The Medical Protection Society (MPS) have recently published a report arguing that the rising costs of clinical negligence needs to be urgently controlled. They state that the NHS is struggling under the increasing burden of clinical negligence costs and suggest some reforms.The report is detailed and thorough and raises some good and interesting points but in reading it, it should be remembered that there is also a very good contrary position that can be advanced by those who act for patients in clinical negligence litigation. This report puts the issues to test.
The report begins by looking at the increasing costs of clinical negligence claims. Costs have increased over the years and the figures are stark. The report quotes figures from NHS Resolution, the new name for the NHS LA (National Health Service Litigation Authority) who estimates that the provision for future clinical negligence costs, relating to claims arising from incidents that have already occurred, stands at £56.1 billion:
“Expenditure on clinical claims by NHS Resolution increased by 72% (11.5% a year on average) over the five years to 2015/16. Should this trend continue it risks becoming wholly unsustainable for the NHS and wider society, which ultimately pays for these cost. Last year alone, nearly £1.5billion was spent and, put into context, this equates to the cost of training over 6,500 new doctors.(p4).”Continue reading →
My friend and mentor, the former Israeli Chief Justice Aharon Barak, used to say that when neither side likes the court’s decision, chances are that the court was right. This is likely to be the case with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision on vaccine manufacturers’ liability, N.W. et al. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD, C‑621/15. Popular press reacted to this decision with sharp criticism that included unsubstantiated assertions about the European law of products liability, about what the Court did and did not say, and about the economics of vaccines. My short blog-post, which appeared here, offered a more positive (and hopefully more informative) assessment of this decision and its implications. I argued that the decision was balanced and well grounded in the principles of evidence and products liability. The follow-ups and subsequent analyses that appeared in Nature, Science and Hipertextual (in Spanish) have largely vindicated the decision (while citing some of its critics alongside the decision’s supporters such as myself).
To remove any remaining confusion about the implications of the ECJ decision, I thought I should clarify the Court’s statement that a vaccine liability suit can only succeed when the plaintiff proves that the vaccine complained against was “defective” within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the European Council Directive on products liability (85/374/EEC) (the Directive). Critics of the Court’s decision have uniformly missed this important proviso. Continue reading →
The World Health Organisation (WHO) has just produced a very informative and helpful report on the need to view patient safety as a global concern and to highlight resources that they have made available to deal with the problem and those in development. Patient safety is a fundamental principle of health care and this is fully acknowledged in the report. The report begins by quoting several facts and figures which emphasize the fact that medical errors should be regarded as a matter of acute global concern:
“According to a new study, medical errors are the third leading cause of death in the United States. In the United Kingdom, recent estimations show that on average, one incident of patient harm is reported every 35 seconds. Similarly, in low- and middle income countries, a combination of numerous unfavourable factors such as understaffing, inadequate structures and overcrowding, lack of health care commodities and shortage of basic equipment, and poor hygiene and sanitation, contribute to unsafe patient care (p1).”
Approximately two-thirds of all adverse health events happen in low-and middle-income countries. Fifteen per cent of hospital expenditure in Europe can be attributed to treating patient safety accidents. Continue reading →
In a recent decision, Volk v. DeMeerleer, 386 P.3d 254 (Wash. 2016), the Washington Supreme Court relaxed the “control” prerequisite for psychiatrists’ duty to protect third parties against violent patients.
The Court made this decision in a case involving a psychiatric patient who murdered his girlfriend and her nine-year old son and then committed suicide (after attempting to kill the girlfriend’s older son as well). For nine years leading up to that tragedy, the patient received outpatient care from the defendant psychiatrist, during which he expressed suicidal and homicidal ideations (without naming the potential victims).
The Court held that the psychiatrist had a “special relationship” with the victims because he was able to control the patient. Correspondingly, the psychiatrist had a duty to exercise “reasonable care to act consistent with the standards of the mental health profession, in order to protect the foreseeable victims of his or her patient.” The Court reasoned in this connection that some ability to control the patient’s conduct is sufficient for the “special relationship” and the consequent duty of care to exist. For that reason, psychiatrists should assume responsibility not only for an inpatient’s actions, but also in connection with an outpatient’s violence against third parties. Continue reading →
Policymakers and scholars interested in medical malpractice and torts generally should read Billeaudeau v. Opelousas General Hospital Authority, — So.3d —-, 2016 WL 6123862 (La. 2016). In this recent and important decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that suits alleging negligent credentialing against a hospital sound in regular negligence, rather than medical malpractice, and consequently fall outside the purview of the state’s Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) and its limitations on liability. The Court made this decision in connection with the state’s cap on damages recoverable in medical malpractice actions, La. Rev. Stat. § 40:1231.2(B)(1), which limits the total amount that courts can award the victim to $500,000, plus interest and cost, on top of the victim’s future expenditures on medical care and support. For many victims of medical malpractice and their families this cap amount is meager, but the Court nonetheless upheld its constitutionality back in 1992. See Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp., 607 So.2d 517 (La. 1992).
The Court has now decided that suits alleging negligent credentialing against hospitals are not subject to this cap and that successful plaintiffs consequently will recover full compensation for any proven damage. Continue reading →
It is important to take a broad holistic approach when looking at patient safety policy development and practice in the NHS. There cannot be a one size fits all approach and a number of possibly quite disparate organisations and stakeholders in the NHS and beyond must be consulted and involved so that effective and positive culture change takes place.
The CQC (Care Quality Commission) is a major patient safety culture change agent whose job is to ensure that health and social care services provide people with safe, effective, compassionate and high-quality care. The CQC encourages care service providers to be on an upward trajectory of improvement. They have recently produced a report to analyse what impact they have on quality and improvement in health and social care. The report provides evidence that the CQC is having a significantly positive impact on regulating care and ensuring good standards.
A majority of new providers and registered managers responding to a CQC survey said that their guidance and standards are clear. The CQC approach to regulation and their standards have an influence on how some providers measure their own quality. CQC inspection reports were also said to be useful. Continue reading →
The NHS LA is a pivotal organisations in the NHS whose work has a daily impact on the lives of patients and on all those who work in the health service. The NHS LA have recently published its new five year strategy which reveals some very interesting and informative data, trends, insights into patient safety and regulation, governance and litigation.
NHS LA functions
If you work as a solicitor, lawyer handling NHS clinical negligence claims, acting either for an injured patient or a hospital then the NHS LA will be a daily feature of your professional life. They appoint solicitors to act for the hospital or other NHS organisation which is being sued from an approved panel of law firms and manage the claims process. Continue reading →
The OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) have recently published a report on the economics of patient safety.The report is in two main sections, section 1, the cost of failure and section 2, reducing harm effectively and efficiently.
Section 1 focuses on a review of the literature in the area. The reports begins by making the point that health care has always been and continues to be, a risk-laden activity:
“While modern medical sciences can certainly do more, the risks of complication, error and harm are commensurately greater.” (p.9)
The report states that adverse health care events can happen at any point of the patient’s journey and can vary between care settings. Similar causative factors can be attributed to most types of harm.On the world patient safety stage, the report states that despite global efforts to reduce the burden of patient harm in developing countries, the situation does not appear to have changed over the past 15 years. WHO data is cited from 2000 which indicates that two –thirds of all adverse events occurred in low-and middle income countries. The risk of patient death as a result of an adverse event appears to be much higher in developing countries with some estimates suggesting that as many as one in three adverse events result in the patient’s death. The report does suggest some ways forward in avoiding adverse health care events in developing countries. Continue reading →
The Department of Health in England have just published a consultation paper on the Governments proposal to introduce a Rapid Resolution and Redress Scheme (RRR) – a voluntary administrative compensation scheme for families affected by severe avoidable birth injury. Action against Medical Accidents (AvMA) the UK charity for patient safety and justice cautiously welcomes the stated intentions of the scheme but state that more thought needs to be given to the proposals. There needs to be more detail of the scheme and some serious concerns are expressed.
The case for change
There are central three policy objectives behind the (RRR) scheme:
Reducing the number of severe avoidable birth injuries by encouraging a learning culture.
Improving the experience of families and clinicians when harm has occurred; and
Making more effective use of NHS resources.
In the consultation paper, a leading policy justification for the (RRR) scheme is the success of a Swedish initiative called, ‘The Safe Delivery Care Project’ which shows evidence of a reduction of claims for severe neurological birth injury. Continue reading →
“The NHS stands on a burning platform — the model of acute care that worked well when the NHS was established is no longer capable of delivering the care that today’s population needs. The need for change is clear, but finding the resources and energy to deliver change while simultaneously providing safe patient care can seem near impossible.” (p.4)
This statement raises the fundamental question of whether the current model of the NHS is,’ fit for purpose’? The NHS since its formation has always had both a good and bad press. Since its inception it always been short of resources. Changing times bring with them new demands which can make established health care delivery structures obsolete and no longer capable of delivering optimal performance. One important NHS developing health care trend is the need to keep pace with a growing elderly population with more complex health needs along with other trends. Continue reading →
PACAC, the House of Commons, (Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee) has just published its analysis of the PHSO’s, (Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman ) second report into the tragic death of Sam Morrish, a three year old child whose death from sepsis was found to have been avoidable. PACAC is composed of MP’s (Members of Parliament) and its remit includes considering matters relating to the quality and standards of administration provided by civil service departments which includes the Department of Health. PACAC also examines the reports of the PHSO.
The PACAC report is very thorough and detailed and really gets to grips with the issues surrounding NHS (National Health Service) health adverse incident investigation. It addresses very clearly the current challenges and opportunities in this area and puts forward some major concerns which need to be fully addressed by the NHS before it can be said to have a listening and learning culture. It is clear from reading the report that the NHS has a very long way to go before it can be said to be even close to reaching its listening and learning culture attainment goal.
The PACAC report also identifies what could be regarded as some muddled thinking by the Department of Health on the concept of the ‘safe space’ in NHS investigations and identifies some important patient safety policy gaps.
In the UK, the Department of Health (DH) have just published a consultation paper on introducing fixed recoverable costs in lower value clinical negligence claims. The document contains some controversial proposals which many claimant, patient lawyers are very concerned about. They feel the proposals will make it much harder for patients with lower value claims to find a solicitor to fight their case .The publication of the consultation paper comes in the wake of criticism that some clinical negligence claimant lawyers, solicitor firms , make excessive and unreasonable costs demands. The NHS LA (The National Health Service Litigation Authority) which manages negligence and other claims against the NHS in England states:
“Claimant costs for lower value claims are disproportionate and excessive. For claims where compensation is less than £10,000, claimant lawyers recover almost three times more in costs on average.”(p.10)
The DH Consultation Paper begins by stating the annual cost of clinical negligence in the NHS. It has risen from £1.2bn in 2014/15 to £1.5bn in 2015/2016.Legal costs were 34% of the 2015/16 expenditure.The consultation paper states that the current system of claims resolution is often lengthy and adversarial. This creates what can be termed a dual problem. Delaying possible learning of lessons from incidents and also escalating the costs of litigation when claims are brought. Continue reading →
This Article advances a novel positive theory of the law of torts that grows out of a careful and extensive reading of the case law. The Article’s core insight is that the benefit from the harm-causing activity determines the form and substance of tort liability. This finding is both surprising and innovative, since tort scholars universally believe that the operation of the doctrines that determine individuals’ liability for accidents—negligence, causation, and damage—is driven by harms, not benefits. The key role of benefits in the operation of our tort system has eluded the searching eye of scholars, even though it is fully consistent with the case law.
Specifically, this Article shows that our tort system operates in two parallel modes—private and public—rather than just one, as conventional accounts erroneously suggest. Furthermore, the system’s mode of operation and the rules allocating liability for accidental harm are dictated by the type of the benefit sought by the alleged tortfeasor. If the benefit sought by the tortfeasor is purely private, she will be held liable for the harm resulting from her actions whenever she exposes her victim to a nonreciprocal risk. The tort system never allows actors to inflict harm on others when the benefit they seek to derive from their activity is purely private, no matter how significant that private benefit is relative to the victim’s harm. The system consequently does not hesitate to discourage the production of private benefits even when they are economically more valuable than the victim’s safety. That is, in cases of private benefit, tort law excludes cost-benefit analysis in favor of the reciprocity and equality principles. When the benefit that accompanies the harm-causing activity is public, by contrast, tort law adopts a strictly utilitarian approach and focuses exclusively on minimizing the cost of accidents and the cost of avoiding accidents as a total sum. Liability in such cases is imposed based on the famous Learned Hand formula (and similar formulations). Accordingly, if the benefit from the harm-causing activity is greater than the expected harm and precautions are too costly, no liability will be imposed. The consequent reduction in the victim’s protection is counterweighted by society’s need not to chill the production of public benefits that the victim enjoys on equal terms with all other members of her community. Continue reading →
The same story involving a federally qualified health center (FQHC) repeats itself again, again, and now again: see Phillips v. Generations Family Health Center, — Fed.Appx. —- (2016), 2016 WL 5340278 (2d Cir. 2016).
A patient from Connecticut receives medical treatment from a physician who works at a Connecticut-based facility known as Generations Family Health Center. This center is an FQHC and the physician is consequently deemed a federal employee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)-(n) (as explained, inter alia, in Phillips v. Generations Family Health Center, 723 F.3d 144, 145 (2d Cir. 2013)). The patient is unaware of this fact even though she could easily find it on the center’s website and in this database that belongs to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Subsequently, when the patient suspects that her physician committed malpractice, she and her attorney sue him in a Connecticut court because they believe him to be just a regular doctor from Connecticut. Alas, they could only sue the physician according to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) after going through a mandatory administrative claim process at DHHS. 28 U.S. Code §§ 1346 (b)(1), 2675. When they realize it, the suit becomes time-barred pursuant to the FTCA, 28 U.S. Code § 2401 (b) (“A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.”). Continue reading →
As many readers of this blog know, the FDA requires that, prior to entering the market, companies prove safety and efficacy for each intended use of their products, but physicians are then free to prescribe the products for any other uses. (Companies are not allowed to promote off-label uses however.)
About two-thirds (63%) of Americans “would not take a doctor prescribed medication that has been approved by the FDA, but not for their specific condition.”
Almost all Americans (94%) “say they have never been told by a physician that a medication they were taking was not approved by the FDA for their condition.”
Patients are right to be skeptical of off-label uses, though they may not appreciate just how common they are. In fact, most off-label use is unsupported by scientific evidence as to safety and efficacy. A new report by the FDA illustrates several off-label uses that were subjected to rigorous clinical trials and turned out to be ineffective or dangerous. For example, Aliskiren is approved for treatment of hypertension and was used off-label for prevention of congestive heart failure (CHF) complications. A large trial showed that, although it did not significantly improve CHF mortality, it did significantly increase rates of kidney failure for CHF patients. We do not know how many other off-label uses would fail if similarly tested. Continue reading →
Arbitration clauses in nursing home agreements are pretty much standard. Whether such a clause precludes tort actions complaining about the resident’s wrongful death is consequently an important issue. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently addressed this issue in Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 147 A.3d 490 (Pa. 2016). In that case, the resident’s family members sued the nursing home in their individual capacity as derivative victims of the alleged tort (the wrongful death action) and as representatives of the resident’s estate (the survival action). In the wrongful death action, the plaintiffs sought compensation for the emotional harm they sustained from losing their loved one prematurely and possibly for their economic losses as the resident’s dependents (the Court’s decision provides no details on that). The survival suit, on the other hand, focused on the resident’s entitlement to be compensated for pain and suffering and other harms she sustained from the alleged negligence. This entitlement belonged to the resident’s estate rather than her successors as individuals.
The agreement between the resident and the nursing home contained a standard compulsory arbitration provision that covered any resident’s suit against the nursing home. This provision consequently extended to the survival action, but not to the wrongful death suit filed by the nonparties to the agreement. However, under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 213(e), wrongful death and survival actions cannot be bifurcated and must be tried together. Based on that rule, the trial court decided that the two actions must be consolidated, and because one of the actions fell outside the scope of the arbitration provision, both actions should go to trial.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned this decision for failure to account for the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), as interpreted (inter alia) in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985); AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346 (2011); and KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S.Ct. 23, 26 (2011). Continue reading →
Under Massachusetts law, suits alleging medical malpractice in a treatment of a minor patient must be filed “within three years from the date the cause of action accrues.” G.L.c. 231, § 60D. In a recent case, Parr v. Rosenthal, 57 N.E.3d 947 (Mass. 2016), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided that a patient’s continuous treatment by the same physician can toll this period under certain restrictive conditions. One of those conditions requires the plaintiff to show that the physician continued to treat the patient “for the same or related condition” after committing the alleged malpractice, and that “treatment” in that context includes supervision of, as well as consultation and advice to, other treating physicians. Another condition makes continuous treatment part of the discovery rule that moves the onset of the limitations period to the day on which the patient knew or could have reasonably suspected that her physician treated her negligently. According to the Court, continuous treatment instills in the patient “innocent reliance” that the physician treats her properly, which makes the physician’s malpractice not reasonably discoverable. Moreover, innocent reliance can even be present when the patient realizes that she sustained harm from the physician’s treatment. As the Court explained, “A patient who continues under the care of the same physician will still have the same challenges in learning whether the harm [she] suffered from the physician’s treatment arose from the physician’s negligence.” Based on these observations, the Court decided that the “continuous treatment” rule will not benefit patients who affirmatively suspected that they received negligent treatment from their physician. Such patients, the Court held, cannot show “innocent reliance.” Continue reading →
The National Health Service (NHS) in England’s quality regulator, the Care Quality Commission (CQC) has recently published a highly critical report on the way patient deaths are investigated in the NHS. The investigation follows events at the Southern Health NHS Foundation Trust where a number of failings were identified in the way patient deaths were identified and investigated. Certain groups of patients including people with a learning disability and older people receiving mental health care were far less likely to have their deaths investigated by this Trust. The Secretary of State for Health called for a CQC investigation into how acute, community and mental health NHS facilities across the country investigate and learn from deaths. The findings of the report are not good and major improvements in this area are needed across the NHS.
There are failings in openness, transparency and missed opportunities to learn important patient safety lessons. Families of patients and carers told the CQC reviewers that they often have a poor experience of investigations and are not always treated with kindness, respect, honesty and sensitivity. The CQC states that across their review they were unable to identify any NHS healthcare facility that could demonstrate good practice across all aspects of identifying, reviewing and investigating deaths and ensuring that learning from the events is implemented. Continue reading →
In Chirillo v. Granicz, — So.3d —- (Fla. 2016), 2016 WL 4493536, the Florida Supreme Court formulated an important rule for psychiatric malpractice cases. Back in 2001, the First District Court of Appeal decided that psychiatrists assume no liability for an outpatient’s suicide because it is generally unforeseeable. Tort liability, it held, can properly be imposed on a psychiatrist only for a custodial psychiatric malpractice. According to the First District, an inpatient’s suicide is foreseeable and psychiatrists can effectively prevent it by restraining the patient. Lawlor v. Orlando, 795 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).