By Gerard McCormack (University of Leeds) and Wai Yee Wan (Singapore Management University – School of Law)
In 2017, Singapore introduced wide-ranging reforms to its insolvency and restructuring laws with a view to enhancing its attractiveness as an international centre for debt restructuring. A key theme of the reforms is the transplantation (with modification) of certain provisions from Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code including the automatic moratorium, cross-creditor cram-down, rescue financing and pre-packs. These provisions are engrafted into the existing scheme of arrangement framework, which in turn has its roots in the United Kingdom (UK).
In our paper, relying on the US experience and the reactions to similar reform proposals in the European Union (including the UK), we critically evaluate the effectiveness of the legal transplantation and discuss the possible unintended consequences of such transplantation.
We raise three issues. First, the new cross-class cram-down provisions could lead to valuation disputes and satellite litigation, such as whether the directors and scheme managers have properly discharged their duties. Second, the 2017 reforms shift power from the creditors to the management of the debtor company. This may prove to be disadvantageous to creditors in Singapore (and many other Asian countries) where the majority of the companies, including publicly listed companies, have concentrated shareholdings, and managers owe their existence to those who are in control. Finally, there remains the question whether the Singapore schemes will be recognised overseas, which will be important if the scheme proposes to modify debt obligations that are governed by non-Singapore law.
The full article is available here. The article is recently published in Journal of Corporate Law Studies.
By Bo Li (Tsinghua University – PBC School of Finance) and Jacopo Ponticelli (Kellogg School of Management – Department of Finance)
In the last decade, China experienced a massive increase in corporate debt and, more recently, in corporate bankruptcies. Despite the mounting pressure on its insolvency resolution system, little is known about how bankruptcy works in China and the role played by the government.
China’s bankruptcy system experienced two recent changes: the reform of the bankruptcy code in 2007, and the introduction of specialized courts between 2007 and 2017. Before the introduction of specialized courts, bankruptcy cases were filed in local civil courts. Characterized by limited expertise and long delays, local courts tend to operate under the influence of local politicians, who have strong incentives to keep financially distressed state-owned companies alive to reduce unemployment and boost their political career. Thus, even though the 2007 reform aligned Chinese bankruptcy law with those in the US and Europe, timely resolution of state-owned firms in financial distress remains a problem due to the influence of local governments.
Recently, China’s central government promoted the introduction of courts specialized in bankruptcy, which are modeled on US courts and run by insolvency professionals. In this paper, we study the impact of the introduction of specialized courts across Chinese provinces a on bankruptcy resolution and credit markets. The introduction of specialized courts led to an increase in the share of liquidations of state-owned firms and a faster speed of processing in court. In addition, state-owned firms operating in jurisdictions with specialized courts experienced a decrease in the size of new bank loans, lower access to new loans, and lower investment in physical capital relative to privately-owned firms.
The full article is available here.
By Cheng-Han Tan, Jiangyu Wang, Christian Hofmann (National University of Singapore Law School)
Corporate personality is not absolute and this paper aims to compare and critically examine the circumstances under which veil piercing takes place against the objectives of incorporation. The countries examined are a mix of common law and civil law countries, including China, England, Germany, Singapore and the United States. We note that English and German courts have in recent years adopted a more restrictive approach to veil piercing, with Singapore courts appearing to be sympathetic to the current English position. On the other hand, courts in the United States and especially China seem to accept a more expansive approach to piercing even while recognising its exceptional nature. One reason for this is because veil piercing has been used loosely in instances which seem inappropriate and where the matters could have been determined by other legal principles.
We suggest that this is sub-optimal and that a narrower approach to veil piercing is preferable. For one, the need to look beyond the corporation is usually only necessary where insolvency has intervened. Direct claims by creditors against shareholders or management therefore potentially risk undermining the collective insolvency framework within which creditors are to have their claims adjudicated. Another reason is that veil piercing potentially overlaps with other legal doctrines, particularly the law of torts. As tort law is principally engaged with the issue of when civil wrongdoing arises, it will often provide a superior framework for determining whether shareholders or management should be directly responsible for alleged wrongdoing to a creditor.
The full article is available here.
The Roundtable will be off for two weeks. We’ll be back early after the New Year.
By Radhakrishnan Gopalan (Washington University in St. Louis – John M. Olin Business School), Todd A. Gormley (Washington University in St. Louis), and Ankit Kalda (Indiana University – Kelley School of Business – Department of Finance)
In our paper, we evaluate the extent to which a director’s past life experience affects the policies their firms follow. The specific experience we focus on is corporate bankruptcy. We identify a set of directors that experience a corporate bankruptcy. We then evaluate the extent to which this bankruptcy experience of the director is associated with the subsequent policies of other firms that these individuals serve as directors.
A corporate bankruptcy can be either a liberating or a traumatic experience. If the bankruptcy allows the firm to shed excess debt and obtain a fresh start, it can be a liberating experience. On the other hand, if the bankruptcy is prolonged and destroys significant value, then it can be traumatic. An inefficient bankruptcy can also affect the future career prospects of the director as the market may partially blame them for the bankruptcy. Either way, a bankruptcy is likely to be a significant life experience and affect the director’s outlook towards risk taking.
We find that, on average, firms take on more risk if they have a director who has experienced bankruptcy in the past. Specifically, such firms finance themselves with more debt, are less likely to issue equity, more likely to take up riskier projects, as reflected in the variability of cash flows, and less likely to diversify their business through acquisitions. These shifts, however, are only present when the original bankruptcy was a less expensive affair. That is, when the previous bankruptcy was quick, resulted in a restructuring of the firm, and was accompanied by a smaller stock price decline. We also find that directors who are associated with such bankruptcies do not experience any adverse career outcomes.
Overall, our results highlight that, on average, a past corporate bankruptcy experience might actually increase a director’s willingness to take on risk in the future.
The full article is available here.
By Edward I. Altman (New York University) & Robert Benhenni (Pole Universitaire Leonard de Vinci)
The market for investing in distressed securities, the so-called “vulture” markets, has captured the interest of increasing numbers of investors and analysts. These investors, sometimes categorized as “alternative asset” institutions, mainly hedge funds, now can convincingly argue that the market has matured into a genuine asset class, with a reasonably long history of data on return and risk attributes.
In earlier works, Professor Altman has helped to classify this market into two distinct categories: (1) “Distressed” debt, meaning bonds or loans whose yield to maturity (later amended to option-adjusted yield) was equal to or greater than 10% above the 10-year U.S. government bond rate (later amended to be the U.S. government bonds with comparable duration), and (2) “Defaulted” debt, referring to bonds or loans of firms who have defaulted on their debt obligations and were in their restructuring (usually Chapter 11) phase.
The purpose of this article is to document the descriptive anatomy of the distressed debt markets size, growth, major strategies, characteristics, and participants, and then to explore its performance attributes, reviewing the relevant 30-year period from 1987-2017. The article notes a number of unique aspects which make this asset class attractive, especially to hedge fund managers who can move in and out of the securities depending upon the credit cycle.
The article is available here.
By Peter S. Saba (Jones Day).
In In re Houston Regional Sports Network, L.P., 886 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that bankruptcy courts have flexibility in selecting the date on which to value collateral, “so long as the bankruptcy court takes into account the purpose of the valuation and the proposed use or disposition of the collateral at issue.” In so holding, the Fifth Circuit rejected the proposition that a bankruptcy court must value collateral as of either the bankruptcy petition date or the effective date of a cramdown chapter 11 plan. However, because the bankruptcy court failed to consider the proposed use of the collateral in assigning it a value, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case below for additional findings.
In declining to establish a bright-line rule mandating the valuation date for a creditor’s collateral in cramdown chapter 11 cases, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, informed by section 506(a), gives bankruptcy courts the flexibility to consider an appropriate valuation date based on the actual use or disposition of a creditor’s collateral and the purpose of the valuation. The principal benefit of this approach is that it recognizes that any valuation in this context should consider developments in a chapter 11 case which may have an impact on value. Even so, secured creditors should be aware that consideration of the proposed or actual use of collateral under a plan may in some cases mean that collateral may be assigned a lower value as of plan confirmation or effectiveness than as of the bankruptcy petition date.
The article is available here.
On November 13, 2018, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on “Big Bank Bankruptcy: 10 Years After Lehman Brothers,” in connection with the proposed “Taxpayer Protection and Responsible Resolution Act” (“TPRRA”). The TPRRA would add a new chapter 14 to the Bankruptcy Code, providing a recapitalization mechanism for bank holding companies or some other financial companies.
This version of chapter 14 would implement the “Single Point of Entry” financial company resolution model in bankruptcy. (The SPOE model contemplates that only a financial company’s top-level holding company would go into bankruptcy proceedings, with losses borne by its creditors, while material subsidiaries continue to operate as going concerns. For more, see here.) The bill contemplates a proceeding where the bank’s holding company would have a large amount of its long-term debt turned into equity over a 48 hour (likely weekend) period. The firm’s subsidiaries would continue to operate, but would be transferred over to a new, debt-free bridge company. The old holding company’s shareholders and creditors would have their claims handled through a bankruptcy process. The bill also included a 48 hour automatic stay on Qualified Financial Contracts (QFCs), but effectively requires their assumption by the new bridge company.
In his opening remarks, Senator Grassley noted that several similar bank bankruptcy proposals have been incorporated into bills introduced into both the Senate and House over the past several Congresses. (For Roundtable coverage of the 2016 and 2017 FIBA bills, click here, here, here, and here.) A principal difference, stressed by Senator Coons in his opening statement, was that the current bill would not affect Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, as some prior provisions would have. The view that a special chapter 14 should complement, rather than replace the FDIC’s Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) is consistent with the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s report on OLA, recommending against its repeal, released earlier this year. (For Roundtable coverage of the OLA, click here and here.)
Video and testimonies available here.
For previous Roundtable posts on the resolution of financial institutions, see Howell Jackson & Stephanie Massman, “The Resolution of Distressed Financial Conglomerates“; Stephen Lubben & Arthur Wilmarth, “Too Big and Unable to Fail“; Mark Roe’s “Don’t Bank on Bankruptcy”; Mark Roe & Stephen Adams, “Restructuring Failed Financial Firms in Bankruptcy: Selling Lehman’s Derivatives Portfolio”; David Skeel’s “Bankruptcy for Banks: A Tribute (and a Little Plea) for Jay Westbrook”; and, “Financial Scholars Submit Letter to Congress Opposing Repeal of Title II.”
(This post was authored by Ryan Rossner, J.D. ’19.)
By Jared Ellias (University of California, Hastings)
In 2005, the perception that wealthy executives were being rewarded for failure led Congress to ban Chapter 11 firms from paying retention bonuses to senior managers. After the amendment became effective, Chapter 11 debtors could only pay executive bonuses through court-approved “Key Employee Incentive Plans,” which required managers to earn their pay by accomplishing specific performance goals, such as increasing revenue or moving the firm through the bankruptcy process.
In my article, I use newly collected data on the compensation practices of Chapter 11 debtors between 2002 and 2012 to examine how the reform changed bankruptcy practice. I find that relatively fewer firms used court-approved bonus plans after the reform, but the overall level of executive compensation appears to be similar. I hypothesize that three problems undermined the efficacy of the reform. First, the 2005 law asks bankruptcy judges to police the line between “incentive” bonuses and “retention” bonuses, which is extremely hard to do – judges are poorly equipped to assess the “challenging-ness” of a proposed performance goal. Second, creditors have limited incentives to police executive compensation themselves and help bankruptcy judges perform their inquiry, and the Department of Justice’s US Trustee program, while vigilant, lacks expertise in executive compensation. Third, gaps in the new regime make it easy for firms to bypass the 2005 law and pay managers without the judges’ permission. I support each of these hypotheses with empirical evidence. Further, there is also evidence that the reform significantly increased the litigation surrounding bonuses plans and, unsurprisingly, the attorneys’ fees associated with them. In many ways this paper examines what happens when Congress tries to change the balance of bargaining power between managers and creditors, and the result appears to be that firms found ways to get around a poorly written rule.
The full article is available here.
By David A. Skeel, Jr. (University of Pennsylvania Law School)
Over the past several years, Congress has considered various versions of a legislative reform that would amend the Bankruptcy Code to facilitate the prompt reorganization of systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”). The reform would adapt the “Single Point of Entry” strategy devised for use under Title II of the Dodd Frank Act to bankruptcy. In each context, the assets, short term liabilities, and secured debt of the troubled SIFI would be transferred to a newly created bridge institution, leaving behind its stock and long-term debt. The newly recapitalized bridge institution would be fully solvent, and could contribute liquidity to the troubled subsidiaries as necessary. Although the bankruptcy for banks legislation appears to have strong support in Congress, its reception among bankruptcy scholars has been mixed.
In this short essay, I take the opportunity of a celebration of the work and influence of Jay Westbrook to explore his and his fellow critics’ opposition to bankruptcy for banks. I begin the essay by surveying Jay’s wide-ranging contributions to bankruptcy scholarship. Jay’s functional analysis has had a profound effect on scholars’ understanding of key issues in domestic bankruptcy law, and Jay has been the leading scholarly figure on cross-border insolvency. After surveying Jay’s influence, I turn to the topic at hand: bankruptcy for banks. Jay has been a strong critic of the proposed reforms, arguing among other things that financial institutions need to be resolved by regulators and an administrative process, not bankruptcy. After addressing these and other objections, I ask Jay if he might reconsider his opposition if the legislation were amended to respond to several of his primary concerns.
The essay is available here.
By Rama Douglas (Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP)
In Hargreaves v. Nuverra Environmental Solutions Inc. (In re Nuverra Environmental Solutions Inc.), 17-1024 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2018), a Delaware district court upheld a bankruptcy court’s ruling that the secured creditors’ “gift” of cash and stock to holders of unsecured claims pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan did not violate the confirmation standards for approving a plan under Chapter 11, even though certain classes of unsecured claims (trade and business-related unsecured claims) received larger distributions from the gift than another class of unsecured claims (noteholders). The decision focuses on the permissible effect of “horizontal” gifting whereby the disparate treatment is among separate classes of the same priority level of creditors — here, separately classified general unsecured claims.
Debtors looking to pursue a reorganization may seek to provide a recovery to certain types of creditors (such as trade) within a class, but not others. Such discrimination is not permissible for value distributed by the debtor’s estate under a plan. Gifting has been a technique — subject to criticism (especially when class skipping is involved) — to provide disparate treatment. While the Third Circuit has not ruled on gifting, this latest Delaware district court decision supports the use of horizontal gifting. Such a decision will certainly be the focus of attention by supporters and critics of gifting.
The full article is available here.