Motivation

I’m going to put a variety of thoughts in here, as Jeff did, since I had a variety of reactions. A common thread running through these ideas is the danger of identifying the adaptive with the good.

Just-So Stories. I share Jeff’s concern about Jeff’s just-so stories. At times, I thought the stories in the reading were both suspect and methodologically dangerous. To give an example, in the Levitin excerpt, I found the argument that the continued presence of music in culture as strong evidence of adaptive value a little empty (pp. 255-56), for a variety of reasons. First, I think it’s nonresponsive to the position Levitin is arguing against, namely that a capacity for music-making is correlated with other adaptive traits but is not of any adaptive value in itself. It seems that the “mere correlation” argument is equally compatible with the continued presence of music within society. Second, and more generally, I share Jeff’s concern from last week with providing evolutionary explanations for all traits, which makes me even more skeptical of arguments of the “continued presence” form.

But this only explains why the arguments are suspect—I also think they’re dangerous. Arguments that employ similarly flimsy methods are dangerous in the context of evolution because they can diminish our ability to see the capacity for change and improvement. If given traits are thought to be adaptive, then we may be lulled into thinking they are (1) intrinsically good and (2) in any case immutable. So, for example, how does one respond to the project of “explain[ing] the evolution of the killing of other human beings”? (p. 310) If the tendency or desire is adaptive, where “adaptive” in evolutionary terms is a good, is the desire itself good? Perhaps, or perhaps not, but I’d much rather ask that kind of question only after rigorous methodology was applied and adaptativeness were less open to question. Last night, I was watching CNN, and I saw heard just the kind of argument that bothers me. A commentator explained that Elliot Spitzer engaged in illicit activities because the “human need for emotion” has been suppressed by our culture and replaced (adaptively) by translating all needs into sex. The commentator suggested that this was a “natural” part of our evolution. Can we deal with such apologists when the results are ugly and the methods are flimsy?

Homosexuality. I agree with the authors that it’s hard to see how homosexuality could be adaptive. Maybe this is an argument in favor of nurture-based accounts, or maybe it’s an argument that homosexuality is evolutionary noise—I’ll note with my tongue firmly planted in my cheek, however, that the “continued presence” of homosexuality may suggest adaptativeness. In any case, I’m dissatisfied with my responses here. If we are to conclude that homosexuality is nurture-based, then that might lend support to those who advocate programs for “correction” of homosexuality, which is nauseating. I recognize, of course, that nurture does not imply the ability to change; I just think that it opens the door wider for such arguments. If we are to conclude that homosexuality is evolutionary noise, then our tendency in this context to associate “adaptive” with “good” cuts the other way—homosexuals are somehow (naturally, evolutionarily) bad, or at least “mistaken.” Can we talk about homosexuality and evolution on less offensive terms?

On Feeling Boxed In. I just wanted to say that there is reason to feel less boxed in here than in the context of other readings. Here, we can tell ourselves a story about “humanity generally” without feeling compelled to identify each of our individual traits with some evolutionary function, whereas in other contexts (perhaps ideology, certainly many determinist and structural accounts) we cannot escape the mechanism described even on an individual level.

I will say, however, that the natural tendency to identify the “adaptive” with the “good” is unsettling.