The Neurolaw Revolution: A lecture by Francis X. Shen

The Neurolaw Revolution: A lecture by Francis X. Shen
September 13, 2017 4:00 PM
Wasserstein Hall, Milstein East A (2036)
Harvard Law School, 1585 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA

Rapid advances in the brain sciences offer both promise and peril for the law. In light of these developments, Dr. Francis Shen will explore how neuroscientific analysis of law may revolutionize legal doctrine and practice.

 Dr. Shen is the third Senior Fellow in Law and Neuroscience in the Project on Law and Applied Neuroscience, a collaboration between the Center for Law, Brain & Behavior at Massachusetts General Hospital and the Petrie-Flom Center. Dr. Shen directs the Shen Neurolaw Lab at the University of Minnesota, is co-author of the first Law and Neuroscience casebook, and serves as Executive Director of Education and Outreach for the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience.

This lecture will be followed at 5:30pm by the Petrie-Flom Center’s 2017 Open House reception.

Part of the Project on Law and Applied Neuroscience, a collaboration between the Center for Law, Brain & Behavior at Massachusetts General Hospital and the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School.

The Neurolaw Revolution: A lecture by Francis X. Shen

The Neurolaw Revolution: A lecture by Francis X. Shen
September 13, 2017 4:00 PM
Wasserstein Hall, Milstein East A (2036)
Harvard Law School, 1585 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA

Rapid advances in the brain sciences offer both promise and peril for the law. In light of these developments, Dr. Francis Shen will explore how neuroscientific analysis of law may revolutionize legal doctrine and practice.

Dr. Shen is the third Senior Fellow in Law and Neuroscience in the Project on Law and Applied Neuroscience, a collaboration between the Center for Law, Brain & Behavior at Massachusetts General Hospital and the Petrie-Flom Center. Dr. Shen directs the Shen Neurolaw Lab at the University of Minnesota, is co-author of the first Law and Neuroscience casebook, and serves as Executive Director of Education and Outreach for the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience.

This lecture will be followed at 5:30pm by the Petrie-Flom Center’s 2017 Open House reception.

Part of the Project on Law and Applied Neuroscience, a collaboration between the Center for Law, Brain & Behavior at Massachusetts General Hospital and the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School.

REGISTER NOW! Behind Bars: Ethics and Human Rights in U.S. Prisons

Behind Bars: Ethics and Human Rights in U.S. Prisons
November 30 – December 1, 2017
Harvard Medical School campus
Longwood Medical Area, Boston, MA

The United States leads the world in incarceration. The “War on Drugs” and prioritizing punishment over rehabilitation has led to mass imprisonment, mainly of the nation’s most vulnerable populations: people of color, the economically disadvantaged and undereducated, and those suffering from mental illness. Although these social disparities are striking, the health discrepancies are even more pronounced. What can be done to address this health and human rights crisis?

This conference will examine various aspects of human rights and health issues in our prisons. In collaboration with educators, health professionals, and those involved in the criminal justice system—including former inmates, advocates, and law enforcement—the conference will clarify the issues, explore possible policy and educational responses, and establish avenues for action.

Registration for the conference is required. To learn more and to register, please visit the HMS Center for Bioethics website.

This event is cosponsored by the Center for Bioethics at Harvard Medical School, the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School, and the Human Rights Program at Harvard Law School.

Mental Health First Aid Training in Prisons, Police Departments, and the Presidential Election

By Wendy S. Salkin

It has been widely reported and acknowledged that many incarcerated Americans live with mental illness. In 2014, the Treatment Advocacy Center and the National Sheriffs’ Association published The Treatment of Persons with Mental Illness in Prisons and Jails: A State Survey, a joint report that included the following findings:

  • In 2012, there were estimated to be 356,268 inmates with severe mental illness in prisons and jails. There were also approximately 35,000 patients with severe mental illness in state psychiatric hospitals. Thus, the number of mentally ill persons in prisons and jails was 10 times the number remaining in state hospitals.
  • In 44 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, a prison or jail in that state holds more individuals with serious mental illness than the largest remaining state psychiatric hospital. For example, in Ohio, 10 state prisons and two county jails each hold more mentally ill inmates than does the largest remaining state hospital.

Similarly widely reported and acknowledged is that prisons often either cannot or simply do not serve the mental health treatment needs of those housed within their walls. As Ana Swanson of The Washington Post observed:

Unsurprisingly, many prisons are poorly equipped to properly deal with mental illness. Inmates with mental illnesses are more likely than other to be held in solitary confinement, and many are raped, commit suicide, or hurt themselves.

Solitary confinement is often used as a means of separating inmates living with mental illness from the rest of a prison population. As Jeffrey L. Metzner and Jamie Fellner reported in their March 2010 article, “Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics”: Continue reading

Hospitals Should Think Before Performing Searches for Law Enforcement

By Shailin Thomas

In 2012, a Jane Doe suspected of transporting drugs was detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents without a warrant, and brought to University Medical Center in El Paso, Texas. Medical Center personnel — under the direction of the law enforcement agents — performed an X-ray, CT scan, and cavity search before determining that the woman was not in fact carrying any controlled substances. A few months after suffering this traumatic — and possibly illegal — event, the woman received a $5400 bill from the Medical Center for the services rendered as part of the search.

While the woman was compensated to some extent — she settled lawsuits with University Medical Center and the CBP to the tune of $1.1 million and $475,000, respectively — her story, and stories like hers, raise important questions about the ways in which hospitals should (or shouldn’t) work with law enforcement to perform invasive searches.

It’s understandable why hospitals and medical professionals are inclined to cooperate with law enforcement requests for invasive procedures and cavity searches — law-abiding citizens often don’t want to obstruct law enforcement agents from doing their jobs. But in the course of bringing suit against University Medical Center, Edgar Saldivar of the ACLU of Texas noted that the hospital and many of its personnel didn’t know where the obligation to assist the CBP stopped. Many medical professional don’t know that — according to the CBP’s own Personal Search Handbook — they are under absolutely no obligation to comply with requests by law enforcement to perform cavity searches with or without a warrant.

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Implied Certification and the Problem of Interpretation Under the False Claims Act

By Joan H. Krause

[Cross-posted from Hamilton and Griffin On Rights]

In a recent post, I explained the contours of the False Claims Act (FCA) implied certification theory of falsity, the subject of the recent Supreme Court argument in Universal Health Services v. United States(UHS). In this post, I will address an issue largely overlooked by most commentators: the potential for differing interpretations of what is required by the underlying Medicare and Medicaid provisions that form the basis for the certification.

Recent years have seen an expansion of FCA cases from “factually false” misrepresentations to those involving “legally false” claims, where items or services were provided but the claimant also violated an underlying legal requirement. For example, UHS involves an allegation that the defendant clinic violated the FCA because, by submitting a claim for payment under MassHealth, it implicitly certified that it was in compliance with all relevant Massachusetts regulations – including the staffing and supervision requirements it later was found to have violated.

Courts have taken two broad approaches to defining the universe of regulatory provisions with which certification will be implied. Some courts, notably the Second Circuit in Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001), limit the theory to violations of statutes or regulations clearly identified as conditions of payment. Other courts, such as the First Circuit in UHS, instead ask whether the claimant “knowingly represented compliance with a material precondition of payment,” which need not be “expressly designated.” The tests may sound similar, but differ both theoretically and functionally. First, defining implied certification by reference to “materiality” is curious in light of the fact that, since 2009, materiality has been an express – and distinct – element of the FCA false records provision in 31 US.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B). Yet implied certification cases such as UHS usually arise under the false claims provision in § 3729(a)(1)(A), which Congress did not amend to require materiality.

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Implied Certification and the Quest for Fraud that “Counts” Under the False Claims Act

By Joan H. Krause

[Cross-posted from Hamilton and Griffin on Rights]

Sometimes, we lie when we speak; other times, we lie when we don’t. Striking the right balance is the essence of the Universal Health Services (UHS) case recently argued before the Supreme Court, which challenged the applicability of the False Claims Act (FCA) to situations in which a claimant falsely “implies” compliance with underlying regulatory requirements.

UHS was brought by the parents of a young woman who died after receiving Medicaid-covered (MassHealth) mental health treatment from a clinic that did not satisfy state licensing and supervision regulations. The parents alleged that the claims for payment were fraudulent because they implicitly represented that the clinic was in full compliance with relevant state requirements. The district court dismissed the suit, finding that the staffing and supervision regulations were not “conditions of payment” whose violation would render subsequent claims false under the FCA. The First Circuit reversed, focusing instead on whether UHS had “knowingly represented compliance with a material precondition of payment.” Noting that preconditions need not be “expressly designated,” the court identified a set of regulations that, read together, appeared to limit MassHealth payment to properly supervised care. While such a fact-intensive dispute might at first appear an unlikely candidate for certiorari, UHS was one of several such “implied certification” opinions issued by the federal appellate courts in 2015. Perhaps because of its emotionally compelling facts – the other cases involved, inter alia, the recruitment practices of a for-profit college and a military contractor that falsified marksmanship scores – UHS was chosen as the vehicle to resolve a growing circuit split. Continue reading

Virginia’s Proposed Lethal Injection Secrecy Law

By Elizabeth Guo

On Monday, Governor Terry McAuliffe of Virginia proposed a significant change to the Virginia legislature’s bill to replace lethal injection with electrocution in death penalty cases. Instead of allowing electrocution, the amendment would give greater authority to the Department of Corrections (DOC) for procuring and making lethal injection drugs. Under the proposed amendments, the DOC could contract with a pharmacy to compound drugs necessary to carry out lethal injection. The amendments would also keep the names of drug suppliers and compounders secret by exempting the information from the Freedom of Information Act. Also, the names would not be discoverable “in any civil proceeding unless good cause is shown.”

States with capital punishment are increasingly resorting to state secrecy laws as they are finding it harder to procure the lethal injection drugs they need. At least fourteen states have passed or tried to pass rules keeping the names of lethal injection suppliers confidential. Some states, such as Georgia, define information about the drugs and equipment used in an execution as a “confidential state secret” so that the public prisoners and even courts are prevented from viewing the information. Other states, including Oklahoma, do not designate this information as a state secret but nonetheless, make the information unavailable through litigation. A few states allow litigants to discover the information through litigation, but the state does not need to make the information publicly available.

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FDA’s Relationship with Marijuana: It’s Complicated

By Elizabeth Guo

Marijuana and marijuana-derived products are top of mind for state legislatures these days. On March 10, the Virginia state legislature passed a bill legalizing cannabidiol oil, a marijuana-derived product, for patients who suffer from epilepsy. Other legislatures are actively debating measures to legalize cannabis-related products in their states, and many of these legislative proposals would allow cannabis-use for patients suffering from specific medical conditions. Last week, the Alabama state legislature debated a bill that would allow people to take cannabidiol to treat certain conditions, and Utah recently defeated a bill that would have allowed people with certain debilitating conditions to use a marijuana-related extract.

As more states pass bills allowing patients to use marijuana-derived products, will state laws clash with federal policies implemented by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)?

Marijuana is complicated. Marijuana refers to the dried leaves and flowers of the cannabis plant. All marijuana plants contain a mixture of molecules, including cannabinoids. Different cannabinoids can have different effects, and scientists have identified more than 200 different cannabinoids from marijuana plants. Some of the most well known cannaboids in marijuana include tetrahydrocannibonol (THC), cannabidiol (CBD), and archidonoyl ethanolamide (anandamide). Continue reading

Humanizing Pain: Advocacy, Policy and Law on Abortion, Execution and Juvenile Life Without Parole

By Robert Kinscherff

I recently attended a presentation on Fetal Pain: An Update on the Science and Legal Implications, jointly sponsored by the Center for Law, Brain and Behavior (Massachusetts General Hospital) and the Petrie-Flom Center (Harvard Law School).  Presenters were Amanda Pustilnik, JD (University of Maryland School of Law) and Maureen Strafford, MD (Tufts University School of Medicine). Video of the event is available on the website, and I encourage everyone to watch the full discussion for themselves.

Doctor Strafford delivered a masterful overview of the trajectory of scientific perspective and research about children and pain.  Over the course of her career, the medical perspective has transformed from “children do not feel pain” to “children do not remember pain” to inquiry into “when and how children feel pain.” Strafford described the medical complexities of understanding the physical and subjective aspects of pain as well as the impossibility of confidently “pinpointing” the exact point in fetal development when a neonate experiences pain.

Professor Pustilnik gave an equally compelling review of law and legal language regarding abortion, particularly law that specifically references fetal pain as a reason for limiting abortion.   This served to frame a conversation about pain and suffering in the law and the ways in which law reflects normative considerations and provides rhetoric (viewed respectively by partisans as “compelling” or “inflammatory”) to political discourse. In this case, discourse about fetal pain both attracts attention and is intended to facilitate empathy for the neonate. Continue reading

Changes in seasons, changes for children: Developments at the intersection of behavioral science, developmental neuroscience, and juvenile justice

By Robert Kinscherff

It is fitting that I am writing this first blog of my time as Senior Fellow in Law and Applied Neuroscience as we transition through the change of seasons.  It is a privilege to have the time afforded by this joint Fellowship between Harvard Law School (Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics) and Massachusetts General Hospital (Center for Law, Brain, and Behavior) to focus upon the intersections of behavioral science, developmental neuroscience, and juvenile justice.  The autumnal change of seasons is a fitting metaphor for the slow but profound changes occurring in juvenile justice which have been spurred in large measure by emerging neuroscience increasingly describing the neurobiology of adolescence.  This neuroscience provides the biological complement to what developmental psychologists have well described and what parents have long known:  Children are different.

This emerging neuroscience has become a quiet but increasingly pervasive force in helping us understand why most delinquent youth desist with maturation—even adolescents who are chronically delinquent and violent.  It helps us understand why punitive “tough on teen crime” approaches born of fears in the 1990’s of the rise of violent teen “super-predators” actually compromises public safety over time—especially when youth are tried as adults and incarcerated with adults.  And, it helps us understand why mass detention and incarceration of youth—many of them for non-violent offenses—not only harms those youth but tends to increase their risks of continued misconduct and of later deep penetration into the adult criminal justice system. Continue reading

23andMe Releases Transparency Report About Law Enforcement Requests for Customers’ Data

By Katherine Kwong

The direct-to-consumer genetic testing company 23andMe was widely discussed in the news recently after it announced it would resume providing health information to customers. Less widely reported was another important announcement: for what appears to be the first time, 23andMe has released a public report about the number of requests it has received from law enforcement seeking its customers’ genetic information. According to the Transparency Report, 23andMe has received four requests for user data from law enforcement, with five different affected users.

Although 23andMe has thus far successfully fought off all of the law enforcement requests for its users’ data, there has long been concern about the potential release of 23andMe’s customers’ information to law enforcement. The 23andMe Privacy Statement states, “23andMe will preserve and disclose any and all information to law enforcement agencies” when it believes it is required to do so. Even though 23andMe has not yet disclosed any of its users’ information, the day may soon come when it is required to do so. That disclosure could have significant impacts for not only users who consented to the use of their data, but for users’ families, who may be implicated through familial DNA searches.

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Public Safety and Public Health

This morning I saw an announcement about a new initiative called “Law Enforcement Leaders to Reduce Crime and Incarceration” and thought it was an important thing to share on this blog. This alliance consists of 120 top current/former police commissioners and prosecutors, including both district attorneys and state attorneys general. These law enforcement leaders have come together to influence legislation and public opinion around mass incarceration. Their first project: supporting the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, a bipartisan bill currently moving through the Senate. This issue matters because there are currently over 2.2 million people in American prisons and jails.

The United States incarcerates more of its citizens than any other nation on earth, and by a disturbing margin: we have just 5 percent of the world’s population, but 20 percent of the world’s prisoners. What’s more, our prison population has grown by over 500 percent since 1978. At any given moment, one in 35 Americans is in prison, on parole, or on probation.

Why is criminal justice a health policy issue? Well, there are many reasons, but let’s start with the fact that the largest mental health provider in the United States is the Cook County Jail. This does not reflect well on our criminal justice policy or our health policy.

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TODAY (9/28): From Troubled Teens to Tsarnaev Panel followed by PFC Open House

From Troubled Teens to Tsarnaev:Prisoner hands
Promises and Perils of Adolescent Neuroscience and Law
September 28, 2015, 4:00 – 5:30 PM
Wasserstein Hall, Room 1015
Harvard Law School, 1585 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA [Map]

Followed by the Petrie-Flom Center’s 2015 Open House reception in the HLS Pub (more information below)! Continue reading

Fetal Personhood and the Constitution

By John A. Robertson

The Rubio-Huckabee claim that actual and legal personhood start at conception has drawn trenchant responses from Art Caplan on the medical uncertainty of such a claim and David Orentlicher, drawing on Judith Thomson’s famous article, that even if a fetus is a person, woman would not necessarily have a duty to keep it in her body.

Their debate claim that the fetus is already a legal person under the constitution also deserves a response, for it has no basis in positive law.  In Roe v. Wade all nine justices agreed that the use of “person” in the Constitution always assumed a born person, and therefore that the 14th Amendment’s mention of person did not confer constitutional rights until after a live birth.  In the years since Roe, when the make-up of the court has changed, no justice has ever disagreed with that conclusion, including those who would overturn Roe and Casey. Continue reading

What Should the Future Look Like for Brain-Based Pain Imaging in the Law? Three Eminent Scholars Weigh In

By Amanda C. Pustilnik, Professor of Law, University of Maryland Carey School of Law; Faculty Member, Center for Law, Brain & Behavior, Massachusetts General Hospital

What should the future look like for brain-based pain measurement in the law?  This is the question tackled by our concluding three contributors:  Diane Hoffmann, Henry (“Hank”) T. Greely, and Frank Pasquale. Professors Hoffmann and Greely are among the founders of the fields of health law and law & biosciences. Both discuss parallels to the development of DNA evidence in court and the need for similar standards, practices, and ethical frameworks in the brain imaging area.  Professor Pasquale is an innovative younger scholar who brings great theoretical depth, as well as technological savvy, to these fields.  Their perspectives on the use of brain imaging in legal settings, particularly for pain measurement, illuminate different facets of this issue.

This post describes their provocative contributions – which stake out different visions but also reinforce each other.  The post also highlights the forthcoming conference-based book with Oxford University Press and introduces future directions for the use of the brain imaging of pain – in areas as diverse as the law of torture, the death penalty, drug policy, criminal law, and animal rights and suffering.  Please read on!

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Let’s Stamp Out Perversion

A cross-posting by Senior Fellow Amanda Pustilnik, which first appeared on the Cato Unbound Blog.

The civil commitment of sexually violent predators (SVPs) is designed to protect society’s vulnerable from a group of perverts and monsters. What could be wrong with this? Only everything.

The current SVP civil commitment regime is itself a perversion – of facts, of medical ethics, and of justice. Cato Unbound usually curates excellent debates, representing a range of opinions. But in this case, we contributors, from a spectrum of backgrounds and ideological commitments, all agree: This regime is abominable. Continue reading

Upcoming Event (6/30): Visible Solutions – How Neuroimaging Helps Law Re-envision Pain

brain_pain_slide_270_174_85Visible Solutions:
How Neuroimaging Helps Law Re-envision Pain

Tuesday, June 30, 2015
8:00 AM – 5:00 PM
Wasserstein Hall, Milstein West A
Harvard Law School [Map]

Can brain imaging be a “pain-o-meter” that tells courts when a person is in pain? Can fMRI help us discern whether intractable chronic pain is “all in your head” or all in the brain – or will it require us to reconsider that distinction? Leading neuroscientists, legal scholars, and bioethicists will debate standards and limits on how the law can use brain science to get smarter about a subject that touches everyone.

Panelists include: Continue reading

Pakistan’s “Last-Ditch Effort” To Eradicate Polio

Allison M. Whelan, J.D.
Senior Fellow, Center for Biotechnology & Global Health Policy, University of California, Irvine School of Law
Guest Blogger

In a previous post, I discussed three possible methods of increasing vaccination and decreasing vaccine refusals in the United States. One of these options was using tort law and allowing lawsuits against parents for refusing/failing to vaccinate their children. The Pakistani government has recently taken it one step further, arresting and issuing arrest warrants for parents refusing to vaccinate their children against polio. Last week,  approximately 512 people, 471 in Peshawar and 41 in Nowshera, were arrested and jailed and arrest warrants were issued for 1,200 more parents for refusing to vaccinate their children.

Currently, the government allows parents to be released from jail and return home if they sign an affidavit promising to vaccinate their children. Despite the fact there is no law requiring polio vaccination, some view the recent crackdown as “a blessing in disguise” for unvaccinated children. This drastic approach responds to high rates of refusal, a contributing factor to Pakistan’s significant number of polio cases. According to the World Health Organization, in the period since March 2014 Pakistan registered 296 polio cases, the most in the world and drastically higher than even the second-highest rate of 26 cases registered by Afghanistan. Why is Pakistan’s vaccination rate so low? For many reasons, including religious beliefs, attacks on medical workers, displacement of individuals due to ongoing military operations, and a lack of trust in health care workers and the vaccine. Continue reading

Problems with fMRI as a tool of lie detection

by Zachary Shapiro

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) evidence of lie detection has, appropriately, faced difficulty gaining evidentiary acceptance in criminal courts. While a comprehensive discussion of the case law is beyond the scope of this post, it is important to note that courts have repeatedly refused to admit such evidence, both under a Daubert test, using Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702, as well as under FRE 403.

Under Daubert, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, courts have found that fMRI lie detection falls short in meeting the necessary standards, including the identification of error rates and maintenance of uniform testing standards. Courts have also pointed out that the motivation to lie may be different in research v. real-world settings.[1] In a laboratory experiment, one can assume that the participant is complying with investigator directions. However, if the scan is to be used in the courtroom, the subject will have a personal interest in the outcome, and may try to employ counter measures, or disregard instructions, in order to “fool” the scanner. Recent research shows that this task may not be hard, at least not for those who know how to effectively “trick” the scanner.

Judges have highlighted that while there are peer-reviewed studies of fMRI lie detection, said studies have very small patient bases (all N<60), and included a range of participants who were not representative of the general population. Courts recognize that neuroimaging, for the purposes of lie detection, is still not generally accepted by the scientific community.[2] Both of these factors limit the applicability of the results to the general population, and to any individual defendant in particular.

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