Collectivities
Professor Benkler’s discussion of group identity led me to wonder whether these findings on behavior and motivation can also apply to actions and decision-making by collectivities. Rational choice theory is used to explain state actors decisions, so can behavioral science do the same? If it can, then, for multi-state collective action problems, we would see cooperative states routinely sanction non-cooperators. Moreover, Fehr et al.’s work in this regard would help explain a big question in international law — when states care more about relative welfare than absolute welfare. But, are there sticking points that make rational choice theory more applicable to collectivities than findings from behavioral science?
jskopek
February 12, 2008 @ 12:26 am
It seems to me that there are a couple of differences between individuals and states that might place limits on the explanatory or predictive scope of the findings in these articles.
First, there might be a scaling problem, as when changes in degree result in shifts in kind. For example: a drastic increase in the number of dollars at stake might significantly change the behavior of the parties involved. This was briefly discussed by Bohnet and Frey: “It has been pointed out that much of the seemingly anomalous behavior observed in individual decision making cancels out in a competitive environment where substantial amounts of money are at stake” (p. 53). Scaling effects might also come into play with significant increases in the number of people involved. Consequently, we might not see strong correspondence between the behavior of the individuals in these experiments and the behavior of states.
Second, the difference in the capacities of states and persons might also be relevant. To the extent that states are not capable of having emotions in the same manner as individuals, the driving forces behind individuals’ and state’s uses of sanctions in cooperation situations might differ. We know from the Falk, Fehr, and Fishbacher article that the desire to harm those who commit unfair acts is often the driving force behind individuals’ uses of informal sanctions. It seems plausible, however, that some of the other fairness theories discussed and rejected (e.g., those that predict inequality minimization, or aggregate gain maximization) might capture states’ uses of sanctions if states are not subject to the same retaliatory impulses as individuals.