By Alex Stein
When Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 1946, it did not envisage that its formulation of the federal government’s liability will allow members of the military forces to sue the United States for service-related noncombatant injuries. The Supreme Court closed this gap in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). It held that FTCA did not waive the government’s immunity from tort liability for members of the military and supported that interpretation by a number of reasons. First and most important, FTCA made the government liable in torts according to state laws that do not – and are not authorized to – govern the distinctly federal relationship between the government and its armed forces. Second, Congress has established a uniform compensation scheme for injured and fallen soldiers (the Veterans Benefit Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 301, et seq.). Four years later, in United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954), the Court rationalized Feres as protecting military discipline as well.
Based on these rationales, the Court subsequently decided that Feres also protects the government against suits for derivative harms sustained by civilians. Specifically, it held that when a military person’s “injury incident to service” is the “genesis” of a civilian’s harm, the civilian cannot sue the government. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
These decisions did not envision the present-day inflow of women into the military and that pregnant servicewomen will be receiving obstetric care at military facilities. For these women and their newborns, the implications of Feres in the event of medical malpractice are unclear. Continue reading