It is no secret that more and more for-profit companies and non-profit organizations are using binding religious arbitration agreements as a means to bypass legal liability. It has been reported that entities that have little or no religious purpose, such as bamboo floor vendors and vocation cabin rental agencies, have quietly inserted binding arbitration clauses into everyday agreements. In the event of a dispute the consumers or victims cannot take these entities to a secular court, but rather to a religious tribunal that claims to be capable of settling any dispute using their interpretations of the Bible. A common reaction against these questionable practices follows this line of critique: shouldn’t religious arbitration, if tolerated at all, only be used for disputes concerning religious or spiritual matters on which the secular courts cannot adjudicate? What does buying bamboo floors or renting a vocation cabin have anything to do with Christian doctrines?
Unfortunately, these questions cannot adequately challenge the religious reasoning behind Christian arbitration agreements. This is due to the counter-intuitive fact that, according to relevant biblical texts, disputes settled in a so-called Christian arbitration tend not to be about important spiritual matters, but trivial matters instead. Here is the text pertaining to lawsuits among Christian believers:
“When one of you has a grievance against a brother, does he dare go to law before the unrighteous instead of the saints? 2 Do you not know that the saints will judge the world? And if the world is to be judged by you, are you incompetent to try trivial cases? 3 Do you not know that we are to judge angels? How much more, matters pertaining to this life! 4 (1 Corinthians 6: 1-4)
At first look, these verses seem to make a strong case for Christian arbitrations. However, upon a closer look, it could be argued that Christians can still settle disputes with others in court under certain circumstances. Verse 1 suggests that Christians shouldn’t “dare to go to law before the unrighteous instead of the saints,” but it only excludes the court system if we assume that the judges at the civil courts are all “unrighteous sinners”. What if they’re not? What if some judges turn out to be devout Christians in private or possess “righteous” and “saintly” qualities? The remaining verses all point to the scope of judging powers the believers are entitled to, since they are to judge the entire world and even angels. Nonetheless, the structure of these rhetorical questions is meant to convince the believers that because they are qualified to judge angels, trivial earthly matters should be a piece of a cake. Since the disputes between Christians are not at all about angels or the whole world, these lines essentially imply that the matters that fall under the purview of Christian arbitrations are precisely trivial matters pertaining to this life on earth, not complicated spiritual affairs. Continue reading →
Recently, the House of Representatives voted on and passed the ADA Education and Reform Act of 2017 — an update to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.). The bill changes the process by which private citizens with disabilities and disabling medical conditions can bring lawsuits to enforce statutory access requirements for places of public accommodation. Under Article III of the ADA, “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182. This covers attempts to explicitly discriminate against those with disabilities, refusals to make reasonable modifications to accommodate them, and failures to remove physical barriers to access for them — unless removing those barriers is not “readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A). One of the primary enforcement mechanisms for these provisions is private litigation brought against non-compliant establishments by those negatively affected by violations. See42 U.S.C. 12188.
As of late, however, there has been growing concern in Congress that this private enforcement avenue is too often abused by plaintiffs bringing unjustified or opportunistic lawsuits, and this is the issue the ADA Education and Reform Act of 2017 seeks to address. Under the proposed bill, lawsuits can no longer be immediately brought against non-compliant establishments. Instead, someone aggrieved by a failure of adequate access must send formal, written notification to the establishment and provide at least four months for the owner to begin dismantling the offending access barrier. Only then — if the owners fail to start the necessary improvements for four months — can a lawsuit be brought. Proponents of the bill believe these additional barriers will curb frivolous and abusive ADA lawsuits brought to enforce accessibility requirements against unsuspecting businesses unaware of their violations.
Co-Blogged by Christopher Robertson and Kelly McBride Folkers (research associate at the Division of Medical Ethics of the NYU School of Medicine)
In 2014, Arizonans overwhelmingly voted in favor of a ballot referendum that claimed to allow terminally ill patients the “right to try” experimental drugs that have not yet been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Despite the policy’s broad support, it has yet to help a single patient in Arizona obtain an experimental drug that they couldn’t have gotten before. Thirty-seven other states have also passed right to try bills, but likewise have seen little real impact for patients.
“Right to try” has moved to the federal stage, as the U.S. Senate unanimously passed such a bill last August without even holding a hearing. The House Energy & Commerce Subcommittee on Health considered the bill in an October hearing, but it failed to garner much enthusiasm among committee members. Vice President Mike Pence has advocated for a federal right to try law, and he recently met with FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb and House leadership to encourage pass of the bill this year. Continue reading →
“From Informed Consent to Shared Decision Making: How Patient Decision Aids Can Improve Patient Safety and Reduce Medical Liability Risk.” Download the presentation here.
Thaddeus Mason Pope is Professor of Law and Director of the Health Law Institute at the Mitchell Hamline School of Law. Pope joined Hamline University School of Law in January 2012 after serving as associate professor of law at Widener University School of Law. There, his research focused on medical futility, internal dispute resolution, tort law, public health law, and normative jurisprudence. He authors a blog on medical futility, reporting and discussing legislative, judicial, regulatory, medical, and other developments concerning end-of-life medical treatment.
Pope also taught at Albany Medical College and the University of Memphis. Prior to joining academia, he practiced at Arnold & Porter and clerked on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Pope earned a JD and PhD in philosophy and bioethics from Georgetown University.
NHS Resolution, an arm’s length body of the Department of Health that manages clinical negligence and other claims brought against the NHS in England, have just published a report on cerebral palsy legal claims. These claims are complex and result in large awards of compensation. In 2016-17, whilst the obstetrics specialty accounted for only 10% of the 10,686 claims received, they represented 50% of the £4,370 Million value of claims received.
Once case may cost £20 Million or more for one child. The report shows that the same errors are often being repeated and that key patient safety lessons go unlearned. The report analyses the data held by NHS Resolution on its claims management system on compensation claims for cerebral palsy that occurred between 2012-2016.There were 50 claims between this period that were suitable for review with a potential financial liability greater than £390 Million. This figure excludes the costs of defending the claim and the wider cost impact on the NHS as a whole. The results of the report are split into two parts. Part one looks at the quality of the serious incident (SI) investigation reports and part two looks at arising clinical themes. Continue reading →
Pancreatic cancer is one of the deadliest illnesses out there. The five-year survival rate of patients with the disease is only about 7%. This is, in part, because few observable symptoms appear early enough for effective treatment. As a result, by the time many patients are diagnosed the prognosis is poor. There is an app, however, that is attempting to change that. BiliScreen was developed by researchers at the University of Washington, and it is designed to help users identify pancreatic cancer early with an algorithm that analyzes selfies. Users take photos of themselves, and the app’s artificially intelligent algorithm detects slight discolorations in the skin and eyes associated with early pancreatic cancer.
Diagnostic apps like BiliScreen represent a huge step forward for preventive health care. Imagine a world in which the vast majority of chronic diseases are caught early because each of us has the power to screen ourselves on a regular basis. One of the big challenges for the modern primary care physician is convincing patients to get screened regularly for diseases that have relatively good prognoses when caught early.
I’ve written before about the possible impacts of artificial intelligence and algorithmic medicine, arguing that both medicine and law will have to adapt as machine-learning algorithms surpass physicians in their ability to diagnose and treat disease. These pieces, however, primarily consider artificially intelligent algorithms licensed to and used by medical professionals in hospital or outpatient settings. They are about the relationship between a doctor and the sophisticated tools in her diagnostic toolbox — and about how relying on algorithms could decrease the pressure physicians feel to order unnecessary tests and procedures to avoid malpractice liability. There was an underlying assumption that these algorithms had already been evaluated and approved for use by the physician’s institution, and that the physician had experience using them. BiliScreen does not fit this mold — the algorithm is not a piece of medical equipment used by hospitals, but rather part of an app that could be downloaded and used by anyone with a smartphone. Accordingly, apps like BiliScreen fall into a category of “democratized” diagnostic algorithms. While this democratization has the potential to drastically improve preventive care, it also has the potential to undermine the financial sustainability of the U.S. health care system.
Muchhasbeenwritten about the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s recent decision in Shinal v. Toms, in which the court held that a physician’s duty to obtain informed consent, as codified in Pennsylvania’s MCARE Act, is non-delegable. According to the court, a physician faced with an informed consent suit cannot defend himself on the grounds that the patient was adequately informed of the risks and benefits of treatment by a physician assistant, nurse, or other intermediary acting under the physician’s direction. Pennsylvania is not the first state to adopt this view – courts in other jurisdictions (Connecticut, Louisiana, South Dakota, Texas, New Mexico) have similarly held that the duty to secure informed consent rests with the treating physician alone.
The MCARE (Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error) Act was passed in 2002 to reform Pennsylvania’s medical malpractice laws, and refers to the duties and rights of “physicians” and “patients.” Shinal, likewise, addressed the issue of informed consent in the context of medical treatment. Thus, I was very surprised to learn that some commercial institutional review boards (IRBs), in reliance on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision, have been advising clinical trial investigators to revise their consent forms and processes to ensure that physician-investigators – and not recruitment coordinators, nurses, or other study staff – secure the consent of research participants.
Schulman, one of the most well-known commercial IRBs, recently posted about the Shinal case on its website; while noting that the case focused on medical malpractice “and does not address consent in the research context,” it advised investigators to “discuss with their legal counsel the impact of this decision on their consent process.” Sterling IRB had a similar post, advising investigators to “consider drafting consent form updates to clearly require that only physician members of the research team may obtain informed consent from a research subject.” In an e-mail that went directly to investigators and study staff, Sterling also suggested that they submit updated consent forms that “make clear that the only person who can obtain consent is the PI/physician.” A recent article in the Journal of Clinical Research Best Practice, titled “What Impact will the Shinal Case have on Informed Consent in Clinical Research?,” offered a more detailed analysis of the case, and concluded that “there is little to suggest that courts would not uniformly apply the same informed consent standards used in the medical practice to clinical research.” Continue reading →
Policymakers and scholars interested in medical malpractice and torts generally should read Billeaudeau v. Opelousas General Hospital Authority, — So.3d —-, 2016 WL 6123862 (La. 2016). In this recent and important decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that suits alleging negligent credentialing against a hospital sound in regular negligence, rather than medical malpractice, and consequently fall outside the purview of the state’s Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) and its limitations on liability. The Court made this decision in connection with the state’s cap on damages recoverable in medical malpractice actions, La. Rev. Stat. § 40:1231.2(B)(1), which limits the total amount that courts can award the victim to $500,000, plus interest and cost, on top of the victim’s future expenditures on medical care and support. For many victims of medical malpractice and their families this cap amount is meager, but the Court nonetheless upheld its constitutionality back in 1992. See Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp., 607 So.2d 517 (La. 1992).
The Court has now decided that suits alleging negligent credentialing against hospitals are not subject to this cap and that successful plaintiffs consequently will recover full compensation for any proven damage. Continue reading →
Critics call the plan crazy, unethical, and sure to fail. The likelihood of success is very low and the risk of Spiridinov dying is high. Spiridonov says that as soon as animal studies confirm the possibility of survival, the risks will be worth taking. He has Werdnig-Hoffmann Disease, a genetic disorder that destroys muscle and nerve cells. He is confined to a wheelchair and has lived longer than expected. Body transplantation offers him the best chance at a life worth living. Continue reading →
It is well known that maternal mortality rates in the United States are higher than in othercountries in the developed world, and that many of these deaths are preventable. But a report published by NPR last week, just a few days before Mother’s Day, drew a direct link between these poor maternal outcomes and health care providers’ focus on fetal health. The report quotes Barbara Levy, vice president for health policy and advocacy at the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, who said, “We worry a lot about vulnerable little babies, [but] we don’t pay enough attention to those things that can be catastrophic for women.” According to the authors of the NPR report, “newborns in the slightest danger are whisked off to neonatal intensive care units … staffed by highly trained specialists prepared for the worst,” while new mothers are instead monitored by nurses and physicians “who expect things to be fine and are often unprepared when they aren’t.”
These patterns are consistent with what Prof. Jamie Abrams calls “fetal consequentialism” – the premise that the birth of a healthy child outweighs any harm to the birthing mother. The increase in U.S. maternal mortality rates highlighted in the NPR report is certainly a product of such fetal consequentialism. So is the practice of obstetric violence, described in my previousposts, where health care providers dismiss birthing mothers’ informed requests for minimal intervention during labor and delivery in an effort to reduce the risk of fetal harm, even when that risk is minimal. Fetal consequentialism is likely driven not only by providers’ judgments of the relative liability risks for harms to fetuses versus harms to mothers, but also by conservative societal trends (evidenced by increasing anti-abortion legislation) that preference fetal interests over maternal interests. Continue reading →
There is growing public recognition that women’s autonomy rights during labor and delivery are being routinely violated. Though such violations rarely rise to the level of egregious obstetric violence I described in an earlier blog post, women recognize that hospital births, even for the most low-risk pregnancies, often involve cascades of medical interventions that lack evidence-based support and can have negative health consequences for both mother and child. Indeed, evidence suggests that an increasing number of women are pursuing options like midwife-assisted birth, delivery in free-standing birthing centers, and even home birth in an effort to avoid interventionist hospital practices. According to the 2013 Listening to Mothers Survey, nearly six in ten women agree that birth is a process that “should not be interfered with unless medically necessary.”
One tool that women frequently use to increase the likelihood that their autonomous choices will be respected during labor and delivery is the birth plan, a document that outlines a woman’s values and preferences with respect to the birthing process, and serves as a tool for facilitating communication with care providers. However, while most women view the creation of a birth plan as empowering, there is little evidence to suggest that the use of birth plans actually improves communication, increases women’s feelings of control, or affects the process or outcome of childbirth. In fact, there appears to be some resistance within the medical community to women’s reliance on birth plans, with one article describing “the two words ‘birth plan’ strik[ing] terror in the hearts of many perinatal nurses.” Continue reading →
In 2016, Facebook unveiled a new tool that allows users to post live streams of video directly from their phones to the social media platform. This feature — known as “Facebook Live” — allows friends and followers to watch a user’s videos as she films them. Originally conceptualized as a means of sharing experiences like concerts or vacations in real time, the platform was quickly adopted for uses Facebook likely didn’t see coming. In 2016, Lavish Reynolds used Facebook Live to document the killing of her boyfriend, Philando Castile, by the Minneapolis police, sparking a national debate surrounding police brutality and racial disparities in law enforcement. Recently, another use for Facebook Live has arisen — one that Facebook neither foresaw nor wants: people have been using Facebook Live as a means of broadcasting their suicides.
This tragic adaptation of the Facebook Live feature has put Facebook in a tough spot. It wants to prevent the suicides its platform is being used to document — and just a few weeks ago it rolled out real-time tools viewers of Live videos can use to identify and reach out to possible suicide victims while they’re filming — but it’s often too late by the time the video feed is live. Accordingly, Facebook is focusing its efforts at identifying those at risk of suicide before the situation becomes emergent. It currently has teams designing artificial intelligence algorithms for identifying users who may be at risk for suicide. These tools would scan Facebook users’ content, flagging individuals that have warning signs of self-harm or suicide in their posts.
The Department of Health in England have just published a consultation paper on the Governments proposal to introduce a Rapid Resolution and Redress Scheme (RRR) – a voluntary administrative compensation scheme for families affected by severe avoidable birth injury. Action against Medical Accidents (AvMA) the UK charity for patient safety and justice cautiously welcomes the stated intentions of the scheme but state that more thought needs to be given to the proposals. There needs to be more detail of the scheme and some serious concerns are expressed.
The case for change
There are central three policy objectives behind the (RRR) scheme:
Reducing the number of severe avoidable birth injuries by encouraging a learning culture.
Improving the experience of families and clinicians when harm has occurred; and
Making more effective use of NHS resources.
In the consultation paper, a leading policy justification for the (RRR) scheme is the success of a Swedish initiative called, ‘The Safe Delivery Care Project’ which shows evidence of a reduction of claims for severe neurological birth injury. Continue reading →
In 2013, Kimberly Turbin came to Providence Tarzana Medical Center for a momentous occasion – the birth of her first child. In the delivery room, she was surrounded by supportive family members. Her mother stood by her side with a video recorder, hoping to capture the once-in-a-lifetime event for posterity.
And this is where Kimberly’s birth story veers off course. According to the complaint filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court against her OB/GYN, Dr. Alex Abbassi, Kimberly is a survivor of sexual assault who had confided in the medical staff that she had previously been raped. She requested that the staff ask permission before touching her, and asked them to “be gentle.” And when Dr. Abbassi told Kimberly during delivery that he would be performing an episiotomy – a surgical procedure in which the perineum and vaginal wall are cut to provide more room for the baby to pass through the vaginal canal – Kimberly objected. When she asked why the episiotomy was necessary, Dr. Abbassi provided no medical justification. He responded, “What do you mean, Why? I am the expert here! … You can go home and do it! You go to Kentucky!” Kimberly continued to object, loudly saying “No!” and “No, don’t cut me!” numerous times. Dr. Abbassi proceeded nevertheless, cutting her perineum twelve times. A video of this entire encounter, which is extremely graphic and difficult to watch, is viewable on YouTube.
These allegations, if true, present a textbook case of battery – the defendant intended to cause contact with the patient, the contact was harmful and offensive, and the contact was neither consented to nor justified by any emergency. And yet, when Kimberly filed suit for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, Dr. Abbassi moved to dismiss her suit – he argued that because Kimberly’s claim was grounded in the failure to obtain informed consent, it constituted negligence under California’s medical malpractice laws and therefore was barred by a shorter statute of limitations. In June of 2016, however, Judge Benny Osorio denied Dr. Abbassi’s motion to dismiss the battery claim, holding that the “alleged act of proceeding against the express wishes of Plaintiff … is premised on intentional misconduct and not professional negligence.”
Recently, I wrote about the rise of artificial intelligence in medical decision-making and its potential impacts on medical malpractice. I posited that, by decreasing the degree of discretion physicians exercise in diagnosis and treatment, medical algorithms could reduce the viability of negligence claims against health care providers.
It’s easy to see why artificial intelligence could impact the ways in which medical malpractice traditionally applies to physician decision-making, but it’s unclear who should be responsible when a patient is hurt by a medical decision made with an algorithm. Should the companies that create these algorithms be liable? They did, after all, produce the product that led to the patient’s injury. While intuitively appealing, traditional means of holding companies liable for their products may not fit the medical algorithm context very well.
Traditional products liability doctrine applies strict liability to most consumer products. If a can of soda explodes and injures someone, the company that produced it is liable, even if it didn’t do anything wrong in the manufacturing or distribution processes. Strict liability works well for most consumer products, but would likely prove too burdensome for medical algorithms. This is because medical algorithms are inherently imperfect. No matter how good the algorithm is — or how much better it is than a human physician — it will occasionally be wrong. Even the best algorithms will give rise to potentially substantial liability some percentage of the time under a strict liability regime.
Artificial intelligence and machine-learning algorithms are the centerpieces of many exciting technologies currently in development. From self-driving Teslas to in-home assistants such as Amazon’s Alexa or Google Home, AI is swiftly becoming the hot new focus of the tech industry. Even those outside Silicon Valley have taken notice — Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center and the MIT Media Lab are collaborating on a $27 million fund to ensure that AI develops in an ethical, socially responsible way. One area in which machine learning and artificial intelligence are poised to make a substantial impact is health care diagnosis and decision-making. As Nicholson Price notes in his piece Black Box Medicine, Medicine “already does and increasingly will use the combination of large-scale high-quality datasets with sophisticated predictive algorithms to identify and use implicit, complex connections between multiple patient characteristics.” These connections will allow doctors to increase the precision and accuracy of their diagnoses and decisions, identifying and treating illnesses better than ever before.
As it improves, the introduction of AI to medical diagnosis and decision-making has the potential to greatly reduce the number of medical errors and misdiagnoses — and allow diagnosis based on physiological relationships we don’t even know exist. As Price notes, “a large, rich dataset and machine learning techniques enable many predictions based on complex connections between patient characteristics and expected treatment results without explicitly identifying or understanding those connections.” However, by shifting pieces of the decision-making process to an algorithm, increased reliance on artificial intelligence and machine learning could complicate potential malpractice claims when doctors pursue improper treatment as the result of an algorithm error. In it’s simplest form, the medical malpractice regime in the United States is a professional tort system that holds physicians liable when the care they provide to patients deviates from accepted standards so much as to constitute negligence or recklessness. The system has evolved around the conception of the physician as the trusted expert, and presumes for the most part that the diagnosing or treating physician is entirely responsible for her decisions — and thus responsible if the care provided is negligent or reckless. Continue reading →
As many readers of this blog know, the FDA requires that, prior to entering the market, companies prove safety and efficacy for each intended use of their products, but physicians are then free to prescribe the products for any other uses. (Companies are not allowed to promote off-label uses however.)
About two-thirds (63%) of Americans “would not take a doctor prescribed medication that has been approved by the FDA, but not for their specific condition.”
Almost all Americans (94%) “say they have never been told by a physician that a medication they were taking was not approved by the FDA for their condition.”
Patients are right to be skeptical of off-label uses, though they may not appreciate just how common they are. In fact, most off-label use is unsupported by scientific evidence as to safety and efficacy. A new report by the FDA illustrates several off-label uses that were subjected to rigorous clinical trials and turned out to be ineffective or dangerous. For example, Aliskiren is approved for treatment of hypertension and was used off-label for prevention of congestive heart failure (CHF) complications. A large trial showed that, although it did not significantly improve CHF mortality, it did significantly increase rates of kidney failure for CHF patients. We do not know how many other off-label uses would fail if similarly tested. Continue reading →
On Wednesday, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS)—an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—released a final rule that “will revise the requirements that Long-Term Care facilities [LTCs] must meet to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs” (1). (Almost all LTCs receive funds from Medicare or Medicaid.) This is the first time that these requirements have been “comprehensively reviewed and updated since 1991” (6)—that is, in the past 25 years. One of the most striking changes to the regulation is found in §483.65, where CMS “require[es] that facilities must not enter into an agreement for binding arbitration with a resident or their representative until after a dispute arises between the parties” (12) which means that CMS is “prohibiting the use of pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements” (12). Among the reasons provided by CMS for this change is a recognition of the notable power differential between LTCs and their residents:
There is a significant differential in bargaining power between LTC facility residents and LTC facilities. LTC agreements are often made when the would-be resident is physically and possibly mentally impaired, and is encountering such a facility for the first time. In many cases, geographic and financial restrictions severely limit the choices available to a LTC resident and his/her family. LTC facilities are also, in many cases, the resident’s residence. These facilities not only provide skilled nursing care, but also everything else a resident needs. Many of these residents may reside there for a prolonged period of time, some for the rest of their lives. Because of the wide array of services provided and the length of time the resident and his/her family may have interactions with the LTC facility, disputes over medical treatment, personal safety, treatment of residents, and quality of services provided are likely to occur. Given the unique circumstances of LTC facilities, we have concluded that it is unconscionable for LTC facilities to demand, as a condition of admission, that residents or their representatives sign a pre-dispute agreement for binding arbitration that covers any type of disputes between the parties for the duration of the resident’s entire stay, which could be for many years. (402-403)
As The New York Timesreported, when the rule was first proposed in July 2015, it was “aimed at improving disclosure.” But, this final version of the rule “went a step further than the draft, cutting off funding to facilities that require arbitration clauses as a condition of admission.”
What will happen to the current medical malpractice system under a single-payer system?
To answer this question, I started by looking at the information provided by Physicians for a National Health Program, whose mission is to replace the ACA (Affordable Care Act) with single-payer. On their website under Single-Payer FAQs, it says:
What will happen to malpractice costs under national health insurance?
They will fall dramatically, for several reasons. First, about one-fourth of all malpractice awards go to pay present and future medical costs (e.g. for infants born with serious disabilities). Single payer national health insurance will eliminate the need for these awards. Second, many claims arise from a lack of communication between doctor and patient (e.g. in the Emergency Department). Miscommunication/mistakes are heightened under the present system because physicians don’t have continuity with their patients (to know their prior medical history, establish therapeutic trust, etc) and patients aren’t allowed to choose and keep the doctors and other caregivers they know and trust (due to insurance arrangements). Single payer improves quality in many ways, but in particular by facilitating long-term, continuous relationships with caregivers. For details on how single payer can improve the quality of health care, see “A Better Quality Alternative: Single Payer National Health Insurance.” For these and other reasons, malpractice costs in three nations with single payer are much lower than in the United States, and we would expect them to fall dramatically here. For details, see “Medical Liability in Three Single-Payer Countries” paper by Clara Felice and Litsa Lambkros.
Let me address the most salient part of the above argument, which states that the significant burden of malpractice recoveries composed of future medical costs will be alleviated because all individuals will be insured. Continue reading →