Post-Jevic, Expansive Interpretation by Bankruptcy Courts Possible

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By Andrew C. Kassner and Joseph N. Argentina, Jr. (Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP)

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017), the Supreme Court held that structured dismissals that violate the distribution scheme set forth in the Bankruptcy Code are not permitted.  The Court distinguished such situations from other, somewhat common bankruptcy practices that also violate the Code’s distribution scheme, such as critical vendor orders, employee wage orders, and lender “roll-ups.”  Those practices, the Court noted, “enable a successful reorganization and make even the disfavored creditors better off.”  The question remained, however, how subsequent bankruptcy courts would analyze such practices in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Jevic.

This article summarizes two early post-Jevic decisions and concludes that at least some courts will read the Jevic holding expansively into areas of chapter 11 practice other than structured dismissals.  In In re Fryar, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1123 (Apr. 25, 2017), the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee would not approve a settlement agreement and § 363 sale that provided payment to a lender on account of its prepetition claims.  In In re Pioneer Health Servs., 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 939 (Apr. 4, 2017), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Mississippi would not permit a hospital debtor to pay three physicians as “critical vendors.”  These courts concluded that Jevic required additional scrutiny of distribution-violating proposals other than structured dismissals.

The full article is available here.

Andrew C. Kassner is the chairman and chief executive officer of Drinker Biddle & Reath, and former chair of its corporate restructuring group. Joseph N. Argentina Jr. is an associate in the firm’s corporate restructuring practice group in the Philadelphia and Wilmington offices. The views expressed in the article are those of Mr. Kassner and Mr. Argentina, and not of Drinker Biddle & Reath.


The roundtable has posted previously on Jevic, including a report of the case by Melissa Jacoby & Jonathan Lipson and a roundup of law firm perspectives on the Court’s decision. For opposing views on the case leading up to oral argument, see Melissa Jacoby & Jonathan Lipson on their amicus brief and Bruce Grohsgal making the case for structured dismissals. For other Roundtable posts related to priority, see Casey & Morrison, “Beyond Options”; Baird, “Priority Matters”; and Roe & Tung, “Breaking Bankruptcy Priority,” an article referred to in the Jevic opinion.

Jevic: Law Firm Perspectives

On March 22, the Supreme Court decided Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., holding that bankruptcy courts may not approve structured dismissals that provide for distributions that deviate from ordinary priority rules without the affected creditors’ consent. According to the Court, Chapter 11 contemplates three possibilities: (1) a confirmed plan; (2) conversion to Chapter 7; or (3) dismissal. Absent an affirmative indication of congressional intent, the Court was unwilling to endorse a departure from the Code’s priority scheme; thus, it rejected the Third Circuit’s “rare cases” exception allowing courts to disregard priority in structured dismissals for “sufficient reasons.”

Dechert warns the decision could short-circuit “creative solutions to difficult and unique issues” and impose a “real economic cost” on debtors, creditors, and the courts. PretiFlaherty speculates that Jevic might give additional leverage to priority claimholders who know that debtors and secured creditors now “have one less arrow in their quiver.” More generally, Winston & Strawn predicts bankruptcy professionals will “look to Jevic for insight” when developing exit strategies in difficult cases.

Foley & Lardner highlights the Court’s basic commitment to absolute priority, while noting the Court’s careful distinction between final distributions, which must follow absolute priority, and interim distributions, which may break from priority to serve the Code’s ultimate objectives.

DrinkerBiddle emphasizes that Jevic provides “support for employee wage orders, critical vendor orders, and roll-ups,” a “shot in the arm for the sub rosa plan doctrine,” and “fodder for objections to class-skipping gift plans.” Duane Morris agrees, noting that Jevic may be “cited in unexpected ways” in battles about gift plans, critical vendor payments, and the like.

Sheppard Mullin wonders how consent will be determined in structured dismissals and whether features of plan confirmation other than absolute priority — for instance, cramdown, the bests interest test, and bad faith — will be imported into the structured dismissal context as well.

(By David Beylik, Harvard Law School, J.D. 2018.)


The roundtable has posted previously on Jevic, including a report of the case by Melissa Jacoby & Jonathan Lipson. For opposing views on the case leading up to oral argument, see Melissa Jacoby & Jonathan Lipson on their amicus brief and Bruce Grohsgal making the case for structured dismissals. For other Roundtable posts related to priority, see Casey & Morrison, “Beyond Options”; Baird, “Priority Matters”; and Roe & Tung, “Breaking Bankruptcy Priority,” an article that the Jevic opinion referenced.

Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Over Foreign Entities: Exorbitant or Congruent?

By Adrian Walters (Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology)

As Oscar Couwenberg and Stephen Lubben have demonstrated, foreign firms commonly file for bankruptcy in the United States in order to take advantage of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. But overseas critics tend to balk at the ease with which global bankruptcy jurisdiction can be engineered in the United States through a combination of the Bankruptcy Code’s low bar to entry and the worldwide effects of a bankruptcy case. They complain that the formal structure of U.S. eligibility and jurisdictional rules promote abusive bankruptcy forum shopping and the harmful imposition of U.S. norms on non-U.S. stakeholders.

This article advances a revised account of U.S. bankruptcy jurisdiction over non-U.S. debtors from a distinctively Anglo-American standpoint. The article’s thesis is that critics overemphasize formal jurisdictional rules and pay insufficient attention to how U.S. courts actually exercise jurisdiction in practice. It compares the formal law “on the books” in the U.S. and U.K. for determining whether or not a domestic insolvency or restructuring proceeding relating to a foreign debtor can be maintained in each jurisdiction and provides a functional account of how U.S. bankruptcy jurisdiction over foreign entities is exercised in practice, using the concept of jurisdictional congruence as a benchmark. While the American and British approaches to abusive forum shopping are developing on different legal cultural paths, the article also identifies reasons for thinking that they are trending towards a rough functional equivalence influenced, at least in part, by the U.S.’s commitment to the UNCITRAL Model Law through chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In sum, the article lays foundations for further critical reflection on the roles that judges, practitioners, and the “center of main interests” standard play in configuring the market for international bankruptcy case filings and in facilitating and regulating forum shopping in that market. Through the lens of legal development, it also presents some practical and policy challenges for universalism, international insolvency law’s dominant theory.

The full article is available here.

United States: In GM, Second Circuit Takes a Wrong Turn on Its Treatment of Unknown Claims

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By Debra A. Dandeneau (Baker & McKenzie)

Elliott v. General Motors LLC (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 829 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2016), addresses General Motors’ attempt to sell substantially all of its assets to “New GM” free and clear of certain claims of vehicle owners under the Bankruptcy Code.

“New GM” acquired GM’s assets in a bankruptcy court-approved sale. New GM assumed liability for claims arising from any accidents occurring after the closing date and for any express vehicle warranties. Three classes of vehicle purchasers were not covered:

– prepetition purchasers with prepetition injuries from the “ignition switch defect,”

– prepetition purchasers with economic damages as a result of defects not covered by an express warranty, and

– postpetition purchasers of used GM vehicles who claimed economic damages as a result of defects.

The Second Circuit held that a debtor may sell free and clear of successor liability claims, but independent claims against New GM were not covered by the “free and clear” sale.

The court applied a variation of the “relationship test,” which requires prepetition conduct by the debtor plus some minimum contact or relationship with the claimant, to determine whether the purchasers held “claims.” Both pre-closing accident claims and economic loss claims by prepetition purchasers constituted “claims,” but postpetition purchasers of used vehicles did not have “claims.”

To determine whether the holders of prepetition claims received sufficient notice, the Second Circuit focused on GM’s knowledge of the claims instead of its knowledge of the identity of the creditors.

The full client alert is available here.

Three Ages of Bankruptcy

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By Mark J. Roe (Harvard Law School)

During the past century, three decisionmaking systems have arisen to accomplish a bankruptcy restructuring — judicial administration, a deal among the firm’s dominant players, and a sale of the firm’s operations in their entirety. Each is embedded in the Bankruptcy Code today, with all having been in play for more than a century and with each having had its heyday — its dominant age. The shifts, rises, and falls among decisionmaking systems have previously been explained by successful evolution in bankruptcy thinking, by the happenstance of the interests and views of lawyers that designed bankruptcy changes, and by the interests of those who influenced decisionmakers. Here I argue that these broad changes also stem from baseline market capacities, which shifted greatly over the past century; I build the case for shifts underlying market conditions being a major explanation for the shifts in decisionmaking modes. Keeping these three alternative decisionmaking types clearly in mind not only leads to better understanding of what bankruptcy can and cannot do, but also facilitates stronger policy decisions today here and in the world’s differing bankruptcy systems, as some tasks are best left to the market, others are best handled by the courts, and still others can be left to the inside parties to resolve.

The full article is available here.

Bankruptcy and the U.S. Supreme Court

By Ronald J. Mann (Columbia Law School)

The continuing struggle of the United States to emerge from the Great Recession gives policy responses to financial distress an immediacy they have lacked for 75 years. The Constitution directly grants Congress a broadly worded Bankruptcy Power, which Congress exercised with vigor in its 1978 enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. But the Code has played little or no role in mitigating the dislocation of the Great Recession. The slight rise in filings under the Code during the early years of financial distress contrasts markedly with the unprecedented rise in foreclosures, to say nothing of the more general social and economic turmoil of the last decade.

My forthcoming book, Bankruptcy and the U.S. Supreme Court, considers the role that the Supreme Court has played in the relatively anemic bankruptcy regime of the 21st century. The book’s main point is that the Supreme Court’s 82 decisions evaluating the Code systematically have taken a narrow interpretive approach that has left the Code much less effective than it might have been. The book includes some quantitative analysis. It is interesting, for example, that only 32 of the 82 decisions (39%) have come down in favor of a broad application of the Code. If you look at close cases (those with three or more dissenting votes), the results are even more stark, with only 5 of the 19 decisions (26%) applying the Code expansively.

But the bulk of the book is a series of case studies of nine of the close cases in the early days of the Code. Because the case studies focus much more on the process of the Court’s decision making than on the doctrinal results, they rely heavily on the internal papers of the Justices. Probably the single most important thing that the case studies demonstrate is the Justices’ attention to these cases. Many readers doubtless think of the bankruptcy cases as the “dogs” that the Justices turn to only after they’ve devoted their attention to the exciting constitutional and civil rights cases. But what you find when you go back to look the Justices’ papers is a great deal of back and forth in the crafting of opinions. In one case (Midlantic v. New Jersey Dep’t of Environmental Protection), Justice Powell’s majority opinion originally was crafted as a dissent; it became a majority when Justice Stevens switched his vote. Similarly, in Bildisco v. NLRB, Justice Rehnquist managed to get a court for his opinion only after months of negotiation that eventually led to the removal and rewriting of a large portion of the original opinion.

If you want to know more about how the Court goes about deciding these cases, then I encourage you to look at the book when it comes out from Cambridge University Press this spring.

Bankruptcy’s Endowment Effect

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By Anthony J. Casey (University of Chicago Law School)

The notion of endowments and entitlements has a powerful effect on corporate bankruptcy policy. Scholars and lawyers generally assume a creditor endowed with a right outside the bankruptcy system must receive the equivalent of that right when its debtor is within the bankruptcy system. Proponents of this idea often assert that the result is required by the foundational theory of bankruptcy.

In a forthcoming essay, “Bankruptcy’s Endowment Effect,” I demonstrate that this is false. The idea of sacred creditor endowments is an untenable position that misunderstands the fundamental principles of bankruptcy. Corporate bankruptcy is, at its core, a system that alters nonbankruptcy endowments according to a hypothetical bargain that all creditors of a firm would have entered if bargaining were costless. The entire point of that hypothetical bargain is to suspend and alter some nonbankruptcy endowments to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate and the firm as a whole. Indeed, if every stakeholder retained all of its nonbankruptcy endowments, the Bankruptcy Code would have no provisions at all.

Of course, altering nonbankruptcy endowments can impose costs. Foremost among those costs is the risk of opportunistic behavior that is costly for the estate as a whole. Bankruptcy policy will, therefore, be designed to maximize estate value while minimizing opportunistic bankruptcy behavior. Thus, the guiding principle for optimal bankruptcy design should be not the preservation of nonbankruptcy rights but rather the minimization of opportunistic behavior that reduces the net value of a firm.

With that principle in hand, we can resolve many difficult questions of bankruptcy policy. In the essay, I focus on applying the principle to the debate over what interest rate a senior creditor should get in a chapter 11 cramdown. In particular, I analyze the dispute in In re MPM Silicones, LLC (“Momentive”), where the bankruptcy court mistakenly reached its final decision by importing a creditor-endowment framework from consumer bankruptcy law (where the framework might make more sense). I show that an optimal rule for corporate bankruptcy supports a cramdown interest rate based on the prevailing market rates for similar loans, which reduces the risk of opportunistic behavior by both debtor and creditor.

The Dubai World Tribunal and the Global Insolvency Crisis

By Jayanth Krishnan (Indiana—Bloomington)

In 2009, as markets from the United States to Europe to the Global South shook, one country—the United Arab Emirates—found itself on the brink of economic collapse.  The U.A.E’s Emirate of Dubai was contemplating defaulting on $60 billion of debt it had amassed.  Recognizing that such a default would have cataclysmic reverberations across the globe, the government of Dubai turned to a small group of foreign consultants for assistance.  The resulting legal experiment demonstrates how aspects of American corporate bankruptcy law can be imported into and prove useful in the context of a foreign legal tradition. During the crisis, insolvency lawyers from the U.S. law firm of Latham & Watkins, analysts from the New York-based investment bank Moelis, and accountants from PwC – together with local domestic counterparts and experts from the U.K.– devised a highly sophisticated plan that helped the Emirate address the economic crisis in which it found itself.  As part of this plan, Chapter 11 and Chapter 15 principles from the U.S. Bankruptcy code, the 2/3 cram down technique on hold-out creditors, and an Anglo-American insolvency tribunal were introduced into Dubai in order to bring about economic stability and handle the highly complex cases that arose during the financial crisis. By respecting and interpreting U.A.E. law, the tribunal has maintained its legitimacy in the eyes of the Dubai government even as it has drawn on Anglo-American insolvency concepts.

On December 13, this study will be formally presented at a public event in Dubai by Indiana-Bloomington’s Center on the Global Legal Profession, where insolvency experts and policymakers from the U.S., Dubai, and the U.K. will be present.

The full article can be found here.

Priority Matters

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By Douglas G. Baird, University of Chicago Law School

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is organized around the absolute priority rule. This rule mandates the rank-ordering of claims. If one creditor has priority over another, this creditor must be paid in full before the junior creditor receives anything. Many have suggested various modifications to the absolute priority rule. The reasons vary and range from ensuring proper incentives to protecting nonadjusting creditors. The rule itself, however, remains the common starting place.

This paper uses relative priority, an entirely different priority system that flourished until the late 1930s, to show that using absolute priority even as a point of departure is suspect when firms are being reorganized. The essential difference between absolute and relative priority is the effect of bankruptcy on the exercise date of the call-option component of the junior investment instrument. Under absolute priority, the bankruptcy accelerates the exercise date; a regime of relative priority leaves it untouched.

Absolute priority is naturally suited for regimes in which the financially distressed firm is sold to the highest bidder. It is much less appropriate for a regime that puts a new capital structure in place without a market sale. In the absence of an actual sale, absolute priority requires some nonmarket valuation procedure. Such a valuation is costly and prone to error.

Chapter 11 attempts to minimize these costs by inducing the parties to bargain in the shadow of a judicial valuation, but rules are needed to police the strategic behavior that arises from the ability of parties to exploit information they have, but the judge does not.

Once one decides in favor of a reorganization rather than a market sale, the commitment to absolute priority is suspect. Instead of trying to find a bankruptcy mechanism that best vindicates the absolute priority rule, one is likely better off trying to identify the priority rule that minimizes the costs of bankruptcy itself. Asking which priority rule is most likely to lead to a successful plan at reasonable cost is a better point of departure than a debate over which priority rule provides the best set of ex ante incentives.

Looking at Chapter 11 from this perspective shows that much of the complexity and virtually all of the stress points of modern Chapter 11 arise from the uneasy fit between its priority regime (absolute instead of relative) and its procedure (negotiation in the shadow of a judicial valuation instead of a market sale). These forces are leading to the emergence of a hybrid system of priority that may be more efficient than one centered around absolute priority.

Read the full article here (forthcoming 165 U. Pa. L. Rev.).

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