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What will Iran do, if hit?

Jul 1st, 2008 by MESH

From Chuck Freilich

Thirty years ago, in his magnificent book on Perception and Misperception, Robert Jervis argued that people’s views are self-reinforcing. Once we believe something to be the case, we further develop an array of arguments to discount those pesky doubts that we may harbor and to fully convince ourselves that our initial position is indeed correct. Opponents of military action against Iran thus tend to be believe that its negative consequences will be broad and severe, whereas those who believe that action may be necessary, if not preferable, tend to believe that the costs are far more limited. Of course, we may all be wrong.

But before I offer my own assessment of costs, here is the good news. As I recently wrote in the Jerusalem Post, Iran is highly vulnerable to external pressure and we may never have to reach the stage of military action, if the West gets its act together. What is needed is a comprehensive policy of heavy sanctions, combined with a big diplomatic carrot.

To this end, I believe the United States should seek to fully engage Iran and offer a “grand bargain,” an array of incentives, in exchange for the nuclear program. Those who take a hard line on Iran should be especially supportive of a policy of engagement. Only if the United States exhausts all diplomatic possibilities, does it stand to gain support for major economic sanctions, let alone future military action. Iran will probably reject the offer, as it has all others, but we will only know if the option is pursued, and it is a vital way station on the road to stronger measures. Talking to Iran does not have to imply acquiescence or appeasement; it would only be a “Munich” if so conducted.

However, the United States and the West should engage from a position of strength, by imposing stringent sanctions now, such as heightened restrictions on trade credits, international banking transactions and investments in Iran. Moreover, Iran imports 40 percent of its refined gasoline products. If the West banned these sales, its economy could be brought to its knees. Oil exports make up 80 percent of Iran’s state budget. Were imports of Iranian oil banned, its economy would be brought to a standstill. Iran’s automobile industry is domestically produced, except for engines. Cut sales of engines and its economy would be greatly weakened. Should these and other measures fail, or sufficient international cooperation not be forthcoming, the United States could unilaterally impose a naval embargo on Iran, which would have the combined affect of most of these measures and then some.

Only if this, too, failed, would there be a need to consider direct military action, primarily an aerial operation, with little or no ground forces. (I believe that any such action need not be nearly as broad as some have suggested. The number of critical nodes is small.)

Those who vociferously oppose and fear the use of force against Iran anticipate “disastrous” consequences (The New York Times) or a regional conflagration (IAEA chief ElBaradie). Military action will incur costs for the United States, but far from being “disastrous,” or even heavy, I believe they will probably be limited. We should not engage in unwarranted and self-deterring risk aversion, or forget who wields the incalculably greater “stick.” Iran certainly will not.

What would be Iran’s likely response? There is little doubt that Iran will respond to a direct attack, or a blockade, but its options, heated rhetoric notwithstanding, are actually limited. What can it do in the Gulf? Attack American ships, block the Gulf? It might deliver a pinprick for the sake of appearances at home, but beyond that, the risks of escalation and the costs to Iran’s economy are too great. Iran is extremist, but not irrational. It knows perfectly well that any serious moves against U.S. forces, or an attack on Saudi oil wells, would result in a massive American retaliation. Does Iran want to invite an American attack on its oil installations as well? The nuclear sites are not enough? Who truly wields escalation dominance? Yes, oil prices will further skyrocket and Iran could add to the crisis by cutting output. But anything beyond limited temporary measures would be tantamount to Iran’s cutting off its nose to spite its face.

Iran may very well cause the United States greater difficulty in Iraq, and increased terror can be expected against U.S. and Western targets there. It is highly unlikely, however, that Iran would be willing to go beyond limited actions and risk direct military escalation—not when the United States has 150,000 soldiers on its doorstep. What some view as 150,000 American targets, look far more like a strike force to Tehran. Unlike the insurgency in Iraq, in this case we are talking about missions of the kind that the U.S. military has already been proven to be trained and equipped for. Moreover, U.S. preparations can greatly reduce, though not eliminate, the dangers of Iran’s potential responses, on all levels.

Iran is far more likely to respond against Israel, indeed, to open up with everything it, Hezbollah and Hamas have: large scale terror, rocket attacks blanketing Israel, ballistic missiles. Israel may pay a heavy price, and there is a significant danger of confrontation with Hezbollah, Hamas and, conceivably, Syria. It is a price Israel should be willing to pay.

Finally, there will undoubtedly be a strong public reaction in the Muslim world, though Arab regimes will be quietly relieved to be free of a nuclear Iran and will presumably be able to contain popular fury. If the United States plays out the diplomatic route first, international reaction will be muted.

Of course, even a fully “successful” strike would only destroy the known program. Iran, having largely mastered the technology, might be able to reconstitute it. A two-year reprieve may not be worth even the limited costs outlined above. But five years probably would be.

Comments are limited to MESH members and invitees.

Posted in Andrew Exum, Chuck Freilich, Diplomacy, Iran, Nuclear | 2 Comments

2 Responses to “What will Iran do, if hit?”

  1. on 01 Jul 2008 at 2:19 pm1 Michael A. Ledeen

    I like Chuck Freilich’s work a lot, and I always learn from him. I have three comments:

    1. American presidents since Carter—including G.W. Bush—have attempted to reach a bargain with Iran for nearly thirty years, and every one has failed. I don’t think there is any reason to believe the Iranians will change their minds now, when they think they’re winning the whole pot. I think Chuck agrees;

    2. I do not agree that Iran is not irrational. The people at the very top of the regime are fanatics, I think they would welcome a showdown with the Satanic forces;

    3. Chuck’s scenario is too static, and oddly leaves out the Iranian internal dynamics. I cannot imagine a quiescent population. Depending on how and where an attack happens, there are many different possible developments, ranging from “rallying round the mullahs” to “seizing the moment” and assaulting the regime in the major cities. I don’t think anyone can predict such things, and I don’t want to witness what actually happens. I think the regime is hollow, and that we would be much better advised to support political revolution than to expend all our energies on debating a terrible scenario.

    Michael A. Ledeen is Freedom Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.


  2. on 02 Jul 2008 at 11:37 pm2 Andrew Exum

    Over the past few weeks, I have been repeatedly asked to imagine how Hezbollah might respond to an Israeli or American strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Invariably, the question that gets asked is whether or not Hezbollah would strike civilian or military targets outside the battlefields of southern Lebanon and northern Israel—where Hezbollah has concentrated the overwhelming majority of its operations. Chuck Freilich’s post seems like a good place to weigh in with some thoughts.

    In some ways, I feel that I am poorly qualified to offer any informed comment. As a social science researcher with expired security clearances and no access to classified intelligence products, I cannot make any authoritative claim about Hezbollah’s external activities and capabilities. The best presentation I have heard on Hezbollah’s alleged external operations and capabilities was given by MESH member Matt Levitt not too long ago, and part of what made Matt’s presentation so compelling was his humility. He was up front and honest about how little we know and admitted that most of what is out there in unclassified reports is largely speculative.

    That said, even if Hezbollah possesses a potent external operation, I feel attacks on Western targets outside the Middle East are highly unlikely. First, I agree with Freilich that it is significant that Hezbollah did not attack targets external to southern Lebanon and northern Israel in 2006 despite coming under direct, heavy pressure by the combined might of the Israel Defense Forces in July and August of that year. We can sit back now, in 2008, and reason that Hezbollah was never threatened existentially in 2006. But I’m not sure that’s the way it appeared to Hezbollah in the first week or so of the war—when the Israeli air force was seemingly attacking at will and a powerful ground invasion appeared likely. So if Hezbollah is not going to attack external targets when it is under attack itself, would it attack external targets in the event of an attack on Iran? Maybe, but this leads me to my second point.

    As recently as January, the United States had 196,600 military personnel deployed to Iraq and surrounding countries. It had 25,700 personnel deployed in support of operations in Afghanistan. If you’re Iran, your nuclear program is attacked, and you decide to respond against the United States, why would you order terror attacks external to the region when you can simply make life miserable for the United States in Iraq? The past year and half have demonstrated that despite impressive gains in Iraq and a truly heroic effort by our soldiers and diplomats, a large portion of that country’s security environment is determined by the Iranians, who have leverage with nearly all of Iraq’s political parties and factions. If Iran desires to turn the heat up there or elsewhere in the region, it can. And punishing the United States in such a way for an attack on Iran’s nuclear program makes a lot more sense than Hezbollah-orchestrated external terror attacks.

    This is also why I suspect an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program would be greeted with outrage among America’s uniformed officer corps. Although Israel cannot be expected to act in the interests of any nation but Israel, an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program has the potential to erase many if not all of the hard-won gains in Iraq and to make the environment there and elsewhere in the region much more dangerous for U.S. servicemen. I am in agreement with Patrick Clawson and Mike Eisenstadt that Iran’s response to an attack on its nuclear program would largely depend on what kind of attack it was—and that there is much that we do not know about how Iran would respond given various scenarios. But as a veteran of both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and with many close friends still serving in each country and elsewhere in the region, I would certainly understand why an Israeli attack on Iran would, at this moment, not be welcomed (to put it mildly) by those operating in already difficult political-military environments in Iraq and elsewhere.

    Andrew Exum is a member of MESH.


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