Kids with Cameras
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Ion queda para albergar archivos a descargar desde Elastico y para que yo actualice y use constantemente la columna de links.
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Gallagher, Catherine. “Fiction, Gender, Property, Charlotte Lennox.” Nobody’s Stories: The Vanishing Acts of Women Writers in the Marketplae 1670-1820. Berkeley: U of California P, 1994. 145-202.
157. When one looks at the decisions handed down under the Statute of Anne in early copyright disputes, one is struck by the emphasis the courts placed on “invention” or “originality” as the definite characteristic of authorship. […] For example, in 1720, the bookseller who owned the copyright of Dr. Thomas Burnet’s Latin work Archaeologiae Philiosophicae tried to stop the publication of an English translation, but the court of Chancery ruled that a translation “may be called a different book, and the translator may be said to be the author” because he had invented a new form for the ideas. To question whether the plaintiff’s rights had been infringed, therefore, was to question whether a translator was an author and, in turn, to ask whether the translator had originated or invented something. In this case, it was decided that the translator was an author even though he had not originated the ideas, for he had conceived a new form, and “forma dat esse rei.” Invention was also found to be the crucial criterion of authorship in cases involving abridgement; books that were only superficially changed or “colourably shortened” were judged to be piracies, but “a fair abridgement… may with great propriety be called a new book, because not only the paper and print, but the invention, learning, and judgement of the author [abridger] is shown in them.
[158 inmediatamente despu
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Hesse, Carla. “The Rise of Intellectual Property 700 B.C.-A.D. 2000.” Daedalus. Cambridge, MA: Spring 2002. 26-45.
Positions on copyright were clearly not the product of disinterested jurisprudential reflection. By the nineteenth century it became clear that nations that were net exporters of intellectual property, such as France, England, and Germany, increasingly favored the natural-rightsf doctrine as a universal moral and economic right enabling authors to exercise control over their creations and inventions and to receive remuneration. Conversely, developing nations that were net importersf of literary and scientific creations, such as the United States and Russia, refused to sign on to international agreements and insisted on the utilitarian view of copyright claims as the statutory creations of particular national legal regimes. By refusing to sign international copyright treaties, the developing nations of the nineteenth century were able to simply appropriate the ideas, literary creations, and scientific inventions of the major powers freely. 40.
By the opening of the twentieth century, as America came to be a full-fledged competitor in international commerce in intellectual property and a net exporter of intellectual property, American legal doctrine began to move toward an increasing recognition of unique authorial rights rooted in the sanctity of the personality of the creator, rather than simply in commercial privileges extended for utilitarian ends. 42.
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Nabokov, Dmitri. “Foreword”. En Lo’s Diary. Pia Pera. Trans. Ann Goldstein. NY: Foxrock, 1999. vii-x.
Lolita is not in the public domain, and won’t be until well into the next millenium when copyright expires–notwihtstanding which [ix] the Washington Post advanced the view that I should lighten up: Lolita, their editors urged, should be fair game in the fields of copyright because it has “come inescapably into common consciousness”.
I thought then, and think now, that this is silly. Is Lolita to pay this price because it is too good, too famous? Are writers to strive for mediocrity lest their works similarly enter the “common consciousness”? Are icons of popular culture–Star Wars perhaps–to be made subject to plundering by free riders because they have entered the common consciousness? The Post urged me to “rethink” my stance, asking whether books like Madam Pera’s “can truly do the original anything but homage?” By ignoring the fact that homage to Lolita can be and has been paid with bona fide licenses, the question seems na
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The [British] 1911 Copyright Act was to prove less long-lived than that of 1842, but was much better conceived. It incorporated a principle which was wholly new in British law, but which had long since been accepted in almost all other European countries. Copyright was now firmly linked to the life of the author, and survived him or her by a substantial period of time. Moreover, the author was explicitly in control of the work; the rights of translation, abridgement, dramatization, or any other form of adaptation, were clearly the author’s and only the author’s. He or she might make contractual arrangements about the use of those rights, but their origin and the ultimate ownership were not in doubt. Indeed, for practical purposes, authors had to reach agreements with publishers and others for the production and distribution of their works, but the fundamental rights which the Society of Authors, and individual writers, had sought for so long were now firmly incorporated in the law.
The new Act recognized, for the first time, the wide range of rights which could derive from intellectual products such as written works or musical compositions. Although it was not wholly satisfactory, it did addres the problem of sound recording and of [204] cinematographic films, and clearly established the principle of the rights of the primary creator over what was created. Ambiguities remained, but they were comparatively insignificant at the time, although the problems were to be compounded by technical developments during the next thirty years.
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