FWIW: I’ve added a blogroll section as well as a public poker blog aggregator. If you’d like your blog included in the aggregator, send me an email.
Filed by at 12:21 am under dtrStories
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Played my first 500 hands of Party Poker over the last day. Since I had never played online before and I don’t have a large bankroll, I played it safe and only went in for two 50 dollar bonuses – that way, if I made money off the bonuses, I’d have some money built up to play through a bigger deposit for IGMPay. My plan is to build a small online bankroll from bonus whoring exclusively – I don’t have the means to play beyond that. Playing 1/2, I was technically a little down after the 500 hands, but I was, in terms of actual money in my pocket, way up because of the bonuses. Nothing like getting paid to practice my poker game. Once my next deposit goes through, I’ll start towards the next bonus, eyeing a move to 2/4 where the rake is better.
I’ll have more to say about this session later. Again, some real bad luck (I cannot seem to win with Aces, Kings, or Queens), but, again, more mistakes.
One piece of SSHE that I have incorrectly implemented is playing overcards. I always pay attention to the backdoor drwas but I don’t think I measure the strength of the board enough. I tcan’t just be raggedy; it’s got be raddedy and not TOO coordinated (otherwise, there’s probably something reasonably strong out there) but not too uncoordinated either (in that case, they aren’t on a draw and must have a pair and possibly a reverse dominating one). I also don’t think I have a good enough sense of how to measure whether I can get people out by playing aggressively in a large pot. Particularly in the 1/2 games, people have resolved to stay in the hand or not whether it’s one bet or two.
I also make a wide variety of river mistakes. On my first time playing in a casino ever, I raised way too much with the second-to-absolute-nuts. I thought, “well, he might call me with X” when that was highly unlikely or “he might have been raising with just a set that can’t beat my flush” when he had a full house. Really silly stuff. Then, I swung in the other direction, and didn’t bet enough on the river. I’d go into a shell with solid hands, even when draws didn’t come through.
Last night, there was one time where I made the former mistake by betting only when I could be beaten and I should have known he rivered his fullhouse given the betting patterns (he had raised pre-flop, I flopped the nut straight to the ace, we had been raising to the limit on flop and turn, so the board pairing should have clued me in – duh). Oh well, one BB lost, not a huge deal.
But there were many other more complicated situations with varied results. Throughout the 500 hands, I noticed people (in general, not just against me) check-raising the river. Mostly, they had the nuts, but sometimes it was indeed a bluff-raise. There was less predictability, so betting for value was harder to do. When semi-scare cards would fall, I found it difficult to figure out how to play.
My biggest problem is when I’ve got something like AK, with an A on the table, with board semi-coordinated. If they called my raise pre-flop, and they check-called with me all the way, have they hit their draw? Did they hit a two pair?
I also made some good laydowns in medium-sized pots. But there were enough mistakes of these varieties to make me notice the issues.
Filed by at 7:51 pm under dtrStories
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Since I haven’t played any more poker this week, this is a good time to bring up a topic I’ve had on my mind: WLLH v. SSHE. I want to make a couple points about the differences, leading to a way people might consider transitioning from the former to the latter approach. Maybe fellow studious newbies will find this useful.
Ed Miller’s main point – that WLLH is too cautious and weak – seems correct. As I’ve said, I fully buy into Miller’s approach. To point out just two important categories of play, his reasoning seems right in relation to playing overcards and playing the turn. But, in certain circumstances, Lee actually recommends aggression, but he just doesn’t make his point strongly and clearly.
Consider WLLH p. 77 (2nd edition, of course), “when you flop second or bottom pair.” Miller advocates that in large pots, it’s worth playing certain marginal hands, like second or bottom pair with an overcard kicker and/or backdoor draws, aggressively in order to knock out players. Jones starts his section by saying “Normally, it’s best to check and fold,” but then goes on to say that you can continue when the pot is large and you have overcard kicker and/or backdoor draws. But what is large? Miller defines it; Jones does not. And how to continue? Miller describes when and how to knock out players; Jones merely alludes to such actions throughout his post-flop discussions.
Those points of clarity are some of the most important in Miller’s book. You are not there to win pots; you’re there to win money. You can win one pot all day and come out ahead, so you need to seize opportunities to win large pots. Jones says this, but doesn’t clearly tell you how to do so.
Miller does. So if you’re a beginniner who’s started with Lee Jones and wants to transition out of it, start by focusing on those pieces. Focus on the chapters on large pots and protecting your hand. Also, check out the section on partial and hidden outs. Read the whole thing, but that’s a good way to start making the transition. Considering a more cautious approach might be more appropriate because you’re (I’m?) just starting out, you can start by becoming more aggressive in the situations that most clearly require it.
A point on why lack of experience might require caution and thus an approach closer to WLLH, consider this Ed Miller statement: “If your opponents have done nothing but check and call so far, assume that they have weak hands and act accordingly. If you have a good hand like top pair or an overpair, that usually means that you should continue betting until you are raised.”
Now, I fully agree with Ed Miller in general. It’s a good assumption – I’ve seen that with many low-limit players. But in particular contexts I’ve seen check and call mean many different things. Not just the typical slowplaying of a set for a raise on the turn. In my short trip to the Palms, I ran into some people who checked and called with excellent hands. For instance, I had AKs and raised pre-flop. There was a little glint in an older (60s or 70s) gentleman’s eye, calling the raise. Not sure what to make of it. Possibly 6 or 7 people call, we’ve got a big pot. Flop comes with an A and a Q and a rag two clubs out there. I bet or raise (not sure if someone had bet already), knock out everyone else but the older gentleman. Non-club falls on the turn. He checks, I bet. He calls. Could be on a draw. When the K of clubs falls on the river, the pot is now pretty big, so I check and call. What does he show? Pocket Qs for a flopped set. Why did he not raise me on the flop or turn? Probably he was fearing that I’d draw out of him and then oh god he’d lose more money even though he was way ahead at that point. Or maybe he feared Aces. I don’t friggin know. All I do know is that he played a huge set almost as slowly as he possibly could. He was in a perfect space to sucker me, given I had AK and he could probably put me on a big Ace because of the pre-flop raise. If he’s lucky, I have AQ.
All this to say: in context, a check and a call can mean many things. Miller’s assumption will work most of the time. Adjusting to the times when it is not right, however, will greatly help. If you cannot identify those contexts, a more cautious approach might be worthwhile – you may just be setting traps for yourself. In this example, the bets on my part were clearly good; however, with a slightly different hand (say, just top pair without a great kicker, an example Miller notes), maybe Jones’ caution is better if you are just a beginner.
Filed by at 9:48 pm under dtrStories
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Welcome to everyone finding their way here from Iggy‘s or elsewhere. I’m glad to be joining this community.
After last week’s losses, it’s time to work back some of the money, and then start planning a homegame for when I get back to school. Apparently, there are a bunch of games around Tufts University. If you’re in the Boston area, drop me a line. Hopefully, I’ll write something a little later on this week.
In the meantime, content yourself with my aggregator and check out this article about my hometown’s poker scene, by one of my best friends.
Filed by at 2:30 am under dtrStories
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The trip ended the way it began, with a similarly bad loss. The money I budgeted for the trip and the money I received as a poker present are gone, but I was thoroughly entertained for 18 total hours this trip and I didn’t spend beyond my budgeted means – what really bugs me is the losing. A couple of notes to sum up what I’m thinking about aftewards:
1. One play has really gotten to me – AQo, with JT47 on board, including two diamonds, with 9 bb bets in the pot on the turn. Here’s the dilemma for me. If the diamond draw is out there, that reduces all of my draws. Also, given that there is a bet and a call into me, there’s probably a pair out there. Maybe even one that reverse dominates my Ace. What’s more, if I pair my Queen, that puts three to a straight out there. If you were to count my inside straight draw as four outs, and add 3 outs for the combined overcards, that’s 7 outs, plenty of odds to call. If you discount the overcards for the reasons suggested, that’s just 4, and would be barely enough if you imagine both players calling on the river for 11 bb bets implied odds. I’d feel better if I could imagine them both betting and calling in front of me again so I could trap for 3-4 bets. If you discount the K of diamonds, that’s a mere three outs, probably not enough. Not to mention the 3/4 of a BB rake. So I fold and the K of hearts shows up, sure enough.
First, why was I talking myself out of all these outs in a pre-flop raised pot with two callers on the flop and two staying with me until the river? Why was I assuming the worst case scenario? Maybe it would have been a long term unprofitable call, but I think I became way too paranoid about all my draws not being good, even it is actually was right to fold (which I’m not sure it was). Second, why, later in the game, was I thoughtless with these draws in somewhat smaller pots? Where’s the balance in my approach – not too paranoid but not too fearless either? Was I tilting? What’s going on? It’s not the decision so much that bothers me, because in context, given how I felt about the players that I was against, it might have been right – but my approach to the decision in the first place seems wrong.
This is connected to my main problem applying Ed Miller, which is the balance between not leaking chips, and remembering that a lost bet can be at worst just one lost bet, but folding is at worst an entire large pot, and, moreover, forfeits your current pot equity. I do not think I am applying this balance properly at all. I find that, for the most part, I played pretty well all week, and did lose a lot because of just a bad string of cards as well as bad luck with my moderate, good, and great hands. It happens. But it’s compounding all that with decisions that could cost me 10 BB and at most lose 1 BB – compounding it with bone head plays. That’s what really bugs me.
2. Related point: how can I tell what’s attributable to a bad swing and what’s attributable to bad play? The former makes me think, I’ll get em next time, so just keep going ahead. The latter makes me think, there is no right time to sit down if you are not a good enough player. The right answer is some of each. Keep going ahead, but practice more – keep thinking. Don’t use luck as an excuse to play beyond your means, but don’t use bad play as a reason to play scared or doubt yourself completely.
I think it’s time for some non-casino play, and hopefully some time in a regular game. Hopefully with some amicable people at school willing to chat about the concepts – I find discussing plays with others helps. I want to play in that environment, or bonus whoring online – haven’t even tried that yet, though I wouldn’t want to play with anything more than the bonus whore money.
3. Related again: losing big in the short term is hard in a game that’s all about winning long term. It’s hard to situate this setback in the context of my attempts to become long-term profitable. My grandmother’s fallacious composition, “Well, if you’re losing in the short run, doesn’t that just add up to losing in the long run?” has some truth in it. That is, if you’re a perpetual short run loser, you are by definition a long term loser. But how I do I get a sense of how bad a swing is? From talking to friends, it doesn’t seem THAT bad – then again, I consider those friends to be better than I am, so they will ride out that swing.
4. Why were these losses much bigger than in July? I suppose I played a lot more and I always played in 2/4 instead of 1/3. But I played worse in July in some ways. Was it because I’m being more aggressive, a la Ed Miller, and thus have a better chance to win bigger? Or was I misapplying Ed Miller, making myself more likely to lose bigger all the time than a weaker Lee Jones-centered approach?
Yesterday, I had a terrible first three hours, that basically depleted most of my bankroll – couple suck outs that really damaged me. Then, I spent the next three hours siphoning off half what I lost in the first three, with just no good cards to play most of the time and winning a whole two pots, one semi-large one small. Was it just that shift that led to the different losses during similar segments of time?
Okay, that feels a bit better. This is all rather silly feeling, because I read all these other poker bloggers who just seem to get it and have no trouble. I’m sure they had to work hard for awhile to get there, and I still have confidence that I can be a long term profitable player, with enough time and practice. Not now, but eventually. I guess it’s better to start off a loser than to win at first and think I’m doing everything right, right? Well, at this point, it wouldn’t feel bad to win for a change. In due time.
Filed by at 8:58 pm under dtrStories
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These are just some notes on reasons for raising, just to help organize these strategies. This is not meant to be comprehensive- just a start. Most of the time, I’ll be talking about the flop.
1. Raising to protect your hand – getting others to fold and buying outs. Ed Miller writes, “Protecting your hand is the art of placing your opponent in … lose-lose situations,” in which calling is not correct but folding, of course, means he has no chance of making his hand and winning. Either way, you win; improper calls are how you make most of your money, and folding knocks him out and improves your odds. This can be useful with strong but vulnerable hands or even marginal hands, as knocking out players can be crucial to improving your chances of winning. If you are ahead, you should not let them draw out on you profitably.
Even if you are behind or do not have a made hand, you still might want to protect your hand. If you somehow make a better hand fold, that is incredibly beneficial. Also, say you have a strong draw along with over cards, a raise can help “buy outs.” Someone with a low pair who has you reverse dominated (e.g., he has pair of 4s with Ace kicker and you have AT, overcards to the board – an Ace gives you top pair but gives him two pair) may fold, opening up some doors to win. It is helpful when this raise can also be “for value” (see below) even if they call, but, with strong draws, this need not always be the case.
Sometimes a raise will not protect your hand on the flop, and it is better to wait for the turn to raise. For instance, if the board is very coordinated, and/or your edge in the hand is only slight, it is better to wait to throw a big bet or even two big bets into your other opponents. You will do so if a “safe card,” one unlikely to make anyone’s hand, comes off on the turn. Also, if the original bet is on your left, your extra bet will often not force anyone to fold and will only make calls profitable on the turn. Again, pushing only moderate edge in this instance would be unwise. Finally, raising in a very large pot will often not protect your hand, and you must wait for the double sized bet of the turn; when you just call on the turn, you are more likely to be bet into on 4th street, giving you a chance to raise.
2. Raising for value or to push an edge. A bet is “for value” if your bet as a percentage of the callers is less than your chance of winning the hand. For instance, say you have a 1/3 chance to win, bet, and get 3 callers. You contribute 25% of the money in that situation, but have a 33% chance to win. You make money on the proposition in the long run.
Filed by at 3:23 am under dtrStories
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A minor loss today, but very solid, much better play overall. Very happy with that. I avoided the silly leaks from the small blind and with chasing overcards too much. I probably won’t get to all the good stuff, because the interesting hands I want to talk about generally aren’t the ones I want to talk out. Let’s break it down, getting the worst out of the way first:
Tight weak play of the day: I have KJ of hearts, call from EP, gets raised in MP by a solid (but not brilliant) player who I played with yesterday, about seven total callers, I call. Flop comes with AQ of hearts along with a medium diamond. MP raiser bets out, a couple folders, then I raise, two or three people fold, MP player calls, not sure whether I should read him as reluctant or merely questioning my play. We’re now heads up. Blank non-diamond comes off on turn, I check, he checks. Blank comes off on river, completing neither flush nor straight, I check, he checks, he shows pocket 10s.
I don’t know what my strategy was on this, so let’s cut the bullshit: I played it wrong. Let me rethink each stage of it. First, on the flop, I appear to have 12 outs with my gutshot draw to the royal. The raise doesn’t seem terrible because I figure a couple people had to get a piece of this, and my raise could both be a raise for value or a setup for a free card play depending on the situation. 12 outs twice is very strong. A call might have been more appropriate, to setup a play on the turn. I don’t think setting up a raise on the turn or raising on the flop would buy me any extra outs given the texture of the flop. So not sure here.
Now, on the turn, I should have bet out. At this point, there’s 9 big bets in the pot. Though my draw remains incredibly strong, the bet isn’t clearly for value heads-up unless I am certain of the implied odds. But that’s not the point. The point is that it was heads-up and I forgot to consider all the strategic implications of that. I am so used to everything being multiway on the turn, particularly when there are 7 people preflop calling a raise with a A and Q out, that I missed this key part.
The permutations: If I bet out on the turn, three things can happen. (1) He can raise, at which point I can call, and, if I make my flush or straight, I can still feel fairly confident that I have the best hand unless it pairs the board; if I don’t make my hand, I lose 2 big bets. (2) If I bet out and he calls, I can bet out again if I make my hand, or bet out again on the river in an attempt to steal the pot. After all, if he didn’t raise on the turn, that might mean he has only a Q, and a K might even be good for me, maybe. (3) If I bet out and he folds, hurray for me. In any case, worst case situation is that he calls me again on the river, and I lose two big bets.
What if I check? Well, he can check back, at which point I have a couple options on the river: check on the river if I miss (with absolutely ZERO positive expectation), bet out if I make my hand and perhaps get a call (my check on the turn suggests a draw of some kind), or bet out again as a bluff. The difference with a semi-bluff here is that it’s weaker because I didn’t bet the turn. So it’s worst case of one lost bet in this permutation, but it has a lesser positive expectation as well. If I check and he bets, I have to call, and my situation on the river remains much the same. If I make my hand, I may win a bet; if I miss it and bluff, it’s a weaker semi-bluff, or I can simply check and fold if I miss. Again, probably worst case of one lost bet with lesser positive expectation. Finally, I could check raise the turn, which sets me up for a possible reraise, particularly if he has a set which he would wait to raise with on the turn. That would lead to potentially three lost bets, and, furthermore, the check raise probably has no better semi-bluff effect than betting out on the turn and river. So let’s disregard this option.
Now add it all up. If I bet out on the turn and plan to follow through with a call if there’s a raise or bluff on the river, I’m worst case going to lose 2 bets. By stealing the pot or making my hand, I will win the 36 plus between 1-4 big bets (unless he folds the turn which I felt was unlikely). If I don’t bet out, I will lose either 0 or 1 bets, and probably make only 1 bet. It all looks fairly similar when you look at this way, though the extra bets if I bet the turn and the strength of the draw point to that option. The real key, though, is that in the first case I have two strong ways to win the hand. The draw alone probably made a bet fine, but the bluff plus the draw surely made it so.
The catch is that I felt I had a decent read on the guy that mitigated a bluff. He did raise before the flop, he’s a solid player, and so I felt it was quite possible for him to have a set, aces and queens, or maybe AK. He could have KQ, which would make me reverse dominated for my K. I didn’t think he’d be scared enough to drop given the size of the pot. I did not put him on merely 10s (which, of course, also reduced the chances of my draw). And, what’s more, because I felt like he had a big pair, I forgot how strong my draw was and the position of the strength I held in this heads-up situation. That’s a complete and utter misplay.
The good news, I guess, is that I didn’t make my draw and thus, in hindsight, I had to rely on the bluff alone. Had that been the case, there probably would have been 44 in the pot, which means my bluff would have had to work 9% of the time. Given he had 10s and the board was so scary, that might have been the case given that the player was decent. So I still have plenty of reasons to kick myself for this hand.
Phew. Fairly large mistake, but luckily the only major one of the day.
Now, the tight-aggressive play of the day: This play is partly a result of reading Ed Miller’s two overpair hands chapter and his other parts about waiting for the turn. I raise in late MP with 99s, get 4-5 callers for a moderate large pot pre-flop. Flop comes 8 and with two other cards, raggedy and spades. Guy leads out into me. I just call. One other player is already in and will simply call if I raise. One player is already out. I would like to push the other player out, but I have a sense that he is going out anyway, or will continue on regardless if they have a draw. The better has either an 8 with a big kicker or a spade draw; what’s more, he will let me know on fourth street if has something bigger and I’m trapped. My pot equity right now does not provide me with a substantial edge. Fourth street brings a non-spade Jack. I do not think this has hit him or the other player, and, again, think they will let me know if I am beat. I believe this is a safe card and that I am ahead. If he bets and I just call, I will likely have to call a bet on the river unless a spade falls and I’m sure. When he bets out, I raise, he just calls. When no spade falls on the river, he checks to me, I bet, he folds.
It’s not perfect, it’s not the prettiest way of waiting for the turn to get a raise in, but it worked. My read was right (I think he had an 8, in the end). I won the pot.
Interesting overcards play: I had QTs of clubs in middle position, I think there were about 7 callers preflop. Flop comes pretty raggedy, 8, 7, and a 3, with one club. I check, it gets bet by a really terrible player on the button, there are a few callers, I just call. The turn is the 9 of clubs, given me an open ended straight draw and solid flush draw. I bet, the person on my right raises. I call, the river ends up being a 10, giving me top pair, but there’s plenty of meat on the board. Because the pot has gotten so big at this point (there was a caller on the turn and I closed the river with two bets already ahead of me), I called with the top pair. Probably this is another example of a too liberal call on the river, as I discussed yesterday. There’s the straight, showing a 6 and 10 of hearts.
Also, would it have been worth raising on the flop? I only could have protected my hand against the two people on my left who were not already in yet. However, one of them did turn out to be the winner. A raise would not have made it correct to call to the inside straight. Then again, I just had overcards, and already had three bettors in front of me – is that really where I want to be putting in my raise, particularly when my overcards will make such a weak top pair? Seems incorrect to raise here.
Also upset that I didn’t hit the straight flush again, when the guy on my right flopped one and the guy on my left flopped quads (grin).
The series of great hands and cracked hands: Rather than poor play and leaks compounding suck outs and leading to a huge loss, I had the suck outs or just unfortunate circumstances lead to my very minor loss. I get KK in the small blind, there’s a raise in MP, I reraise, and the UTG caps. Four players total. Whew. I’m worried about AA and QQ, maybe AK or AQ. One of the callers was a total loser, but the other two were decent enough players, particularly to be calling and then capping from UTG. The flop comes with an Ace, I check, capper bets, called by all. Turn comes with a Q, I check, capper bets, two calls. I call time to repeat to myself again and again “YOU’RE BEAT!” The pot was so enormous that I really needed to sit there and think a bit. Could another K get me the win? Probably not. I fold. The river was a Jack. All I remember is that the capper had AA in the hole, the first raiser had QQ in the hole, and they both got beat by the fourth guy, the loser player, who got a back door straight with T9s. Just an unfortunate circumstance for me, but one that I lost the absolute minimum on all things considered.
Very next hand, I get AQs on the button. Raise it up. Don’t remember the exact circumstances, but several callers. Flop two pair, with two clubs and I’m not holding any. I bet the flop, get raised, think someone’s on a draw, there are two callers. Turn, I still bet, they just call. River brings a club, along with a 3 that would make a straight for anyone holding 45. This time there’s a bet in front of me by the loser player who won with T9s. I think and think, look at what happened, and fold in part because there was a guy to act behind me. Well, he didn’t have the flush, but the loser player was holding 45. A good river laydown, in light of what I discussed yesterday and my read on the players. Maybe a little risky, but correct in this instance
Another two hands later, I get KK again. This time TWO aces flop. I still bet out, hoping to make them respect my original raise given that I’d just raised twice before and hadn’t done much all day. My sense from the other players is that this missed them. At worst, it’s another two dollars worth investing in this pot with my Ks. Bunch of folders, just one caller from a predictable player who I don’t think has it (same guy from the 99 hand above). Turn is a blank, I bet again, he folds, I win a decent size pot (a several callers to my raise pre-flop). Solid aggressive play on a scary flop – totally contrary to the tight weak play above.
Then, I get Aces UTG+1. Because I had just shown the KK and had been raising so often recently, and because others had been willing to raise preflop, I try to just limp with the intention of raising and getting some more money in. Usually, I wouldn’t do this, but I felt, given the tenor of the table, it was right to mix it up here. The loser is in the small blind, and I suppose he would have called anyway from there. Long story short, I bet the flop, he calls, he bets out on the turn, mild concern with a call, and then bet and call on the river. On the turn he made his inside straight draw holding 85. To add insult to injury, the board makes a straight to the seven on the river, so I really have to call again.
The semi-mistake I keep making: What is it with me with K on a board with a Q also there but otherwise uncoordinated flop, and then check-raising from EP with top pair Kings and a weak kicker. I ended up just losing to Queens over 5s, so I was ahead. But with this raise I just end up checking the turn when I get callers. What am I trying to accomplish here? Was it worth knocking out just one player? Sure, there became no straights or flushes possible, but what am I going for? Why raise from EP here, even though top pair was often way better than what some of these jokers were playing? Why not try to use the big bet of the turn to my advantage? I need to finetune this to figure out how I should best use this to knock out players, given my positional disadvantage in the rest of the hand.
Filed by at 11:54 pm under dtrStories
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I’m good enough, I’m smart enough, and, doggonnit, the cards don’t hate me.
One thing I am reasonably happy with from today’s play was my sticking to Ed Miller’s principles re: raising with hands like AJs, ATs, KJs. I used to get cute with these hands and not raise. My poker-playing grandmother and others at the tables have told me that you shouldn’t raise because you’re not going to push anyone out and you’ll just build a pot for them. To quote Ed Miller, “This argument ignores the mistake that your opponents have already made by entering the pot. Your strong hand clearly has an edge in pot equity before the flop. You should expect to win signficantly more often than your fair share of seventeen percent with five opponents [in this example]. If you have a pot equity edge, at least one, and probably several of your opponents must have a pot equity deficit.” I only got cute once, UTG, with AQ, considering a possible raiser directly to the left of me – that was a mistake, I still won the pot, and I should have won a bigger pot. I wonder if the subconscious reason for this play was all the times where I followed Ed’s advice and completely missed the flop or really did just build a big pot that made it correct for others to draw out on me.
In any case, I’m still fairly proud of myself for following through 99% of the time. I think that generally speaking my post-flop play was good enough to follow through with this strategy. I need to work on playing with overcards, which occurred numerous times in these situations. But I generally followed his advice properly against ragged flops (sometimes with backdoor draws), trying to winnow the field on the flop and folding on the turn. Given the amount of players calling and the turn cards, I generally made the decision to drop correctly on 4th street. Still need plenty of work there, but it’s better than I’ve played before.
Filed by at 1:41 am under dtrStories
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Back in Vegas, so it was back to the Palms. And what a day – my worst yet, by a landslide. Sounds like a good day for a first post. For the first part of the day, the cards were running me over, and I was getting unlucky, both in the sense that when I was in front they called with terrible odds and won and called with sufficient odds and won. Then the cards went dead, and it was a long six hours. Which is not to say that I didn’t make any mistakes – I still made my fair share, I’d estimate between 3-5 big bets worth. I want to focus on one problem area, very fitting to this blog’s title: playing the river.
“Folding the best hand on the river in a large pot is the single worst mistake you can make.” I’ve drilled that into my head so hard. SSHE has also helped me differentiate between small and big pots. But I feel like I still don’t have a good sense of when it is actually right to fold. For instance, today, the board ended up showing something like 3 clubs, along with a straight to anyone with one J. The river was the 10c, pairing my kicker and giving me aces and tens. I think I was getting either 8, 9, or 10 to 1 on my river call, not sure which. There were six in before the flop, and I had two with me all the way to the river – up until that point, my aces ten kicker was seemingly leading.
The question is, regarding any of those fairly similar odds, and one player left to act behind me, does that call make sense? With that board, will I win between 10-12.5% of the time? I know that reads matter in this situation, but the don’t fold in big pots mantra eschews excessive reliance on reads. Or did reads not even matter here? Was 10-12.5% simply not enough? Given how scary that board was, it seems quite possible. Many of Ed Miller’s examples include 11-14 to 1 odds, so perhaps I am misreading his suggestions. Given that LLH is often about pushing small edges, the small percentage differences may matter.
I feel like I run into the above a lot. Times when I am somewhat sure that my overpair is no longer good, and so on. I feel like I call way too liberally. For a beginner, that seems somewhat appropriate given that folding in a large pot with the best hand is such a disaster. But to take it to the next level, I’ll have to adjust.
Slightly different, here’s another tricky river situation for me: 4 diamonds by the river, including the K, and I’ve got QJ of diamonds. If I check into my one opponent in this fairly large pot, I maybe lose a bet. But with three diamonds on the turn, would she have called with anything less than the ace draw? Particularly when I know I have the second and third nut locked up, and there are no other draws or scariness on the board? In this case, I bet, she raised, have to call and there’s the ace. That seems like an error, but couldn’t I have been called with worse hands? Given that I was betting all the way, she could have assumed I had an overpair and that a weaker, maybe even the 10d flush, was good. But I question my play here.
There were a few other mistakes today too. A time when I pushed too hard with pair of tens ace kicker and a draw, when other completed draws became more likely – that was just plain silly, and a silly bet on the river when I felt high cards might be best. Other leaks from the small blind considering who was in and whether it was worth calling.
These mistakes, compounded with the lack of luck, made for a humbling day. But that’s alright, I suppose – I need these lessons to get better in the long run.
Filed by at 1:15 am under dtrStories
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