Independence and Impartiality of Resolution Professionals Under Indian Law: Filling the Gaps or Creating Law?

By Sanjay Kumar Yadav, Syamantak Sen, and Vivek Badkur (National Law Institute University, Bhopal, India)

Sanjay Kumar Yadav
Syamantak Sen
Vivek Badkur

Under Indian Insolvency Law, any person may be designated as a resolution professional (“RP”), provided he is enrolled with an insolvency professional agency and registered with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India. The role of an RP, under Indian Insolvency Law, is similar to that of a private trustee under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code.

Any person is eligible to be appointed as an RP, provided he is independent of the corporate debtor and no further eligibility criterions have been prescribed, under Indian Insolvency Law. However in a surprising turn of events, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal in State Bank of India v. Metenere Ltd. (May 22, 2020), directed substitution of an Interim RP, based on him being a former employee of the financial creditor.

This raises concerns as it is prevalent in India for retired bankers to be appointed RPs and may therefore alter such practice, besides potentially disqualifying all former employees from acting as RPs, where the employer is involved. In this article, we discuss whether such substitution is founded in law and its consequent impact on the Indian insolvency jurisprudence, with respect to appointment of RPs.

The full article is available here.

Big Data Meets Bankruptcy

By Carl Wedoff (Jenner & Block), David P. Saunders (Jenner & Block)

Carl Wedoff
David P. Saunders

For as long as there have been consumer businesses, they have collected consumer data. But in recent years, the volume and value of consumer data collection has increased exponentially, becoming a multibillion-dollar industry of its own. At the same time, consumer privacy laws are on the rise at the state level and are under consideration at the federal level. The value of data can create substantial friction for a business with respect to maintaining consumer interests and complying with privacy laws and regulations while maximizing the usefulness of consumer data to the business itself.

Bankruptcy courts routinely deal with the sale of consumer data, often in retail bankruptcies, but to date, “big data” issues have rarely, if ever, surfaced. However, this could change with the anticipated surge of corporate bankruptcy resulting from the recent COVID-19 pandemic.

As a result, bankruptcy judges and “consumer privacy ombudsmen,” or CPOs, need to evaluate more now than ever whether the transfer of consumer data is both permissible and in the best interests of all parties involved, including the consumers to whom the information relates.

This article explores the current framework for the sale of consumer data in bankruptcies and the potential changes in how bankruptcy courts may approach consumer data privacy issues in the future.

The full article can be found here.

Insolvency of Significant Non-Financial Enterprises: What Can We Learn from Bank Failures and Bank Resolution?

By Ilya Kokorin, Leiden Law School (The Netherlands)

Ilya Kokorin

The current economic downturn triggered by the spread of COVID-19 demonstrates that the role of insolvency law should not be restricted to resolving conflicts between private parties (i.e. creditors and debtors). Nevertheless, the very framework of insolvency law remains primarily: (i) microprudential – single entity focused and designed to protect individual debtors and their creditors, (ii) contractarian – implementing the idea of creditors’ bargain and solving coordination problems between creditors of a single entity, and (iii) reactive – centred around post-crisis liquidation of assets and allocation of proceeds among creditors. It may therefore be ill-fitted to serve the public interest in mitigating the negative externalities of large-scale (systemic) corporate debacles (e.g. Chrysler, GM, British Steel, Carillion) or handling the economy-wide instability experienced nowadays.

In contrast to corporate insolvency, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008 (GFC), bank resolution in the European Union (EU) and the USA went through fundamental changes that seek to preserve financial stability and ensure continuity of critical functions. Bank resolution has increasingly embraced the macroprudential vision, recognizing the need for an advanced preparation and a speedy intervention to ensure continuity of critical functions, preservation of financial stability and avoidance of bailouts. This vision has resulted in the specific proactive and reactive recovery and resolution strategies. In the recent paper Insolvency of Significant Non-Financial Enterprises: Lessons from Bank Failures and Bank Resolution, I explore whether the modern approaches to bank crises can be extended to non-financial enterprises. I discuss how insolvency law might help minimize social harm stemming from wide-ranging shocks and grand-scale business failures and suggest what we can learn from bank failures and bank resolution.

The failure of Carillion, once the UK’s second-largest construction company, has shown that the reactive approach to crisis resolution, centred around post-crisis intervention, posed significant risks not only for creditors but also for other stakeholders and communities at large. Carillion had around 43,000 workers, of whom 19,000 were based in the UK. It owed around GBP 2 billion to the extensive network of 30,000 suppliers, sub-contractors and other creditors and left the pension liability exceeding GBP 2.5 billion. Even though the signs of financial distress appeared long before Carillion filed for liquidation in January 2018, these warning signals were largely ignored. The failure of Carillion had substantial implications for the provision of public services, raising environmental, health and safety concerns. It ultimately led to a state intervention backed by taxpayers’ money. However, the actual economic and social cost of Carillion’s insolvency are hard to quantify. Financial distress of such a significant enterprise (significant non-financial enterprise or SNFE) required timely state intervention. Nevertheless, its multiple profit warnings came as a surprise to the Cabinet Office.

Insolvency of Carillion was characterized by the absence of timely reaction to prevent crisis escalation, a genuine threat of public disruption and a vast complexity determined by both the debtor’s organizational structure, consisting of more than 320 group members, and the nature of its activities. Many of the same features were observed in the failure of banks and banking groups during the GFC. As a response, both the EU (BRRD) and the USA (Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act) have embraced a proactive and precautionary approach focused on preparation and early response. In my paper, I use the case of Carillion to inquire whether selected bank recovery and resolution tools could have been adopted to prevent the collapse of Carillion, or to mitigate its negative consequences.

In particular, I analyse three such tools, namely: (i) intervention powers granted to state authorities for early (preventive) reaction to the escalation of financial problems before the actual insolvency, (ii) entity and group recovery and resolution planning, and (iii) administrative-led insolvency process. I conclude that while the first two mechanisms may prove beneficial, the last one is rather controversial. While an administrative-led process has certain advantages and prevails in bank resolution, it may be difficult and unnecessary to replicate or transpose to non-financial enterprises. Instead, a transparent court-supervised process with active involvement of creditors and debtors, as well as a limited and targeted engagement of public authorities on matters of public interest should be encouraged.

The full paper is available here.

Oversecured Creditor’s Right to Contractual Default-Rate Interest Allowed Under State Law

By Stacey L. Corr-Irvine and Mark G. Douglas (Jones Day)

Stacey L. Corr-Irvine
Mark G. Douglas

It is generally well understood that an “oversecured” creditor is entitled to interest and, to the extent provided for under a loan agreement, related fees and charges as part of its secured claim in a bankruptcy case. Although section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that fees, costs or charges allowed as part of a secured claim must be “reasonable,” the provision does not expressly impose any restrictions on the amount or nature of interest allowable as part of a secured claim. A Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit recently considered whether a secured creditor is entitled to contractual default-rate interest under section 506(b).

In In re Family Pharmacy, Inc., 614 B.R. 58 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2020), the panel reversed a bankruptcy court’s order disallowing a secured creditor’s claim for interest at the default rate under the parties’ contract using a penalty-type analysis generally applied to liquidated damages provisions. According to the panel, such an analysis cannot be applied to default interest provisions. The panel also held that the bankruptcy court erred when it held that the default interest rate was unenforceable based on “equitable considerations.”

The full article is available here.

Second Circuit Affirms Enforceability of Swaps’ Flip Provisions

By Shmuel Vasser (Dechert)

Shmuel Vasser

Swaps, like other financial contracts (repurchase agreements, securities contracts, commodities contracts, forward agreements and master netting agreements), receive special treatment under the Bankruptcy Code.  Their acceleration, liquidation and termination is not prohibited as an ipso facto clause and the exercise of setoff rights is not subject to the automatic stay.  Transfers made in connection with these contracts are also exempt from avoidance as preferences and constructive fraudulent transfers as well as actual fraudulent transfer under state law.  But their scope is not always free from doubt.  Are provisions that modify the debtor’s priority of payment upon bankruptcy protected as well?  Are provisions that the swap incorporates by reference protected?  Must the swap counterparty itself exercise the right to liquidate, terminate and accelerate the swap?  The Second Circuit just answered these questions.

The full article is available here.

Insolvency Law in Emerging Markets

By Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez (Singapore Management University)

Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez

Corporate insolvency law can serve as a powerful mechanism to promote economic growth. Ex ante, a well-functioning insolvency framework can facilitate entrepreneurship, innovation and access to finance. Ex post, corporate insolvency law can perform several functions, including the reorganization of viable companies in financial distress, the liquidation of non-viable businesses in a fair and efficient manner, and the maximization of the returns to creditors. Therefore, if having an efficient corporate insolvency framework is essential for any country, it becomes even more important for emerging economies due to their potential for growth and their greater financial needs.

Unfortunately, the academic literature has generally paid more attention to the regulation of corporate insolvency in developed countries. Thus, it has largely omitted the debate about the optimal design of insolvency law in jurisdictions that, in addition to requiring a more active policy debate, amount to 85% of the world’s population and 59% of the global GDP, since they include some of the world’s largest economies such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and Indonesia.

In my new article, ‘Insolvency Law in Emerging Markets’, I seek to fill this gap in the academic literature by analyzing the problems and features of insolvency law in emerging economies and suggesting a new framework for financially distressed companies in these countries. My paper argues that, even though, in an ideal scenario, any improvement of the insolvency framework in these countries should start by enhancing the judicial system and the sophistication of the insolvency profession, these reforms usually take time, resources and political will. In fact, due to a variety of factors, including corruption, lack of awareness about the importance of the insolvency system for the real economy, or lack of political incentives to engage in such complex reforms whose benefits will only be shown in the long run, they might never occur. For this reason, my paper suggests an insolvency framework for emerging economies taking into account the current market and institutional features of these countries. If these conditions change over time, or they do not exist in some particular emerging economies, my proposal would need to be adjusted accordingly.

My proposed corporate insolvency framework for emerging markets is based on three fundamental pillars. First, pre-insolvency proceedings and out-of-court restructuring should be promoted as a way to avoid an insolvency system that is usually value-destroying for both debtors and creditors. Second, insolvency proceedings should be reformed to respond more effectively to the problems and features existing in emerging markets, which generally include the prevalence of small companies and large controlled firms, as well as the existence of inefficient courts and unsophisticated insolvency practitioners. Finally, emerging economies should adopt a more contractual approach to deal with a situation of cross-border insolvency. Thus, by facilitating the choice of insolvency forum, debtors, creditors and society as a whole will be able to enjoy the benefits associated with having access to more sophisticated insolvency frameworks. Besides, since many debtors and creditors would be using foreign insolvency proceedings, this value-creating forum shopping may incentivize many Governments in emerging economies to invest the resources needed to improve the market and institutional environment existing in these countries, hopefully making the insolvency framework suggested in this article no longer needed.

The full article is available here.

Another version of this post was previously published on the Oxford Business Law Blog and the Singapore Global Restructuring Initiative Blog.

For previous Roundtable posts on insolvency reforms in China and India, see Xiahong Chen, INSOL Europe/LexisNexis coronavirus (COVID-19) Tracker of Insolvency Reforms—China; Xiao Ma, China Continues to Issue New Rules Promoting Corporate Rescue Culture, Facilitation of Bankruptcy Proceedings; and Himani Singh, Pre-packaged Insolvency in India: Lessons from USA and UK.

Secured Creditor’s “Net Economic Damages” Estimate of Disputed Claims “Plainly Insufficient” to Establish Collateral Value

By Paul M. Green and Mark G. Douglas (Jones Day)

Paul M. Green
Mark G. Douglas

Valuation is a critical and indispensable part of the bankruptcy process. How collateral and other estate assets (and even creditor claims) are valued will determine a wide range of issues, from a secured creditor’s right to adequate protection, postpetition interest, or relief from the automatic stay to a proposed chapter 11 plan’s satisfaction of the “best interests” test or whether a “cram-down” plan can be confirmed despite the objections of dissenting creditors. Depending on the context, bankruptcy courts rely on a wide variety of standards to value estate assets, including retail, wholesale, liquidation, forced sale, going-concern, or reorganization value. Certain assets, however, may be especially difficult to value because valuation depends on factors that may be difficult to quantify, such as the likelihood of success in litigating estate causes of action.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently addressed this issue in In re Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway, Ltd., 956 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2020) (“MMA Railway”). The First Circuit affirmed a ruling that a secured creditor failed to satisfy its burden of establishing that collateral in the form of indemnification claims settled by the estate had any value entitled to adequate protection. According to the court, with respect to a disputed claim, a showing of possible damages is not enough. Instead, the creditor must establish the likely validity of the claim and the likelihood of recovery.

MMA Railway is a cautionary tale for secured creditors. Creditors bear the ultimate burden of proof in establishing the value of their collateral under section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code—a determination that has important consequences in many contexts in a bankruptcy case. The First Circuit’s ruling highlights the importance of building a strong evidentiary record to support valuation. It also indicates that certain types of collateral (e.g., disputed litigation claims) are more difficult to value than others.

The full article is available here.

Update on Corporate Bankruptcy Tax Refund Litigation

By Michael L. Cook (Schulte Roth & Zabel)

Michael L. Cook

Federal courts regularly resolve consolidated corporate tax refund disputes in bankruptcy cases.  In the current economic downturn, the ownership of a large tax refund paid to an affiliated group of corporate debtors can be significant.  See, e.g., FDIC v. AmFin Corp., 757 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2014) ($170 million refund).  If a corporate debtor’s parent owns the refund, it is part of the parent’s bankruptcy estate, and the subsidiary may be an unsecured creditor for any claimed benefits.  But if the debtor parent is an agent or trustee for its affiliates, the parent cannot use the refund to repay its creditors.

Corporate parents and their subsidiaries often file a consolidated tax return.  That enables affiliates to offset their losses against each other so as to reduce the group’s overall tax liability.  Because only the corporate parent may file a consolidated return, any refund is also paid to the parent, not to individual affiliates.  Affiliated groups, therefore, usually enter into tax sharing or allocation agreements.  These agreements – or their absence – have generated a spate of litigation.

The Circuit Courts of Appeals had been sharply split on how to resolve tax refund ownership issues until the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the issue this past February in Rodriguez v. FDIC (In re Western Bancorp, Inc.), 589 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 713 (Feb. 25, 2020).  Without deciding the merits, the Court remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit, directing it to apply state law to resolve the refund ownership dispute between the parent’s bankruptcy trustee and a subsidiary.  The Supreme Court also rejected a purported federal default rule promulgated by the Ninth Circuit in 1973 that had been adopted by a few other Circuits, describing it as inappropriate federal “common lawmaking.”  On May 26, 2020, following the Supreme Court’s remand, the Tenth Circuit, applied Colorado law, construed the relevant group tax sharing agreement, and held for the subsidiary bank, now in the hands of a FDIC receiver.

This article describes relevant issues litigated over the past fifty years.  It also notes open issues that will continue to be litigated following the Rodriguez decision.

The full article is available here.

Challenges of Emerging Market Restructurings in the Age of COVID-19

By Steven T. Kargman (Kargman Associates/International Restructuring Advisors)

Steven T. Kargman

As part of the overall global economic slowdown in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, many emerging market economies around the globe have suffered sharp economic downturns, particularly in light of the lockdowns of economies that were imposed in many of these countries.  With the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic in emerging economies, a number of these economies have been faced with a veritable perfect storm.

Specifically, many of these economies have been adversely affected by, among other things, a sharp drop in prices for commodities such as oil and various metals, the drying up of foreign tourism revenues in view of the disruption of international air travel and the closing of national borders, and the major decrease in remittances due to layoffs of overseas foreign workers.  In addition, many major emerging market currencies have experienced significant depreciation vis-à-vis hard currencies such as the US dollar.

Moreover, emerging economies as a whole have also faced what economists term a “sudden stop”—i.e., a sudden outflow of foreign investment capital that had previously been flowing into these economies.  Furthermore, the public finances of governments in the emerging markets have become strained as such governments have been forced to make expenditures on economic recovery programs as well as public health responses to the pandemic.

The article discusses the implications of the global economic slowdown associated with COVID-19 for restructuring activity in the emerging markets around the globe.  In particular, the article examines how the economic slowdown may give rise to several different types of emerging market restructurings, namely, sovereign debt restructurings, corporate debt restructurings, and infrastructure project restructurings.  It also examines how the economic slowdown in the emerging markets might affect restructuring-related matters involving state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-performing loans (NPLs) in national banking systems.

The article also considers special issues associated with China’s newly prominent role as the largest official creditor to the emerging markets and developing countries and China’s sponsorship of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects around the world.  Further, the article discusses other legal and policy issues that have become more salient in recent years in the context of emerging market restructurings, such as the role of holdouts in sovereign debt restructurings as well as the relevance in corporate debt restructurings in these jurisdictions of any potential gap that may exist between insolvency/restructuring law and practice.

The full article can be found here.

Bankruptcy Process for Sale

By Kenneth Ayotte (University of California Berkeley School of Law) and Jared A. Ellias (University of California Hastings College of the Law)

Kenneth Ayotte
Jared A. Ellias

The lenders that fund Chapter 11 reorganizations exert significant influence over the bankruptcy process through the contract associated with the debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) loan. In this Article, we study a large sample of DIP loan contracts and document a trend: over the past three decades, DIP lenders have steadily increased their contractual control of Chapter 11. In fact, today’s DIP loan agreements routinely go so far as to dictate the very outcome of the restructuring process. When managers sell control over the bankruptcy case to a subset of the creditors in exchange for compensation, we call this transaction a “bankruptcy process sale.” We model two situations where process sales raise bankruptcy policy concerns: (1) when a senior creditor leverages the debtor’s need for financing to lock in a preferred outcome at the outset of the case (“plan protection”); and (2) when a senior creditor steers the case to protect its claim against litigation (“entitlement protection”). We show that both scenarios can lead to bankruptcy outcomes that fail to maximize the value of the firm for creditors as a whole. We study a new dataset that uses the text of 1.5 million court documents to identify creditor conflict over process sales, and our analysis offers evidence consistent with the predictions of the model.

The full article is available here.

1 2 3 4 39