Morality, Maturity, and Abortion Access in the US

by Clíodhna Ní Chéileachair

In the complex web of restrictions on abortion access, parental consent laws and judicial bypass mechanisms play a small, but hugely significant part. States are entitled to enact parental consent and notification laws in relation to abortion care for minors, as long as they allow minors to ‘bypass’ this requirement judicially, an attempt to account for the myriad circumstances in which it will be impossible, difficult or dangerous for teens to tell their parents about their pregnancy and their wish to end it. Finding different justifications in different contexts, some laws appeal to the perceived immaturity of the individual in arriving at a decision without adult intervention; other legal schemes emphasize the critical importance of respecting the family unit, and by extension, the ability of parents to determine the medical treatment their child will receive. The exact stats, state by state, are available here.

The patchwork regime which governs the US rules on abortion access, administered by local courts presiding over the individual applications of pregnant teenagers, is a highly dysfunctional one, where standards of judgment can be entirely capricious. Judges are, after all, not medical professionals, nor are they therapists, health experts or developmental psychologists. The standard criteria pronounced upon by a judge at a bypass hearing is whether the minor is ‘mature enough, and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independent of her parents knowledge’ or that ‘even if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests’. The gateway for unchecked judicial discretion is gaping. Markers of maturity are wholly subjective determinations, as are the metrics to determine whether a minor is sufficiently informed, or where her best interests lie. After all, for a staunchly anti-abortion judge, it is entirely possible that no-one could be informed about the process of abortion and yet rationally seek it, or that it could never be in an individual’s best interests to receive abortion care as a minor. The controlling law doesn’t foreclose on these possibilities.

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Genomic Screening: What’s Age Got To Do With It?

By Margaret Waltz, PhD, R. Jean Cadigan, PhD, Anya E. R. Prince, JD, MPP, Debra Skinner, PhD, and Gail E. Henderson, PhD

Age is an important consideration in medical screening, but calls for population based preventive genomic screening programs do not mention an upper age limit. Should such programs employ upper age limits, as occurs in other clinical screenings, on the assumption that older individuals would not benefit clinically? To address this question, our Genetics in Medicine paper analyzed data from GeneScreen, a research study of preventive genomic screening aimed at adults. We focused on how the researchers who designed the study and 50 individuals who joined the study understood and valued age in relation to screening.

GeneScreen used a screening panel of 17 genes associated with 11 rare conditions for which treatment and/or prevention options were available, like Hereditary Breast and Ovarian Cancer, Lynch Syndrome, and Long QT Syndrome. GeneScreen researchers initially suggested an upper age limit, reflecting the assumption that older individuals were unlikely to clinically benefit from the results. One clinician worried that without an upper age limit, GeneScreen might reinforce the desire for screening among older adults and the misconception that screening “does a lot of good when you’re 80.” This was reconsidered when they discussed familial benefit. As one researcher said, participation “might not actually save the 80-year-old that we test, but [it] could save his grandchildren.” The recognition of familial benefit motivated the decision to not exclude adults based on age.

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