U.S. hegemony. The word “unipolarity” was not in common use fifteen years ago. Second, U.S. foreign policy elites have nearly always included genuine hegemonists, though they have usually spoken in coded language. Often some have been near or at levers of power. Layne is able to point to numerous statements and decisions that appear consistent with his argument. Third, generally accepted elite and public assessments of the severity of particular threats have more often than not looked overblown in hindsight.

The main thing that Layne has against him is that open, visible U.S. foreign policy discourse has virtually never been dominated by hegemonist logic—neither offensive realist nor liberal logic construed in support of hegemony. Although Layne claims that the purpose of Bretton Woods was to establish U.S. control of the world trading regime and that NATO was aimed more at forestalling the rise of a Western European great power than at containing the Soviets, such arguments were a tiny fraction of the visible policy discussions on those issues. Thus Layne must either overturn our memories of past debates or show that the ostensible reasons for many decisions were manipulated by means opaque to most U.S. elites. Layne does, on many points, remind us of striking evidence that mainstream histories either forgot or never knew, but the cumulative effect is still short of what would be needed to revise most readers’ understanding of six decades of U.S. grand strategy.

The real test, however, of any work on foreign policy is whether it offers useful advice. Layne has been the most consistent and trenchant voice warning that even as—indeed, because—U.S. military superiority over everyone else has escalated, our ability to use that power without provoking balancing against ourselves has slipped away. Since 2002, the United States has provoked Iran and North Korea to escalate their nuclear weapons programs, destroyed its own legitimacy in the Muslim world, damaged, to varying degrees, its relations with almost every allied or neutral major power, and taken on so much new public and private debt as to conceivably reduce reserve mobilization potential in case of unforeseen emergency.

Scholars are now debating in the field’s best journals whether policy changes in the directions that Layne advocates can reverse these losses. They should be.

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Amy Patterson’s book provides an informative look at the AIDS epidemic in Africa that is likely to appeal to both specialists and readers new to the topic. She paints a portrait of indifference among most African leaders and of suffering publics distracted by poverty and other grave problems. Her discussion
of the lack of political salience of AIDS in much of Africa is the best part of
the book and echoes Alex de Waal’s recent *AIDS and Power: Why There Is

Patterson is less successful in explaining the variation among African
countries in their responses to the epidemic. She evaluates several hypotheses
related to institutional attributes of African states, including state capacity,
centralization, corruption, and stability. However, in her case studies of South
Africa, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, she finds that no single hypothesis
explains the level of effort on AIDS by different governments. She would ex-
pect that a poor country like Uganda, with its centralized government, would
perform badly, but Uganda’s AIDS prevention program is perhaps the con-
tinent’s most well-known success story. South Africa, given its relative wealth,
would be expected to have a better AIDS program, but Thabo Mbeki, the
President since 1999, has famously undermined his country’s AIDS efforts.
Patterson tries to explain why there is no meta-answer for variations in country
performance, but there could be a more unified narrative. The closest the book
comes to one is a recognition that personal leadership (or its absence) by a
state’s top leaders has been critically important in countries like Uganda, South
Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.

Patterson uses the AIDS Programme Effort Index (API) as one of the
main measures for evaluating the performance of the different governments
in her case studies. The API is a survey instrument that is intended to reflect a
country’s level of effort on AIDS on a number of criteria, including political
support, policy and planning, organizational structure, legal and regulatory
environment, and human rights. Scores are derived from surveys with experts
knowledgeable about different components of the country’s AIDS program.
Scores are generated on a 100-point scale for individual components as well an
aggregate. The experts base their judgments on what would constitute an ideal
level of effort. In the 2003 API, the average number of respondents per com-
ponent was four. This is likely to make aggregate scores troublesome for cross-
country comparison. South Africa, for example, scored a 75 on the 2003 API,
similar to Uganda (76) and less than Botswana (80) and Rwanda (81). How-
ever, as Patterson notes, President Mbeki has undermined South Africa’s
AIDS program. Mbeki denied that HIV causes AIDS and resisted the use
of anti-retroviral therapy in the treatment of HIV-positive South Africans,
although South Africa is the country with the second-highest number of HIV-
positive people (India has the highest number). How could South Africa score
so high on the API? Patterson is understandably constrained by data avail-
ability. In the absence of better indices or metrics, the API is perhaps the only
option. An exploration of the API’s limitations could have been helpful.

Patterson’s chapter on donor responses to the epidemic is, like the rest of
the book, rich in detail. Her review of the George W. Bush administration’s
response to the epidemic is insightful, particularly the discussion of how the
politically contested nature of prevention programs has contributed to the in-
creased focus on treatment. This chapter is more descriptive than explanatory. She addresses donor motivations in passing, and because her final chapter is a call for greater political commitment, more discussion of political mobilization dynamics in donor countries would have been useful. For readers trying to get a handle on why African governments have had such difficulty dealing with the epidemic, Patterson’s book is a good introduction.

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