Iran’s opposition punished—by us
Mar 7th, 2008 by MESH
From Raymond Tanter
Since December 2006, the UN Security Council and the United States Government have rightly used designation lists to counter the Iranian regime’s terrorist activities and pursuit of nuclear weapons. Ironically, Washington also designates as terrorist the regime’s main opposition, although it is a prime source of vital intelligence about Iran’s nuclear programs.
On December 23, 2006, Security Council Resolution 1737 sanctioned Iranian entities involved in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Among entities and individuals sanctioned was the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. A high-profile name was Maj.-Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), whom the regime replaced as a result of the designation. The raison d’être of the IRGC is to produce nuclear weapons and export the regime’s revolutionary ideology via terrorism.
Because of the Iranian regime’s refusal to comply with UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) demands to halt its enrichment and ballistic missile programs, the Security Council stepped up sanctions in a second resolution on March 24, 2007. Resolution 1747 expanded the list of ballistic missile and nuclear entities to banks funding Iran’s nuclear weapons program, including Bank Sepah, which was designated by the U.S. Treasury Department in January 2007. The Resolution also listed entities and individuals of the IRGC, including Qods Aeronautics Industries and Qods Force Commander Qasem Soleimani.
Despite Resolutions 1737 and 1747, the Iranian regime accelerated its uranium enrichment during 2007, prompting the Departments of State and Treasury to issue unilateral sanctions against regime entities. On October 25, 2007, State placed the Revolutionary Guards on its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, “to counter Iran’s bid for nuclear capabilities and support for terrorism.”
On January 9, 2008, Treasury imposed yet another round of sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for fueling violence in Iraq, including Qods Force Brigadier General Ahmed Foruzandeh, who “leads terrorist operations against Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces, and directs assassinations of Iraqi figures.” Tehran’s failure to comply with Resolutions 1737 and 1747 led to a third UN Resolution to extend sanctions, on March 3, 2008.
The irony of the designations against the Iranian regime over the past year is that the Iranian opposition that provided intelligence to help make such designations possible, is itself designated by the United States as a terrorist entity: the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the parliament-in-exile based in France with a network of supporters in Iran.
President Clinton designated the NCRI as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1999. There is evidence that the U.S. listings were part of a politically-motivated effort by the Clinton administration to appease the clerical regime in Tehran, and research by the Iran Policy Committee (of which I am President) concludes that the Clinton administration’s allegations, which were used to designate the groups, are baseless.
Not only has the Bush administration continued the designation of the NCRI, which failed to appease Tehran; the State Department also designated the NCRI-US in 2003, in exchange for a promise from the Iranian regime not to subvert Iraq following the takedown of Saddam Hussein. The regime broke its promise, yet the NCRI and NCRI-US inexplicably remain designated.
It is nonsensical for the United States, Europe, and the UN to sanction the Iranian regime, while simultaneously designating as terrorist brave Iranian oppositionists who risk their lives for intelligence that makes sanctions against the regime possible. Lifting unwarranted terrorist designations of the Iranian opposition would remove contradictions that plague U.S. policy, jumpstart stalled diplomacy, and avert the need for military action against the Iranian regime. Contradictions weaken targeted sanctions, allow the regime to perfect uranium enrichment, and increase the likelihood that President Bush’s successor, whether Clinton, McCain, or Obama, will be left with the difficult choice of an Iranian bomb or bombing Iran.
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Ray Tanter is right to point out that the Mujahedeen-e Khalq Organization (MEK, what he refers to as the NCRI) has provided some very useful intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program. They’ve also provided some less useful information, but—to be fair—that is the nature of intelligence. It should not be assumed, however, that all or much or even a significant amount (if any) of the information the U.S. government has relied upon as the evidentiary basis for its various actions targeting Iran came from the MEK.
But that was not the main thrust of Ray’s posting. It was just the hook for the real point: that the MEK should be de-listed because it targets an adversary of the United States. On that point I disagree. We lose the counterterrorism high ground if we only call out and designate those terrorists who target our friends and allies. As long as the MEK—a radical, cult-like group—continues to carry out acts of terrorism and political violence, it should remain on the U.S. list of designated terrorist groups.
True, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has de-listed the MEK as a terror organization, and the European Court of First Instance ordered MEK’s funds unfrozen. But the European Court decided in the end to maintain the blacklisting of the MEK, and so should the United States.
The history of the MEK aside, the group’s ongoing violent activities—and its financial support activity here in the United States—clearly place the group well within the definition of a terrorist group worthy of being so designated by the United States.
Consider this, from the State Department’s 2006 Country Reports on Terrorism, released in April 2007 (the 2007 report is expected to be released next month):
As I have written on this blog before, Iran poses a variety of threats to its neighbors, the international community, and the international financial system. From support for terrorist groups, to nuclear proliferation, to the use of deceptive financial practices to hide its support for these illicit activities, Iran maintains a threatening posture that must be addressed. But forgiving the MEK its acts of terrorism simply because they target an adversary is not the answer. Indeed, today’s targeted financial measures against Iran are focused on Iran’s illicit activities and those most directly involved in those activities. That is the same standard we should apply to the MEK.
Matthew Levitt is a member of MESH.
Matt Levitt is correct to insist that Washington be vigilant in targeting groups that engage in terrorist activity, regardless of whether they target our friends or enemies. But the MEK simply isn’t a terrorist organization.
And Matt Levitt is incorrect to equate the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK) with the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). The MEK is an opposition group based in Iraq; the NCRI is the Iranian parliament-in-exile, based in Paris, of which the MEK is one member. While the MEK, or People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI) as it’s known in Europe, is listed as a terrorist group by the EU, the NCRI is not. This contradiction with U.S. policy, where both groups are listed, was one inspiration for my initial post.
Levitt also mistakenly claims that the European Court of Justice “decided in the end to maintain the blacklisting of the MEK.” In fact, the European Council, the executive body of the EU, decided to maintain the listing, in defiance of the Court.
In addition to these factual inaccuracies, Matt Levitt mischaracterizes my position as, “The MEK should be de-listed because it targets an adversary of the United States.” Levitt responds to this straw man by asserting that the United States should not turn a blind eye to those terrorists who target our enemies, in which category he places the MEK, because doing so would cede the counterterrorism high ground.
My actual position is that it is in the U.S. interest to delist the MEK because it not only opposes a principal adversary, but also because the group does not engage in terrorism. Accordingly, in a May 2003 New York Post op-ed, Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson posed the following question and answer: “Is the MEK a terrorist group? No.”
Levitt refers to 2001 attacks inside Iran cited by the State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, but Levitt and the State Department would be hard pressed to find an example of an attack since then, because there have not been any such attacks.
Consistent with the Pipes-Clawson conclusion and extensive Iran Policy Committee research, on November 30, 2007, the Proscribed Organizations Appeals Commission (POAC) of the United Kingdom ordered the Government to delist the PMOI. It is notable that this court made it very clear that delisting the PMOI was not ordered because of any larger foreign policy context involving Iran as an adversary of the UK, which Levitt incorrectly supposes to be my justification for delisting:
Instead, the UK court ordered the delisting of the PMOI because the group was found to not be a terrorist organization:
Under the section of the U.S. Code that sets forth the criteria for designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, it must be the case that the group so designated is “foreign,” “engages in terrorist activity,” and “the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the national security of the United States.” If the judgment of the UK court were applied to U.S. law regarding designation, the MEK listing would clearly be unwarranted.
I concur with Levitt’s conclusion that the MEK should be held to the same standard as the Iranian regime. Doing so finds unimpeachable evidence of Tehran’s terrorist activity, as well as equally valid evidence that the MEK does not engage in terrorist activity.
Raymond Tanter is a member of MESH.