Medical Malpractice Under a National Health System and the ACA

By Matthew H. H. Young

What will happen to the current medical malpractice system under a single-payer system?

To answer this question, I started by looking at the information provided by Physicians for a National Health Program, whose mission is to replace the ACA (Affordable Care Act) with single-payer. On their website under Single-Payer FAQs, it says:

What will happen to malpractice costs under national health insurance?

They will fall dramatically, for several reasons. First, about one-fourth of all malpractice awards go to pay present and future medical costs (e.g. for infants born with serious disabilities). Single payer national health insurance will eliminate the need for these awards. Second, many claims arise from a lack of communication between doctor and patient (e.g. in the Emergency Department). Miscommunication/mistakes are heightened under the present system because physicians don’t have continuity with their patients (to know their prior medical history, establish therapeutic trust, etc) and patients aren’t allowed to choose and keep the doctors and other caregivers they know and trust (due to insurance arrangements). Single payer improves quality in many ways, but in particular by facilitating long-term, continuous relationships with caregivers. For details on how single payer can improve the quality of health care, see “A Better Quality Alternative: Single Payer National Health Insurance.” For these and other reasons, malpractice costs in three nations with single payer are much lower than in the United States, and we would expect them to fall dramatically here. For details, see “Medical Liability in Three Single-Payer Countries” paper by Clara Felice and Litsa Lambkros.

Let me address the most salient part of the above argument, which states that the significant burden of malpractice recoveries composed of future medical costs will be alleviated because all individuals will be insured. Continue reading

Fighting the Next Pandemic: Airline Vaccine Screens

Whether it is Ebola, H1N1, the season flu, or the next nasty bug that we cannot yet even imagine, if we wanted to efficiently spread the disease, one could not do much better than packing several Flight routeshundred people into a cylinder for a few hours, while they eat, drink, defecate, and urinate.  Even more, to make sure that the disease cannot be contained in a particular locality, we could build thousands of those cylinders and move them rapidly from one place to another worldwide, remix the people, and put them back in the cylinders for return trips back to their homes, schools, and jobs.

We are (hopefully) not going to stop airline travel.  But we can make it a lot safer, by ensuring that almost everyone who boards these flights is vaccinated.  That’s the thesis of a new paper out this week.

Airlines carry two million people every day.  And, prior research has shown that airline travel is a vector of disease.  In fact, when the September 11 attacks caused airline travel to fall, seasonal flu diagnoses fell too.

The threat of pandemics is quite real, and more generally, the mortality and morbidity associated with infectious disease is a severe public health burden.  About 42,000 adults and 300 children die every year from vaccine-preventable disease.  New vaccines are on the horizon.

Arguably, airlines have market-based and liability-based reasons to begin screening passengers, whether for vaccinations generally or for particular ones during an outbreak.  Although the states have traditionally exercised the plenary power to mandate vaccinations, and have primarily focused on children in schools, the U.S. federal government also has substantial untapped power to regulate in this domain as well.

Surrogacy Contracts, Abortion Conditions, and Parenting Licenses

By Dov Fox

Everything went fine the last time for Melissa Cook, when the 48-year old mother of four carried a child for a family back in 2013 to supplement her office job salary. This time was different. First were the triplets. She had been impregnated with three embryos, created using eggs from a 20-something donor and sperm from the intended father who paid for everything. Then, it was that the man, Chester Moore, turned out to be a deaf 50-year-old postal worker who lived with his parents. Finally, was that Moore asked Cook to abort one of the fetuses. He said that he had run out of money to support a third child and worried the high-risk multiple pregnancy would endanger the health of any resulting children.

Cook, who is pro-life, refused. A battle over parental rights of the triplets, all boys, began even before they were born (prematurely, at 28 weeks). Moore argued that his surrogacy contract with Cook, explicitly enforceable under California law, made clear that he was the sole legal parent. Cook sued for custody, notwithstanding her prior agreement that any children resulting from the pregnancy would be his to raise. She argued that the statute, by authorizing private contracts for gestation of a human being, reduces children to “commodities” for sale, and a surrogate like her to a “breeding animal or incubator.” Continue reading

Hospitals’ Exposure to Products Liability Suits

By Alex Stein

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has recently delivered an important decision that opens up new possibilities for suing hospitals and clinics. This decision allowed a patient alleging that hospital employees injected her with a contaminated medication to sue the hospital in products liability. Gallinari v. Kloth, — F.Supp.3d —- (U.S.D.C. D.Conn. 2015), 2015 WL 7758835. Continue reading

New Developments in the Guatemala STD Experiments Case

In the late 1940s, US government scientists, in collaboration with Guatemalan counterparts, were involved in a horrible array of experiments on human subjects in which a variety of vulnerable groups in Guatemala were intentionally infected with syphilis, gonorrhea, and chancroid and left without treatment. [For more on how they ended up in Guatemala and the ethics of intentional infection studies, see my work here and here.] The experiments were done without consent and without scientific rigor, violating both contemporaneous and modern ethical standards.  They were not uncovered, however, until a few years ago when a historian discovered the files in the midst of doing archival research on one of the scientists, who had also been involved in the Tuskegee syphilis study in the US.

Since her discovery, the US and Guatemalan governments have both issued apologies and reports condemning the studies (here and here), and the US pledged a relatively small amount of money to support the Guatemalan government’s efforts to improve surveillance and control of H.I.V. and other sexually transmitted diseases in that country. However, individual compensation to the victims of the experiments and their families has not been forthcoming; the victims calls for a voluntary compensation program to be established have gone unheeded, and they have also been unable to prevail in court, for a variety of jurisdictional and technical reasons.

As Glenn Cohen and I argued following the victims’ first court loss in 2012, compensation is a moral imperative.  We expressed support for a voluntary compensation program, but in its absence, alternative mechanisms of justice are essential.  Therefore, we were heartened to hear that a petition for the victims was just filed in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Washington, D.C., by the Office of Human Rights for the Archdiocese of Guatemala, represented by the UC Irvine School of Law International Human Rights Clinic and The City Project of Los Angeles.  The petition claims violations of the rights to life, health, freedom from torture, and crimes against humanity under both the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as the denial of a right to a remedy for human rights violations.

There are still a number of hurdles ahead, not the least of which is determining which individuals would actually be entitled to compensation, as the record keeping in the initial experiments was so poor and so much time has passed.  But we are heartened that advocates are still pressing forward for these victims and hope that justice, though certainly delayed, will not continue to be denied.

More information on the petition is available here.

(UPDATED) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Granted in Looney v. Moore (SUPPORT trial lawsuit)

UPDATE: Plaintiffs have filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Their brief is due on October 19.

The district court has granted summary judgment (opinion pdf) for all remaining defendants as to all of plaintiffs’ remaining claims in Looney v. Moore, the lawsuit arising out of the controversial SUPPORT trial, which I last discussed here. This therefore ends the lawsuit, pending possible appeal by the plaintiffs.

Plaintiff infants include two who were randomized to the low oxygen group and survived, but suffer from “neurological issues,” and one who was randomized to the high oxygen group who developed ROP, but not permanent vision loss. In their Fifth Amended Complaint (pdf), plaintiffs alleged negligence, lack of informed consent, breach of fiduciary duty, and product liability claims against, variously, individual IRB members, the P.I., and the pulse oximeter manufacturer. What unites all of these claims is the burden on plaintiffs to show (among other things) that their injuries were caused by their participation in the trial. Continue reading

The Curious Case of “Mr. Oft”

by Zachary Shapiro

In the course of my year-long project with Petrie-Flom, I am studying the potential impact of neuroimaging techniques on criminal law. During the course of my research, I found a story of an individual whose case presents difficult questions for our conceptions of criminal guilt and responsibility. [1] While this may be a bit longer than a normal entry, I want to share this story with you.

In 2000, a 40 year-old man, “Mr. Oft”, found himself developing an increasing, and nearly uncontrollable, interest in child pornography.[2] Mr. Oft began collecting pornographic material, while making efforts to conceal his behavior from his family, and from those who knew him. Collecting pornography gave way to soliciting prostitution at “massage parlors,” and while Mr. Oft at first made careful attempts to conceal his actions, his aberrant behavior continued, and soon Mr. Oft was obsessively collecting and downloading child pornography, both at work and at home.[3] Before long, Mr. Oft began making subtle sexual advances toward his prepubescent stepdaughter. After several weeks, his stepdaughter informed his wife of this behavior, leading to the discovery of his newly collected child pornography.[4]

After his wife reported him, Oft was found guilty of child molestation and was ordered to either undergo inpatient rehabilitation in a 12-step program for sexual addiction or go to jail. Despite Oft’s strong and clear desire to avoid prison, he found himself unable to resist soliciting sexual favors from staff and other clients at the rehabilitation center. The center expelled him, and Mr. Oft prepared to go to jail. However, the night before his sentence was to begin, Oft was admitted to the University of Virginia Hospital emergency department complaining of severe headaches. In the course of his neurological examination, Oft made numerous sexual advances towards the hospital staff, and appeared totally unconcerned after urinating on himself. This behavior, combined with his seemingly unsteady gait, caused doctors to undertake a full neurological evaluation, eventually ordering an MRI scan of his brain.

Continue reading

Recommended Reading: New Empirical Analysis of False Claims Act Whistleblower Litigation

By Kate Greenwood
[Cross-posted at Health Reform Watch]

Late last year, the Columbia Law Review published David Freeman Engstrom’s Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, the fourth in a series of articles Professor Engstrom has written on the growth and evolution of qui tam litigation. (My colleague Associate Dean Kathleen Boozang wrote about the first three at Jotwell, here.) Private Enforcement’s Pathways, like the articles that precede it, brings a welcome dose of data and empirical analysis to a controversial area of the law, the debate over which has at times generated more heat than light.

Professor Engstrom’s analysis rests on a database he built containing information on the roughly 6,000 unsealed FCA cases that have concluded in a litigated judgments or settlement since 1986. In response to Freedom of Information Act requests, the Department of Justice provided information on the judicial district in which each case was filed, the date that DOJ decided whether or not to join each case, and the outcome of each case (including the amount, if any, that the government recovered and the whistleblower’s share of that recovery). DOJ also provided the date of filing for the 3,000 cases filed since 1986 that remain under seal, as well as for the 6,000 unsealed cases. From PACER, Professor Engstrom retrieved information on the parties, law firms, and individual lawyers involved in each unsealed case. Continue reading

Clinical Trials Regulation in India

An op-ed from our friends Mark Barnes and Barbara Bierer at Harvard’s Multi-Regional Clinical Trials Center on recent legal changes to India’s clinical trial requirements, arguing that using the clinical trial context to promote a social or political policy agenda in India may sacrifice scientific integrity in the service of social justice.  A quick snippet:

The overbreadth of these requirements, and how poorly tailored they are to achieve the specific goal of protecting clinical trial participants from risks directly caused by trials themselves, leaves one wondering whether the regulatory authorities fully comprehend the clinical trial process and the nuances of complex medical and biological processes. One further wonders whether what animates these measures may be less a concern for specific justice in individual cases than the goal of righting social wrongs and achieving social justice, unrelated to but prompted by clinical trial experiences. Achieving social justice and a more just allocation of social resources may be completely laudable – even desirable – as social or political policy, but unconsciously using the clinical trial context to promote this agenda threatens to corrupt science and to undermine health, with results that may create more social distress than social justice.

Read the full piece here.

And more commentary from MRCT on this issue:

Upcoming Fairness Hearing in NFL Concussion Litigation

By Christine Baugh

On November 19, Judge Anita Brody will hold a fairness hearing in the class action lawsuit of National Football League (NFL) Players v. NFL re: concussion injury. This is one of the final steps toward final approval (or rejection) of the settlement in the case. Before final approval Judge Brody must determine that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for the over 20,000 retired NFL players who are included in the class. A variety of concerns have been brought forth publicly regarding the proposed settlement, which received preliminary approval from Brody earlier this year. Around 140 retired NFL players filed objections to the proposed settlement and around 200 have opted out of the class. This blog post provides a brief overview of the settlement and objections to it.

Settlement terms (summarized):

  • Monetary Awards for those with a qualifying diagnosis. Award amount is determined based on a sliding scale that factors in diagnosis, age, and years played in the NFL.
  • Baseline Assessment Program. Class members who are Retired NFL Players have the option to participate in a baseline assessment and medical monitoring program.
  • Education Fund will be established to promote safety and injury prevention in football.

The long-form settlement document can be viewed here.

Concerns (summarized, non-exhaustive): 

A variety of concerns regarding the preliminarily approved settlement have been brought forth through the media and other channels. These are the types of issues that will likely be discussed at the fairness hearing and that Judge Brody will have to weigh in her determination of whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable for the class as a whole.

Many concerns regard the categories of diagnosis that are eligible for compensation.

Compensable categories are too restrictive: Under the current settlement agreement, former players can be compensated if they have a qualifying diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS, or Lou Gehrig’s disease), death with chronic traumatic encephalopathy (between January 1, 2006 and July 7, 2014), and what are called Level 2 and Level 1.5 Impairment (these categories represent a pattern of performance on a battery of neurocognitive tests that is 2 or 1.7-1.8 standard deviations below normal, respectively). Some have argued that, although the categories included are important to compensate, there are other prevalent problems such as pituitary dysfunctiondepression, and mood and behavioral disorders that are associated with repetitive head trauma and should also be covered by the settlement agreement. Others are concerned that there are characteristics about the existing categories that are problematic (see next two points below).  Continue reading

Update: Proposition 46

By Emily Largent

I previously wrote about California Proposition 46–which proposed to raise the cap on pain and suffering awards in malpractice cases from $250,000 to $1.1 million, require doctors to check a statewide database of drug prescriptions before prescribing some narcotics, and require doctors to undergo random drug and alcohol testing–here.

What happened?  On Tuesday, voters “soundly defeated a proposal to lift a decades-old cap on courtroom damages for medical negligence, after a multimillion-dollar political duel pitting trial lawyers against doctors and insurers.”  Proposition 46 was defeated by a 2-to-1 margin, with 67% of voters rejecting it. (There is some speculation that an error in translation for voter materials could have affected the way Vietnamese-speaking voters voted on Tuesday; however, there is no suggestion this would have changed the outcome.)

Proposition 46 was the most expensive race in California this election.  The No side spent close to $60 million in its efforts to see the Proposition defeated, almost seven times the spending on the Yes side.

The Medical Liability Climate: The Calm Between Storms Is the Time For Reforms

By: Michelle Mello, JD, PhD
Stanford Law School and Stanford University School of Medicine

On November 4, Californians will vote on Proposition 46, a ballot initiative to adjust the $250,000 state’s noneconomic damages cap in medical malpractice cases for inflation, raising it to $1.1 million virtually overnight.  It’s a long overdue move – California has one of the most stringent damages caps in the country, and the cap really affects access to the legal system.  Now is the perfect time to do it, because after years of turbulence, the medical liability environment has calmed.

In an analysis published October 30 in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), David Studdert, Allen Kachalia and I report that data from the National Practitioner Data Bank show that the frequency and average cost of paid malpractice claims have been declining.  The rate of paid claims against physicians decreased from 18.6 to 9.9 paid claims per 1,000 physicians between 2002 and 2013, with an estimated annual average decrease of 6.3% for MDs and a 5.3% decrease for DOs. Among claims that resulted in some payment, the median amount paid increased from $133,799 in 1994 to $218,400 in 2007, an average annual increase of 5%. Since 2007 the median payment has declined, reaching $195,000 in 2013, an average annual decrease of 1.1%.

Trends in insurance premiums vary more according to which market you’re looking at, according to data from the Medical Liability Monitor’s Annual Rate Survey, but also look pretty favorable overall. None of the locations we examined showed large increases over the last 10 years, and most showed flat or declining premiums.  Continue reading

Doctors’ Decision-Making: Regression Proof?

By Kate Greenwood
[Cross-posted at Health Reform Watch]

As I have blogged about before, last year, in Kaiser v. Pfizer, the First Circuit joined the handful of courts to have approved a causal chain of injury running from a pharmaceutical company’s fraudulent promotion, through the prescribing decisions of thousands of individual physicians, to the prescriptions for which a third-party payer paid.  To establish but-for causation in the case, Kaiser submitted an expert report and testimony from Dr. Meredith Rosenthal, a health economist at the Harvard School of Public Health. Dr. Rosenthal conducted a regression analysis to determine the portion of physicians’ prescribing of the drug Neurontin that was caused by the defendant’s fraudulent promotion, arriving at percentages ranged from 99.4% of prescriptions for bipolar disorder to 27.9% of prescriptions for migraine.

Pfizer argued that Dr. Rosenthal’s regression analysis should not have been admitted (and at least suggested that such an analysis should never be admitted in a third-party payer case) because regression analysis could not “take into account the patient-specific, idiosyncratic decisions of individual prescribing physicians.” Dr. Rosenthal’s report, the company argued, “merely demonstrated ‘correlation’ and not ‘causation.’”  The First Circuit disagreed, upholding the lower court’s determination that the challenged evidence was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, because “regression analysis is a well-recognized and scientifically valid approach to understanding statistical data” and because it “fit” the facts of the case.

Eric Alexander, a partner at Reed Smith, made a similar argument to Pfizer’s when he critiqued a decision issued in July in a third-party payer case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Writing at the Drug and Device Law blog, Alexander criticized the court for failing to address “the fundamental—to us—issue of whether an economist [Dr. Rosenthal was the plaintiff’s expert in that case, too] can ever determine why prescriptions were written.”  Alexander points out that “[t]o get to millions of dollars of revenue from prescriptions, many physicians have to prescribe the drug to many patients[,]” and those physicians can “pretty much do what they want[.]” Economists, Alexander argues, should not be allowed to by-pass this complexity and simply “assume” causation.

I would argue that, as idiosyncratic as physician decision-making may be, it is not uniquely so.  Continue reading

Medical Malpractice in Reproductive-Choice Procedures

By Alex Stein

Malpractice suits filed in connection with reproductive-choice procedures often present unique problems. The suit filed by Jami Conner against her former gynecologist, Dr. Bryan Hodges, is a case in point. The plaintiff, a mother of two children, decided that she did not want to have more children. To avoid future pregnancy, she asked the defendant to perform bilateral ligation of her tubes and the defendant granted her wish. Two and a half years later, however, the plaintiff discovered that she was pregnant again. Her suit against the defendant promptly followed that discovery. Continue reading

Evidential Damage: Liability for Uncertainty in Medical Malpractice Suits

By Alex Stein

As I wrote in my book with Ariel Porat, Tort Liability Under Uncertainty, our torts system must develop systematic remedy for wrongful inflictions of evidentiary harm.

The Florida Supreme Court’s recent decision, Saunders v. Dickens, — So.3d —- (Fla. 2014), is a case in point. Continue reading

The $4 billion Medical Data Breach Case That Lost Its Way

By Nicolas Terry

Sutter Health v. Superior Court, 2014 WL 3589699 (Cal. App. 2014), is a medical data breach class action case that raises questions beyond the specifics of the Californian Confidentiality of Medical Information Act.

The stakes were high in Sutter — under the California statute medical data breach claims trigger (or should trigger!) nominal damages at $1000 per patient. Here four million records were stolen.

Plaintiffs’ first argued the defendant breached a section prohibiting unconsented-to disclosure. The not unreasonable response from the court was that this provision required an affirmative act of disclosure by the defendant which was not satisfied by a theft.

A second statutory provision argued by the plaintiffs looked like a winner. This section provided, “Every provider of health care … who creates, maintains, preserves, stores, abandons, destroys, or disposes of medical information shall do so in a manner that preserves the confidentiality of the information contained therein.” Continue reading

Michael Jackson and Emotional Damages

by Dov Fox

You know the King of Pop died in 2009 while rehearsing for a comeback tour in London. Here’s a twist you may not have heard about: Michael Jackson fan club members sued Conrad Murray, the doctor who administered the lethal overdose of anesthesia. And the celebrity enthusiasts won. A French court recently awarded five of the grieving fans economic damages (albeit just a euro each) to compensate for their emotional suffering.

The case highlights a neglected problem in our own law, not just medical malpractice, but constitutional and common law too. It’s this: Supreme Court rules and policies about harm, compulsion, and intentionality rely on the flawed assumption that operations of the mind are meaningfully distinct from those of the body. In our new essay on Dualism and Doctrine, Alex Stein and I (1) demonstrate just how this fiction distorts the law, (2) argue that the reasons for its persistence cannot save it, and (3) identify the ways in which courts should uproot dualism’s pernicious influence on our legal system. Continue reading

Pom Wonderful v. Coca-Cola: Will the Supreme Court’s Decision Have Implications Beyond “Pomegranate Blueberry Flavored Blend of 5 Juices”?

By Kate Greenwood

Cross-Posted at Health Reform Watch

On April 21st, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Pom Wonderful v. The Coca-Cola Company, a case in which Pom sued Coke under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act arguing that Coke’s product “Pomegranate Blueberry Flavored Blend of 5 Juices” was misleadingly named.  Coke countered that the suit should be dismissed because the name was specifically authorized by the Food and Drug Administration’s regulations governing flavored juice blends, and both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.

In its opening brief filed last week, Pom argues that neither the provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act governing food and beverage labeling generally, nor the regulations that specifically address juice blends, precludes the application of the Lanham Act to Coke’s misleading juice label.  This conclusion, per Pom,

“follows inexorably from this Court’s holding in Wyeth v. Levine … that FDA’s approval of a drug label does not displace state failure-to-warn suits challenging the adequacy of the warning. … Following Wyeth, there can be no serious argument that the provisions of the FDCA are in ‘irreconcilable conflict’ with the Lanham Act.  FDA does not even generally review—much less approve—particular food labels; nothing even arguably prevented Coca-Cola from designing its label to avoid misleading consumers; and FDA has given no indication that its juice-naming rules set the outer bounds of labeling regulation.” 

In its brief opposing Pom’s petition for certiorari, Coke distinguished Wyeth, noting that the provisions of the FDCA governing drug labeling do not expressly preempt state regulation.  The provisions of the FDCA governing food and beverage labels, by contrast, “expressly supplant State laws—including those that imposed more ‘stringent’ requirements[.]”  This, Coke argued, shows that the food and beverage statutory provisions and their implementing regulations “were not intended as a ‘floor’ but rather as the exclusive body of regulation to which food and beverage labels would be subject.”

In her latest article, The Magical Thinking of Food Labeling: The NLEA as a Failed Statute, Diana Winters decries the time and money courts deciding food and beverage labeling cases must spend “negotiating the interaction between federal and state law, with inconsistent outcomes”.  Continue reading

Tips from a former medical student – Part II

By Deborah Cho

[See Part I here]

Last week, I wrote the first of a two-part series on tips that may be helpful for law students and lawyers interested in or working in health/medical law.  I continue with Tip #4 here.

4. If you need to learn about a disease, procedure, or drug that you know nothing about, your best starting point is probably Wikipedia.  Google will lead you to some incorrect answers, and diagnose-yourself websites will give you answers that are much too broad to use practically in legal practice.  Once you have familiarized yourself with the general topic on Wikipedia, you can then go back to your search engine of choice for more specific terms and weed out the wrong information.  Starting on PubMed or GoogleScholar probably isn’t the best idea either because most of what you’re reading will be highly technical and the articles you find will likely be about novel uses or instances of whatever you’re searching.  Another fantastic source is UpToDate, an evidence-based Wikipedia-like source for healthcare providers, but many people may not have access to all the information on this site.

Continue reading