by Martín Hevia (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella)
In 2006, Nobleza Piccardo, a main tobacco company in Argentina, had filed a claimed against the government of the Province of Santa Fe because a law sanctioned by the Provintial Congress completely banned the advertising and promotion of tobacco products in the Province (Santa Fe is one of the main Provinces of Argentina). Nobleza Piccardo argued that those restrictions infringed upon free speech and upon commercial freedom. It also claimed that, under the Argentine National Constitution, the Province is not allowed to pass legislation of that kind because the National Congress had already passed law 23.344, which regulated tobacco advertising (but did not ban it); once National Congress did so, Provintial Congresses cannot further legislate on the issue.
In its October 27 ruling, the Supreme Court held that nothing in the National Constitution provides National Congress with an exclusive power to legislate on health matters. Furthermore, Provintial legislation may complement federal legislation on the matter.
On the free speech and commercial freedom argument, the Court held that there is a tendency in other jurisdictions to restrict or even completely ban tobacco advertising. According to the Court, the restrictions established by the law are justified because they are proportionate to the public health concerns it wants to address; in addition, they follow internationallly accepted standards on the matter.
In his vote, Judge Lorenzetti, President of the Supreme Court, wrote that restricting tobacco advertising does not infringe upon free speech because tobacco advertising is not related to the working of republican and democratic institutions. Thus, Lorenzetti says, it would be wrong to analyze the restrictions established by the provintial law with the strict scrutiny test used in free speech cases. This claim, of course, is very important and will deserve much more discussion by the Supreme Court in future decisions. But the main teaching of the case is that, for the first time, the Supreme Court clearly states that tobacco control measures are a matter of human rights. This is, no doubt, a very important step.
By Martín Hevia
In “D.M.A. s/ declaración de incapacidad” decided early this month, the Supreme Court of Argentina upheld the right to decide about one´s own death (“muerte digna”). As I had explained in a previous comment written when the ruling of the case was pending, the case involved a patient, M.A.D., that had been in a permanent, irreversible, vegetative state for 20 years due to a car accident. His sisters requested the discontinuation of the vital supportive measures which maintained M.A.D alive in an artificial way. Although this was not the first time that the Court discussed the right to die, it was a different case in that there was not a patient’s written statement on whether it was appropriate for him to continue or not certain medical treatment to keep him alive.
The Argentine National Congress had already passed legislation stating that, whenever a patient is unable to give informed consent, her relatives can do so in her name. On that basis, following the opinion of the sisters of M.A.D., the Supreme Court ordered the discontinuation of the vital supportive measures which maintained M.D alive in an artificial way. Continue reading
by Martín Hevia
In 2015, the Argentine Supreme Court is to hear a case involving the right to die, death with dignity, and informed consent. Because of a car accident in the Province of Neuquén, M.D., the patient, has been in a permanent, irreversible, vegetative state for 18 years. His sisters and curators have requested the discontinuation of the vital supportive measures which maintained M.D alive in an artificial way.
This will not be the first time that the Supreme Court hears a case of death with dignity. In 2012, the Court heard the case of Albarracini Nieves, who was unconscious when admitted to a hospital in Buenos Aires. The physicians established that a blood transfusion was necessary. But, as Albarracini belonged to the cult “Jehovah’s Witnesses”, he had had made a statement before a public notary in 2008 where he expressed he would not accept any blood transfusions even if his life were in danger. His father requested a cautionary measure that would order the transfusion to be practiced. The first instance court admitted the solicited measure, considering that although Albarracini had expressed that he refused an eventual transfusion, he was not “in a condition to make decisions with full discernment.”The case then reached the Supreme Court, which argued that there were no reasons to doubt over the current validity of Albarracini’s expression of will and that there was no evidence that he would not have considered the significance of his decision.The Court argued that “…this Court has clearly established that Article 19 of the National Constitution grants the sphere of freedom, within which he can freely adopt fundamental decisions about himself without any State or third parties interference, as long as those decisions do not violate third parties’ rights.”The Court stated that“The possibility of accepting or refusing a specific treatment, or selecting an alternative form of treatment, is part of self-determination and personal autonomy; that patients have the right to choose options according to their own values or points of view, even when they may seem irrational or imprudent, and that free choice must be respected.”
The M.D. case is different in that it is difficult to prove the patient’s will – unlike in the Albarracini Nieves case – because there is not a patient’s written statement on whether it is appropriate for him to continue or not certain medical treatment to keep him alive. The Superior Court of Justice of the Province of Neuquén has decided on the case invoking the 2009 Patients´ Rights Act: according to this law, the sisters have standing to grant informed consent in the name of their brother.
The Supreme Court and Argentine lower courts have interpreted the National Constitution and concluded that it grants patients a wide range of autonomous choice as regards their autonomy, reflected in their right to refuse medical treatment. On that basis, the Supreme Court will probably confirm the decision of the lower court.
by Martín Hevia
Access to drinking-water is obviously necessary to lead a healthy life. However, in Latin America, many lack access to this vital resource.
Very recently, in December 2, the Argentine Supreme Court discussed the legal status of access to drinking-water in the Argentine legal system (the case is “Kersich, Juan Gabriel y otros c/Aguas Bonaerenses y otros s/amparo”). The Argentine Constitution does not explicitly recognize a right to have access to drinking-water. The Court discussed the claim of citizens of 9 de Julio against “Aguas Argentinas,” which was allegedly providing water with levels of arsenic higher than those allowed by Argentine law. In deciding the case, with the vote of 4 of the 5 Supreme Court judges, the Court reached two important conclusions.
First, invoking General Comment 15 on the right to water of the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Court concluded that Access to drinking water is a fundamental human right: it is necessary to lead a life with dignity, as well as necessary to fulfill other human rights, mainly, the right to health. The Court also invoked human rights treaties incorporated to the Argentine Constitution such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child – its Article 24.2.c mandates providing clean drinking water to combat disease.
Second, the Court held that the provision of drinking-water is a community interest. Thus, the right to access to drinking water is a “collective right” (the Spanish term is “derecho de incidencia colectiva”): drinking water is one of the elements of the environment, which is collective good under Section 41 of the Argentine National Constitution.
Although the Court discussed the particular claim of the inhabitants of 9 de Julio, and it ordered lower courts to analyze again the case on the basis of the aforementioned two conclusions, it is worth asking about the legal implications of this decision for the Argentine legal system. The decision of the Court expressly recognizes access to drinking water a collective constitutional right. This means that, from now on, inhabitants of Argentina will be able to file collective claims to demand both the Federal and the Provintial States that they make access to drinking-water a priority. Not doing so will entail not taking the Constitution seriously.
By Martín Hevia
The Argentine Congress has just passed a new and unified Civil and Commercial Code. The new Code will be effective as of January 2016. The Code covers topics from torts and contracts to family law and in vitro fertilization. It is a massive volume of almost 2700 articles – it is, however, shorter than the current Code, which includes almost 4000 articles -.
One of the main issues in the new Code is the definition of legal personhood. Article 19 of the new Code states that “Human personhood starts with conception”. This wording has been strongly critized because “conception” has been frequently defined as “fertilization.” Critics argue that Art. 19 may imply an obstacle for assisted reproductive technologies: in vitro embryos may be considered “legal persons”, comparable to a live human person. Thus, they may be taken to have the same right to life. In fact, this argument has been accepted by some courts. For example, in 2002, the Supreme Court of Argentina prohibited the production, distribution, and commercialization of Imediat, an emergency contraceptive because of its perceived abortive effects it is considered to violate the right to life, which is regarded as an absolute right that preempts any other right. For the Court, life begins with the union of the gametes, namely, with fertilization and before implantation. A similar line of reasoning was followed by the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court in 2004.
In contrast, defenders of the wording of Article 19 argue that it should be read together with Article 20, which states that “time of conception is that between the maximum and the minimum length of pregnancy”. This may mean that there cannot be conception outside a woman´s body. Thus, conception is to be understood as “implantation.” Continue reading
We are pleased to introduce our newest contributor, Martín Hevia, to Bill of Health.
Martín (SJD, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto; Abogado, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Argentina) is the Executive Dean and Director of the Law Programme (J.D. Equivalent) at the School of Law of the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Buenos Aires, Argentina), where he is an Associate Professor of Law. His research and teaching interests include comparative constitutional and private law; health law and reproductive rights; and legal theory and political philosophy.
Professor Hevia has acted as a legal consultant to the Argentine National Congress on the reform, actualization, and unification of the Argentine Civil and Commercial Codes, and as an Expert for the World Health Organization Public Health Law Consultation Group. He was Co Editor-In-Chief of the Journal of Law & Equality (2004-2006) and Editor-In-Chief of Revista Argentina de Teoría Jurídica (1999-2000). He has also served as a Global Fellow at the International Reproductive and Sexual Health Law Programme, University of Toronto (2009) and Fellow in Comparative Law and Political Economy at Osgoode Hall, York University (2008).
At the University of Toronto, he was awarded the Alan Marks Medal to the Best Graduate Thesis of 2006-2007, the 2007 Gordon Cressy Student Leadership Award for extraordinary extra-curricular contributions to university life and was President of the Graduate Law Students’ Association.
Representative Publications: Continue reading