[Crypto-Bankruptcy Series] Quantifying Cryptocurrency Claims in Bankruptcy: Does the Dollar Still Reign Supreme?
by | posted in: Bankruptcy, Chapter 11, Claims Trading, Crypto-Bankruptcy Series, Cryptocurrency, Reorganization, Valuation | 0

By Ingrid Bagby, Michele Maman, Anthony Greene, and Marc Veilleux (Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft LLP)

Note: This post is the second post in a series of posts on bankruptcies of cryptocurrency companies and the emerging issues they pose. The first post can be read here (by Megan McDermott).

This series is being managed by the Bankruptcy Roundtable and Xiao Ma, SJD at Harvard Law School, xma [at] sjd [dot] law [dot] harvard [dot] edu.

Check the HLS Bankruptcy Roundtable periodically for additional contributing posts by academics and practitioners from institutions across the country.

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Ingrid Bagby

Michele Maman

Anthony Greene

Marc Veilleux

Crypto-watchers and bankruptcy lawyers alike have speculated how customer claims based on digital assets such as cryptocurrencies should be valued and measured under bankruptcy law. However, a crypto-centric approach to valuing claims raises a number of issues.  For example, measuring customer claims in cryptocurrency and making “in-kind” distributions of these assets could lead to creditors within the same class receiving recoveries of disparate USD value due to fluctuation in cryptocurrency prices. Moreover, the administrative burden associated with maintaining, accounting for, and distributing a wide variety of cryptocurrencies as part of a recovery scheme or plan may prove costly and complex.  Equity holders also might challenge the confirmability of a plan where valuations and recoveries are based on cryptocurrency rather than USD, as a dramatic rise in cryptocurrency values may  allow for a return of  value to equity.

A recent dispute in the Celsius bankruptcy proceedings as to whether a debtor is required to schedule claims in USD, or whether cryptocurrency claims can be scheduled “in-kind,” may serve as a preview of things to come on these issues. In Celsius, each Debtor’s schedule of unsecured creditors’ claims (Schedule E/F) listed customer claims by the number of various forms of cryptocurrency coins and account types, rather than in USD. Subsequently, a  group of Celsius preferred shareholders filed a motion directing the Debtors to amend their Schedules to reflect customer claims valued in USD, in addition to cryptocurrency coin counts.

Ultimately, the Debtors and the Series B Preferred Holders were able to consensually resolve the motion by the Debtors agreeing to amend their schedules by filing a conversion table reflecting the Debtors’ view of the rate of conversion of all cryptocurrencies listed in the Debtors’ schedules to USD as of the petition date.  However, it remains to be seen whether scheduling of claims in cryptocurrency and providing conversion tables will become the norm in similar cases involving primarily crypto-assets.  Practitioners and creditors should expect further issues to arise in the claims resolution process in crypto-related  cases as claimants and liquidation trustees (or plan administrators) wrestle with how to value claims based on such a volatile asset, subject to ever-increasing regulatory scrutiny.  For now, the bankruptcy process continues to run on USD.

The full article can be read here, and the memo is also republished by National Law Review, Lexology and Mondaq.

 

The Law and Economics of Investing in Bankruptcy in the United States
by | posted in: Bankruptcy Roundtable Updates, Claims Trading, Distressed Debt Markets | 0

By Jared A. Ellias (University of California Hastings College of the Law)

Jared A. Ellias

When commentators describe American bankruptcy law as “the model to which European restructuring laws should aspire,” they are really speaking about an ‘American bankruptcy ecosystem’ of which law is only a significant part. The American bankruptcy ecosystem is best understood as a complex system inhabited by bankruptcy judges, law firms, investment bankers and activist investors. In this Report, I focus on one of the major components of this ecosystem: specialized investors that participate in the ‘bankruptcy claims trade.’ As I discuss, American bankruptcy courts today are best understood not as a place of shame and failure but rather as an integrated part of the capital markets, similar to the private equity firms of New York and the venture capital investors of Palo Alto. As this view of bankruptcy law took hold, investors, typically hedge funds, began to raise a large stock of capital to deploy in it. Importantly, while these investors were born of the bankruptcy bar’s development of institutions that situated bankruptcy courts within the capital markets, they have deployed their capital to accelerate it. This Report chronicles the rise of claims trading and the state of the academic literature on activist investing. In sum, the best interpretation of the available empirical evidence is that claims trading and activist investing have, at the very least, not harmed Chapter 11 or distressed corporations, and may have actually improved the capacity of the American bankruptcy system to reorganize distressed assets.

The Report is available here.

Inequitable Subordination: Distressing Distressed Claims Purchasers by Propagating Subordination Benefit Elimination Theory
by | posted in: Bankruptcy Administration and Jurisdiction, Bankruptcy Roundtable Updates, Claims Trading, Jurisprudence | 0

By Jay Rao (University of California, Berkeley, School of Law)

Jay Rao

This Article examines the application of equitable subordination under Title 11 of the United States Code to bankruptcy claims purchasing transactions that transpire after the occurrence of inequitable conduct by a third party. Although a significant issue with practical consequences, it has drawn relatively scant commentary. To the author’s knowledge, no scholarship to date has attempted to comprehensively discuss the issue or describe the indirect cleansing and washing of tainted claims resulting therefrom. While analyzing and criticizing the current state of the law, this Article introduces the concepts of the “subordination benefit,” “subordination benefit elimination theory,” and “limited subordination benefit theory” to facilitate and further conversations related to the intersection of equitable subordination and bankruptcy claims trading.

This Article primarily aims to promote an active, fluid bankruptcy claims trading market to, on an ex post basis, benefit creditors and, on an ex ante basis, reduce the cost, and induce the extension, of credit in the primary capital markets, thereby supporting the broader economy. Additionally, this Article seeks to reduce indirect cleansing of tainted claims and indirect claims washing through the bankruptcy claims market.

The subject matter is particularly timely and relevant, given the recent publication of the Final Report and Recommendations of the American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, the significant growth of the claims trading market and increasing activity and sophistication of distressed investors, and the recent formation of the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Claims Trading Committee.

This Article argues that subordination benefit elimination theory, which represents the dominant theory propagated by courts and commentators, finds support in a misguided reading of caselaw and conflicts with sound economic policy and logic. Further, while acknowledging limited subordination benefit theory is a superior approach to subordination benefit elimination theory, this Article argues that limited subordination benefit theory also runs contrary to sound economic policy and logic. This Article requests commentators and courts halt and reverse the propagation of subordination benefit elimination theory and avoid disseminating limited subordination benefit theory. Instead, this Article proposes post-misconduct discounted claims purchasers be entitled to participate in the subordination benefit to the same extent as pre-misconduct claimholders.

If commentators and courts are unready to abandon both theories and if required to make a suboptimal binary choice, this Article suggests limited subordination benefit theory be propagated and utilized in lieu of subordination benefit elimination theory.

The full article is available here.

A Cautionary Tale for Claims Traders and Other Contract Counterparties
by | posted in: Claims Trading | 0

By David Griffiths and Leonard Yoo (Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP).

During a negotiation over a sale of claims, when parties agree to a price and preliminarily agree to enter into a final agreement, is there a binding agreement to negotiate in good faith towards a final agreement? 

The bankruptcy court in Westinghouse addressed this very issue.  In Westinghouse, Seaport, on behalf of its client, reached out to Landstar to purchase its claims against Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.  An employee of Landstar negotiated with Seaport to sell the claims but explained to Seaport that, while she was authorized to negotiate a price, all other terms would need to be approved by Landstar’s legal counsel.  Seaport and Landstar’s employee eventually agreed to a price for the claims that was “subject to” executed documentation.  Two days after this agreement, Landstar informed Seaport that it decided to not go through with the sale.  Seaport and its client litigated this matter arguing that there was a binding obligation to negotiate in good faith because it was customary in the claims trading industry for parties to agree on the price over email and negotiate the other terms towards a final agreement. 

The bankruptcy court disagreed and held that a preliminary agreement to negotiate in good faith was not formed because, among other reasons, (i) Landstar reserved its right to not enter into a binding agreement and (ii) Seaport did not explicitly confirm with Landstar that there was an enforceable agreement as to the obligation to negotiate in good faith nor the purchase price.

The full article is available here.

The Ninth Circuit Affirms Creditors’ Ability to Block ‘Cramdown’ by Purchasing Claims
by | posted in: Claims Trading, Cramdown and Priority | 0

By George P. Angelich and Annie Y. Stoops (Arent Fox).

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the creditor’s ability to block “cramdown” by purchasing junior debt for the purpose of protecting its own existing claim.  In re Fagerdala USA-Lompoc, Inc., 891 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2018).  In reversing the bankruptcy court’s decision to designate claims for bad faith under 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e), the Ninth Circuit held that the creditor acting in its self-interest by purchasing unsecured claims to block “cramdown” did not constitute bad faith unless evidence showed the creditor acted with a motive ulterior to the purpose of protecting its economic interest in a bankruptcy proceeding.  Examples of “ulterior motive” included a creditor purchasing claims for the purpose of blocking litigation against it or a debtor arranging to have an insider purchase claims.

Fagerdala clarifies that creditors may purchase claims in defense of their economic interests in bankruptcy proceedings.  In holding that the bad faith inquiry under 11 U.S.C.  § 1126(e) requires evidence of an “ulterior motive,” the Ninth Circuit sets the stage for designation where a non-creditor or strategic investor purchases claims as an offensive move to gain an advantage over the Chapter 11 debtor.

The full article is available here.

Bankruptcy Claims Trading
by | posted in: Bankruptcy Administration and Jurisdiction, Bankruptcy Roundtable Updates, Claims Trading | 0

By Jared A. Ellias (University of California, Hastings)

Over the past twenty years, a robust secondary market has emerged in the debt of Chapter 11 firms. Critics worry that the trading associated with this market has undermined bankruptcy governance, by forcing managers to negotiate with shifting groups of activist investors in the Chapter 11 bargaining process. In my new Article, “Bankruptcy Claims Trading” I perform the first empirical study of trading in the financial claims of Chapter 11 debtors to learn more about how claims trading impacts the average Chapter 11 case. Using the entire record of trading in bond debt for all Chapter 11 debtors that filed for bankruptcy between 2002 and 2012, I find that nearly all Chapter 11 bonds trade very heavily throughout the bankruptcy process. However, I find that claims trading appears to be less important for bankruptcy governance than many critics fear. The activist groups that tend to participate in negotiations usually enter cases early and rarely change significantly. This suggests that bankruptcy claims trading is, on average, much more about passive investment and much less about activist entrance and exit.

The full article is available here.

WSJ Examiners – Claims Trading
by | posted in: Claims Trading | 0

Does claims trading impede chapter 11 reorganizations? And, if so, would disclosure of additional information about traded claims remove the impediments it creates?

Kenneth A. Rosen answers “yes” to both questions. He argues that ownership of an in-the-money claim incentivizes liquidation and thus encourages bad-faith rejections. Disclosure, he contends, would enable courts to assess more accurately whether a party’s rejection of a plan was made in good faith.

Elliot Ganz disagrees on both scores. He maintains that claims traders try to maximize a debtor’s going-concern value rather than immediately lock in paper gains. In so doing, they provide liquidity and expertise that improves the reorganization process. Disclosure, however, would publicize their strategies and thus chill their participation.

Who has the better argument? The Wall Street Journal’s expert panel of Examiners agrees with Mr. Ganz.

Marc Leder, Brett Miller, Anders J. Maxwell, Sharon Levine, Jack Butler, and Mark Roe all agree that claims trading is generally beneficial and that current disclosure requirements are adequate. Mr. Butler also details the history of claims trading to show that Congress was aware of the practice when it adopted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.

Finally, Mark Roe addresses a common criticism of claims trading–namely, that it hinders resolution via a negotiated plan because claims traders, fearful of insider trading liability and other risks, will not participate in plan formation. He argues that 363 sales ameliorate this problem because such sales may proceed absent negotiation among the various classes of creditors.

(This post was authored by Ben A. Sherwood, J.D. ’17.)

Purchasing Claims and Changing Votes: Establishing “Cause” under Rule 3018(a)
by | posted in: Claims Trading | 0

By Amir Shachmurove

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code gives creditors whose rights will be impaired the right to vote to accept or reject a proposed plan of reorganization, subjecting this prerogative to only two limitations. The first is set forth in Section 1126(e), which provides that a vote not cast or “not solicited or procured in good faith” may be nullified. The second appears in the penultimate sentence of Bankruptcy Rule 3018(a), which requires “a creditor or equity security holder” seeking “to change or withdraw” a vote to establish “cause.” Though “cause” has always been the sole constraint on the right to change or withdraw a previously cast vote in the whole of bankruptcy law, Rule 3018(a)’s text and commentary provide no definition or example. Existing precedent, moreover, is threadbare.

In four substantive parts, Purchasing Claims and Changing Votes: Establishing ‘Cause’ Under Rule 3018(a) proposes a new blueprint for the application of Rule 3018(a)’s deceptively plain “cause.” Necessarily, Part II surveys the present and wanting legal landscape. Part III then summarizes the standards for interpreting federal rules generally and shows how bankruptcy law’s specialized character compels these precepts’ alteration when a bankruptcy rule is at issue. Thereafter, Parts III and IV employ these tenets to delineate the effective range of “cause” in Rule 3018(a). In so doing, this article explicates the rarely-noticed interpretive constraints applicable to the Bankruptcy Rules and reads Rule 3018(a) accordingly, demonstrating how bankruptcy’s lone check on a pivotal privilege must be understood in light of such modern phenomena as claims trading.

The full article is published in 89 Am. Bankr. L.J. 511 (2015), and is available here.

Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider
by | posted in: Claims Trading | 0

Authors: Kenneth Ayotte & David Skeel

Since the outset of the recent financial crisis, liquidity problems have been cited as the cause behind the bankruptcies and near bankruptcies of numerous firms, ranging from Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers in 2008 to Kodak more recently.  As Kodak’s lead bankruptcy lawyer explained to the court on the first day of the case: “We’re here for liquidity.” In this Article, we offer the first theoretical analysis of bankruptcy’s crucial role in creating liquidity for firms in financial distress.

The dominant normative theory of bankruptcy (the “Creditors Bargain theory”) argues that bankruptcy should be limited to solving coordination problems caused by multiple creditors. Using simple numerical illustrations, we show that two well-known problems that cause illiquidity–debt overhang and adverse selection– are more severe in the presence of multiple, uncoordinated creditors.  Hence, bankruptcy is justified in addressing them.

We discuss the Bankruptcy Code’s existing liquidity-providing rules, such as the ability to issue new senior claims, and the ability to sell assets free and clear of liens and other claims.  In addition to identifying this function in a variety of provisions that have not previously been recognized as related, our theory also explains how the recent trend toward creditor control in Chapter 11 cases can be explained as an attempt to create illiquidity for strategic advantage.  Although bankruptcy’s liquidity providing rules are essential, especially in the current environment, they also carry costs, such as the risk of “continuation bias.”  To address these costs, we propose qualitative principles for striking the balance between debtor liquidity and respect for nonbankruptcy rights.

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 80, Fall 2013.  A draft is available on SSRN.

Activist Investors, Distressed Companies, and Value Uncertainty
by | posted in: Claims Trading | 0

Authors:  Michelle M. Harner, Jamie Marincic Griffin, and Jennifer Ivey-Crickenberger

Hedge funds and other private investment funds often play a key role in chapter 11 cases.  They may hold the debtor’s prepetition secured debt or provide postpetition financing to the debtor.  They also may buy and trade the debtor’s secured and unsecured debt both before and after a chapter 11 filing.  These activities can provide much-needed liquidity to a debtor and foster a robust secondary market for creditors looking to exit the credit.  A fund’s participation in a case, however, sometimes generates litigation and, arguably, both delays the resolution and increases the cost of the case.  Consequently, many commentators and practitioners debate the utility of funds in restructurings.

In our most recent article on funds in chapter 11, we conduct an original empirical study of funds as purchasers of chapter 11 debtors.  Specifically, the study analyzes cases where a fund (individually or as part of a group) acquires control of a debtor through the chapter 11 process by purchasing either substantially all of the debtor’s assets or a majority interest in the reorganized stock.  In the stock acquisition context, we were concerned only with the investment of new capital.

Overall, the data suggest that funds have the potential to provide value in chapter 11.  But neither the participation of funds nor the chapter 11 process itself is a panacea, and more empirical and traditional case studies are needed to understand fully the impact of funds on corporate restructurings.  We hope our study encourages further research.

The full-length article can be found here.

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