Insider Status and U.S. Bank v. Village at Lakeridge

By Ronit J. Berkovich and David Li (Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP).

The U.S. Supreme Court, in U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. ___ (2018), offered plenty of hints on an important topic while simultaneously ruling very little about it.  In chapter 11, whether a creditor qualifies as an “insider” can have enormous implications on a range of issues, including plan confirmation, fraudulent transfer and preference analyses, and severance payment and employee incentive/retention plan (KEIP/KERP) approvals.  Lakeridge involved a dispute as to whether the bankruptcy court properly determined in confirming a plan that the sole impaired accepting creditor (the romantic partner of one of the debtor’s officers) was not a “non-statutory” insider.  If the creditor actually were such an insider, then the chapter 11 plan should not have been confirmed.

In granting cert to hear the case, the Supreme Court expressly declined the opportunity to address whether the Ninth Circuit articulated the correct legal test to determine if a person qualifies as a non-statutory insider.  Instead, the Supreme Court granted cert only to answer the narrow question of whether the Ninth Circuit applied the correct standard of review to the lower court’s determination.  Justice Kagan, writing for the Court, kept to that script by simply affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision to apply a clear error standard of review.  Concurrences by Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor, however, each acknowledged shortcomings in the legal test the Ninth Circuit applied and each appeared to invite lower courts to consider alternative approaches.  As a whole, Lakeridge provides little binding guidance, and practitioners can expect further development in non-statutory insider law by the Courts of Appeals.

The article is available here.

Ninth Circuit Holds That Impaired Accepting Class Requirement Applies to Plan Confirmation on a “Per-Plan” Rather Than a “Per Debtor” Basis

By James L. Bromley, Lisa M. Schweitzer, Sean A. O’Neal, Luka A. Barefoot, and Daniel K. Soltman (Cleary Gottlieb).

On January 25, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires cramdown plans to have at least one impaired accepting class, applies on a “per-plan” basis, rather than a “per-debtor” basis. In re Transwest Resort Properties Inc., Case No. 16-16221 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). Under the “per-plan” rule, multiple debtors with a single plan of reorganization may cram down a plan on any creditor class with the support of only one impaired accepting class, even where the impaired accepting class has claims against a different debtor than the crammed down class that has rejected the plan. The Ninth Circuit is the first circuit court to address the “per-debtor” versus “per-plan” issue, and previous decisions were split between the Southern District of New York (adopting the “per-plan” approach) and the District of Delaware (adopting the “per-debtor” approach). Transwest will likely have a significant impact on how debtors and creditors within the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere consider their relative options prior to and during bankruptcy.

The remainder of this article will discuss the Transwest case background and the Ninth Circuit’s decision, and the expected impact of the decision, both inside and outside of the Ninth Circuit. The article is available here.

For earlier Roundtable coverage of 1129(a)(10), please see our recent post on strategic impairment in cramdowns.

Applying Jevic: How Courts Are Interpreting and Applying the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Structured Dismissals and Priority Skipping

By Shane G. Ramsey and John T. Baxter (Nelson Mullins).

The U.S. Supreme Court in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S.Ct. 973 (2017), addressed the issue of chapter 11 debtors using structured dismissals to end-run the statutory priority rules. The Court’s ruling preserved the priority system, holding that the bankruptcy court could not approve a structured dismissal of a chapter 11 case that provided for distributions that failed to follow the standard priority rules unless the affected creditors consented to such treatment. Although the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly apply its priority distribution scheme to a structured dismissal, the Court clarified that courts should do so.

As a way to track how bankruptcy courts across the country are applying the ruling in Jevic, the Nelson Mullins Bankruptcy Protector has introduced a new periodic series: the Jevic Files. As of February 19, 2018, the Jevic Files has collected and summarized thirteen cases across twelve jurisdictions. While the majority of the cases involved structured dismissals in the context of a chapter 11 case, courts have also applied the ruling in Jevic to the dismissal of chapter 13 plans; the priority of trustee payments in a chapter 7 case; and even a state court foreclosure hearing that came on the heels of a dismissed chapter 11 case. As Jevic continues to be interpreted and applied in bankruptcy (and other) courts throughout the country, we will continue to keep an updated summary of cases through the Jevic Files.

The article is available here.

The Roundtable has posted on Jevic before, including a report of the case by Melissa Jacoby & Jonathan Lipson and a roundup of law firm perspectives on the Court’s decision and an initial scholarly take on the opinion from Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos. For other Roundtable posts related to priority, see Casey & Morrison, “Beyond Options”; Baird, “Priority Matters”; and Roe & Tung, “Breaking Bankruptcy Priority,” an article that the Jevic opinion referred to.

The Janus Faces of Reorganization Law

By Vincent S. J. Buccola (University of Pennsylvania – The Wharton School – Legal Studies & Business Ethics Department).

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corporation, 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017), the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts lack authority to implement structured dismissals that sidestep the absolute priority rule. The bankruptcy judge’s power to resolve cases by dismissal, a power the Bankruptcy Code grants explicitly, is implicitly limited by the norm of waterfall distribution—or so in any case the majority reasoned. The Court’s decision rested on an interpretive default rule. Because distributional priorities are so important to bankruptcy, the Code will be understood to bar departures absent a clear statement. At the same time, however, the Jevic majority went out of its way to distinguish (and seemingly bless) what it called “interim distributions” such as critical vendor orders, notwithstanding their capacity to undermine priorities and their dubious textual basis.

This article argues that this seeming inconsistency in Jevic is no misstep, but that there might be some sense to the conflicting interpretive approaches after all. Two distinctive paradigms now color interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code. One paradigm governs during the early stages of a case and is oriented toward the importance of debtor and judicial discretion to use estate assets for the general welfare. The other paradigm governs a bankruptcy’s conclusion and is oriented toward the sanctity of creditors’ bargained-for distributional entitlements. In combination, they produce what appears to be policy incoherence. But, at least in a world of robust senior creditor influence, a rule under which judicial discretion diminishes over the course of a case—discretion giving way to entitlements—may in fact tend to maximize creditor recoveries.

The full article is available here.

Debt Priority Structure, Market Discipline and Bank Conduct

By Piotr Danisewicz (University of Bristol), Danny McGowan (University of Nottingham), Enrico Onali (Aston University; University of Wales System – Bangor University), and Klaus Schaeck (University of Bristol).

This article explores how changes in debt priority structure affect banks’ funding costs and soundness. We exploit the staggered introduction of depositor preference laws across 15 U.S. states between 1983 and 1993 which confer priority to deposit claims in case of bank liquidation. The laws are exogenous with respect to the outcomes of interest and apply to state-chartered banks but not to nationally-chartered banks, allowing us to isolate causality using difference-in-difference methods.

We document changes in monitoring intensity by various creditors depending on whether creditors move up or down the priority ladder. Enactment of depositor preference reduces deposit interest rates, consistent with the fact that deposit claims are protected in case of bankruptcy thereby reducing depositors’ monitoring incentives. However, non-deposit interest rates increase as these creditors are exposed to greater losses in bankruptcy which leads them to more intensively monitor banks’ conditions.

Subordinating non-depositor claims also reduces banks’ risk-taking and leverage, consistent with market discipline. For example, non-depositors who receive negative signals about project returns may refuse to roll over funds which motivates banks to improve soundness to maintain access to key funding sources such as Fed Funds.

These insights highlight a role for debt priority structure in the regulatory framework, and support recent innovations in banking regulation that reallocate monitoring incentives towards non-depositors.

The full paper can be found here.

Recent Developments in Bankruptcy Law October 2017

By Richard Levin (Jenner & Block LLP)

The bankruptcy courts and their appellate courts continue to explore issues of interest to practitioners and academics. This quarterly summary of recent developments in bankruptcy law covers cases reported during the third quarter of 2017.

The Second Circuit adopted the use of a market rate to determine cram-down interest rates in a chapter 11 case. It also disallowed a secured lender’s make-whole, although without deciding whether a make-whole should be generally disallowed as unmatured post-petition interest. (In re MPM Silicones (Momentive)) In contrast, the Houston bankruptcy court allowed a make-whole in a solvent case, but also without reaching the post-petition interest issue. (In re Ultra Petroleum)

The Delaware bankruptcy court clarified its jurisdiction to approve a third-party release in a settlement implemented through a confirmed chapter 11 plan, holding that plan confirmation is a core proceeding, so Article III limits do not apply. (In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC) The Delaware bankruptcy court also reconsidered, and disallowed, a merger agreement termination fee after termination of the agreement. (In re Energy Future Holdings, Inc.)

Bankruptcy courts increasingly approve of the idea that under section 544(b), the trustee may use the longer reachback periods of the Internal Revenue Code and the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (In re CVAH, In re Alpha Protective Services). And the Ninth Circuit has ruled that for the trustee to pursue an avoidance claim against the United States, section 544(b) does not require a separate sovereign immunity waiver. (In re DBSI, Inc.) 

Finally, the courts have been sympathetic to attorneys in allowing their fees. (In re Stanton; In re Hungry Horse, LLC; In re CWS Enterps., Inc.) Less so for investment bankers. (Roth Capital Partners)

The full memo, discussing these and other cases, is available here, and the full (900-page) compilation of all prior editions is available here.

Momentive: Law Firm Perspectives

On October 28, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down its decision in In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C., holding that where an efficient market exists, the appropriate cram-down interest rate in Chapter 11 cases is the market rate, distinguishing the formula rate applied by the Supreme Court in Till v. SCS Credit Corp. in Chapter 13 cases. The Second Circuit wrote that “the market rate should be applied in Chapter 11 cases where there exists an efficient market. But where no efficient market exists for a Chapter 11 debtor, then the bankruptcy court should employ the formula approach endorsed by the Till plurality.” The Second Circuit also disallowed the senior creditors’ claim for a make-whole payment, although the Third Circuit had allowed such a claim in In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.

Law firms have so far reacted unanimously that this decision is a win for secured creditors as it ameliorates the risk that unsecured creditors could extract value from the debtor at the secured creditors’ expense. Weil writes that “it seems like the Bankruptcy Court, now freed from Till, will find that an efficient market exists, and will adjust the interest rate on the replacement notes accordingly.”

Nevertheless, some firms predict that there may still be areas future controversy. Davis Polk warns that this decision “could result in expensive litigations between debtors and secured creditors as to whether there exists an efficient market and, if so, what the efficient market rate should be.” Norton Rose Fulbright also emphasizes that the next step for secured creditors is to focus on when an efficient market exists.

Firms have also noticed the decision’s implication for debtor-side strategy. Baker McKenzie suggests the possibility that “a debtor may engage in forum shopping to file its case in a jurisdiction that applies the formula approach,” or “be even more sensitive to the potential for exit financing quotes to be used as evidence against [debtors] in establishing a market rate.”

On the issue of the make-whole premium, Davis Polk highlights that the circuit split may increase forum shopping for distressed issuers with potentially significant make-whole obligations. It expects future issuers to draft clearly around the issue of make-whole obligation to provide for future Chapter 11 cases.

(By Jianjian Ye, Harvard Law School, J.D. 2018.)

Finding Acceptance: Using Strategic Impairment to Satisfy 1129(a)(10)

by David L. Curry, Jr. and Ryan A. O’Connor (Okin Adams LLP; Houston, Texas)

Section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – requiring acceptance of a proposed plan from at least one impaired voting class – can often pose a unique challenge for single asset real estate debtors. Finding Acceptance: Using Strategic Impairment to Satisfy 1129(a)(10) (the “Article”), explores the potential use of “strategic” or “artificial” impairment as a means of achieving plan confirmation in contested cases where consensual restructuring of the secured creditor’s claim is not obtainable.  Whether such artificial impairment is permissible remains an open question, but the Article notes a growing majority of courts finding that impairment need not be economically driven. Yet, while artificial impairment may not be prohibited by § 1129(a)(10), courts have found that plans relying upon such may be subject to heightened scrutiny under § 1129(a)(3)’s good faith requirements. Thus, the Article goes on to contrast two recent circuit court opinions – Western Real Estate Equities, L.L.C. v. Vill. At Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P.), 710 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2013) and Vill. Green I, GP v. Fannie Mae (In re Vill. Green I, GP), 811 F.3d 816 (6th Cir. 2016) – and their opposing outcomes in an effort to understand what factors a court may consider when determining whether a plan has been proposed in good-faith.  Ultimately, the Article concludes that while strategic impairment of insiders or other closely related parties may give rise to an inference of bad faith, the impairment of unrelated, minor creditors should be permissible.

The full article is available to download here.

David L. Curry, Jr. is a partner, and Ryan A. O’Connor is an associate, in the Houston office of Okin Adams LLP. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors, and not Okin Adams.

 

Through Jevic’s Mirror: Orders, Fees, and Settlements

posted in: Cramdown and Priority | 0

By Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos (McKinney School of Law, Indiana University)

This article takes the United States Supreme Court’s simple “no” to nonconsensual structured dismissals in Jevic as an opportunity to study its contours. The first issue is the pending clarification on whether the right to object to a structured dismissal is an individual or a class right. An individual right would leave little space for consensual structured dismissals, whereas a class right would fit with the anti-hold-out scheme of reorganization law. Second, Jevic implies increased scrutiny on first-day orders, especially in liquidating reorganizations, pushing for additional caution and negotiation before early payments. Third is the issue of fees—latent in Jevic but burning in the academy—the tension between race-to-the-bottom and race-to-the-top views of jurisdictional competition with the Court’s silence in the foreground. Fourth is the Court’s approval of settlements (via interim orders) that violate priorities provided they promote a bankruptcy goal, as Iridium’s approval did. Fifth, the juxtaposition of the settlements in Iridium and Jevic stresses the importance of the bankruptcy court’s role in approving settlements when the parties’ incentives are biased.

The full article is available here.


The roundtable has posted previously on Jevic, including a report of the case by Melissa Jacoby & Jonathan Lipson and a roundup of law firm perspectives on the Court’s decision. For opposing views on the case leading up to oral argument, see Melissa Jacoby & Jonathan Lipson on their amicus brief and Bruce Grohsgal making the case for structured dismissals. For other Roundtable posts related to priority, see Casey & Morrison, “Beyond Options”; Baird, “Priority Matters”; and Roe & Tung, “Breaking Bankruptcy Priority,” an article that the Jevic opinion referenced.

Post-Jevic, Expansive Interpretation by Bankruptcy Courts Possible

posted in: Cramdown and Priority | 0

By Andrew C. Kassner and Joseph N. Argentina, Jr. (Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP)

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017), the Supreme Court held that structured dismissals that violate the distribution scheme set forth in the Bankruptcy Code are not permitted.  The Court distinguished such situations from other, somewhat common bankruptcy practices that also violate the Code’s distribution scheme, such as critical vendor orders, employee wage orders, and lender “roll-ups.”  Those practices, the Court noted, “enable a successful reorganization and make even the disfavored creditors better off.”  The question remained, however, how subsequent bankruptcy courts would analyze such practices in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Jevic.

This article summarizes two early post-Jevic decisions and concludes that at least some courts will read the Jevic holding expansively into areas of chapter 11 practice other than structured dismissals.  In In re Fryar, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1123 (Apr. 25, 2017), the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee would not approve a settlement agreement and § 363 sale that provided payment to a lender on account of its prepetition claims.  In In re Pioneer Health Servs., 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 939 (Apr. 4, 2017), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Mississippi would not permit a hospital debtor to pay three physicians as “critical vendors.”  These courts concluded that Jevic required additional scrutiny of distribution-violating proposals other than structured dismissals.

The full article is available here.

Andrew C. Kassner is the chairman and chief executive officer of Drinker Biddle & Reath, and former chair of its corporate restructuring group. Joseph N. Argentina Jr. is an associate in the firm’s corporate restructuring practice group in the Philadelphia and Wilmington offices. The views expressed in the article are those of Mr. Kassner and Mr. Argentina, and not of Drinker Biddle & Reath.


The roundtable has posted previously on Jevic, including a report of the case by Melissa Jacoby & Jonathan Lipson and a roundup of law firm perspectives on the Court’s decision. For opposing views on the case leading up to oral argument, see Melissa Jacoby & Jonathan Lipson on their amicus brief and Bruce Grohsgal making the case for structured dismissals. For other Roundtable posts related to priority, see Casey & Morrison, “Beyond Options”; Baird, “Priority Matters”; and Roe & Tung, “Breaking Bankruptcy Priority,” an article referred to in the Jevic opinion.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7