Score one for ‘Hamaswood’
Aug 11th, 2009 by MESH
From Matthew Levitt
Hamas, which recently created a production company and released its first major film production glorifying the life of a master terrorist (view the Arabic trailer at the end of this post), has scored its first major public relations coup. In a new article on the website of Foreign Affairs, Michael Bröning (director of the East Jerusalem office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung) cites the group’s recent downplaying of the relevance of its own charter as a telltale sign that Hamas is turning around or even “growing up.” To be sure, the rhetoric of Hamas leaders has visibly changed in public statements. But in focusing on these statements alone, Bröning misses the real point: Hamas’s words have changed, but their actions have not.
Hamas cannot be judged on the basis of its choice of vocabulary alone. Neither the relevance of each and every part of the Hamas charter (which Hamas leaders have expressly refused to revoke or update) nor the public statements of its leaders deserve as much weight as what the group actually does in judging whether or not it has truly evolved. The approach of solely examining what the group says, rather than what the group does—the approach upon which Bröning has relied—dangerously disregards Hamas’s actions on the ground.
True, in recent interviews, Hamas leader Khaled Meshal has offered to cooperate with U.S. efforts to promote a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, indicated a willingness to implement an immediate and reciprocal ceasefire with Israel, and stated that the militant group would accept and respect a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital. But the conciliatory tone of this hardline Hamas leader, who personally has been tied to acts of terrorism and is himself a U.S.-designated terrorist, is belied by the group’s continued violent actions and radicalization on the ground, as well as the rise to prominence of violent extremist leaders within the group’s local Shura (consultative) councils. Hamas’s activities of late appear to be diametrically opposed to the thrust of Meshal’s statements.
Continued terrorist activities: Despite talk of a ceasefire and pursuit of a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Hamas’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, continues to engage in terrorist activities. Shooting attacks are still common along the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip, including the firing of rocket-propelled grenades and mortar shells of the kind that rained on Israel just the other day. In late July, two Qassam Brigades operatives were killed in a “work accident” while placing explosives along the border fence near the al-Buraij refugee camp in central Gaza. A few days later, Israeli defense officials revealed that Hamas has been digging tunnels—often used by the group to smuggle weapons and conduct kidnapping operations—next to UN facilities, including one near a UN school in Bait Hanun that had recently collapsed. The placement of the tunnels near UN facilities was purportedly intended as a preventive measure against an Israeli attempt to destroy the tunnels.
Meanwhile, over the past several months, Palestinian security forces in the West Bank have seized at least $8.5 million in cash from arrested Hamas members who plotted to kill Fatah-affiliated government officials. Palestinian officials reported that some of the accused had “recently purchased homes adjacent to government and military installations, mainly in the city of Nablus” for the purpose of observing the movements of government and security officials. Security forces also seized uniforms of several Palestinian security forces from the accused Hamas members.
Radicalizing Palestinian society: For Hamas, mutating the predominantly ethno-political Palestinian national struggle into a fundamentally religious conflict is critical to the group’s ideology and its continued ability to inspire Palestinians to reject compromise or peaceful solutions to the conflict. Recently, Hamas embarked on a large public relations campaign using culture and the arts to glorify violence and demonize Israel. In a telling example, Hamas produced a feature-length film in 2009 that celebrated the life of Emad Akel, a leading Hamas terrorist who was killed by Israeli troops in 1993. Written by hardline Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar, Emad Akel was first screened in July 2009 at the Islamic University in Gaza City and described by Hamas interior minister in Gaza Fathi Hamad as the first production of “Hamaswood instead of Hollywood.”
In addition, despite Meshal’s statements, Hamas’s continues its campaign of radicalization targeting Palestinian youth. This summer, more than 120,000 Palestinian children attended Hamas-run summer camps that focused not only on Islamic teachings, but also on “semi-military training with toy guns.” Hamas campers recently staged a play reenacting the Gilad Shalit abduction before an audience that included Hamas officials such as Usama Mazini and Sheikh Ahmad Bahar.
Militants elected to leadership positions: Hamas’s ongoing radical activities are particularly apparent in its willingness to place its most militant members in positions of power. This year, Hamas’s local Shura councils held elections to determine who would move into leadership positions. Three local councils under the aegis of the Majlis al-Shura, the group’s overarching political and decisionmaking body in Damascus, represent Gaza, the West Bank, and Hamas members in Israeli prisons. This last council completed a five-month-long election process in July 2009 that resulted in the appointment of Yahya al-Sinwar, described as the founder of a Hamas security agency who is serving a life sentence, as president of the prison Shura council. Many other Hamas operatives involved in terrorist activities were placed as council members, including:
- Abbas al-Sayyed, the mastermind of the March 2002 Park Hotel suicide bombing that killed 29 people and left 155 seriously wounded.
- Salah al-Arouri, a founder of the Qassam Brigades in the West Bank, who served as both a recruiter and commander for Hamas terrorist cells.
- Abd al-Khaliq al-Natsheh, Hamas’s spokesman in Hebron, where he reportedly was the interlocutor between Hamas members who wanted to carry out suicide attacks and the leaders of Hamas terror cells within the Qassam Brigades.
In the August 2008 elections for Gaza’s Shura council, for example, Hamas hardliners dominated as well.
As Hamas’s activities on the ground make clear, the group’s tactical flexibility cannot be mistaken for strategic change. Even in his recent interviews, Meshal was clear that Hamas has not rejected terrorism, but has put it on hold due to current circumstances. “Not targeting civilians,” Meshal explained, “is part of an evaluation of the movement to serve the people’s interests. Firing these rockets is a method and not the goal.” In the context of discussing the sharp drop in Hamas rockets fired at Israeli civilian population centers, Meshal added, “The right to resist the occupation is a legitimate right, but practicing this right is decided by the leadership within the movement.”
Even as Hamas advances a public-relations blitz for tactical gains, the group continues to advance its strategic goals through ongoing terrorist activities, robust radicalization, and the election of militant hardliners to leadership positions. Hamas’s policies are evidenced not only by its words, but also by its deeds and actions. Michael Bröning had the right idea when he advised policymakers to “study recent Hamas policies and the movement’s performance on the ground.” If only he’d taken his own advice.
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(If you do not see the embedded trailer, click here.)
MESH Admin: There is an Arabic translation of this post.
3 Responses to “Score one for ‘Hamaswood’”
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In a recent contribution to the Foreign Affairs website, I argued that “Hamas is in the midst of an unprecedented ideological transformation,” and that Western decision-makers have until now widely ignored these changes to the detriment of all involved. Instead of acknowledging change within Hamas, decision-makers remain focused on misleading reassertions of “facts” and continue to base their assessments on outdated Hamas statements such as the 1988 Hamas Charter.
In light of recent and more moderate Hamas policy declarations, and in view of the party’s comprehensive state-building activities in Gaza, I suggested that “Western diplomats should acknowledge the organization’s reduced aspirations and ideological softening” rather than “focusing on Hamas’ unbending symbolic positions.” This, last but not least, is pertinent given that the Charter today seems more widely quoted in Western capitals than in the Palestinian Territories.
A modification in the Western approach appears necessary in view of the failed boycott that has been in place for the better part of two decades. This approach has left Western decision-makers with limited policy options and has resulted in an increasingly popular Hamas.
Matthew Levitt, one of the foremost American experts on Hamas, has rejected this argument on the grounds that Hamas “continues to advance its strategic goals through ongoing terrorist activities, robust radicalization, and the election of militant hardliners to leadership positions.” My argument in Foreign Affairs was thus interpreted as “score one” for Hamas, and my reasoning perceived as weakening the boycott and legitimizing Hamas as a political movement.
This criticism, however, is unconvincing. First, it is questionable whether a political movement that enjoys the support of roughly 40 percent of Palestinians is truly in need of a public relations campaign to bolster its standing in the West. Hamas has not only won municipal elections in many towns in the West Bank but has also gained a landslide victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. To describe a much-needed re-evaluation of Hamas as falling into the trap of a “public relations blitz” thus seems rather detached from the actual political developments on the ground. Hamas is a significant player in one of the world’s most complicated conflict zones, and will continue to be relevant with or without Western endorsement.
Second, Levitt bases his argument on a cursory and incomplete stock-taking of Hamas’ current behavior, focusing on recent events selected out of context. He begins his reply by arguing that Hamas’ military wing “continues to engage in terrorist activities,” as “shooting attacks are still common along the border between Israel and Gaza.” Make no mistake about it: Every rocket that is fired from Gaza on Israeli homes is an unacceptable contravention of the rules of war and a clear violation of international law. Such attacks been rightly condemned by numerous governments and non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. The Israeli Army not only has the right to prevent such attacks, but is also obliged to protect its citizens.
However, to argue that Hamas mortar shells today “rain down on Israel” is both an inaccurate and outdated representation of reality. While authoritative data is yet to be released, the Israeli Army reported that this year between June 13 and July 16, there was one rocket attack. According to the official Israeli Army spokesperson, this rocket “was fired from the Shujaiya district of Gaza City and fell in a field near the Nahal Oz kibbutz.” The current level of violence at the border does constitute a substantial decrease when compared to roughly 3,000 mortars and rockets that were launched from Gaza in 2008.
This improvement at the Israeli-Gaza border does not stand alone. Concerning suicide-attacks in Israel, Hamas has also refrained from engaging in any terrorist operations since 2006. Contrary to popular belief, this decline cannot be attributed to the West Bank barrier, which remains incomplete and has proven easy to penetrate.
Levitt rejects any such improvement by referring to Hamas leader Khaled Mashal’s recent explanation for this change. Mashal states that “not targeting civilians is part of an evaluation of the movement [Hamas] to serve the [Palestinian] people’s interest.” While this statement might be criticized for lack of empathy, the shift towards non-violence and the resulting relative quiet should be welcomed.
Levitt’s second argument states that Hamas is currently engaged in an effort to “radicalize Palestinian society” and to “inspire Palestinians to reject compromise or peaceful solutions to the conflict.” To bolster this claim, Levitt refers to Hamas summer camps, which in 2009 allegedly included “Islamic teachings” and “semi-military training with toy guns.”
While similar claims could easily be made for activities of public youth organizations from Russia to the People’s Republic of China, it remains to be seen whether “toy gun” war games should prevent responsible decision-makers from diplomatic engagement. Indeed, it must also be asked how Hamas leaders manage to “inspire Palestinians to reject compromise or peaceful solutions,” while they simultaneously engage in a widespread and public Arabic television campaign, repeatedly advocating for the parameters of a two-state solution.
In Levitt’s opinion, policy outlines such as Khaled Mashal’s recently televised speech from Damascus should be rejected as propaganda in view of a Gaza film production on Hamas terrorist Emad Akel. The production of this feature film points to the fact that violent resistance and a cult of martyrdom remain widespread in Palestinian society. However, the screening of the film in the cultural center Shawwa—Levitt errs in writing that the film was screened at the Islamic University—can hardly be considered more authoritative than officially declared party policies as outlined in numerous election pamphlets and public statements. To base political analysis of recent Hamas positions on the study of a feature film, seems notably discriminatory to say the least. How would Levitt engage Palestinian decision-makers if they based “informed” assessments of the Obama administration on a cursory study of current Hollywood productions? Feature films certainly have a place in society and may be relevant in pertinent cultural studies courses, but should not be considered a sound basis for political analysis and responsible decision making.
Furthermore, Levitt attempts to bolster his argument for an unchanged Hamas by pointing at recent Shura elections—the equivalent of a Hamas parliament. He argues that “ongoing radical activities are particularly apparent in [Hamas’] willingness to place its most militant members in positions of power.” This claim is supported by listing three militant activists: Salah Al-Arouri, Abd al-Khaliq al-Natsheh and Abbas al-Sayyed. The three are widely reputed for their uncompromising and confrontational positions with Israel.
What Levitt fails to mention is that the Shura Council consists of 73 persons of which he has selectively chosen three as representative of the Council in its entirety. Is the election of three hardliners truly indicative of the Council’s inflexible hidden agenda? Are the statements of Hamas’ politburo chief Mashal thus discredited and easily dismissed? One could argue the opposite: The fact that Hamas’ current moderate policy declarations are also issued by renowned hardliners should be interpreted as the beginning of an ideological transformation rather than a dramatic tactical maneuver maliciously backed by Arab decision-makers from Cairo to Damascus. This is so especially in view of Hamas’ current state-building activities on the ground, a nearly comprehensive de facto ceasefire with Israel, and open calls for a de facto two-state solution.
The current attempts—especially by some factions in Israel’s security establishment—to reject these new policies as “a public-relations blitz for tactical gains” are noteworthy for different reasons. First, it seems rather peculiar that Hamas statements are only taken at face value when they support Western expectations of militancy and irrationality. After all, in the last twenty years, the Hamas Charter has been quoted relentlessly to prove beyond a doubt the movement’s annihilationist agenda. While Hamas statements have thus served as convenient points of reference for Western observers in the past, today, more moderate voices are rejected as mere “rhetoric.” Effectively, such a circular argument leaves no room for development and progress in a meaningful peace process. Following this line of reasoning, even an official revocation of the Hamas Charter by the Shura Council would undoubtedly be rejected as strategic camouflage by experts who today demand such a move. In the end, this argument tells us more about the rigid mindset of its proponents than about the actual situation on the ground.
To be clear: Hamas cannot be regarded as a democratic, just and secular force in the Palestinian Territories. The movement must be scrutinized and the ever-present idolatry of Palestinian martyrdom justifies severe admonition and continuous criticism. However, in light of recent developments, Hamas should be engaged via diplomatic processes that acknowledge the party’s capacity for ideological softening and political realism. Hamas must be recognized as a relevant political player. Only such an approach will pave the way for a political process that is in the best interest of Israelis and Palestinians.
The alternative to such a readjustment of Western policy would be an ongoing boycott and an unsustainable adherence to the status quo. Already in 1989, Thomas Friedman observed that this Middle East dogma could be paraphrased as “I will stop beating you as soon as you start loving me.” Such a development is as unlikely today as it was twenty years ago. Certainly, love does not and will not characterize the relationship between Hamas and the West or Hamas and Israel. However, finding the means and the mechanism to stop the cycle of beating could quite simply begin with a diplomatic challenge.
Michael Bröning is director of the East Jerusalem office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a political foundation affiliated to the Social Democratic Party of Germany.
Michael Bröning’s polemic against Matthew Levitt culminates in this conclusion:
There is a serious logical lacuna here. Bröning’s claim that Hamas is “a relevant political player” is true whether the group has changed or not. (Its “capacity” for change is a red herring; nothing in the universe lacks that.) If the fact of Hamas’s popular support dictates engagement, then the question of whether or not Hamas has genuinely softened is moot—so why waste time parsing Hamas’s statements and actions? Or does Bröning mean to say that if Hamas had not softened, or if this softening were not genuine or insufficient, then he would not favor engagement, regardless of Hamas’s “relevan[ce]?” In that case, he would do well to tell us what he regards as the threshold at which sufficient softening will have occurred and been proved to qualify Hamas for engagement. Then we can debate more cogently whether that threshold has been crossed.
Joshua Muravchik is a member of MESH.
Michael Bröning’s response to my post misses the point. Hamas actions speak louder that Hamas words. So, in my book, the seizure on the Egyptian side of Rafah last week of one ton of explosive material headed for Hamas-run Gaza says more about Hamas’ true intentions than its leader’s unverifiable promises of moderation.
Bröning’s other points, while peripheral at best, warrant these quick replies:
• Bröning points to public support for Hamas—perhaps as high as 40 percent—as a sign that the group does not need a public relations campaign. But in fact it does. Hamas leadership in Gaza has performed poorly, vacillating between implementing elements of Shariah law (which is highly unpopular among Palestinians generally, and even the more conservative Gazans), putting at risk the importation of goods from Israel by targeting the crossing points for attacks, and putting civilians at risk instead of going to proper lengths to protect them during December-January fighting by placing rockets and hiding officials in mosques, schools and hospitals. Moreover, as has been widely documented, Hamas’ electoral victory had as much or more to do with Fatah’s failures as with Hamas’ success.
• Downplaying the centrality of Hamas’ radicalization campaign is very dangerous. To the extent Hamas succeeds in transforming the conflict from an ethno-nationalist conflict over land into a religious conflict over theology, the possibility of solving this conflict is severely undermined. If Hamas were truly interested in a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, as its leaders have suggested, it should not be teaching Palestinian children the virtues of suicide bombers and perpetual jihad against Israelis and Jews.
• True, the local Shura Council elections involved some 73 people, not just the three I cited, but many more of those elected—and especially those elected to senior positions—belong to Hamas’s terrorist wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.
As Bernard Lewis has noted, our adversaries often tell us exactly what they plan to do, and we tend to ignore their warnings. Taken in this light, and against the evidence of events that have taken place since, consider that even after its sweeping electoral victory in 2006 Parliamentary elections, Hamas leaders did not soften their rhetoric. Instead of allowing participation in the political process to co-opt them into moderation, Hamas leaders underlined their intention to continue attacking Israel and make Palestinian society more Islamic.
Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar insisted the group’s Qassam Brigades “will remain, they will grow, they will be armed more and more until the complete liberation of all Palestine.” Under Hamas, Zahar predicted, the new Palestinian government would promote “martyr tourism” to draw tourists interested in the history of armed Palestinian resistance and the ministry of culture would produce literature about jihad. If elected, a Hamas candidate from Rafah promised, Hamas would enact legislation consistent with Islamic Shariah (religious law). “We would present to the ummah [Muslim nation] and the Palestinian people the laws and legislation compatible with the Islamic Shariah and would do our best to nullify the non-Islamic ones.” This would come hand in hand, the candidate promised, with enhanced social services courtesy of the Hamas da’wa.”
The policy readjustment must come not from the West but from Hamas, if it is indeed capable of such a readjustment. Were Hamas to couple its moderate talk with a disavowal of violence in word and deed that would be something. But promises of moderation that coincide with continued violence and radicalization are, as they say in the region, kalam fadhi (empty words).
Matthew Levitt is a member of MESH.