July has been a busy month for those following the controversy around off-label promotion of drugs and devices. As many on this blog know, federal law requires that prior to marketing any drug or device, companies must prove to the FDA’s satisfaction that it is safe and effective for all intended uses. If the company reveals that it intends unapproved uses, sales of the drug or device are illegal. Nonetheless, physicians can prescribe “off-label,” and companies are free to sell for those known-but-not-intended purposes.
This carefully-wrought policy may seem convoluted, but it serves important epistemic and economic purposes, as I have argued elsewhere. This month, I have a new draft paper on SSRN, assessing recent assertions of a First Amendment right to promote for uses not approved by the FDA, and consider whether such a right would be equally applicable to drugs that have no FDA-approved label at all. I worry that the entire pre-market approval regime may be at stake. Feedback on that intentionally-provocative analysis is quite welcome.
On Wednesday, two medical device company executives, were convicted of promoting a product “to deliver steroid medications to patients’ sinuses, though it was only approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for keeping sinuses open.” The prosecutors thought the case was particularly egregious, because the company had intended the broader use to deliver medicine all along, but sought to mislead the FDA, denying it the chance review the safety and efficacy of the real intended use. The jury instructions and verdict form are particularly interesting, to see how the government’s trial strategy avoids the holding of a Second Circuit case of Caronia, which overturned a conviction on First Amendment grounds. I’ll return with some analysis later. Continue reading
By John Tingle
The National Health Service (NHS) just does not seem to be able to deal properly with discharging elderly patients from hospital back into the community. There have been major issues in this area going back decades. Stories in the media and official reports regularly appear about ‘bed blocking’ by elderly patients or hospitals discharging them back into the community without proper care arrangements being made.
There is a real fear that the NHS will never be able to turn things around here and that the lessons of the past are not being learnt .There are seemingly intractable problems being faced by trusts, social services and others in doing a proper job with elderly patient discharge.The high financial cost to the NHS of keeping well elderly patients in hospital has also been widely discussed.
Hospitals and social services have faced a barrage of criticism of failing to have coordinated care policies and arrangements leading in some cases to deaths of patients.
Two reports have been published recently which show that patient safety is being seriously compromised in this area. Continue reading
The Policy Surveillance Program staff has recently updated the Nurse Practitioner Scope of Practice Dataset on LawAtlas.org to include laws through May 2016.
Fifty jurisdictions and the District of Columbia have laws pertaining to nurse practitioners’ scope of practice. In general, scope of practice laws regulate the autonomy nurse practitioners are given within their practice to treat patients. State laws fall into two main categories: limited practice and full practice. In limited practice states, the law limits autonomy for nurse practitioners by requiring them to collaborate with, or work under, the supervision of another health care provider. By contrast, full practice states allow nurse practitioners to practice independently.
In total, there are 29 limited practice states. In those states, collaboration, supervision, or a combination of the two are required in performing activities such as prescribing medication, ordering tests, performing examinations, and counseling or educating patients, among other activities.
– States with limited practice authority
By Alex Stein
In its recent decision, Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 369 P.3d 229 (Ca. 2016), the California Supreme Court has sharpened the critical distinction between “medical malpractice” and general negligence.
Under California statute, a plaintiff’s ability to file a medical malpractice suit expires in one year after the accrual of the cause of action. The statute tolls this period for two additional years, provided that the plaintiff files the suit within one year after he discovers the injury or could reasonably have discovered it. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5 (providing that suits for medical malpractice must be filed “three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.”). For other personal injury suits, the limitations period is “two years of the date on which the challenged act or omission occurred.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff was injured when one of the rails on her hospital bed collapsed. Continue reading
Behavioral nudges are everywhere: calorie counts on menus, automated text reminders to encourage medication adherence, a reminder bell when a driver’s seatbelt isn’t fastened. Designed to help people make better health choices, these reminders have become so commonplace that they often go unnoticed. In Nudging Health, forty-five experts in behavioral science and health policy from across academia, government, and private industry come together to explore whether and how these tools are effective in improving health outcomes.
Behavioral science has swept the fields of economics and law through the study of nudges, cognitive biases, and decisional heuristics—but it has only recently begun to impact the conversation on health care. Nudging Health wrestles with some of the thorny philosophical issues, legal limits, and conceptual questions raised by behavioral science as applied to health law and policy. The volume frames the fundamental issues surrounding health nudges by addressing ethical questions. Does cost-sharing for health expenditures cause patients to make poor decisions? Is it right to make it difficult for people to opt out of having their organs harvested for donation when they die? Are behavioral nudges paternalistic? The contributors examine specific applications of behavioral science, including efforts to address health care costs, improve vaccination rates, and encourage better decision-making by physicians. They wrestle with questions regarding the doctor-patient relationship and defaults in healthcare while engaging with larger, timely questions of healthcare reform.
Nudging Health is the first multi-voiced assessment of behavioral economics and health law to span such a wide array of issues—from the Affordable Care Act to prescription drugs.
Read the introduction on SSRN and
By Ameet Sarpatwari and Aaron S. Kesselheim
Each month, members of the Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL) review the peer-reviewed medical literature to identify interesting empirical studies, in-depth analyses, and thoughtful editorials on pharmaceutical law and policy.
Below are the papers identified from the month of June. The selections feature topics ranging from lessons from the history of randomized controlled trials, to the prevalence and predictors of generic drug skepticism among physicians, to the availability and dissemination of results from FDA-mandated post-approval studies of medical devices. A full posting of abstracts/summaries of these articles may be found on our website.
- Bothwell LE, Greene JA, Podolsky SH, Jones DS. Assessing the Gold Standard–Lessons from the History of RCTs. N Engl J Med. 2016;374(22):2175-81.
- Gellad WF, Good CB. Prescription of Brand-Name Medications When Generic Alternatives Are Available-Patently Unfair. JAMA Intern Med. 2016 Jun 27. [Epub ahead of print]
- Hwang TJ, Sokolov E, Franklin JM, Kesselheim AS. Comparison of rates of safety issues and reporting of trial outcomes for medical devices approved in the European Union and United States: cohort study. BMJ. 2016;353:i3323.
- Ioannidis JP. Why Most Clinical Research Is Not Useful. PLoS Med. 2016;13(6):e1002049.
- Kesselheim AS, Gagne JJ, Eddings W, Franklin JM, Ross KM, Fulchino LA, Campbell EG. Prevalence and Predictors of Generic Drug Skepticism Among Physicians: Results of a National Survey. JAMA Intern Med. 2016;176(6):845-7.
- Kesselheim AS, Gagne JJ, Franklin JM, Eddings W, Fulchino LA, Avorn J, Campbell EG. Variations in Patients’ Perceptions and Use of Generic Drugs: Results of a National Survey. J Gen Intern Med. 2016;31(6):609-14.
- Luo J, Seeger JD, Donneyong M, Gagne JJ, Avorn J, Kesselheim AS. Effect of Generic Competition on Atorvastatin Prescribing and Patients’ Out-of-Pocket Spending. JAMA Intern Med. 2016 Jun 27. [Epub ahead of print]
- Moore TJ, Furberg CD, Mattison DR, Cohen MR. Completeness of serious adverse drug event reports received by the US Food and Drug Administration in 2014. Pharmacoepidemiol Drug Saf. 2016 Jun;25(6):713-8.
- Quesada O, Yang E, Redberg RF. Availability and Dissemination of Results From US Food and Drug Administration-Mandated Postapproval Studies for Medical Devices. JAMA Intern Med. 2016 Jun 27. [Epub ahead of print]
- Sarpatwari A, Kesselheim AS. Navigating the Dermatological Drug Cost Curve. JAMA. 2016;315(24):2724-5.
- Sarpatwari A, Avorn J, Kesselheim AS. State Initiatives to Control Medication Costs–Can Transparency Legislation Help? N Engl J Med. 2016;374(24):2301-4.
- Schwartz LM, Woloshin S, Zheng E, Tse T, Zarin DA. ClinicalTrials.gov and Drugs@FDA: A Comparison of Results Reporting for New Drug Approval Trials. Ann Intern Med. 2016 Jun 14. [Epub ahead of print]
By John A. Robertson
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (WWH) is the most important abortion case since Casey in 1992, and a major setback for the anti-choice movement. By allowing courts to weigh the importance of the health benefits of a regulation, it will most likely invalidate most TRAP laws, which usually only marginally advance health while making it more difficult for women to access abortion. WWH, however, will not stop the anti-choice movement from pressing its fight against abortion in other ways. It now controls many state legislatures, and more legislation in areas left open by WWH may be expected.
Future health-related regulation will have to hew to the WWH line of providing real benefit, at least if substantially limits access to abortion. But close questions may still arise. What if a state has a valid health justification for a regulation that does limit access to abortion, as Jonathan Will notes would occur if a state law that directly promotes women’s health leads to that one clinic closing, as might occur in a state like Mississippi? Here there would be a substantial burden on access, but given the health benefit of the law, which interest should take priority? Neither Casey nor WWH are clear on this point. In my view the question will turn on how great is the health benefit from the requirement. A state, for example, should be able to close the only clinic in the state if it was as derelict as the Gosnell clinic. In that case, however, one could show serious danger to women’s health and life that would be comparable or even greater than the risk of childbirth. If the health benefit is less but still substantial, the question is harder. Such a situation would call into question whether the state itself must allow even a sub-standard abortion facility even when acceptable facilities exist across a state line. (See Jackson Women’s Health v. Currier.) Continue reading
By Alex Stein
Any person interested in medical malpractice or torts in general must read the Missouri Supreme Court’s recent decision, Mickels v. Danrad, 486 S.W.3d 327 (Mo. 2016). This decision involved a physician who negligently failed to diagnose the presence of a malignant brain tumor, from which the patient was doomed to die. The patient first saw the physician when he experienced numbness, blurred vision, and headaches. The physician sent the patient to an MRI scan, which he subsequently reviewed but made no diagnosis. Eleven weeks later, the patient arrived at a hospital in an altered mental state and underwent a CT scan of his brain, which showed a malignant and incurable tumor. Four months later, the patient died of that tumor. According to patient’s oncologist – who testified as a witness in a subsequent malpractice trial – the tumor was incurable when the patient first saw the physician. The plaintiffs offered no evidence controverting that testimony. Continue reading
One of the world’s most important human rights law firms is now under attack from a government whose leader has, to put it mildly, a mixed record on human rights. The firm is the Lawyer’s Collective, which has done some of the most important work within India on HIV, LGBT and gender issues. The firm’s lawyers have also made great contributions internationally. Indira Jaising has served as a member of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. Anand Grover was the UN Special Rapporteur on Right to Health from 2008 to 2014, during which service he issues several fearless reports that helped move the world forward towards an enabling environment for HIV among the most legally marginalized people.
On June 1, the Indian Union Ministry for Home Affairs suspended the firm’s license to receive foreign funding, contending that the Lawyer’s Collective had violated the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act. The Lawyer’s Collective faces the prospect of having their license cancelled permanently, which would seriously impact their work. Both the suspension order and the Lawyer’s Collective’s response have been widely reported in the Indian media. Continue reading
By Diana R. H. Winters
[Crossposted from the Health Affairs Blog]
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has recently taken three steps toward providing consumers with more and better information about food products that the agency regulates. First, in response to several citizen petitions, the agency requested comments on the use of the term “natural” on food labeling. Second, the agency issued a statement in early May indicating that “in the near future” it planned to solicit comments reevaluating how nutrient content claims are regulated — including the term “healthy.” And third, the agency issued a final rule on an updated Nutrition Facts label, with which large companies must comply by July 2018.
With each of these actions the FDA is attempting to ensure that information provided to consumers by food manufacturers comports with the latest scientific understanding about food components. Indeed, the updated nutrition facts label will provide important information and potentially allow consumers to make more informed choices about what they eat. The agency, however, has set itself a far trickier task in defining words such as “natural” and “healthy.”
In the past, the FDA has repeatedly declined to define the term “natural.” The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) of 1990 required the FDA to standardize definitions for nutrient content claims, like “fat free” or “high in fiber,” and to limit the use of health claims, like “heart healthy” (21 U.S.C. §§ 343(r)(1)(A), (B)). The word “natural,” however, does not fit into either of these categories.
By Alex Stein
Three years ago, Oregon’s Supreme Court voided the state’s $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages for medical malpractice for violating the constitutional guarantee that “In all civil cases the right of Trial by Jury shall remain inviolate” (Or. Const., Art. I, § 17, as interpreted in Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 987 P.2d 463, modified, 987 P.2d 476 (Or. 1999)). Klutschkowski v. Oregon Medical Group, 311 P.3d 461 (Or. 2013). This cap also clashed with “every man’s” right to “remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or reputation” (Or. Const., Art. I, § 10, as interpreted in Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333 (Or. 2001), and in Hughes v. PeaceHealth, 178 P.3d 225 (Or. 2008)). The Court reasoned that a person’s right to recover full jury-assessed compensation for injuries recognized as actionable in 1857, when Oregon adopted its constitution, cannot be abolished or abridged by statute or common law. For my discussion of the Klutschowski decision, see here. For my discussion of a similar entrenchment principle adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Smith v. United States, 356 P.3d 1249 (Utah 2015), see here.
The Oregon Supreme Court has now changed this course in a long precedential decision, Horton v. Oregon Health and Science University, — P.3d —- 359 Or. 168 (Or. 2016). Continue reading
By Dov Fox
The landmark abortion decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt eclipsed quieter reproductive rights news out of the Supreme Court at the end of its term. It involves a couple’s claim that the Tennessee Supreme Court violated their equal protection rights by refusing to recognize “disruption of family planning as either an independent cause of action or element of damages.” You won’t have heard about this case. It wasn’t a merits judgment, but a decision not to decide. The Court’s denial of certiorari in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis has gone all but unremarked. It shouldn’t. This post lays out the arguments and why the Court (most likely) declined to hear it on appeal (without explaining its decision, as standard for cert denials). My updated article out in next year’s Columbia Law Review elaborates on the significance of professional wrongdoing that imposes, deprives, and confounds procreation in the face of people’s best efforts to plan a family.
The dispute arose during Michelle Rye’s third pregnancy. Rye has Rh negative blood, meaning that she produces antibodies that attack the blood cells of a Rh-positive fetus, potentially leading to serious harm in a born child. Doctors nowadays easily prevent this Rh-sensitization by injecting the pregnant woman with a compound called RhoGAM. But Rye’s doctor didn’t give her that injection. Now the couple couldn’t have more children of their own without risking serious health problems. Their Catholic faith took fetal testing and abortion off the table. They couldn’t even use birth control to prevent a risky pregnancy. Rye and her husband sued the doctor (who admitted negligence) for disrupting their family plans. Tennessee courts, all the way up to the state’s Supreme Court, rejected their claim. The courts held that the couple had not suffered the kind of injury that would support a legal cause of action. The Ryes’ petition to the U.S Supreme Court argued that the state Court’s refusal to recognize their claim denied them equal protection under the law. Continue reading
The Supreme Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health is sure to be dissected in the coming days, weeks, and months. In the meantime, I wanted to quickly reengage the discussion about the status of the “purpose prong” of Casey and what, if anything, Whole Woman’s Health tells us about it. While Justice Breyer’s analysis in the majority opinion does not seem to be couched expressly in terms of Casey’s purpose prong, the majority’s willingness to assess the applicable laws’ benefits may ultimately be purpose dressed in different clothing. If there is not sufficient evidence of a law’s benefit, there could be a problem.
As a quick refresher, recall that Casey prohibits laws that have either the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. While most folks can readily associate Casey’s “undue burden” test in terms of abortion restrictions that have the effect of placing obstacles, Priscilla Smith and Caitlin Borgmann, have written about courts seemingly ignoring Casey’s other mandate that laws should not have the purpose of even trying to place such obstacles (regardless of whether they succeed in creating that effect). This avoidance of the purpose prong coupled with great deference to the asserted justifications of the legislature (without the kind of benefits inquiry seen in Whole Woman’s Health) has historically led to many TRAP (targeted regulation of abortion provider) laws being upheld.
I have just made my way through all 107 pages of Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the Supreme Court’s decision this morning to invalidate Texas’ H.B. 2 admitting privileges and surgical center regulations as undue burdens on the abortion right. Full disclosure I filed an amicus brief arguing for this result. The case was 5-3 with Justices Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts in dissent. I am sure I’ll have a lot more to say after I’ve read through the opinion 3 or 4 more times. Here’s what’s clear to me though even on a quick read.
First, this is a major victory for opponents of Targeted Regulation of Abortion Provider (TRAP) laws. Armed with this opinion they will have a much easier time in the lower courts challenging such laws. Among other things, (1) the Court signals much less deference to legislatures than in Gonzales and prior cases (see p. 21 of Opinion); (2) the Court instructs that “The rule announced in Casey, however, requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits” conferred (p. 19) ; (3) the Court clarifies the “large fraction” language from Casey as to what is an undue burden in a way favorable to opponents of these regulations. Let me quote the majority here:
Casey used the language “large fraction” to refer to “a large fraction of cases in which [the provision at issue] is relevant,” a class narrower than “all women,” “pregnant women,” or even “the class of women seeking abortions identified by the State.” 505 U. S., at 894–895 (opinion of the Court) (emphasis added). Here, as in Casey, the rele- vant denominator is “those [women] for whom [the provi- sion] is an actual rather than an irrelevant restriction.” Id., at 895. (p.39)
Contrast that with Justice Alito’s long discussion in his dissent as to his understanding (with the pizzaz that shows why he is such a good writer) in a footnote:
The Court, by contrast, applies the “large fraction” standard without even acknowledging the open question. Ante, at 39. In a similar vein, it holds that the fraction’s “relevant denominator is ‘those [women] for whom [the provision] is an actual rather than an irrelevant re striction.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Casey, 505 U. S., at 895). I must confess that I do not understand this holding. The purpose of the large-fraction analysis, presumably, is to compare the number of women actually burdened with the number potentially burdened. Under the Court’s holding, we are supposed to use the same figure (women actually burdened) as both the numerator and the denominator. By my math, that fraction is always “1,” which is pretty large as fractions go.
Second, it is remarkable how differently these sets of opinions read from, let’s say, the gay marriage cases or even Gonzales v. Carhart. All the opinions, except perhaps Justice Ginsburg’s very short concurrence, are decidedly in the “technocratic” mode of writing as opposed to what we might call the “kulturkampf” mode that characterized much of Justice Scalia’s dissents on these kinds of issues. These opinion are written for lawyers not the public. I would have to do a proper count to be sure but it seems to me that something like 2/3 to 3/4 of the total pages of these set of opinions are devoted to issues that only lawyers will be able to engage in — res judicata/claim preclusion, severability, third-party standing, as-applied versus facial challenges, and the cogency of tiers of scrutiny.
By John Tingle
I voted in the referendum yesterday along with many others. The referendum turnout was 71.8%, with more than 30 million people voting. It was the highest turnout in a UK-wide vote since the 1992 general election.
My area, Broxtowe in Nottingham where I live, voted to leave the EU, 54.6%, 35754 votes, remain 45.4% 29672 votes. I live in the East Midlands, Middle England. Deep regional divisions have been laid bare by this referendum. It was notable that London largely voted to stay in the EU whereas in my region there was a notable push to leave, 58.5%.The referendum result shows British politics has, according to the Guardian newspaper, fractured beyond all recognition since the last referendum on Europe in 1975.
The issues around EU membership have been hotly debated and there was a high level of public interest in what went on. Immigration has been the dominant theme in many areas and health along with a number of other issues has also come up. At this moment we are in a post referendum, after shock stage and picking through the fallout to see what is happening and what is going to happen. People are happy, sad and anxious over the result.It was not that long after the vote was announced by the BBC that our Prime Minister David Cameron said he was going to stand down in October, that was a lot to take in so soon after the result. Looking at some of the posts on Facebook it is striking how many young people feel a sense of betrayal by the vote to leave the EU. Many seem to harbour a deep sense of resentment that they have been robbed of a future by an elder generation, it’s the baby boomers against the millennials. Continue reading
By Nicolas Terry and Frank Pasquale
This week our guest is Professor Deborah Lupton, one of the world’s leading digital sociologists. Her new book, The Quantified Self, is the basis of most of our discussion–and it has fascinating lessons for health care lawyers, providers, and patients.
Deborah joined the University of Canberra in early 2014 as a Centenary Research Professor associated with the News & Media Research Centre in the Faculty of Arts & Design. Her research and teaching is multidisciplinary, incorporating sociology, media and communication and cultural studies. Deborah has previously held academic appointments at the University of Sydney, Charles Sturt University and the University of Western Sydney.
Deborah is the author of 15 books and over 150 journal articles and book chapters on topics including the social and cultural dimensions of: medicine and public health; risk; the body; parenting cultures; digital sociology; food; obesity politics; and the emotions. She is an advocate of using social media for academic research and engagement, including Twitter (@DALupton) and her blog This Sociological Life.
Those interested in further exploring the social theory of digital selfhood may be interested in Frank’s piece, The Algorithmic Self. And for some forward-thinking reflections on new technologies of digital health, check out Nic’s recent post at Health Affairs on hearing aids and regualtory arbitrage.
The Week in Health Law Podcast from Frank Pasquale and Nicolas Terry is a commuting-length discussion about some of the more thorny issues in Health Law & Policy. Subscribe at iTunes, listen at Stitcher Radio, Tunein and Podbean, or search for The Week in Health Law in your favorite podcast app. Show notes and more are at TWIHL.com. If you have comments, an idea for a show or a topic to discuss you can find us on twitter @nicolasterry @FrankPasquale @WeekInHealthLaw
Earlier today, the NIH rejected a request filed by consumer groups including Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) to exercise the government’s march-in rights on an expensive prostate cancer drug, Xtandi. Xtandi costs upwards of $129,000 per year, and KEI had asked the government to exercise its rights under the Bayh-Dole Act, which specifies a range of conditions under which the government may require a patentholder to grant licenses on reasonable terms to others to practice the patent. Specifically, the government may require such a license where “action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied,” 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2), or where the benefits of the invention are not being made “available to the public on reasonable terms,” 35 U.S.C. § 201(f).
For some time now, there has been debate over the question of whether high prices for pharmaceuticals are a sufficient trigger to invoke the use of march-in rights under these clauses of the statute. I don’t take a position on that question here. Instead, I want to ask whose responsibility it is to decide that question. Congress has the legal right to do so, but it seems unwilling or unable to. The agencies in question have recently declined to, even assuming they have the power to interpret the statute in that way. And so we might look to the courts. But there’s a puzzle here: it’s not clear that anyone can ask a court to decide whether high prices meet the statutory requirements unless an agency actually decides that high prices meet the statutory requirements.
by Joan H. Krause
[Cross-posted from Hamilton and Griffin On Rights]
On June 17, the Supreme Court unanimously decided Universal Health Services v. United States ex rel. Escobar (UHS), holding that FCA cases may be predicated on “implied certifications” of compliance as long as the defendant knowingly violates a requirement it knows is material to the government’s payment determination. Because the First Circuit applied an incorrectly broad interpretation of materiality, however, the Justices nonetheless vacated the appellate judgment and remanded. While both parties quickly claimed victory, in reality the decision is likely to satisfy no one and to raise as many questions as it answers.
The case was filed by the parents of a young woman who died after receiving Medicaid-covered mental health treatment from a Massachusetts clinic that failed to satisfy state licensing and supervision regulations. Her parents alleged that the clinic’s MassHealth claims were fraudulent because, by filing for payment, the clinic had implicitly represented that it was in compliance with all relevant state requirements. A district court dismissed the suit but the First Circuit reversed, taking a very broad view of the scope of implied certification. On appeal, UHS asked the Court to reject the implied certification theory, arguing that a failure to disclose noncompliance should not be considered fraudulent in the absence of an affirmative duty to disclose. Respondents, supported by the United States as amicus curiae, countered that a defendant who knowingly bills the government for services without disclosing a failure to meet material conditions has submitted a false claim. While few observers expected the Court to entirely abolish implied certification, at oral argument the Justices appeared deeply divided as to the scope of the theory and the source of any limiting principle.
By Nicolas Terry
Business disruption, Christensen’s classic observation of disruptive technologies leveraged by market entrants attacking mainstream industry incumbents, has generally failed in health care. There are several reasons why innovative businesses harnessing modern technologies have found health care a difficult nut to crack. The most likely reason is that the misaligned incentives caused by third-party reimbursement discourage consumers from choosing new, lower-cost alternatives.
However, there are additional explanations. Sometimes the arcane, fragmented nature of health care proves to be a poor fit for technologies successfully implemented in other businesses. In other cases—think electronic health records—a lack of common data standards allows proprietary data formats to cause customer lock-in.
But, what is the impact of health care regulation? Beyond the traditional trope that regulation stifles innovation, how does health care regulation impact disruption? Recent developments in the markets for hearing aids suggest some answers and even a possible regulatory approach to the broader and burgeoning category of mobile health apps and wearables.…
Read the full post at the Health Affairs Blog!
Earlier this week, a bipartisan group of Senators introduced the Creating and Restoring Equal Access to Equivalent Samples (CREATES) Act, a bill designed to speed generic drug approvals (and thus lower drug costs) by removing a delaying tactic some branded drug companies use to impede the generic approval process. Essentially, branded drug companies sometimes refuse to sell samples of their drugs to generic companies who want to come to market, preventing them (for at least a time) from performing the necessary bioequivalence testing and extending their market dominance. Sometimes companies try to hide behind a regulatory program, Risk Evaluation or Mitigation Strategies (REMS), in claiming that they legally cannot provide such access. Other times, such as in Martin Shkreli’s case, no such excuse exists and the company simply refuses to provide access.
These delaying tactics have received substantial attention from both scholars (Jordan Paradise’s work can be found here) and lawmakers. This is Congress’ third attempt at addressing the situation, although as Ed Silverman helpfully notes at Pharmalot, the previous attempts would have only dealt with REMS delays, not Shkreli-like closed distribution systems. By contrast, the CREATES Act would require brand-name companies to provide access to samples of their drugs, whether subject to a REMS or not, on “commercially reasonable, market-based terms” or face potential civil action from the generic drug company in question. There’s already been a lot of commentary on the bill, including a particularly helpful blog post from Geoffrey Manne providing background on REMS abuses and on why antitrust law has not sufficed to solve the problem. Here, I want to add two points that I haven’t yet seen in the discussion: one about drug shortages and another about remedies.