, Tribune Company Retirees and Noteholders, and the National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees.
By Megan McDermott (University of Wisconsin Law School)
The confirmation of a new Supreme Court justice offers opportunities to speculate about how his judicial philosophy will impact various areas of the law. Bankruptcy is no exception. Justice Gorsuch’s presence on the high court could have major implications for bankruptcy law.
Using Gorsuch’s published Tenth Circuit bankruptcy decisions, my essay examines how closely Justice Gorsuch’s approach is likely to overlap with that of his predecessor, Antonin Scalia. As I show in a forthcoming Utah Law Review article (here), Justice Scalia played a leading role in the Supreme Court’s development of modern bankruptcy law during his three decades on the court. In this sequel essay, I explain why Justice Gorsuch is well-poised to play a similarly important role, with two highlights.
First, I predict that Gorsuch may push the Court to revisit Stern v. Marshall, the blockbuster 2010 decision in which the Court rejected Congress’s efforts to give bankruptcy courts judicial powers beyond the bounds of Article III. If Judge Gorsuch’s decision in In re Renewable Energy Development Corporation, 792 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2015), is a reliable indication of where he and the other justices he cites are leaning, we may soon see a new approach to the many Stern problems that bankruptcy judges have faced during the last decade. Under this new approach, the focus will shift away from the public rights doctrine and toward the framework of summary and plenary jurisdiction employed by the eighteenth century English bankruptcy system.
Second, Justice Gorusch may be more open to considering legislative history arguments than his predecessor. Justice Scalia routinely urged his colleagues to avoid references to legislative history. In stark contrast to this dogmatic approach, Gorsuch’s Tenth Circuit bankruptcy writings suggest some willingness to indulge arguments about legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code. Because so many of the bankruptcy appeals that the Court hears are, essentially, statutory interpretation questions, even this slight shift in interpretive approach could have significant repercussions for the field.
The full paper can be found here.
By Ralph Brubaker (University of Illinois College of Law), Bruce A. Markell (Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law), Charles W. Mooney, Jr. (University of Pennsylvania Law School), and Mark Roe (Harvard Law School).
Bankruptcy Code § 546(e) contains a safe harbor that prevents avoidance of a securities settlement payment, e.g. as a preferential or constructively fraudulent transfer. This amicus brief was filed in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., No. 16-784 (U.S.). The brief explains how § 546(e) rationally constrains its scope via the statutory specification that the safe harbor only applies (because it need only apply) if the “transfer” sought to be avoided was allegedly “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a protected securities market intermediary, such as a stockbroker or a financial institution.
Ascertaining the meaning and function of that determinative scope language requires an understanding of (1) the concept of a “transfer” as the fundamental analytical transaction unit throughout the Code’s avoidance provisions, and (2) the relationship between that avoidable “transfer” concept and the inextricably interrelated concepts of who that “transfer” is “made by or to (or for the benefit of).” By its express terms, § 546(e) only shields a challenged “transfer” from avoidance if (1) that transfer was “made by” a debtor-transferor who was a qualifying intermediary, “or” (2) a party with potential liability—because the challenged transfer allegedly was made “to or for the benefit of” that party—was a protected intermediary. Thus, the transfer of cash to a stock seller and of the stock back to the buyer is not safe-harbored. The delivery of the cash (and the stock) through financial intermediaries, however, is.
The full amicus brief may be found here.
Oral argument took place on November 6, 2017. The transcript is available here. The roundtable previously posted an article by Ralph Brubaker on the meaning of § 546(e) and a roundup of law firm perspectives on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision on May 1, 2017. Petitioner Merit Management Group, LP’s opening brief was subsequently filed, along with the Respondent’s brief, and Petitioner’s reply. Additional amicus curiae briefs were filed by Opportunity Partners, L.P., Various Former Tribune and Lyondell Shareholders, Tribune Company Retirees and Noteholders, and the National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees.
On October 28, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down its decision in In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C., holding that where an efficient market exists, the appropriate cram-down interest rate in Chapter 11 cases is the market rate, distinguishing the formula rate applied by the Supreme Court in Till v. SCS Credit Corp. in Chapter 13 cases. The Second Circuit wrote that “the market rate should be applied in Chapter 11 cases where there exists an efficient market. But where no efficient market exists for a Chapter 11 debtor, then the bankruptcy court should employ the formula approach endorsed by the Till plurality.” The Second Circuit also disallowed the senior creditors’ claim for a make-whole payment, although the Third Circuit had allowed such a claim in In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.
Law firms have so far reacted unanimously that this decision is a win for secured creditors as it ameliorates the risk that unsecured creditors could extract value from the debtor at the secured creditors’ expense. Weil writes that “it seems like the Bankruptcy Court, now freed from Till, will find that an efficient market exists, and will adjust the interest rate on the replacement notes accordingly.”
Nevertheless, some firms predict that there may still be areas future controversy. Davis Polk warns that this decision “could result in expensive litigations between debtors and secured creditors as to whether there exists an efficient market and, if so, what the efficient market rate should be.” Norton Rose Fulbright also emphasizes that the next step for secured creditors is to focus on when an efficient market exists.
Firms have also noticed the decision’s implication for debtor-side strategy. Baker McKenzie suggests the possibility that “a debtor may engage in forum shopping to file its case in a jurisdiction that applies the formula approach,” or “be even more sensitive to the potential for exit financing quotes to be used as evidence against [debtors] in establishing a market rate.”
On the issue of the make-whole premium, Davis Polk highlights that the circuit split may increase forum shopping for distressed issuers with potentially significant make-whole obligations. It expects future issuers to draft clearly around the issue of make-whole obligation to provide for future Chapter 11 cases.
(By Jianjian Ye, Harvard Law School, J.D. 2018.)
By Mark Roe (Harvard Law School)
In the next month, the US Treasury Department is expected to decide whether to seek to replace the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act’s regulator-led process for resolving failed mega-banks with a solely court-based mechanism. Such a change would be a mistake of potentially crisis-size proportions.
Yes, creating a more streamlined bankruptcy process can reduce the decibel level of a bank’s failure, and bankruptcy judges are experts at important restructuring tasks. But there are critical factors that cannot be ignored. Restructuring a mega-bank requires pre-planning, familiarity with the bank’s strengths and weaknesses, knowledge of how to time the bankruptcy properly in a volatile economy, and the capacity to coordinate with foreign regulators.
The courts cannot fulfill these tasks alone, especially in the time the proposal under consideration has allotted – a 48-hour weekend. Unable to plan ahead, the courts would enter into the restructuring process unfamiliar with the bank. Moreover, the courts cannot manage the kind of economy-wide crisis that would arise if multiple mega-banks sank simultaneously. And they cannot coordinate with foreign regulators.
Recent Roundtable coverage of this subject includes a round-up of op-eds; a summary of a letter submitted to Congress by financial scholars; a summary of a White House memorandum calling for reconsideration of the OLA; and an analysis of recent legislative efforts to address bankruptcy for banks.
The Roundtable has also published commentary on the treatment of insolvent financial institutions; see Jackson & Massman, “The Resolution of Distressed Financial Conglomerates” and Lubben & Wilmarth, “Too Big and Unable to Fail.”
by David L. Curry, Jr. and Ryan A. O’Connor (Okin Adams LLP; Houston, Texas)
Section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – requiring acceptance of a proposed plan from at least one impaired voting class – can often pose a unique challenge for single asset real estate debtors. Finding Acceptance: Using Strategic Impairment to Satisfy 1129(a)(10) (the “Article”), explores the potential use of “strategic” or “artificial” impairment as a means of achieving plan confirmation in contested cases where consensual restructuring of the secured creditor’s claim is not obtainable. Whether such artificial impairment is permissible remains an open question, but the Article notes a growing majority of courts finding that impairment need not be economically driven. Yet, while artificial impairment may not be prohibited by § 1129(a)(10), courts have found that plans relying upon such may be subject to heightened scrutiny under § 1129(a)(3)’s good faith requirements. Thus, the Article goes on to contrast two recent circuit court opinions – Western Real Estate Equities, L.L.C. v. Vill. At Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P.), 710 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2013) and Vill. Green I, GP v. Fannie Mae (In re Vill. Green I, GP), 811 F.3d 816 (6th Cir. 2016) – and their opposing outcomes in an effort to understand what factors a court may consider when determining whether a plan has been proposed in good-faith. Ultimately, the Article concludes that while strategic impairment of insiders or other closely related parties may give rise to an inference of bad faith, the impairment of unrelated, minor creditors should be permissible.
The full article is available to download here.
David L. Curry, Jr. is a partner, and Ryan A. O’Connor is an associate, in the Houston office of Okin Adams LLP. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors, and not Okin Adams.
By Hilary Till (J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities, University of Colorado Denver Business School)
In the fall of 2011, futures market participants were caught off-guard when MF Global filed for bankruptcy. Essentially, this episode educated industry participants that customer protections in the U.S. commodity futures markets had been more ambiguous than expected. That said, there are a number of reforms that have been undertaken to help prevent future MF Globals. This article takes the position that a number of red flags existed as far back as 2007, regarding the firm’s financial weakness, which could have served as a warning to those investors relying on MF Global as a fiduciary.
In discussing the MF Global debacle, this article will cover the following seven areas:
(1) a brief background on the firm will be outlined;
(2) warning signs will be identified;
(3) the firm’s final week will be recalled;
(4) the response of regulators and bankruptcy trustees will be noted;
(5) the shortfall in customer segregated funds will be described;
(6) the CFTC’s charges and settlement will be mentioned; and
(7) later reforms will be summarized.
The article concludes that while MF Global’s business model appears not to have been viable after 2007, this observation does not excuse unlawful practices. In particular, the firm effectively (and arguably unlawfully) used customer funds in large-scale proprietary trades that the firm ultimately could not fund, leading to its chaotic bankruptcy.