By Allison K. Hoffman
[cross-posted from RegBlog. see original here]
It is still an open question—at least for a little while longer—what exactly the Republicans’ Affordable Care Act “repeal and replace” promise will entail. However, the broad contours of the Republican strategy, which both Congress and President Trump have made clear they will pursue at all deliberate speed, are already visible.
Speaker of the House Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) foreshadowed the Republicans’ central approach in his Patient’s Choice Act, a health care plan he put forward in 2009. That plan emphasized a desire to empower individuals to make healthy decisions, asserting that a “large percentage of heart disease, stroke, and type 2 diabetes, as well as many cancers, could be prevented if Americans would stop smoking, start eating better, and start exercising.” According to Ryan, the aim of health reform should be to encourage “individuals to adopt healthy lifestyles and behaviors.”
Ryan’s assumption—a theme also echoed in the other major Republican proposals on the table—is that personal responsibility will serve as a salve to the wounds of the American healthcare system. Impliedly, if Americans would only jog more and eat more vegetables, then we could dramatically reduce cancer and strokes and save a fortune on medical care. Continue reading
We’ve rounded up the latest news from the past week, January 9-15, 2017, for housing law and equity. The HUD confirmation hearing was, of course, the biggest news, but a few other items of note:
Did we miss anything? Let us know!
By Alex Stein
Under Massachusetts law, suits alleging medical malpractice in a treatment of a minor patient must be filed “within three years from the date the cause of action accrues.” G.L.c. 231, § 60D. In a recent case, Parr v. Rosenthal, 57 N.E.3d 947 (Mass. 2016), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided that a patient’s continuous treatment by the same physician can toll this period under certain restrictive conditions. One of those conditions requires the plaintiff to show that the physician continued to treat the patient “for the same or related condition” after committing the alleged malpractice, and that “treatment” in that context includes supervision of, as well as consultation and advice to, other treating physicians. Another condition makes continuous treatment part of the discovery rule that moves the onset of the limitations period to the day on which the patient knew or could have reasonably suspected that her physician treated her negligently. According to the Court, continuous treatment instills in the patient “innocent reliance” that the physician treats her properly, which makes the physician’s malpractice not reasonably discoverable. Moreover, innocent reliance can even be present when the patient realizes that she sustained harm from the physician’s treatment. As the Court explained, “A patient who continues under the care of the same physician will still have the same challenges in learning whether the harm [she] suffered from the physician’s treatment arose from the physician’s negligence.” Based on these observations, the Court decided that the “continuous treatment” rule will not benefit patients who affirmatively suspected that they received negligent treatment from their physician. Such patients, the Court held, cannot show “innocent reliance.” Continue reading