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Wikileaks FAQ

December 7th, 2010  |  by mollysauter  |  Published in Future of the Internet  |  49 Comments

I just finished recording a podcast with Larry Lessig and the Berkman fellows about Wikileaks.  It should be online within a day or two.  In the meantime, we’ve been trying to simply nail down some of the facts surrounding the situation.  We figured we’d share what we’ve gathered so far as a FAQ, and we’ll update it as we learn more or get corrections.  Feel free to leave new questions in the comments and we’ll aim to work those in too.

What is Wikileaks?

Wikileaks is a self-described “not-for-profit media organization,” launched in 2006 for the purposes of disseminating original documents from anonymous sources and leakers.  Its website says: “Wikileaks will accept restricted or censored material of political, ethical, diplomatic or historical significance. We do not accept rumor, opinion, other kinds of first hand accounts or material that is publicly available elsewhere.”

More detailed information about the history of the organization can be found on Wikipedia (with all the caveats that apply to a rapidly-changing Wiki topic).  Wikipedia incidentally has nothing to do with Wikileaks — both share the word “Wiki” in the title, but they’re not affiliated.

Who is Julian Assange and what is his role in the Wikileaks organization?

Julian Assange is an Australian citizen who is said to serve as the editor-in-chief and spokesperson for Wikileaks since its founding in 2006.  Previously he’d been described as an advisor.  Sometimes he is cited as its founder.  The media and popular imagination currently equate him with Wikileaks itself, with uncertain accuracy.

In 2006, Assange wrote a series of essays which have recently been tapped as an explanation of his political philosophy.   A close reading of these essays shows that Assange’s personal philosophy is in opposition to secrecy-based, authoritarian conspiracy governments, in which category he includes the US government amidst many others not conventionally thought of as authoritarian.  Thus, as opposed to espousing a philosophy of radical transparency, Assange is not “about letting sunlight into the room so much as about throwing grit in the machine.”  For further analysis, check out  Aaron Bady‘s original blog post.

Why is Wikileaks so much in the public eye right now?

At the end of November 2010, Wikileaks began to slowly release a trove of what it says are 251,287 diplomatic cables acquired from an anonymous source.  These documents came on the heels of the release of the “Collateral Murder” video in April, and Afghan and Iraq War Logs in July and October, which totaled 466,743 documents.  The combined 718,030 are said to originate from a single source, thought to be U.S. Army intelligence analyst Pfc. Bradley Manning, who was arrested in May 2010, but that’s not confirmed.

Has Wikileaks released classified material in the past?

Yes, under an evolving set of models.

Berkman Fellow Ethan Zuckerman has some interesting thoughts on the development of Wikileaks and its practices over the years, which will be explained in greater detail when the Berkman Center podcast is released later this week.  In the meantime, here’s a capsule version.

Wikileaks has moved through three phases since its founding in 2006.  In its first phase, during which it released several substantial troves of documents related to Kenya, Wikileaks operated very much with a standard wiki model: the public readership could actively post and edit materials and had a say in the types of materials that were accepted and how such materials were vetted.  The documents released in that first phase were more or less a straight dump to the Web: very little organized redacting occurred on the part of Wikileaks.  Wikileaks’ second phase was exemplified with the release of the “Collateral Murder” video in April of 2010.  The video was a highly curated, produced and packaged political statement.  It was meant to illustrate a political point of view, not merely to inform.  The third phase is the one we currently see with the release of the diplomatic cables: Wikileaks working in close conjunction with a select group of news organizations to analyze, redact and release the cables in a curated manner, rather than dumping them on the Internet or using them to illustrate a singular political point of view.

What news organizations have access to the diplomatic cables and how did they get them?

According to the Associated Press, Wikileaks gave four news organizations (Le Monde, El Pais, The Guardian and Der Spiegel) all 251,287 classified documents.  The Guardian subsequently shared their trove with The New York Times.

So have all 251,287 documents been released to the public?

No.  Each of the five news organizations is hosting the text of at least some of the documents in various forms with or without the relevant metadata (country of origin, classification level, reference ID).  The Guardian and Der Spiegel  have performed analyses of the metadata of the entire trove, excluding the body text.  The Guardian’s analysis is available for download from its website.

Wikileaks itself has released (as of 1:06pm on 7 December 2010) 1095 documents out of the total 251,287.  The Associated Press has reported that Wikileaks is only releasing cables in coordination with the actions of the five selected news organizations.   Julian Assange made similar statements in an interview with Guardian readers on 3 December 2010.  Cables are being released daily as the five news organizations publish articles related to the content.

Are each of the five news organizations hosting all the documents that Wikileaks has released?

No.  Each of the five news organizations hosts a different selection of the released documents, in different forms, which may or may not overlap.  It’s not clear how much they’re coordinating on releasing new documents, since each appears to have a full set.

How are the five news organizations releasing the cables?

Le Monde hosts an application, developed in conjunction with Linkfluence, which host the searchable text of several hundred cables.  The text can be searched by  the sender (either country of origin, office or official), date range, persons of interest cited in the docs, classification status, or any combination of the above.  Only the untranslated, English text of the cables can be accessed and there is no cut-and-paste available.

El Pais offers access to over 200 cables, available in the orginal English or in Spanish translation, searchable by country of origin and key terms and subjects (such as “Google and China”).  These searches also return El Pais articles written on a given subject (often places ahead of the cables in the search listings).  They also offer a “How to read a diplomatic cable” feature, explaining what all the abbreviations and and technical verbage mean in plainspeak, posted on 28 November 2010.

The Guardian offers the cable data in several forms: they have performed an analysis of metadata of the entire  251,287 document trove, and made it available in several forms (spread sheets hosted on Google Docs and in downloadable form) as well as infographics.

The Guardian also hosts at least 422 cables on their website, searchable by subject, originating country and countries referenced.

The New York Times hosts what it calls a

selection of the documents from a cache of a quarter-million confidential American diplomatic cables that WikiLeaks intends to make public starting on Nov. 28.  A small number of names and passages in some of the cables have been removed by The New York Times to protect diplomats’ confidential sources, to keep from compromising American intelligence efforts or to protect the privacy of ordinary citizens.

The documents are not searchable and are organized by general subject.

Who is responsible for redacting the documents?  What actions did Wikileaks take to ensure that individuals were not put in danger by publication of the documents?

According to the Associated Press and statements released by Wikileaks and Julian Assange, Wikileaks is currently relying on the expertise of the five news organizations to redact the cables as they are released, and is following their redactions as it releases the documents on its website.  (This cannot be verified without examining the original documents, which we have not done — nor are we linking to them here.)  According to the BBC, Julian Assange approached the US State Department for guidance on redacting the documents prior to their release.  One can imagine the dilemma for the Department there: assist and risk legitimating the enterprise; don’t assist and risk poor redaction.  In a public letter, Harold Koh, legal adviser to the Department of State, declined to assist the organization and demanded the return of the documents.

The Los Angeles Times reported that Wikileaks has directly released at least one cable describing a U.S. Department of Homeland Security list of sensitive overseas facilities:

The Department of Homeland Security list on overseas sites, known as the Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative, includes oil and gas pipelines, telecom cables, rare-metal and other mines, military contractors, ocean navigation chokepoints, and such obscure facilities as an Australian laboratory described as the sole supplier of Crotalid Polyvalent Antivenin — an antidote to rattlesnake venom.

The list, “whose loss could critically impact the public health, economic security, and/or national and homeland security of the United States,” according to the leaked cable that contained it, is maintained by the Department of Homeland Security, which was seeking to update it in February 2009 by getting recommendations from State Department diplomats.

American officials have denounced the apparent release of the list, and it’s not clear that the document has been made available by any of the five newspapers possessing copies of all the cables.

If you’re willing to part with your email address, you can find out from stratfor.com why they think that

[s]uggestions that a list of critical infrastructure released by WikiLeaks helps terrorists drastically underestimate transnational terrorists’ capabilities and sophistication when it comes to target selection.

Are the documents hosted anywhere else on the Internet? What is the “insurance” file?

In late July 2010, Wikileaks is said to have posted to its Afghan War Logs site and to a torrent site an encrypted file with “insurance” in the name. The file, which apparently can still be found on various peer-to-peer networks, is 1.4 gigabytes and is encrypted with AES256, a very strong encryption standard which would make it virtually impossible to open without the password. What is in the insurance file is not known. It has been speculated that it contains the unredacted cables provided by the original source(s), as well as other, previously unreleased information held by Wikileaks. There is further speculation, which has been indirectly boosted by Julian Assange, that the key to the file will be distributed in the event of either the death of Assange or the destruction of Wikileaks as a functioning organization. However, none of these things is known. All that is known for sure is that it’s a really big file with heavy encryption that’s already in a number of people’s hands and floating around for others to get.

What happens if Wikileaks gets shut down? Can it be shut down?

It depends on what’s meant by “Wikileaks” and what’s meant by “shut down.”

Julian Assange has made statements suggesting that if Wikileaks becomes non-functional as an organization then the key to the encrypted “insurance” file will be released. The actual machination of how such a “dead man’s switch” would operate is not known. If the key were released, and if the encrypted insurance file contains unredacted and unreleased secret documents, then those decrypted files would be available to many people nearly instantaneously. Wikileaks claimed in August that the insurance file had been downloaded over 100,000 times.

Wikileaks apparently maintains a small paid staff — who and where is not exactly on a “people” page, though there used to be a physical PO box in Australia where documents could be sent — and is additionally supported by volunteers, speculated to be at most a few thousand. So, would it be possible for a motivated organization to disrupt its real-world infrastructure? Yes, probably. However, at this point, it is not practical to recover the information the organization has already distributed (which includes the entire trove of diplomatic cables to the press as well as whatever is in the encrypted insurance file), as well as any other undistributed information the organization might seek to release. So in terms of the recovery of leaked information, the downfall of Wikileaks as an organization would matter little.

Furthermore, there appear to be currently over a thousand sites mirroring Wikileaks and its content. Wikileaks has made available downloadable files containing its entire archive of released materials to date.

On a more technical level, the Wikileaks website can come under attack, and its means of collecting money can be made much more difficult.

Why did wikileaks.org stop working as a way to find the site?

For a traditional website to work it will want a domain name like website.com, so people can find it.  Those domain names can stop working for any number of reasons.  One commonly assumed action for Wikileaks is that ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers that manages certain top-level protocol and parameter assignments for the Internet, intervened.  It did not.

A little technical discussion to explain why: The domain name system (“DNS”) is hierarchical, and its zones are exclusive of one another rather than inherited (save for the lateral mirroring among the twelve root zone servers). The root zone orchestrated by ICANN is a very small file — just a mapping between each top-level domain like .org or .ch (“TLD”) and the IP address(es) of the servers designated to say more about that TLD (one server, not in ICANN’s hands, keeps track of names under .org, one for names under .ch, etc.). You can see a user-friendly version of the file here, with the Swiss name servers described here. The info you see there is what ICANN can directly change — and that only for its own root zone servers (B, L, and sort-of A), hoping to have it mirrored by the others; map below the fold here.

So for those servers, ICANN could all-or-nothing delete .ch, which means for those drawing TLD info from the ICANN roots they’d eventually (depending on caching of previous info) cease finding the nic.ch server(s) in Switzerland through which to resolve any .ch name. But there’s no way to express in the TLD zone something like “go to nic.ch for every domain name under .ch except wikileaks.ch.” And if .ch were ditched, the mirroring root servers would likely balk at mirroring that elision, and ISPs using B, L, and A to resolve TLDs would just turn to other root zone servers — or hard code in the last known IP address for nic.ch as the place to go for .ch names.

I guess a too-crafty-by-half solution would be to mirror everything in the .ch zone to a new .ch server run by ICANN, then delete wikileaks.ch’s info from that server’s files, then redirect the root zone to the new server instead of the old. That would work for about five minutes. After that, increasing chaos as Swiss webmasters made changes to their .ch names in the “official” nic.ch registry only to find them not reflected for those users unlucky enough to be rerouted to ICANN’s snapshot mirror. At which point the mirror roots (and the ISPs) awaken to the deception and take action a la the preceding graf.

Note that wikileaks.org went down not because of anything done to its DNS entry within the list kept by the registry* that minds the list of .org domains.  Instead, the name server to which its entry pointed was attacked by unknown parties — DDOS’d — and EveryDNS, the operator of the name server, chose to stop answering queries about wikileaks in the hopes that the DDOS would stop.  (Apparently it did.)  EveryDNS is not to be confused with EasyDNS, which is a separate company that isn’t involved in the situation! [Update 12/9/10: Wired reports that EasyDNS is now assisting Wikileaks as a result of being confused with EveryDNS; “We’ve already done the time; we might as well do the crime,” said its CEO.]

*I’m on the board of Trustees for the non-profit Internet Society, ISOC, which is the parent to the Public Interest Registry, which keeps track of names in .org.

If a domain name doesn’t work, a website can try to register and maintain another domain name, or it can just use a direct IP address — a number — to be found.  A website also needs hosting, and Wikileaks has apparently had to shift its hosting at least once after being dropped by a chosen provider: Amazon’s commodity hosting service shut down the site for terms of service violations after being contacted by U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman.

(added 9 December 2010)

Is Wikileaks breaking US law by receiving and releasing the cables and other classified material?

Good question.  There are laws that penalize the release of classified information, but they’ve generally been applied to someone — such as a government official — entrusted with the information who then leaks it or gives it to an enemy — Aldrich Ames was a CIA officer who gave information to the Soviets, and Army soldier Bradley Manning is currently under arrest for claimed involvement in passing information to Wikileaks.  Ames was charged under a part of the “ Espionage Act,” 18 U.S.C. 794, “Gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign government.”  Manning was charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice; there’s a helpful summary of what provisions have been applied here.

So what about Wikileaks?  There are some provisions of the Espionage Act that might apply — 18 U.S.C. 793 is about “gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information,” and it criminalizes the act of “obtaining” a document “connected with the national defense” if done “for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation.”  18 U.S.C. 798 on classified information might also apply.

The former section was invoked in the famed “Pentagon Papers” case, where the government sought to prevent continuing publication of a classified history of the Vietnam War authored by the government and leaked to the Times by Daniel Ellsberg, a former military analyst who was employed by the RAND Corporation at the time.  The Times prevailed in the Supreme Court, which issued a brief and unenlightening “per curiam” opinion accompanied by more detailed concurring opinions, none of which garnered a majority of the Justices’ votes.  One reading of the outcome of the case is that the Pentagon Papers themselves weren’t deemed so sensitive — so damaging to the national security — that once leaked to the Times the Times could be ordered not to share them.  Rather, the Times could share them and then face whatever consequences the government might bring to bear.  But once the papers were published, the government did not seek to prosecute the Times, both because its behavior isn’t a great fit with the statute(s), because the First Amendment might be found to trump the statutes, and because there are political difficulties with making an enemy of the press.

A separate criminal case under section 793 against Ellsberg as the leaker is a more natural fit with the statute, and it was brought — but it evaporated amidst revelations of illegal government wiretaps against him.

So, what about Wikileaks?  Its position may be roughly equal to that of The New York Times or any of the other four news organizations currently hosting copies of the cables.  Indeed, the prospect has been raised that the Times should face prosecution.  Perhaps here the balance of the news value of the cables versus the harm caused by their release is less helpful to the intermediaries like the Times and Wikileaks.  And Assange’s own statements, described above, about the purpose of Wikileaks — to bring down what he sees as corrupt governments rather than merely to inform the public — might establish a needed intent to harm the government that a “regular” newspaper arguably lacks.  The Justice Department has also stated that it is exploring options other than the Espionage Act, including “conspiracy or trafficking in stolen property,” under which to indict Julian Assange.  That would look closely at the levels of cooperation and encouragement between Wikileaks and any government leakers; something more than the prototypical “small brown envelope” appearing on Wikileaks’s (or the Times’s) doorstep could be enough to say that a leaker like Manning and an intermediary like Wikileaks are engaged in a criminal enterprise together — and anything done wrong by one can be attributed to the other.  (The classic example is the driver of a getaway car in the bank robbery being held responsible for the shooting of a bank employee inside as if he or she had pulled the trigger.)

Of course, even a prosecution with a good chance of success would face tricky political questions — does arrest and prosecution make Assange and Wikileaks underdog heroes?  Traditionally prosecutors have not applied the Espionage Act’s broad proscriptions to the press, and this may make sense given the frequency with which high-level government officials intentionally leak information to the press — it’d be strange to leak the information and the prosecute the press for publishing it, or worse, only prosecute the press when one isn’t the leaker.

Wikileaks has indicated that its next leak will be of private sector information: the private records of a large bank or BP, for example.  If that is true, releasing such information could be a breach of trade secret or copyright law.  There, civil cases could be brought by the organizations originally holding the records, or even perhaps private torts cases by those whose privacy might be invaded.

A final note: Bills have been introduced in both the House and the Senate that would overtly criminalize the publication of the “names of military or intelligence community informants.”  These are being played as “anti-Wikileaks” bills, but because they would specifically criminalize publication, they attack news organizations and Wikileaks equally.

What is Operation Payback?  Who is “Anonymous”? What is a distributed denial of service attack (DDOS)?

Operation Payback began in September 2010 as a coordinated retaliation to actions taken by the MPAA, RIAA, and other groups against file sharing sites such as The Pirate Bay and BitTorrent search engines.  In some cases, it was in response to DDOS attacks targeted at file-sharing sites, such as those launched by Aiplex Software against sites hosting pirated copies of Bollywood films.  In others, the triggers were statements made by individuals that were considered hostile to file sharing services or their users, such as those made by KISS bassist Gene Simmons.  Internet security consulting firm Pandalabs reported that by October 7, 2010, the total downtime for copyright-related websites targeted by Operation Payback was 537 hours and 55 minutes.

Operation Payback has since evolved to include attacks against those organizations perceived to be taking actions harmful to Wikileaks.  Targets appear to include Mastercard, Amazon, Paypal, PostFinance, and the Swedish Prosecution Authority, among others. (Wikileaks, too, has suffered denial of service attacks.  You can see an account of these and other attacks at the Pandalabs blog.)

The group associated with Operation Payback is known as “Anonymous,” a “loose coalition” of internet users, associated with the image board 4chan and a handful of other forums and wikis.  Because of this most recent and very high profile campaign, they’ve attracted significant media attention from The Guardian, the New York Times, the BBC, and the Wall Street Journal, among others.

In this particular wave, Anonymous is using a tool known as a distributed denial of service attack , or DDOS.  During a DDOS attack, an attacker will generate, either via the use of proxy machines or an automated program, a flood of “pings” or requests to the targeted site. The server essentially has a meltdown, unable to respond to the many, many requests for information and is rendered unable to serve the page to the legitimate user requests.  In most cases, a DDOS attack is effected through the use of innocent machines which have been previously been infected and are part of a botnet or zombie army, without the knowledge of their owners.  It is unclear whether or not Anonymous is using an all-volunteer botnet with motivated Internet users adapting such tools as the colorfully named “Low Orbit Ion Cannon,” or whether some machines are being used without their owners’ permission as would happen with a traditional botnet. You can see the Internet Storm Center’s analysis of the DDOS tool here.

There’s at least one rumor circulating that Anonymous is shifting its tactics away from DDOS.

First Amendment and prior restraint issues aside, does the US government have any legal authority to arbitrarily shut down a website?  Is there any precedent for the US government shutting down websites?

The US government has previously taken action to seize domain names and thus render the associated websites practically unavailable on the Internet, most recently with the November 30 “Cyber Monday” seizure of about 80 websites thought to be involved in the sale of counterfeit goods.  “Operation In Our Sites II” was an effort of the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

So far there is no indication that a government has attempted to overtly seize the Wikileaks.org domain name. Rather, it appears as though Wikileaks’s troubles are arising from political pressure, claimed TOS violations,  and DDOS attacks (actual or threatened) arising from non-governmental sources.

For more on the role of intermediaries with regard to the hosting and operations of Wikileaks, you might read Rebekah Heacock’s analysis of the situation over at ONI.

What is the relationship between Wikileaks and the Wikimedia Foundation?

There is no connection between Wikileaks, the Wikimedia Foundation or other “Wiki-” organizations. The Wikimedia Foundation does not own the Wikileaks.org domain name. “Wiki” is a descriptive term, not a trademark, and does not indicate any relationship between the two entities.

Here is the domain name registration (“Whois”) data for both Wikileaks.org and Wikimedia.org.

What is a mirror?  What are the risks of running a mirror site?

A mirror is a site which hosts a copy of data on another site.  There are currently appear to be over a thousand sites mirroring both the Wikileaks main site and its diplomatic cables site.

The legal risks of mirroring the Wikileaks content may at first glance track the risks of hosting the original content, particularly if the mirroring is done with the intention of preserving the specific contents of the mirrored site.

For that matter, participating in a DDOS attack runs afoul of the law in multiple jurisdictions.

Responses

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  1. Toby Murray says:

    December 7th, 2010 at 5:09 pm (#)

    Could you elaborate on why, presumably under US law, it might be less legal to read these documents from major news organizations as opposed to WikiLeaks? Does WikiLeaks (and it’s readers) lack some legal protection that these other organizations enjoy?

  2. Toby Murray says:

    December 7th, 2010 at 5:10 pm (#)

    Its, not it’s. Stupid iPhone autocorrect!

  3. Wikileaks Cables FAQ :: The Future of the Internet — And How to … | The Daily Conservative says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 1:56 am (#)

    […] more here: Wikileaks Cables FAQ :: The Future of the Internet — And How to … Share and […]

  4. Kurt says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 12:14 pm (#)

    Could Wikileaks have a legal claim for damages against Paypal, Mastercard and Visa for cutting off their account on the mere suspicion that they’ve violated US law?

  5. MCR says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 12:26 pm (#)

    Is it illegal to publish these kinds of documents in the US? How about in other countries? And is it illegal to posess them?

  6. JD says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 12:26 pm (#)

    One question Id like ansered is “Where does wikileaks get the info from?”

  7. “State and Terrorist Conspiracies”-filozofia din spatele WikiLeaks(pdf) « Blogari de bine, colaborati pentru Romania! says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 12:30 pm (#)

    […] FAQ serios despre Wikileaks  aici:wikileaks-cable-faq […]

  8. B says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 12:32 pm (#)

    What about the cables the Lebanese paper has? Where do those come from and what’s their relation to the cables Wikileaks, The Guardian et al have?

    Story: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/12/lebanese-newspaper-publishes-us-cables-not-found-on-wikileaks/67430/

  9. Cathryne says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 12:33 pm (#)

    Thanks for your time and effort in putting together this overview! A very educating read 🙂

  10. Alex Hayton says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 12:38 pm (#)

    @Toby: It all comes down to whether Wikileaks has 1st amendment rights or not.

    I would imagine that it’s pretty difficult to call either way until it gets to the Supreme Court

    The general consensus so far is that many lawyers think that there is no difference between Wikileaks and, e.g. the New York Times, but politicians and State Department staff see WL as a non-journalistic entity that can be prosecuted under some kind of “Patriot Act” law. How Patriotic!

    There is also the question of whether Wikileaks’ actions are seen to be breaking any US laws on espionage. The State Department rhetoric indicates that they think WikiLeaks have broken US laws to do with disclosure of classified materials (but has not produced any legal documents indicating why this would be the case). In this case, I don’t know why WikiLeaks would be liable for prosecution but not the New York Times (both have offered to have the government redact the documents themselves and to provide a co-ordinated, responsible release, which has so far been refused by the US Government). If anything the New York Times is more likely to have broken the law as it is operating on US soil!

  11. Mark A. Taff says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 12:44 pm (#)

    It might be helpful to include info in this FAQ on the history of why Wikimedia (of Wikipedia) owns the wikileaks.com domain name, to clarify a clearly odd situation.

  12. George Grams says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 2:12 pm (#)

    Is it true that Wikileaks have committed no crime in releasing the diplomatic files? If that’s so, on what basis could Assange be extradited to the USA and tried?

  13. T says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 2:38 pm (#)

    “Could Wikileaks have a legal claim for damages against Paypal, Mastercard and Visa for cutting off their account on the mere suspicion that they’ve violated US law?”

    I’d like to know the answer to this too.

  14. Bob says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 4:28 pm (#)

    It would be very difficult to follow up legally on the pompous grandstanding by our leaders, because a similar issue has already gotten to the Supreme Court 30 years ago and was decided that the newspapers have the right AND DUTY to publish secret government documents that illustrated how the government has been deceiving the very people it’s supposed to serve (hint: it is us, not corporations).

    The documents in question were related to the Pentagon papers on the Vietnam war, painting the government in a not so rosy picture.

    So the Government is trying to “throw the book” at Assange and Wikipedia to try and catch them with anything that might work. With the complex legal system we have allowed to evolve over the years, everyone is guilty of something, it’s only a matter of finding someone with enough resources to find you guilty. In this case, that someone is our Government and attorney general fighting a fight against people’s right to know.

    The fact that politicians have publicly labeled WikiLeaks as a “terrorist organization” is quite telling with regards to their willingness to pervert the special circumstance legislation (Patriot, spying powers etc) and will stop at nothing in order to protect themselves from embarassment.

    So next time there’s another extension on PATRIOT, or another expansion of government power proposed, be it “for the children”, “for our safety”, think how it might be abused later, because abused it will be.

  15. Dean Procter says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 5:03 pm (#)

    Amazon illegally? selling #wikileaks cables. Visa and mastercard happy to arrange payment. http://amzn.to/hmxY8Z

    Documents were only able to be stolen because a senior US officer removed the download restrictions from the network. The fault lays squarely on his shoulders.
    wikileaks didn’t steal them. Dumb security decisions by US officers led to the leaks.

  16. Peter Sachs Collopy says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 8:03 pm (#)

    “The Associated Press has reported that Wikileaks is only releasing cables in coordination with the actions of the five selected news organizations. Julian Assange made similar statements in an interview with Guardian readers on 3 December 2010.”

    This is really striking because it would mean that the newspapers are still playing their traditional role of deciding whether leaks get published. I think it was the case when the AP and Guardian published, but I don’t think it is now. As far as I can tell, the 2008 Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative (CFDI) list, a document which might raise legitimate national security concerns, is available from Wikileaks but not from any of their newspaper partners; you can read about it at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-wiki-terror-targets-20101207,0,3105543.story or read the document itself at http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/02/09STATE15113.html.

  17. Kat says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 9:23 pm (#)

    @Mark: Wikimedia does not have anything to do with the domain names. Wikia does; it’s a separate organization. (My knowledge of what they have to do with it is only secondhand; they say they sold the domains back to Wikileaks but that for various reasons the transfer was never completed.)

  18. WikiLeaks Live Updates 12.08 « BrothersFiasco says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 10:02 pm (#)

    […] thinker on the internet and the law, a founder of the Chilling Effects website – recommends this FAQ on WikiLeaks that tells you everything you wanted to know about WikiLeaks but were afraid to […]

  19. Kurt says:

    December 8th, 2010 at 11:00 pm (#)

    I guess my question is now partly answered. Datacell, the payments processor for Wikileaks, intends to file suit against Mastercard and Visa: http://datacell.com/news.php. I guess they had direct contracts with those companies that have been breached? It sounds like the U.S. State Department procured the breach.

  20. A 5-Paragraph Primer on WikiLeaks says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 12:28 am (#)

    […] Jonathan Zittrain’s WikiLeaks FAQ […]

  21. Lesenswerte Artikel 9. Dezember 2010 says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 1:01 am (#)

    […] Wikileaks FAQ Guter Übersicht über WikiLeaks […]

  22. Bob says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 2:02 am (#)

    A TOC heading the faq (highlighting new/updated faqs) would not go astray.

    Thanks.

  23. Alberto Cammozzo says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 2:49 am (#)

    It turns out that global free speech right is limited by corporate terms of use from Amazon, EveryDNS, Visa/Mastercard, Twitter etc.

    A strong right gets regulated by weak law…
    Isn’t this odd?

  24. Wikileaks FAQ « War on Sanity says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 6:59 am (#)

    […] way, the Wikileaks FAQ is there to help shut them up. What news organizations have access to the diplomatic cables and how […]

  25. Wikileaks oder die Krise der Netzphilosophie « Freunde der Zukunft says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 7:10 am (#)

    […] die Analyse nicht zu kümmern; das stimmt teilweise, aber für die Diplomaten-Depeschen eindeutig nicht: Wenige Hundert von 250 000 sind veröffentlicht, den Rest arbeiten Auswertungs-Einheiten der […]

  26. El futuro de Internet… y cómo pararlo #ebook « Este Blog es says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 11:07 am (#)

    […] propio concepto que hizo nacer al periodismo. Aún así podéis ver cómo en el sitio web oficial futureoftheinternet.org mantiene un blog donde el tema Wikileaks aparece en forma de un interesante FAQ publicado hace […]

  27. David James Demko says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 11:17 am (#)

    Well done.
    Definitive account replete with copious citations.
    A helpful tool for social debate.
    Much appreciated.

  28. Quick Links | A Blog Around The Clock says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 11:24 am (#)

    […] Web sites of MasterCard and other opponents and Silencing Wikileaks is silencing the press and Wikileaks FAQ and Wikileaks: Australia FM blames US, not Julian Assange and Wikileaks To Take On Bank Of America […]

  29. Lewis Poretz says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 11:41 am (#)

    Could Cyber Anarchists living in the clouds have Earthly Ramifications?

    – nice read ->> http://bit.ly/dNEF33

    Dr. Eric Cole –
    Dr. Cole is a global industry expert with breadth and depth experience across integrated cyber security.

    #wikileaks #cyber #security

    HIGH QUALITY ADVICE

  30. Wikileaks exploded the internet, quick thoughts | odd letters says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 11:44 am (#)

    […] down this Wikileaks explosion currently happening all over the internet. The result is this FAQ JZ and I have put together, which has gotten a lot of play around the […]

  31. The best what-is-journalism hullabaloo ever. And your opinion? | Festival del Giornalismo says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 1:28 pm (#)

    […] wikileaks FAQ Wikileaks FAQ :: The Future of the Internet — And How to Stop It http://futureoftheinternet.org/wikileaks-cable-faq […]

  32. WIKILEAKS « Jlbolden's Blog says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 1:31 pm (#)

    […] Better Definition Here […]

  33. Technically Legal » Blog Archive » Wikileaks says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 1:42 pm (#)

    […] Zittrain and Molly Sauter posted a great “Wikileaks FAQ” on JZ’s Future of the Internet blog.  A portion of the FAQ was also  published in […]

  34. John says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 1:45 pm (#)

    Their use of stolen US documents is flat out illegal (possession of stolen property, intent to disseminiate stolen property,e tc.). Period. Why is no one addressing that? The US government did not hand over these files to wikileaks. They obtained them thru illegal means. Game over.

  35. what is meant by ‘Wikileaks’ and what is meant by ‘Shut Down’? « You Must Be The Change You Wish To See In The World~gandhi says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 4:16 pm (#)

    […] Wikileaks FAQ: nailing down some of the facts surrounding the situation […]

  36. Glanzlichter 45 « … Kaffee bei mir? says:

    December 9th, 2010 at 5:17 pm (#)

    […] Zittrain Wikileaks FAQ Der Rechtsprofessor Zittrain beantwortet Fragen über die Praxis der […]

  37. Arturo R Montesinos says:

    December 10th, 2010 at 12:03 am (#)

    When addressing if Wikileaks broke any US laws you mention Ellsberg, which I think is incorrect and misleading, invalidating the legal considerations made from there on. Daniel Ellsberg would be analogous to Bradley Manning in this case, not to Julian Assange or WikiLeaks.

  38. El nuevo Wikileaks y una libertad de expresión que no es igual para todos | Obamaworld says:

    December 10th, 2010 at 12:11 am (#)

    […] de otros. Wikileaks existe desde 2006. Nunca había alcanzado tanta popularidad. Los documentos que publicaba en los primeros años eran menos relevantes: sobre corrupción en Kenia, la Iglesia de la […]

  39. Daniel Baulig says:

    December 10th, 2010 at 5:13 am (#)

    Your FAQ suggests that Julian Assange intends to bring down “secrecy-based, authoritarian conspiracy governments, in which category he includes the US government”. This is not true.

    If you read his older texts you will see that his intention is to reduce effectiveness of authoritarian and conspiracy structures that lie within most organizations with power (including governments). He believes that the most effective way to accomplosh this goal is to increase the “cost” to maintain secrecy within those conspiracy networks. Wikileaks is doing *exactly* that.

    The interesting part is, that in Assanges eyes authoritarian and conspiracy are no absolute, (in a mathematical sense) discrete words but more like floating point numbers. The grade of authoritarian undercut in a government can be low or high – or anywhere between. Assange believes that the higher the grade of conspiracy, secrecy and authority the more effect increasing the “cost” of the system will provide. So something like Wikileaks will harm the effectiveness of large, strong and powerfull conspiracies much more than that of small and weak conspiracies.
    In any case, it will subsequentially reduce the power of the conspiracy and strengthen democratic and liberal structures that where previsouly undercut by the conspiracy structures.

    So the goal is not to bring down the US government or state but to weaken the corrupt and authoritarian elements in any government by increasing the “cost” attached to maintain secrets and conspiracies by introducing the factor of easy and secure leakage through Wikileaks.

  40. » Blog Archive » The Wikileaks FAQ says:

    December 10th, 2010 at 2:06 pm (#)

    […] more here. Digg this post Buzz it up share via Reddit Share with Stumblers Tweet about it Buzz it […]

  41. Take a stand | Burn as One says:

    December 11th, 2010 at 3:03 am (#)

    […] Truth is under attack. No greater stakes have ever been fought for. It is time to take a stand. Here is a safe link to get informed Truth by […]

  42. zee says:

    December 11th, 2010 at 3:14 am (#)

    See http://www.dazzlepod.com/cable/ for live update on WikiLeaks cables presented in a nicely formatted table.

  43. From Twitter 12-11-2010 « memoirs on a rainy day says:

    December 11th, 2010 at 2:02 pm (#)

    […] 01:40:50: RT @djela: The Future of the Internet | Wikileaks FAQ http://futureoftheinternet.org/wikileaks-cable-faq […]

  44. Wikileaks and the First Amendment « Andy on the Road says:

    December 11th, 2010 at 8:47 pm (#)

    […] 8:45PM: Jonathan Zittrain, Tim Hwang, Ethan Zuckerman, Jillian York, Dan Gillmor – all Berkman folk, all very brilliant, […]

  45. NSR Bookmarks (weekly) | Not So Relevant says:

    December 12th, 2010 at 4:31 am (#)

    […] Wikileaks FAQ :: The Future of the Internet — And How to Stop It […]

  46. Wikileaks: Fragen & Antworten | blog.sektionacht.at says:

    December 13th, 2010 at 4:54 am (#)

    […] Inzwischen wurde und wird soviel über Wikileaks geschrieben, dass es eigentlich schon reichen würde, auf die besten Quellen zu Wikileaks zu verweisen. Am kurzweiligsten ist sicherlich der aktuelle Videocast von Robert Misik zum Thema. Am umfassendsten und fundiertesten sind wohl die FAQs am Blog von Havard-Internetrechtsexperten Jonathan Zittrain. […]

  47. WikiLeaks related materials for (new) media educators | FLOSSE Posse says:

    December 13th, 2010 at 8:58 am (#)

    […] Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University / Harvard Law School is maintaining Wikileaks cable FAQ. It covers the event much better than most of the mass media. Also the FAQ format works with this […]

  48. Wikileaks and Freedom of Speech: Can self regulation work? | LSE Media Policy Project Blog says:

    December 14th, 2010 at 5:32 am (#)

    […] attempting to test the regulability of the internet, among other things (see Johnathon Zittrain’s Wikileaks FAQ). If Assange’s own theorisations are to be believed, the aim ultimately could be to implement a […]

  49. Ein paar Links zu Wikileaks » Infobib says:

    December 17th, 2010 at 3:42 am (#)

    […] kaum je einfacher gewesen als im Falle Wikileaks. Man nehme: die FAQ zu den Cablegate-Dokumenten. Zweit- und Drittmeinungen und Expertisen jeglicher Couleur sind darüber hinaus einfach zu […]

Blog

  • A novel way of defending against mass uses of our data
  • AI is getting better at performing mass categorization of photos and text. A developer can scrape a bunch of photos from, say, Facebook — either directly, likely violating the terms of service, or through offering an app by which people consent to the access — and then use a well-trained categorizer to automatically discern ethnicity, gender, or even identity.

    Some defenses can be built in against abuse, starting with a technical parlor trick and ending with support from the law. There’s been promising research on “image perturbation” that adjusts a photo in a way that is unnoticeable to a human, but that completely confuses standard image recognition tools that might otherwise make it easy to categorize a photo. (There’s a helpful video summary of some of the research by Nguyen, Yosinski, and Clune available here.)

    For example, this intrepid group of MIT students can make Google’s otherwise-reliable image recognition algorithm mistake a turtle for a rifle, or a cat for … guacamole.

    I’m part of a team at MIT and Harvard within the Assembly program — Dhaval Adjodah, Francisco, Daniel Pedraza, Gretchen Greene, and Josh Joseph — that’s working on tools so that users can upload invisibly-modified photos of themselves to social media without making them so readily identifiable.

    Those modifications won’t thwart AI tools forever — but they’ll represent an unmistakable indication about user preference, and the law can then demand that those preferences be respected.

    There is already a model for this: photos taken with a smartphone are invisibly labeled with time, date, and location. Facebook and Twitter for years have automatically stripped this information out before they show those photos on their services, avoiding a privacy nightmare by which a single photo could instantly locate someone. (There would no doubt have been Congressional hearings had they failed to do this.)

    They can and should similarly undertake, on behalf of their users, to perturb images with the latest technology to prevent widescale AI-assisted identification by others, and to provide an anchor similar to “do not track” to make user preferences about bulk downstream use abundantly clear.

    And these defense need not only apply to photos. An insurance company had an opt-in plan for Facebook users to have the nature of their posts influence their car insurance rates. As the Guardian described it:

    Facebook users who write in short, concise sentences, use lists, and arrange to meet friends at a set time and place, rather than just “tonight”, would be identified as conscientious. In contrast, those who frequently use exclamation marks and phrases such as “always” or “never” rather than “maybe” could be overconfident.

    There are also techniques that have moved from academia to industry like “differential privacy” and its precursors, where decoy data — a few new random stray likes in a profile — can be introduced to allow for helpful generalizations from bulk data across lots of people while protecting individual privacy by preventing easy generalizations about a single person.

     

  • Should the director of OPM be fired over its massive data breach?
  • I participate in a regular poll by the Christian Science Monitor on Internet policy topics.  This week’s question was about the recent data breaches at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management:

    As you can see, most people said yes.  I count myself among good company among the noes, including Dan Kaminsky and Dan Geer.  My answer:

    “I’m saying ‘no’ not because I don’t believe in accountability, but because I think the question obscures the problem. The breach is the result of, sadly, quite common security practices. The head of an agency is surely responsible for what that agency does (or fails to do), but let us not confuse that legal and cultural fiction with an actual belief that most leaders in Katherine Archuleta’s position have an easy way of knowing what’s going on in IT security and improving the situation — the failure here is systemic and all too common.”

    Here’s what the Dans said:

    “It’s important not to punish people for looking to identify and solve their problems. This could have been actively ignored, and upon discovery, this could have been swept under the rug. That’s not what happened. There’s no question there’s some deep issues at OPM. I stand concerned about disincentivizing the next cleanup. What, you think OPM’s the only hacked agency?” – Dan Kaminsky, White Ops 

    “Changing a person will not help – it is purely symbolic, and such symbolic gestures are precisely, totally, and without debate what happens in political hierarchies (read, Washington) whenever there is bad news to handle. Even talking about whether to fire someone is a criminally profligate waste of the citizenry’s attention span. What is neither a waste nor a diversion is the question that matters: When data is scarce or precious, there may be compelling reason to centralize it, but if and only if that centralization is risk cognizant. When data is either plentiful or of marginal value, then centralizing it can only create risk, never value.  Therefore, what is to be asked of those to whom OPM reports is what, exactly, was their raison d’etre for assigning the OPM its role as centralizer (scarcity or preciousness of what, exactly), and whether they delegated to OPM their own duty of risk cognizance on purpose or by accident. If wanting prediction, then the supposed reforms embodied in the Dodd-Frank law massively removed resilience from the financial system by forcing the centralization of functions previously widely dispersed into what now can only be described as freshly minted single points of failure waiting to happen.  It is the urge to centralize that is what political hierarchies do.  It is apologists for, and hucksters of, centralization that should lose their jobs.” – Dan Geer, In-Q-Tel

    The most persuasive “yes” answer seems to me to be less of the reflexive “captain pays if the ship runs aground” approach and more grounded in the specifics of unheeded warnings:

    “The OPM was repeatedly warned by the Inspector General of significant security lapses dating back to 2012. OPM leadership repeatedly failed to take the OIG’s warnings seriously. The potential consequences of this breach may be devastating for military and government personnel who hold clearances due to the highly personal data contained in SF-86 forms stored on OPM’s network. The White House, Congress, and the American people should hold OPM responsible and accountable for this breach due to negligence.” – Jeffrey Carr, Taia Global  

    Overall, as Dan G. says, it’s the wrong question to ask.

  • Does Santa Exist? A Chat with Eric Kaplan (Transcript)
  • DSE

    Jonathan Zittrain: This is Jonathan Zittrain speaking. I’m on the line, wherever that is, with one Eric Kaplan, author of “Does Santa Exist? A Philosophical Investigation,” a book that I had the pleasure of reading and that Eric had the burden of writing—and we thought we would talk about it for a little bit. So, hello, Eric.

    Eric Kaplan: Hi. How are you?

    JZ: I am very well, thank you. It would be interesting if I weren’t and we then proceeded into a lengthy discussion of my various complaints—

    EK: Of your ailments, sure.

    JZ: I’d be tempted to do it because one of the interesting features of the book is that it is wonderfully dialectical for a monograph, for something that really is just a number of pages of you speaking, as basically any book with a single author is. But it has this quality of you anticipating your audience as the book is reading, and there are even some wonderful footnotes there that you basically are counting on developing a relationship with the reader as you go on.

    And that leads to two questions. One, anything else we should know about you before we jump in? And second, what kind of reader were you envisioning as you put your pen to paper?

    EK: I don’t think you need to know anything more about me. I think you know plenty about me. I think it’s a strange relationship you enter into when you write. And in the same way, it’s almost like—Let me give you an analogy. Sometimes people are like, “Is there a voice in your head that talks when you think?” And some people say yes and some people say no. And it’s kind of a weird voice if you say yes. Does it sound like you? I don’t know what I sound like, but sometimes I do have a sense that when I’m thinking, I’m overhearing myself thinking.

    And I think in the same way that whatever kind of ontological entity that voice is, I think the hearer is in the same mental space. In the same sense that when I’m talking I’m hearing myself talking, the person I’m imagining reading is like that, which is like it is me, or it’s not me, or it’s an alternative version of me, or it’s an alternative version of what I like someone else to be. I guess, I’d like someone to be understanding, but then I’d also like someone—

    Sometimes I imagine the person reading my book is quite annoyed with me for some reason having to do with me, I suppose. I’ll think like, “Wow, I bet they’re just getting pretty mad about this. This all seems stupid.” But then sometimes I’ll calm down a little bit and think, “Maybe they like it or maybe it’s helping explore something for them.”

    I like the idea that it could be something for someone that hits them in a way that’s quite unanticipated. And that’s a relationship that I like with people, that sometimes you just sit down next to someone on the bus and you don’t know what kind of person they’re going to be, and you can have a commonality with them. But the way in which they’re different from you is something you’re not even prepared to think about that’s quite surprising, it’s like they’re especially interested in—I was on a plane trip with somebody and she was especially involved in prison chaplaincy. And I wasn’t even thinking about prison chaplaincy, even a little bit. It’s so interesting. Did that answer your question?

    JZ: Yes, it factually was an answer to the question. It made me more curious than before. In that sense, it may not have been a conclusory kind of answer.

    EK: Right, right.

    JZ: Given the sort of branching dialogue you have in mind with this stuff, that might be exactly the right kind of thing. How much in writing the book did you find your own view evolving? Was this basically a bunch of stuff that had been simmering for a while, which the act of writing the book was a great way of cathartically clearing out the pipeline, versus actually rethinking a bunch of stuff that had been on your mind but the act of writing the book transformed your own perception?

    EK: It was a little bit more the first. It was a little bit more because I had been kind of worrying about this issue of contradiction and I had been always—I started off in philosophy and then I got into comedy and I’d been bouncing back and forth between comedy and philosophy. So I had been formulating to myself, although I had never said it, the idea that there is something that comedy and philosophy have in common about being able to simultaneously look at the same issue from two different ways. And that was something that I wanted to get off my chest, that’s that cathartic idea that you mentioned.

    But then as I wrote, I found that…there was almost like a tone which I liked and there were certain things I liked—I was holding them with the tips of my fingertips and I didn’t quite know if they were real. And once I put them down on paper, I thought, “Okay, that’s a thing someone could say because I said it.” While before, I was always sort of, oh, that’s just some kind of weird problem that I have or some weird confusion that I’m. Or it’s not even a thought. It just looks like a thought. But it won’t be one when I take a look at it. So some of that stuff crystallized. So that was fun.

    JZ: It certainly makes the book a great exercise in the tension between the virtue of being unfiltered and actually really baring oneself without worrying about what might sound embarrassing. It’s a very intimate book and at the same time, given that it’s trying to anticipate where the reader’s at, it’s one that is very sensitive to who might be reading it and listening, and what doubts that person might be having. It’s interesting to see you plumbing both sides of that tension.

    EK: Well, that is a weird thing. That is a weird thing I found, which is—and I’m not the first one to say this, but I do think it’s true. Those times when you say something that seems so weird you don’t even know if you look like an idiot for saying it, or so personal that it feels very, very painful to disclose it, those are the times that people say, “Oh, it’s just like that with me.” I don’t know quite why that is. Why do you think?

    JZ: I don’t know, but it reminds me of something else that has a monologic quality, like we go and watch a play together or we’re at a conference and somebody makes a presentation and pre-Twitter and pre-everything being wired, you might have a room of 1000 people but no one is communicating with anybody else and your reaction to it—the entire room may be feeling a certain way, but unless they literally brought jars of mayonnaise with them and they’re hurling it at the podium, you may not even know where the audience is at on it.

    And today, to be experiencing a presentation from somebody and be able to react sentence by sentence in the back channel, say a Twitter channel, has completely changed that experience. I certainly have had the same experience you had on the presenting side of things where the more directly and authentically one can speak, often the more people respect that and resonate with it because maybe it’s bizarrely rare for people to share the stuff that is most in front of them.

    EK: Yeah, I think that’s true. One theory I have is just that we do like to hear things that are really coming from people and are for real. Take even, like, a diet book. If somebody says, “Oh, I ate nothing but bean sprouts and I did it for 30 days and now I’m sexier and I’m younger and I’m stronger and I can run faster. I’m healthy.” I’m like, “Okay, that’s very interesting.” And then you say, “Well, did you really do that?” “Oh no, I didn’t do it. It’s just a story.” Like, “Well, I don’t care then.” I really don’t care.

    I don’t think that all philosophy is an advice book. But I think it’s a lot closer to the advice book genre maybe than one might think in academia. Because like, “Hey, here’s a theory about how to run a country.” “Well, has anyone ever done it?” “Oh, no.” Well, that’s less interesting than people did it and it worked great. Here’s a theory about how to live your life. Here’s a theory about how to think about what’s important.

    And I do think about it that way. And it helped. That to me is interesting. So if I say, “Oh, man, I feel really embarrassed about such and such and I really do and here’s what I did about it.” Then I think that just inherently makes it more interesting because it actually worked. It’s not just a fanciful walk through my ability to put words together.

    JZ: And I don’t know if your hypothesis about what works and what doesn’t, what sticks to the wall and what doesn’t in a philosophical vein carries over to your craft of comedy. I’ve got to say in reading the book, I felt like the sections that felt to me like they were written with the surest, most passionate hand were some of the passages and reflections on under what circumstances should we take offense at something rather than find it funny.

    I don’t know if it’s possible to do both. And it was one of the times where it felt like you really tipped the hand of your own very strongly held views about when it’s okay to make a joke. And I don’t know if there’s something that you want to say about that now about when is it too soon, when is it not too soon, that kind of thing.

    EK: Well, it’s funny. I mean, I congenitally don’t have sympathy for people who are offended. It just seems to me like an oddly bullying move. That is, supposing something tragic happened to me—God forbid, a child died and you make a joke about it. I don’t care. Make your joke about my dead child. It’s not going to make my child deader. It’s not going to make him back to life if you don’t. That’s kind of an unthinking not terribly reflective gut feeling I have, that people who take offense are trying to push everybody else around and they should just cut it out and it’s not helpful.

    Now, when I question that, I think like, “Well, okay.” I mean, if somebody was murdered and you’re making some joke and the premise was that they killed themselves and we all know that it’s not true and the reason why you make that joke is because you’re the one who killed them. Then it’s like, “Well, fuck you, buddy. That’s not cool.”

    JZ: That’s a funny joke. Why is that funny?

    EK: Why is it funny? I mean, I guess—

    JZ: Joke about the person making the joke is, in fact, the killer.

    EK: They are actually the killer. That’s not cool. I don’t think that’s cool.

    JZ: Yeah.

    EK: No. I mean, I don’t know. I hope not to offend the pro-murder people listening on the internet. That’s the weird thing about the internet. We don’t know who is going to be listening.

    JZ: Yeah.

    EK: And then I’m always questioning if I’m just wrong or coming at something from my own perspective. I do think that comedy is probably often in my own case and maybe everybody’s case a defense against painful emotion. So, I think, if there’s a situation where you should be feeling the painful emotion, then probably, to make a joke about it is offensive. Like in my example of the person who murdered somebody, then they should be feeling the painful emotion because they did something bad and by golly they should feel bad about it.

    So them cracking jokes, then I think that’s wrong and, I guess, offensive. I mean, offensive is a weird word. I’m actually thinking about that. Because, I think, an offense in the Victorian way, it’s a bit like a slap in the face. You’re showing that you can hurt someone else with impunity. And I think people don’t like that. If I go up to you and I pull your nose, then you’re like, “That’s offensive.” Because you’re acting as if I’m so much more powerful than you are that I can abuse your rights and I don’t need to worry about it.

    And, I think, when you look at victim politics, what they don’t like is let’s make up an ethnic group and they’re called “Poes” but sometimes other people call them “Boes” or something. And they say, “It’s so offensive when you call as “Boes”.” And I’m like, “Why? They’re basically the same word.” But what their argument is, “We don’t want to be called “Boes”. You know we don’t want to be called “Boes” and you’re doing it anyway, and that’s offensive because you are exerting your power and your privilege over us.” I get that.

    JZ: Like when the Republicans had the insight two or three years ago to use “Democrat” as the adjective for Democrats, instead of “democratic.” Like, “We don’t agree with the Democrat policies.” That just sounds much harsher on the ear than, “We don’t agree with the democratic policies of the president.” And, I guess, you’re saying “whatevs,” if they just want to say that.

    EK: I guess. But if we’re in the schoolyard and I start calling you Zoottrain, and you’re like, “My name is not Zoottrain,” and I’m like, “Shut up, Zoottrain,” it’s pretty clear that I’m using the fact that I can do something wrong just to annoy you and see if you have the guts to be annoyed. But it’s also a clever thing, because if you get up and you say, “Hey, why are we fighting?” “Well, he called me Zoottrain.” The teacher is going to say, “Well, why don’t you call him Koplon or something?”

    The teacher will take a higher standard, and you’ll feel foolish for being upset about it. And now I’ll have won, because I’ve deliberately come up with something that’s annoying, but it’s so sneaky that it’s so hard for you to articulate why it’s annoying. So, I think “Democrat” is maybe something like that. Well, it’s “democratic,” don’t they mean the same thing? Yeah, I guess it means the same thing. But then they kind of win that one.

    JZ: So, I guess, the case I could imagine being made on the other side, if we wind back just a little bit to humor and offensiveness and such, would maybe come back to the dichotomy I hear some time between punching up and punching down. And it says comedy is maybe at its best when it’s punching up, which is to say the way that South Park tends to satirize the powerful and the complacent, although they’re pretty much an equal-opportunity satirizer. And that’s different from a kind of humor that I gather is that of the French anti-Semite who has a whole comedy show around making fun of Jews using stereotypes. Is that a distinction that has any meaning for you?

    EK: I wish it could work better.

    JZ: Yeah.

    EK: Because I can’t help but think like, well, I don’t know. We’re in Germany in 1920 and I’m a heroin addict—or whatever it was, a morphine addict. And I’m Hermann Goring. I’m pretty much on the shitty end of the stick of a lot of people, and some of them were gays. The Nazis were profoundly at the bottom of the social heap, but they were still profoundly horrible people. So I don’t think you can give a task to people just because they’ve been horribly victimized.

    In other words, I think you can punch up in a horrific way, and you can punch down in a funny way, and I don’t think there’s clear ranking of all humans in terms of who is up and who is down. Somebody could be in the 19th century a wealthy snobbish gay man and then he could make fun of some poor heterosexual guy in the snobby and hilarious way. He’s sort of punching diagonally, you know what I mean?

    JZ: Who is the more privileged, you’d have to sort out first before—

    EK: Yeah. And that’s not to say that there couldn’t be—Look, I haven’t listened to this anti-Semitic thing in French. Maybe it’s funny. I don’t know. I’m not going to say a priori it’s not funny just because people making the jokes are objectionable and the people who are the victims of the jokes are nice.

    JZ:
    Yes. And is part of the reason you then include comedy as part of the four-legged stool that is the structure of your book, is it because there’s a certain atomic inability to further deconstruct “funny” at a certain point, and/or is it that comedy rests, in fact, if you analyze it, in contradiction, in being able to embrace the contradiction or say something that you wouldn’t normally say but understand a certain truth with it?

    EK: It’s kind of the second one. I mean, I believe in the hermeneutic circle and, I think you can explain everything by connecting it to other things. So I’m sure you could explain comedy by connecting it to a bunch of other things. But I do think it’s interesting that—Lately, I’ve been reading Metaphysics Gamma, which is when Aristotle comes out against contradicting yourself. He says it’s very terrible to contradict yourself.

    But I think he is wrong. And one of the arguments that he makes is he says, “Well, if you contradict yourself, you’re no better than a vegetable.” And so, basically, he is interested in this language game where people assert things and it’s systematic and you can kind of play this game of debating and you can beat people down if they haven’t come up with a good reason for believing what they have to say.

    And one of the ways you do that is through the elenchus that you point out that they’re contradicting themselves. And I think there’s all kinds of other ways people can relate to the truth and that they can relate to each other, other than this sort of debate school model where you put forward an assertion and it better not be self-contradictory. And, I think, comedy is one of them and, I guess, poetry is probably another one.

    But I think it’s interesting because I think it’s like a form of non-Aristotelian or non-rational thinking. But it is thinking. I’m not being a pumpkin. I’m not being a mindless vegetable when I’m responding to a joke or I’m laughing at a joke. And yet I’m able to embrace contradictions, which according to Aristotle is sort of like a necessary condition of being a confident participant in our collective intellectual life. So that’s why I think it’s interesting.

    JZ: I don’t want to end up telegraphing too much about where the book goes, because it really does have the character of a journey and there’s pieces that you introduce precisely because you introduced earlier pieces. But there’s this wonderful counterpart you’ve done online where people can kind of choose their own adventure as you’re narrating on 14 YouTube videos on how much choice they might want to make.

    But it’s probably not tipping hand too much to say you examine logic, you examine mysticism, you examine comedy—which is to say trying not to be contradictory at all costs, embracing contradiction, and then looking for a way that can tolerate contradiction without making everything equally true.

    By the time you get to what you have found right now that works for you, which I should say was a really interesting kind of 30-degree turn for the book to take, are you thinking more as in, “This is just what happened to add up for me given the path I personally have experienced and taken?” Or are you thinking, “I’m really on to something, and somebody reading this book might well join me literally in the place I end up on what counts for figuring out things like whether Santa exists?”

    EK: Well, the second one. I think it could be helpful if people could literally like the way I put things together and put things together for them. But I think in a weird way, what I’ve come up with is almost like a method of mapping from where you are to where you want to go. I think like, wow, what I end up doing is having this kind of—I wouldn’t say a mismatch but I kind of lived synthesis of a bunch of different things that I’ve gone through in my life and it involved looking at my emotions and what it is that drove me to think about stuff and doubling back and looking at it from an emotional point of view.

    And I think that that could be helpful for somebody else. But they could be different. They could be some Marxist Chinese person who is somehow getting more interested in the Daoist tradition of their grandpa. They could have different stuff going into the cauldron, into the witch’s brew, so to speak. But I do think it’s not just a memoir. I mean, I do think I’m talking about my life deliberately in an abstract enough way that could be helpful to other people.

    JZ: And what would be the ideal reaction to this book? What’s your highest hope for it other than, of course, it ends up by the cash register at—I think they still have bookstores—that it ends up by the cash register there and flies out the door and you make a lot of money.

    EK: Well, one of the things I feel is a kind of a tragic thing right now is a way that religious people and atheists talk past each other. And I see that in our national life in the United States. And I also see it globally. I wish the book could help people from both sides lower the heat and increase the light of those conversations. Because I do think that they’re not as different as they think and there’s an ignorant, hectoring quality that I see both in atheists talking about how stupid religious people are, and religious people talking about how wicked and shallow atheist people are.

    And I would like it if people could just put those cudgels down and start appreciating each other. So that’s my highest hope. And then also my highest hope is that people who are internally tormented by these issues might be able to put their internal cudgeling down and be just like, “Oh, I like logic and mysticism too and that’s okay.” And if somebody could have a more free, easy relationship with themselves from reading my book, that’s another hope.

    JZ: That’s funny. As I thought about what you’re describing as a problem of public discourse, I thought that maybe part of that problem is that people too often think of joining a discourse about something as a team sport in which they’re a member of a team and they measure success of the conversation by how many goals they’ve scored, rather than as a joint pursuit of truth or enlightenment. Or you’d measure success by how much your view has changed, because wow, that’s productive conversation.

    And I wonder how much the team sports/entertainment view of discourse — I think of the debate, the Creation Museum between Ken Ham and Bill Nye, the Science Guy. I mean, that was surely “get out your popcorn and watch the sparks fly.” The studio-wrestling view. Do you figure that’s kind of a big part of the problem? Or when you look at comedy, and comedy is form of entertainment, so it’s weird to blame a desire for entertainment over truth seeking as the issue.

    EK: Well, I guess, I think I’m more concerned on maybe with a slightly more intractable phenomenon which is that people—Let’s say you’re an anti-abortion activist. And you’re just like, “Wow, there are these people killing babies.” And I just feel like, “Well, why did you decide that those were babies and how did you decide that those people were murderers? Why don’t you think about that a little bit more and maybe talk to some of them?”

    And then on the other side of the aisle, people are just like, “Oh, there are these people, there are these morons saying the world is 6,000 years old.” Then just kind of like, “Why do they think that? What are they expressing when they say that? How do you want to talk to people like that? Maybe they are worried that there’s kind of hegemonic quality to your discourse and how do you put yourself in their shoes?”

    So, I think, it’s something that—Even if people are going into these debates not trying to entertain, I think they still can run into just this sort of failure of moral imagination of what it would be like to grow up and honestly be a Pentecostal Christian or honestly be an atheist. I just think people don’t know what’s going on in the minds of other people and I wish they would take more of an interest.

    JZ: Which is to say then that a big part of the book and the question posed by the book whether asked between adults or between kids is, “Are you ready to be in a place where you might find yourself changing your minds sufficiently or changing your identity? Are you okay with that? Are you ready to examine almost anything, no matter how nailed down you consider it to be?”

    EK: I think so. I think there’s a kind of an emotional angle also. The thinking is almost like a form of psychotherapy, or self-psychotherapy. I used to be worried that the world is changing too fast, and I’m speaking autobiographically now. It’s like, “Oh, no, Disney channel is going to be teaching my children, and they are this heartless capitalist enterprise, and the world is getting away from me.”

    And then I started to think, like, “What am I holding onto? What am I afraid of? Why am I afraid that my children won’t have the moral compass or the imaginative compass to find a way in the world just as I did? Why do I feel like I’m a child who can’t defend myself?” That’s what I find interesting. Realizing maybe the things that scare me—what did it tell me about me that certain things scare me or horrify me?

    I would sometimes have this mood, these last few days where I look at it and be like, “Oh, people are callous and shallow, and I’m sensitive.” And then I thought, “Well, how do I know they’re callous and shallow? I mean, do I share what I’m sensitive about with people every day? No, I kind of hide it. Well, maybe they’re doing the same thing.” To me, that’s kind of an exciting journey and that’s maybe because I’m self-obsessed. But to me, it’s interesting just to be like, wow, they are these interesting intellectual questions. But they’re motivated by these emotional questions and those emotional questions are motivated by a very deep sense of who I am and what I’m vulnerable to and what I’m afraid of and what I hope.

    JZ: Which is why what otherwise could be a highly analytic book, rigorous in the traditional sense, is so wonderfully tempered by, I think, what you called earlier the aspects of memoir that really put yourself into it even as you are curious about what the self is and whether there even is one.

    EK:
    Right. Personally, maybe I’m just gossipy, but I’m interested in, “what was Thomas Jefferson thinking when he was sleeping with that slave?” Was he just not thinking about it? Did he think he was just being an animal and then feel sorry the next morning? I would like to know. And I don’t know if he knew. I don’t know if asking him, presuming we have a time machine, if we would get a straight answer from him or an illuminating answer. But I think it’s really important. So I just wonder about those things. And I think if there was an honest memoir by Immanuel Kant, it’s like, “Hey, Immanuel Kant, how did you decide that freedom was the most important thing?” And like, “Well, look, when I was 11 years old in Prussia, I ran into all these people who were pushing other people around and it really made me sick.” “Oh, okay, that’s interesting.”

    I don’t think it detracts from his achievement to know where it came from. And sometimes it may give you more appreciation for his courage to think like, wow, this guy, he didn’t decide to go and work for the monarchy and he didn’t decide to go and be a religious guy even though he sort of was. He didn’t even get married. And he hardly ate anything! And he just kind of lived his life of trying to spread some knowledge. I think that’s cool and I would like to sit him down and have coffee, if he drank it, and then ask him why and what motivated him.

    JZ: And that’s why I’m really grateful for the chance to have sat down over the virtual phone line and had a chance to talk to you about this book. Perhaps it will be one of a series as this filters in. Is there a prospect that you’d write another? Or does this feel again so cathartic like…

    EK: I’m interested in writing a book called “Other People: What are They Good For?” Just from the perspective of a lone person. Like what are other people for? Are they just to give me pleasure? Should I just put up a wall against them and keep them from hurting me? Or is there some more fundamental use for them? I just find it interesting.

    I mean, I’m pro-other people, but I think that’s something that people so easily fall into sanctimoniousness about, where people are just like, “Well, you know what it is? You should love everyone else as much as you love yourself.” But sort of deep down, no one really does that, or very few. Why do people say that if they don’t really think it? It’s just kind of like they’re trying to get their hand in their pocket by telling you that your money and their money are the same thing. I just find it interesting.

    I suspect it will be, like, it’s a little scary to me. I feel like it’s, “Oh, I hope I don’t come out of it more selfish than I was to begin with. I hope I come out writing it less selfish and a better person. But maybe I’ll change my mind about what it means to be a better person.” I don’t know. I’m puzzled by it. I’m interested by it.

    JZ: It might be the kind of book, given the title, to co-author, crowdsource, or otherwise write from multiple points of view.

    EK: Yeah, that’s so interesting. I’m so interested in collaboration. And I think it’s tricky because sometimes when we enter into collaboration, we protect vulnerable parts of ourselves and we put forward a social self. And that’s going to make it less interesting. But if you have people who are really not doing that, then it’s very exciting because you get something amazing, like Coleridge and Wordsworth and Lennon and McCartney, people like that.

    JZ: Yeah. EK, thank you so much for this kaleidoscopic chat around a book that really does divide into so many directions. I feel lucky to have read it and will be eager to hear from others who have, and to carry on that conversation.

    EK: Well, thank you for the opportunity. I’ve enjoyed talking about it and talking with you.

  • Does Santa Exist? A Chat with Eric Kaplan
  • F0151_SantaExist-238x238


    Eric Kaplan is a writer and producer of the Big Bang Theory. He’s also a student and teacher of philosophy. Put the two together and you get Does Santa Exist?, an exploration of metaphysics, life, and ethics, from the point of view of a dangerously smart comedian. Eric and I recorded a conversation about his book, below.  (Spoiler non-alert: we do not declare whether Santa exists.)

    http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/futureoftheinternet/files/2014/12/jzinterview_boosted.m4a

    Direct link here.

    You should also check out his blog, which has such gems as the Secret of All Story-Telling.

  • Everything you should know about … warrant canaries
  • "CANÁRIO-DA-TERRA-VERDADEIRO (Sicalis flaveola)" by Dario Sanches on Flickr (https://www.flickr.com/photos/dariosanches/2297206634) Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0

    “CANÁRIO-DA-TERRA-VERDADEIRO (Sicalis flaveola)” by Dario Sanches on Flickr.
    Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0

     

    Guest post by Naomi Gilens, J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School

    [I’m pleased to feature on the blog some of the best work undertaken by HLS students on Internet-related topics. –JZ]

    In 2002, the FBI used the newly-passed Patriot Act to demand that libraries secretly turn over records of patrons’ reading materials and Internet use. The libraries had to comply – even though such secret requests go against the entire ethos of a professional librarian. To get around the government’s mandate not to disclose the orders, some libraries came up with a potential workaround: they hung signs on their entrances stating, “The FBI has not been here (watch very closely for the removal of this sign).” The idea was that, like a canary in a coal mine, the presence of the sign would reassure the public, and its removal would signal to those watching closely that all was no longer well. An order not to disclose something may differ legally from an order compelling continued, false notices that no national security request has been served, and warrant canary notices work by exploiting that difference.

    Warrant canaries have been discussed in some Internet policy and privacy circles since the initial deployments, and recently some major companies appear to have adopted the libraries’ approach in order to send signals about the digital data the companies hold on their customers. For example, last November, Apple made headlines for including a warrant canary in its biannual transparency report, declaring:

    unnamed

    Recently, observers noted that Apple removed that text from its last few transparency reports, prompting speculation that the company may have actually been served with a 215 order for records on Apple users.

     

    Apple isn’t the only one to have adopted a canary. Since the Snowden disclosures began last summer, the public has become increasingly sensitive to privacy concerns and tech companies have come under commensurate pressure to disclose how they share user information with governments. As a result, many companies have begun experimenting with warrant canaries in an effort to increase transparency. Encryption and information security providers like Silent Circle and Wickr have been leading the trend:

     

    4
    And even popular social networking sites like Tumblr have picked up on the approach:

    2

     

    Up until recently, these canaries have all remained alive and well. It’s possible that this is still the case, as it’s not entirely clear yet whether Apple actually intended to kill its canary and signal that it had received a 215 order. Though Apple’s transparency report no longer includes the statement that “Apple has never received an order under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act,” it now says that “Apple has not received any orders for bulk data.” Section 215, which allows the government to collect business records related to national security investigations, is an authority under which the government carries out the bulk collection of Americans’ phone record metadata for foreign intelligence purposes.

     

    Nonetheless, the fact that Apple removed its canary language from its most recent transparency reports has provoked a spate of speculation as to what the change signifies. Mike Masnick at TechDirt, for example, has suggested that the Justice Department may have pressured Apple to change the language. Another possibility is that Apple just never intended to adopt a warrant canary to begin with. In telling the public it had never received a national security order under Section 215, Apple may have simply failed to think through what would happen if it ever did receive a 215 order. If that is the case, the company would have been surprised by the press coverage lauding it for adopting a canary. Changing its language may have been a strategic move to remain generally transparent, while making it clear that the statement is not a canary that can be relied on to communicate the fact of a national security request.

     

    As Chris Soghoian of the ACLU pointed out, “There is a lesson to be learned here: once you post a warrant canary, it needs to stay in the same place and use the same language.” Indeed, warrant canaries could be at their most effective if companies work together to adopt standardized language and publication cycles, making it crystal clear to the public that they are intentionally publishing canaries. Then, should the canaries disappear, observers can be confident that the company did actually receive a national security order.

     

    What if Apple really is signaling that it has been served with a 215 order? If it did receive such an order, it would likely have felt obliged to remove its canary statement whether or not it actually wanted to communicate the fact of the order to the public. After all, leaving it in the transparency reports would be a direct lie to the public (and to Apple’s shareholders). Replacing it with a statement that the company had never received an order for bulk data may have been an intentional attempt to avoid liability for violating the gag order by confusing the message that killing the canary would have otherwise sent.

     

    Apple has so succeeded in confusing its message (see: this blog post) that it is surely in no danger of prosecution for violating the gag order. But as canaries become increasingly common, it seems inevitable that such a scenario will take place in the near future. When it does, it’s possible that the government will prosecute the company that killed its canary, arguing that the company has violated the gag order by communicating the fact of the national security order to the public. The company is likely to respond with a First Amendment defense that, while the government can prohibit a company from speaking about an order, it cannot compel the company to publish an untrue canary statement. Essentially, this argument turns on the idea that compelling a person to be silent is categorically different than compelling a person to lie.

     

    The question whether the government can force someone to lie appears to be a novel one. As EFF has explained, the outcome of a case is likely to depend heavily on the actual facts before the court. Apple’s might be an ideal test case—the broad language of its canary, combined with the company’s huge customer base, ensures that even if Apple did kill its canary, no individual user would have reason to suspect that his or her own personal data was requested. As a result, killing the canary would cause only minimal harm to national security, and the interest in preventing that harm is easily outweighed by Apple’s First Amendment interest.

     

    Other companies publish more granular canaries, which provide individual customers with more specific information about the security of their own personal information. CloudFlare, for example, publishes a series of different canary statements tailored to specific services it provides—among others, it states:

    3

    If CloudFlare killed this canary, it would alert users that their encrypted communications may no longer be secure, and at least some of those users would be likely to close their accounts and move their information to another provider. Theoretically, a company could even create individual canaries for each user and email them to the user every day, alerting the user that no requests for his or her information has been received. Killing this canary would provide highly useful information to the subject of a national security investigation, and one can imagine that the government would vigorously oppose it.

    The hypothetical canary that provides individualized notices to each user illustrates the extent to which canaries are essentially end-runs around lawful gag orders. Companies exploit the potential legal loophole in the difference between compelled silence and compelled lies in order to communicate information that they would otherwise be prohibited from sharing. The fact that so many companies are adopting canaries, even at the risk of exposing themselves to litigation and—at the outside—potential criminal liability, highlights how out of step even routine national security requests have become with the companies’ willingness to turn over information on their users. Like Apple’s recent embrace of automatic encryption, canaries are a symptom of the growing public desire to maintain control over personal data. In the end, then, canaries do not only signal information about national security requests that companies couldn’t otherwise communicate; they also signal the dissonance between the government’s emphasis on secrecy and industry’s willingness to cooperate. The era of companies sharing data with the government in the name of patriotism with just a shake of the hand is now over.

     

    To read more, see Naomi’s paper on the subject, available at SSRN, and EFF’s FAQ here.

     

     

     

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