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Refining Thoughts on Madster

Slept on it, and my fears have moderated a little. Some of this may be redundant – I’m just trying to talk out my thoughts as I analyze the case.

James Grimmelmann has a good post on the topic.  He points out how Posner does provide a blueprint for people who want to argue substantial non-infringing uses. Someone also added a helpful comment at Lawmeme about how this may be a step up from the Napster standard.


I think it’s important to recognize, as those two do, that Posner appears to chip away at one of the most harmful parts of the Napster opinion.  If knowledge alone is enough to trigger contributory liability, even people like Morpheus are in danger. Knowledge of one infringing use isn’t enough. From what I can tell, Posner means that you have to know about a substantial number of infringing uses, and you have to know about them when getting rid of them would not be too burdensome.


So here’s where my fears might be unfounded. If you read Napster to mean that contributory liability rested only on the knowledge standard, Posner is helping out, pushing us closer to the Grokster standard. The “cabined within the architecture of the system” language only exists in the vicarious liability section of Napster, and you could read the passing references to material contribution and ability to purge material in the contributory section as irrelevant. (Posner almost collapses the distinction between the two doctrines, which seems rather reasonable.)

Moreover, even if you don’t read Napster that way (and I don’t think you should, particularly in light of Grokster), you could read Posner’s decision as ultimately equalling the Grokster and Napster standards. That isn’t such a bad thing in that it aligns it with Grokster. It simply emphasizes the point that knowledge alone is not enough.

So my only real worry, then, is that you can read Posner’s decision as meaning, if it’s not costly, you should have to completely reengineer your system if doing so will prevent infringing uses. Posner didn’t do this in the language of Grokster, which focused on whether Grokster and Morpheus could act on their knowledge of infringing uses at that particular moment given their current systems’ designs.


Here’s what counters that fear: the fact that Posner doesn’t think AIM would be at risk, even if it used encryption for privacy purposes. If AIM, which has access to its servers, wouldn’t have to do anything, Morpheus probably wouldn’t have to do anything. Probably.


I still worry about these vague standards. The law is all about line drawing, and some lines I guess are better than no lines. But the fact that so much hinges on a case-by-case cost-benefit analysis means that this will continue to be a problematic legal issue. Again, think about what Professor Lessig said before the argument: “If innovators have to guess how a federal court will balance the effects of its technology upon copyright interests, then there will be less innovation. Thus the genius of its rule was that it said essentially this: if your technology is “capable” of a “substantial noninfringing use,” then the question of whether your technology should be permitted is no longer a judicial question.”

The extreme version of Sony is long dead, but that doesn’t mean we should forget the “genius” of it, that it created a framework where innovators could innovate without being worried about what they could be sued for.

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