Balance of terror
Apr 14th, 2008 by MESH
From Alan Dowty
So the focus shifts to deterrence. Both Charles Krauthammer (here) and Zev Chafets (here) hold out little hope for international efforts to block Iran getting the bomb, or for military action to that end (though Chafets suggests that Israel might be able “in the best case” to weaken and delay Iran’s program). As a wake-up call this is justified: the sanctions are pathetic and the military options are dismal.
It is too early to give up completely; international pressure has slowed the program down, and the Iranians are still years from possession of a significant amount of fissionable material (which is why the apparent hiatus in weapons development is meaningless). Dragging out the program gives more time for moderating trends within Iran. But it makes sense at this stage to ask how a nuclearized Iran, guided by apocalyptic notions, might be deterred.
Krauthammer offers the Berlin model of extended deterrence. Extended deterrence in the Cold War setting had two dimensions: the threat of nuclear retaliation to protect non-nuclear allies, and the threat of nuclear retaliation in response to an overwhelming conventional attack. Kennedy’s pledge on Berlin involved both. Since the United States could not actually prevent Soviet bloc forces from occupying the Berlin enclave, the answer was to threaten a “full retaliatory response” upon the Soviet Union itself. In truth, there was always an irrational side to this posture: would the United States actually sacrifice tens or hundreds of millions of American lives to defend a city that would doubtless be also destroyed in a full-scale nuclear exchange? Fortunately, this was never tested.
The suggested “Holocaust Declaration” is in some respects more credible. Krauthammer proposes that it apply only to a nuclear attack on Israel, and as he points out there is little fear—for now—of Iranian retaliation against the United States itself. On the other hand, Israel is not Berlin, and it is far from clear that any U.S. government would feel the need to reinforce a deterrence that is already in place: the certainty of a massive Israeli response to any nuclear attack. Chafets is correct: the key is deterrence by Israel.
| MESH Updater: Read more MESH discussion on deterring Iran in this thread and this thread. |
If an Iranian government would not be deterred by the likelihood of casualties in the tens of millions (as calculated recently by Anthony Cordesman), then what additional impact would a U.S. pledge of retaliation have? The issue of vulnerability to a first strike, eliminating Israel’s retaliatory force, is raised—but it will be decades, if ever, before Iranian forces could conceivably carry out such an attack, and Israel is already moving to protect these forces.
Nor should we forget that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East is already a reality: chemical and biological weapons are already a part of the equation between Israel and Syria, for example. A Middle East “balance of terror” already exists. It is not the world that we prefer, but it may be the world we have to live with and find ways to stabilize.
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3 Responses to “Balance of terror”
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In the difference of opinion that has arisen between Charles Krauthammer (here) and Zev Chafets (here) over the notion of an American “Holocaust” pledge to Israel, my sympathy lies with Chafets, with one—just one—reservation. But there is also a significant ambiguity in their discussion, the resolution of which should make a difference in how any sensible person thinks about the problem. And both share a premise I think is mistaken. All of these—sympathy, reservation, ambiguity and premise—are tangled together, naturally enough: We are, after all, talking about Israel and the Middle East.
Starting from the end of the list, Krauthammer and Chafets share the premise that the Bush Administration policy has already failed and the Iranians will have a bomb. I don’t agree. There is still time for diplomatic pressure to work; there is still time for military action if it doesn’t; and it isn’t even clear that the Iranians are stupid enough to turn the last screw and openly test a nuke, even if they get that far.
But if we grant the premise for the sake of argument, the ambiguity rests in the fact that Krauthammer calls for a Presidential declaration, not a treaty to be ratified by the Senate. He muddies the water by referring to NATO and Cold War extended deterrence, but he doesn’t call for a formal alliance in so many words. Chafets seems to assume the reverse, for only in the context of a Senate debate on a treaty would the kind of constraints on Israel that Chafets fears be brought forth in full form. In short, the two seem to be talking past each other on a very important detail.
If Krauthammer really means a NATO-like U.S. treaty commitment, then Chafets’s concern that such a U.S. commitment would limit Israeli sovereignty to an unacceptable degree is correct. (That’s been the reason all along, after all, for the polite and studied opposition of Israeli statesmen to the occasional suggestion that Israel be taken into NATO.) The limits one might imagine resulting from such a connection seem modest right now, because recent U.S. administrations have been sympathetic for the most part to Israeli strategic concerns. But that was not always the case and may not always be the case in the future.
The core of the problem lies in the fact that it is not clear if the strategic logic of the Cold War, which bound the United States and Israel together as objective allies, will be replicated in the context of the so-called war on terror, the problem of Iran, or anything related to either. With the future stretched out long before us, even a “Holocaust Declaration” that is a unilateral guarantee not formally requiring anything of an Israeli government could be turned to nefarious purposes from an Israeli point of view if U.S. and Israeli core interests come to diverge significantly. To put it Biblically, a pharaoh might arise who knows not Joseph. If so, a future U.S. administration’s public renunciation of a “Holocaust Declaration” might do more harm than having created it in the first place will do any good.
As for the reservation, Chafets’s assertion that Israel can take care of its own security might not be as true in extremis as he thinks. Israel is a small country with its population concentrated in the narrow belt between Haifa and, say, Rishon LeZion. Just one or two nuclear explosions in that area could kill 1-2 million people and effectively destroy Israeli society. Iran, on the other hand, is a comparatively huge country, with a far more dispersed population something like ten times the size of Israel’s. For the IDF to destroy a comparable percentage of Iranian population that would destroy Iranian society would take a lot more than one or two bombs. Without rehearsing the strategic logic we all learned thirty years ago, suffice it to say that it is not self-evident that Iranian leaders will conclude that Israel can do to Iran in a second strike what Iran can do to Israel in a first strike. It’s their judgment that counts, not ours; so they may not be as deterred as all that, even according to a rational calculus that sets aside possible irrational motivations. Therefore, some pledge of extended deterrence could well “even up” the calculation, and if not from the United States, then from where?
This leaves me wishing that the U.S. Government could convey a pledge of extended deterrence to Israel that leaves a little something to the Iranian imagination. But wait: Isn’t there already such a pledge, dating from 1969 and updated thereafter, and don’t the Iranians already know of it? (Or are we not supposed to mention this?) And if the Iranians were in doubt, didn’t President Bush say on June 1 of last year: “If I were an Israeli, I would take the words of the Iranian president seriously, and as President of the United States I take them seriously…. Whether there’s an imminent attack coming, I don’t think so,” but—and here’s the essence—“If Iran did strike Israel we will defend our ally, no ands, ifs or buts”?
Seems to me I’ve already got my wish, and Krauthammer is asking George Bush to do something he’s pretty much already done. Even so, in the end Chafets is right: An Iranian nuclear threat is an existential problem for Israel, but not for the United States, so for Washington to assume responsibility for that problem presupposes its assumption of a major chunk of Israeli sovereignty, as well. Sadly, it may come to that one day; but, on a happier note, that day is not yet here.
Adam Garfinkle is a member of MESH.
The question here is not so much a U.S. guarantee for Israel but one for all its allies in the region. This is surely going to be an issue in the not-distant future. One of the greatest threats of Iran having nuclear weapons is the panic among a dozen or more countries ranging from Turkey to Jordan to Saudi Arabia and all the smaller Gulf Arab states, and even Iraq. If and when Iran has nuclear weapons, all these regimes are going to put appeasing Tehran at the top of their priority list. The outcome will be a disaster for Western interests, and U.S. interests most of all. Ironically, Israel has some nuclear deterrence of its own and an ability to defend itself. The others don’t. Any president better have a very serious and specific plan over how to provide the most credible possible nuclear umbrella and mechanism for deterring Iran. Whether or not Tehran is not reasonably deterrable—that is a worthwhile but a separate debate—Washington is going to have to do the best possible job trying, no matter what else it does.
Barry Rubin is a member of MESH.
Charles Krauthammer already has a good record in giving a memorable name to an existing practice, namely, what he called the Reagan Doctrine, a U.S. policy to aid Contras, Afghans, and many other groups willing to die for our interests in their cause. So, as Adam Garfinkle points out, the “Holocaust Declaration” already exists: Bush said as much on June 1, 2007. Charles ought to stimulate the President to repeat the pledge, and then ask the presidential candidates to sign up. It’ll be good for him, good for them, and who knows, it might be good for the Middle East.
The two comments, and those of Alan Dowty, are all dimensions of the same classic problem, that between two allies, one large and less vulnerable, the other much smaller and much more vulnerable. Predictably, successive Israeli governments have sought the benefits of an American shield while still retaining freedom of action. The Americans, just as predictably, have demanded no complicating surprises. In 1980-81, Begin wanted Osirak halted through international action and only after that appeared unlikely did he strike. In 1991, Shamir agreed to refrain from retaliation against Saddam’s Scuds, leaving it to the United States, although he was much criticized for diminishing Israel’s deterrent. The last two Israeli governments have followed Begin’s diplomatic example, broadening the case for international action. But here is the difference: Israel could strike Osirak without asking, or telling, the United States. I do not think that could be done in the Iranian case for practical reasons; hence telling becomes a form of asking.
So to sum it up, the “Holocaust Declaration” is there waiting only to be reannounced. That covers an Iranian attack on Israel. Yet to be covered is an Israeli attack on Iran.
Harvey Sicherman is a member of MESH.