Ninth Circuit Holds That Impaired Accepting Class Requirement Applies to Plan Confirmation on a “Per-Plan” Rather Than a “Per Debtor” Basis

By James L. Bromley, Lisa M. Schweitzer, Sean A. O’Neal, Luka A. Barefoot, and Daniel K. Soltman (Cleary Gottlieb).

On January 25, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires cramdown plans to have at least one impaired accepting class, applies on a “per-plan” basis, rather than a “per-debtor” basis. In re Transwest Resort Properties Inc., Case No. 16-16221 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). Under the “per-plan” rule, multiple debtors with a single plan of reorganization may cram down a plan on any creditor class with the support of only one impaired accepting class, even where the impaired accepting class has claims against a different debtor than the crammed down class that has rejected the plan. The Ninth Circuit is the first circuit court to address the “per-debtor” versus “per-plan” issue, and previous decisions were split between the Southern District of New York (adopting the “per-plan” approach) and the District of Delaware (adopting the “per-debtor” approach). Transwest will likely have a significant impact on how debtors and creditors within the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere consider their relative options prior to and during bankruptcy.

The remainder of this article will discuss the Transwest case background and the Ninth Circuit’s decision, and the expected impact of the decision, both inside and outside of the Ninth Circuit. The article is available here.

For earlier Roundtable coverage of 1129(a)(10), please see our recent post on strategic impairment in cramdowns.

Recent Developments in Bankruptcy Law October 2017

By Richard Levin (Jenner & Block LLP)

The bankruptcy courts and their appellate courts continue to explore issues of interest to practitioners and academics. This quarterly summary of recent developments in bankruptcy law covers cases reported during the third quarter of 2017.

The Second Circuit adopted the use of a market rate to determine cram-down interest rates in a chapter 11 case. It also disallowed a secured lender’s make-whole, although without deciding whether a make-whole should be generally disallowed as unmatured post-petition interest. (In re MPM Silicones (Momentive)) In contrast, the Houston bankruptcy court allowed a make-whole in a solvent case, but also without reaching the post-petition interest issue. (In re Ultra Petroleum)

The Delaware bankruptcy court clarified its jurisdiction to approve a third-party release in a settlement implemented through a confirmed chapter 11 plan, holding that plan confirmation is a core proceeding, so Article III limits do not apply. (In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC) The Delaware bankruptcy court also reconsidered, and disallowed, a merger agreement termination fee after termination of the agreement. (In re Energy Future Holdings, Inc.)

Bankruptcy courts increasingly approve of the idea that under section 544(b), the trustee may use the longer reachback periods of the Internal Revenue Code and the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (In re CVAH, In re Alpha Protective Services). And the Ninth Circuit has ruled that for the trustee to pursue an avoidance claim against the United States, section 544(b) does not require a separate sovereign immunity waiver. (In re DBSI, Inc.) 

Finally, the courts have been sympathetic to attorneys in allowing their fees. (In re Stanton; In re Hungry Horse, LLC; In re CWS Enterps., Inc.) Less so for investment bankers. (Roth Capital Partners)

The full memo, discussing these and other cases, is available here, and the full (900-page) compilation of all prior editions is available here.

Momentive: Law Firm Perspectives

On October 28, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down its decision in In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C., holding that where an efficient market exists, the appropriate cram-down interest rate in Chapter 11 cases is the market rate, distinguishing the formula rate applied by the Supreme Court in Till v. SCS Credit Corp. in Chapter 13 cases. The Second Circuit wrote that “the market rate should be applied in Chapter 11 cases where there exists an efficient market. But where no efficient market exists for a Chapter 11 debtor, then the bankruptcy court should employ the formula approach endorsed by the Till plurality.” The Second Circuit also disallowed the senior creditors’ claim for a make-whole payment, although the Third Circuit had allowed such a claim in In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.

Law firms have so far reacted unanimously that this decision is a win for secured creditors as it ameliorates the risk that unsecured creditors could extract value from the debtor at the secured creditors’ expense. Weil writes that “it seems like the Bankruptcy Court, now freed from Till, will find that an efficient market exists, and will adjust the interest rate on the replacement notes accordingly.”

Nevertheless, some firms predict that there may still be areas future controversy. Davis Polk warns that this decision “could result in expensive litigations between debtors and secured creditors as to whether there exists an efficient market and, if so, what the efficient market rate should be.” Norton Rose Fulbright also emphasizes that the next step for secured creditors is to focus on when an efficient market exists.

Firms have also noticed the decision’s implication for debtor-side strategy. Baker McKenzie suggests the possibility that “a debtor may engage in forum shopping to file its case in a jurisdiction that applies the formula approach,” or “be even more sensitive to the potential for exit financing quotes to be used as evidence against [debtors] in establishing a market rate.”

On the issue of the make-whole premium, Davis Polk highlights that the circuit split may increase forum shopping for distressed issuers with potentially significant make-whole obligations. It expects future issuers to draft clearly around the issue of make-whole obligation to provide for future Chapter 11 cases.

(By Jianjian Ye, Harvard Law School, J.D. 2018.)

Fair Equivalents and Market Prices: Bankruptcy Cramdown Interest Rates

posted in: Cramdown and Priority | 0

By Bruce A. Markell (Northwestern University Law School)

Cramdown is the confirmation of a plan of reorganization over the dissent of an entire class of creditors. Bankruptcy’s absolute priority rule permits such confirmation only if the dissenting class is paid in full, or if no junior class receives anything. “Paid in full,” however, does not require payment in cash. It can consist of intangible promises to pay money that banks, investors, and markets regularly value.

Whether this market value can precisely be transferred to cramdown has vexed many. This Article, “Fair Equivalents and Market Prices,” surveys the doctrinal background of such valuations and devises three short apothegms that can synthesize the history and doctrine under these phrases: “don’t pay too little”; “don’t pay too much”; and “don’t expect precision.”

Against this background, debates arose recently when a New York bankruptcy court applied a chapter 13 case, Till v. SCS Credit Corp., to a large corporate cramdown in In re MPM Silicones, LLC (“Momentive”). Given the legislative history and precedents in the cramdown area, the Article takes the position that Momentive was correct, that it is compatible with the doctrinal roots of cramdown, and that in the future, courts should resist using pure market-based valuations in cramdown calculations.


This article recently appeared in the Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal (2016). The Roundtable has also recently posted Anthony Casey’s related article from the same issue, “Bankruptcy’s Endowment Effect.”

The Future of UK Debt Restructuring

By Jennifer Payne (University of Oxford – Faculty of Law)

In the UK, a number of different mechanisms exist which can be used to restructure the debt of viable but financially distressed companies. This paper assesses the debt restructuring mechanisms currently available to companies in English law and considers whether reform is needed. In particular, the paper analyses the reform proposals put forward by the UK Insolvency Service in July 2016, which recommended: (i) the introduction of an option to cramdown whole classes of creditors using a single restructuring mechanism (something which can only be accessed at present using a scheme of arrangement combined with administration); (ii) the introduction of a restructuring moratorium akin to that which is attached to administration at present, together with a new ability for companies to prevent creditors with “essential contracts” from terminating them on the basis of insolvency alone; and (iii) the introduction of provisions designed to facilitate debtor-in-possession financing, something notably absent from the current UK regime. These reforms will need to be introduced with skill and care in order to ensure that the potential benefit they can bring to financially distressed businesses is balanced appropriately with the constraints that they impose on existing creditors’ rights. The aim of the Insolvency Service’s proposals is laudable, and it is argued that reform of the UK regime is needed. In particular, the introduction of a restructuring moratorium and a cramdown facility would be beneficial. Making these changes would provide English law with a stronger and more effective debt restructuring procedure. Furthermore, such changes are required if the UK wants to remain competitive in a global market.

The full article is available here.