Towards an Optimal Model of Directors’ Duties in the Zone of Insolvency: An Economic and Comparative Approach
by | posted in: Bankruptcy Roundtable Updates, Corporate Governance, International and Comparative | 0

By Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez (Singapore Management University)

Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez

When a company becomes factually insolvent but it is not yet subject to a formal insolvency proceeding, the shareholders—or the directors acting on their behalf—may engage, even in good faith, in various forms of behaviour that can divert or destroy value at the expense of the creditors. For this reason, most jurisdictions around the world provide a variety of legal strategies to respond to this form of shareholder opportunism. One of these strategies is the imposition of special directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency.

In a recent article, I analyse the primary regulatory models of directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency observed internationally. From a sample of more than 20 countries from Asia, Australia, Europe, Latin America, Africa, and North America, I distinguish six primary regulatory models: (i) the imposition of a duty to initiate insolvency proceedings, generally found in Europe; (ii) the imposition of a duty to recapitalise or liquidate the company, typically existing in Europe and Latin America; (iii) the imposition of duties towards the company’s creditors, including the duty to minimise losses for the creditors existing in the United Kingdom; (iv) the imposition of a duty to prevent the company from incurring new debts, existing in countries like Australia and South Africa; (v) the imposition of a duty to prevent the company from incurring new debts that cannot be paid in full, existing in Singapore and New Zealand; and (vi) the imposition of a duty to keep maximising the interest of the corporation, as it exists in Canada and the United States.

After analysing the features, advantages, and weaknesses of these models, my paper argues that the desirability of each regulatory model of directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency depends on a variety of country-specific factors including divergences in corporate ownership structures, debt structures, level of financial development, efficiency of the insolvency framework, and sophistication of the judiciary. For instance, in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as well as large controlled firms, there is a greater alignment of incentives between directors and shareholders. Therefore, in the event of insolvency, the directors will have more incentives to engage in a series of opportunistic behaviour that will advance the shareholders’ interests even if it is at the expense of the creditors. As a result, a more interventionist approach to protect the creditors, such as the duty to initiate insolvency proceedings, may make more sense in countries with a significant presence of SMEs and large controlled firms, as it happens in most jurisdictions around the world. By contrast, in countries like the United Kingdom and the United States, where large companies usually have dispersed ownership structures and therefore the directors are less influenced by the shareholders, a more flexible approach for the regulation of directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency may be more justified. Therefore, a duty to keep maximising the interest of the company or a duty to take steps to minimise potential losses for the creditors may make sense.

Nonetheless, country-specific factors other than corporate ownership structures can also affect the desirability of each regulatory model of directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency. For example, in countries without sophisticated courts, the discretion of courts should be reduced. Therefore, the imposition of clear rules (e.g., duty to initiate insolvency proceedings) may be more desirable than the use of standards (e.g., duty to minimise losses for the creditors or duty to keep maximising the interest of the corporation). Similarly, in countries with inefficient insolvency frameworks, initiating an insolvency proceeding can do more harm than good for both debtors and creditors. Therefore, these countries should not impose a duty to initiate insolvency proceedings even if, as it happens in many jurisdictions with inefficient frameworks (e.g., emerging economies), this solution makes more sense from the perspective of the corporate ownership structure prevailing in the country.

Based on a comparative, interdisciplinary, and country-specific analysis, my articles provides various policy recommendations to enhance the regulatory framework of directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency across jurisdictions taking into account international divergences in corporate ownership structures, debt structures, level of financial development, efficiency of the insolvency framework, and sophistication of the judiciary.

The full article is available here.

A modified version of this post was published on the Singapore Global Restructuring Initiative Blog.

Puerto Rico; Act III
by | posted in: Bankruptcy Roundtable Updates, International and Comparative | 0

By Stephen J. Lubben (Seton Hall University School of Law)

Stephen J. Lubben

Since 2017, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (and certain of its affiliated entities) have been in “bankruptcy” under Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”).  PROMESA is a bankruptcy law, with various other bells and whistles, although Congress purported to enact it under its Article IV territories powers.

These cases are pending in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico; however, Judge Laura Taylor Swain, of the Southern District of New York, was appointed by the Chief Justice to preside over the cases.  My new paper – Puerto Rico; Act III – provides a concise overview of where things now stand in the PROMESA process, and where they might be heading.

In addition to its restructuring provisions, the law creates the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico.  The Board frequently states that “the purpose of the Oversight Board is to provide a method for Puerto Rico to achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets.”  In essence, the Board operates as a supra-governmental body for fiscal matters.

At present several members of the Board have stepped down, and President Trump bumped one member off the Board – former bankruptcy judge Arthur J. González – by appointing a new member to his slot.  Congress and the president will have to fill out the Board, or devise a new path for the Commonwealth.

In the face of hurricanes, earthquakes, and COVID-19, the Board has attempted to push forward with a reorganization under Title III.  The virus, however, might substantially delay the process and force a reconsideration of the present reorganization plan.  It thus represents the opening of a third act in Puerto Rico’s debt drama.

Even before recent events, I had argued that the Board was being far too timid in its efforts to revamp Puerto Rico’s economy, given that the PROMESA process was presumably a one-time opportunity.  In particular, the debt relief the Board was proposing was comparatively modest, and I worried that it might leave the Commonwealth with still too much debt to successfully restart its economy.

The problem is that the Board’s current plan has the support of almost nobody, making even “cramdown” of the plan extremely unlikely.  Pensioners might be the most likely ally with the Board, although the government of Puerto Rico, and presumably many of the pensioners, object to the current offer.  As Justice Sotomayor recently noted,

The Board’s decisions have affected the island’s entire population, particularly many of its most vulnerable citizens. The Board has ordered pensions to be reduced by as much as 8.5 percent… Other proposed cuts take aim at already depleted healthcare and educational services. It is under the yoke of such austerity measures that the island’s 3.2 million citizens now chafe.[1]

Indeed, Justice Sotomayor’s recent opinion also provides a kind of roadmap for a challenge to PROMESA.  She explains that she concurred in the Court’s result only because nobody had argued that Puerto Rico’s Commonwealth status was inconsistent with the creation of the Board.  As she sees it, Congress made certain commitments to Puerto Rico in the 1950s when it created the Commonwealth, and Congress may not “take back” those commitments.  Any litigation following her approach would presumably involve extensive appeals, but it looms as a threat to the PROMESA process.

At heart, the problem in Puerto Rico is not unlike the problem in many sovereign and municipal workouts.  The bondholders want to recover as much as possible, of course, and are leery of settling claims only to see the debtor rebound shortly thereafter.  The conundrum being that the rebound is unlikely to happen without serious debt reduction.  Debt reduction is often not the only requirement for a rebound, but it is fundamental.

Either the Board needs to lead Puerto Rico out of this feedback loop, or Puerto Rico needs to extract itself from the PROMESA process. If not, the drama will continue for many more acts.  Future acts could in theory include statehood for Puerto Rico, or some new restructuring process, or perhaps even both.  Or the parties may simply reach a deal on a plan.  At this point it is hard to say any particular outcome is more likely than another.

[1] Financial Oversight And Management Bd. For Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC, 590 U. S. ____ (2020), Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment, slip opinion at page 7.

Germany Poised for Big Step Towards Corporate Restructuring Best Practice
by | posted in: Bankruptcy Administration and Jurisdiction, Bankruptcy Reform, Bankruptcy Roundtable Updates, International and Comparative | 0

By Sacha Luerken (Kirkland & Ellis)

Sacha Luerken

Germany’s insolvency law has only in very few cases – around 1% of filings – been used for a Chapter 11-style going concern restructuring of a debtor company. Initiatives to introduce processes like the scheme of arrangement, an English procedure that was also commonly used to restructure non-English companies and is capable of Chapter 15 recognition in the U.S., were not successful, even though recoveries for unsecured creditors in Germany are remarkably low compared to other jurisdictions.

A paradigm shift occurred when the EU in June 2019 passed its directive 2019/1023 on preventive restructuring frameworks, which requires all EU member states to introduce a restructuring process for companies in financial difficulties, but before an actual insolvency. On September 18, 2020, a draft law was presented to introduce a scheme-like procedure in Germany, which provides for a restructuring of selected liabilities with 75% majority by amount in class, a cross-class cram-down subject to tests similar as in a U.S. Chapter 11 proceeding, a court-approved stay on enforcement and collateral realization, and even a rejection of onerous contracts by the court.

The draft law has been welcomed as a big step towards a restructuring culture in Germany by many advisors and practitioners, and as a potential blueprint for the implementation of the EU directive in other European jurisdictions.

The full article is available here.

Reprinted with permission from the October 06, 2020 edition of the Law.com International 2020 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-257-3382 or reprints@alm.com.

Argentina’s Quest for the Moral High Ground in the Recent Restructuring with Its Foreign Bondholders
by | posted in: Bankruptcy Roundtable Updates, International and Comparative | 0

By Steven T. Kargman (Kargman Associates/International Restructuring Advisors)

 

Steven T. Kargman

Argentina’s new government under President Alberto Fernández recently completed a bond exchange which was approved overwhelmingly by its foreign bondholders.  The final restructuring deal that Argentina reached with its foreign bondholders in early August was the product of a fraught and tortuous negotiating process that lasted several months and came after Argentina had defaulted on its sovereign debt in late May for the ninth time in its history.

A recent four-part article published in Global Restructuring Review examines the negotiating dynamics in the restructuring negotiations between Argentina and its foreign bondholders.  The article focuses in particular on what I call the “three P’s”—namely, the pandemic, the professoriate, and the Pope—that I argue underpinned Argentina’s strategy in those negotiations.

Argentina sought to use each of the “three P’s” to its advantage.  First, the pandemic likely made Argentina’s foreign creditors more accommodating in their stance vis-à-vis Argentina in light of the strains the pandemic placed on Argentina’s sovereign balance sheet.  Second, Argentina benefited from the support of prominent professors from around the world who expressed their strong support for Argentina’s negotiating position.  The professors weighed in on various matters such as whether Argentina’s debt sustainability would or would not be restored by debt restructuring proposals then under consideration and what type of collective action clauses (CACs) for binding dissenting creditors through a supermajority vote should be used in the new bonds issued pursuant to the restructuring.  Third, Argentina sought to benefit from the Pope’s moral authority as reflected in a meeting the Pope held in late January with President Fernández as well as in the Pope’s participation a few days later in a Vatican conference on issues of debt and development.

In its final section, the article discusses the economic prospects for Argentina post-restructuring in view of the major economic challenges that Argentina will continue to face notwithstanding the outcome of the recently concluded sovereign debt restructuring.  The article also provides an overview of certain factors that may be relevant to Argentina’s upcoming discussions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concerning the IMF’s outstanding loan of $44 billion to Argentina.

The full article can be found here. This four-part article was first published in Global Restructuring Review (GRR) and is reposted with the permission of the GRR.

Independence and Impartiality of Resolution Professionals Under Indian Law: Filling the Gaps or Creating Law?
by | posted in: Bankruptcy Administration and Jurisdiction, Bankruptcy Roundtable Updates, International and Comparative | 0

By Sanjay Kumar Yadav, Syamantak Sen, and Vivek Badkur (National Law Institute University, Bhopal, India)

Sanjay Kumar Yadav
Syamantak Sen
Vivek Badkur

Under Indian Insolvency Law, any person may be designated as a resolution professional (“RP”), provided he is enrolled with an insolvency professional agency and registered with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India. The role of an RP, under Indian Insolvency Law, is similar to that of a private trustee under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code.

Any person is eligible to be appointed as an RP, provided he is independent of the corporate debtor and no further eligibility criterions have been prescribed, under Indian Insolvency Law. However in a surprising turn of events, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal in State Bank of India v. Metenere Ltd. (May 22, 2020), directed substitution of an Interim RP, based on him being a former employee of the financial creditor.

This raises concerns as it is prevalent in India for retired bankers to be appointed RPs and may therefore alter such practice, besides potentially disqualifying all former employees from acting as RPs, where the employer is involved. In this article, we discuss whether such substitution is founded in law and its consequent impact on the Indian insolvency jurisprudence, with respect to appointment of RPs.

The full article is available here.

Insolvency of Significant Non-Financial Enterprises: What Can We Learn from Bank Failures and Bank Resolution?
by | posted in: Bankruptcy Reform, Bankruptcy Roundtable Updates, International and Comparative | 0

By Ilya Kokorin, Leiden Law School (The Netherlands)

Ilya Kokorin

The current economic downturn triggered by the spread of COVID-19 demonstrates that the role of insolvency law should not be restricted to resolving conflicts between private parties (i.e. creditors and debtors). Nevertheless, the very framework of insolvency law remains primarily: (i) microprudential – single entity focused and designed to protect individual debtors and their creditors, (ii) contractarian – implementing the idea of creditors’ bargain and solving coordination problems between creditors of a single entity, and (iii) reactive – centred around post-crisis liquidation of assets and allocation of proceeds among creditors. It may therefore be ill-fitted to serve the public interest in mitigating the negative externalities of large-scale (systemic) corporate debacles (e.g. Chrysler, GM, British Steel, Carillion) or handling the economy-wide instability experienced nowadays.

In contrast to corporate insolvency, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008 (GFC), bank resolution in the European Union (EU) and the USA went through fundamental changes that seek to preserve financial stability and ensure continuity of critical functions. Bank resolution has increasingly embraced the macroprudential vision, recognizing the need for an advanced preparation and a speedy intervention to ensure continuity of critical functions, preservation of financial stability and avoidance of bailouts. This vision has resulted in the specific proactive and reactive recovery and resolution strategies. In the recent paper Insolvency of Significant Non-Financial Enterprises: Lessons from Bank Failures and Bank Resolution, I explore whether the modern approaches to bank crises can be extended to non-financial enterprises. I discuss how insolvency law might help minimize social harm stemming from wide-ranging shocks and grand-scale business failures and suggest what we can learn from bank failures and bank resolution.

The failure of Carillion, once the UK’s second-largest construction company, has shown that the reactive approach to crisis resolution, centred around post-crisis intervention, posed significant risks not only for creditors but also for other stakeholders and communities at large. Carillion had around 43,000 workers, of whom 19,000 were based in the UK. It owed around GBP 2 billion to the extensive network of 30,000 suppliers, sub-contractors and other creditors and left the pension liability exceeding GBP 2.5 billion. Even though the signs of financial distress appeared long before Carillion filed for liquidation in January 2018, these warning signals were largely ignored. The failure of Carillion had substantial implications for the provision of public services, raising environmental, health and safety concerns. It ultimately led to a state intervention backed by taxpayers’ money. However, the actual economic and social cost of Carillion’s insolvency are hard to quantify. Financial distress of such a significant enterprise (significant non-financial enterprise or SNFE) required timely state intervention. Nevertheless, its multiple profit warnings came as a surprise to the Cabinet Office.

Insolvency of Carillion was characterized by the absence of timely reaction to prevent crisis escalation, a genuine threat of public disruption and a vast complexity determined by both the debtor’s organizational structure, consisting of more than 320 group members, and the nature of its activities. Many of the same features were observed in the failure of banks and banking groups during the GFC. As a response, both the EU (BRRD) and the USA (Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act) have embraced a proactive and precautionary approach focused on preparation and early response. In my paper, I use the case of Carillion to inquire whether selected bank recovery and resolution tools could have been adopted to prevent the collapse of Carillion, or to mitigate its negative consequences.

In particular, I analyse three such tools, namely: (i) intervention powers granted to state authorities for early (preventive) reaction to the escalation of financial problems before the actual insolvency, (ii) entity and group recovery and resolution planning, and (iii) administrative-led insolvency process. I conclude that while the first two mechanisms may prove beneficial, the last one is rather controversial. While an administrative-led process has certain advantages and prevails in bank resolution, it may be difficult and unnecessary to replicate or transpose to non-financial enterprises. Instead, a transparent court-supervised process with active involvement of creditors and debtors, as well as a limited and targeted engagement of public authorities on matters of public interest should be encouraged.

The full paper is available here.

Insolvency Law in Emerging Markets
by | posted in: Bankruptcy Reform, Bankruptcy Roundtable Updates, International and Comparative | 0

By Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez (Singapore Management University)

Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez

Corporate insolvency law can serve as a powerful mechanism to promote economic growth. Ex ante, a well-functioning insolvency framework can facilitate entrepreneurship, innovation and access to finance. Ex post, corporate insolvency law can perform several functions, including the reorganization of viable companies in financial distress, the liquidation of non-viable businesses in a fair and efficient manner, and the maximization of the returns to creditors. Therefore, if having an efficient corporate insolvency framework is essential for any country, it becomes even more important for emerging economies due to their potential for growth and their greater financial needs.

Unfortunately, the academic literature has generally paid more attention to the regulation of corporate insolvency in developed countries. Thus, it has largely omitted the debate about the optimal design of insolvency law in jurisdictions that, in addition to requiring a more active policy debate, amount to 85% of the world’s population and 59% of the global GDP, since they include some of the world’s largest economies such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and Indonesia.

In my new article, ‘Insolvency Law in Emerging Markets’, I seek to fill this gap in the academic literature by analyzing the problems and features of insolvency law in emerging economies and suggesting a new framework for financially distressed companies in these countries. My paper argues that, even though, in an ideal scenario, any improvement of the insolvency framework in these countries should start by enhancing the judicial system and the sophistication of the insolvency profession, these reforms usually take time, resources and political will. In fact, due to a variety of factors, including corruption, lack of awareness about the importance of the insolvency system for the real economy, or lack of political incentives to engage in such complex reforms whose benefits will only be shown in the long run, they might never occur. For this reason, my paper suggests an insolvency framework for emerging economies taking into account the current market and institutional features of these countries. If these conditions change over time, or they do not exist in some particular emerging economies, my proposal would need to be adjusted accordingly.

My proposed corporate insolvency framework for emerging markets is based on three fundamental pillars. First, pre-insolvency proceedings and out-of-court restructuring should be promoted as a way to avoid an insolvency system that is usually value-destroying for both debtors and creditors. Second, insolvency proceedings should be reformed to respond more effectively to the problems and features existing in emerging markets, which generally include the prevalence of small companies and large controlled firms, as well as the existence of inefficient courts and unsophisticated insolvency practitioners. Finally, emerging economies should adopt a more contractual approach to deal with a situation of cross-border insolvency. Thus, by facilitating the choice of insolvency forum, debtors, creditors and society as a whole will be able to enjoy the benefits associated with having access to more sophisticated insolvency frameworks. Besides, since many debtors and creditors would be using foreign insolvency proceedings, this value-creating forum shopping may incentivize many Governments in emerging economies to invest the resources needed to improve the market and institutional environment existing in these countries, hopefully making the insolvency framework suggested in this article no longer needed.

The full article is available here.

Another version of this post was previously published on the Oxford Business Law Blog and the Singapore Global Restructuring Initiative Blog.

For previous Roundtable posts on insolvency reforms in China and India, see Xiahong Chen, INSOL Europe/LexisNexis coronavirus (COVID-19) Tracker of Insolvency Reforms—China; Xiao Ma, China Continues to Issue New Rules Promoting Corporate Rescue Culture, Facilitation of Bankruptcy Proceedings; and Himani Singh, Pre-packaged Insolvency in India: Lessons from USA and UK.

Challenges of Emerging Market Restructurings in the Age of COVID-19
by | posted in: Bankruptcy, International and Comparative | 0

By Steven T. Kargman (Kargman Associates/International Restructuring Advisors)

Steven T. Kargman

As part of the overall global economic slowdown in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, many emerging market economies around the globe have suffered sharp economic downturns, particularly in light of the lockdowns of economies that were imposed in many of these countries.  With the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic in emerging economies, a number of these economies have been faced with a veritable perfect storm.

Specifically, many of these economies have been adversely affected by, among other things, a sharp drop in prices for commodities such as oil and various metals, the drying up of foreign tourism revenues in view of the disruption of international air travel and the closing of national borders, and the major decrease in remittances due to layoffs of overseas foreign workers.  In addition, many major emerging market currencies have experienced significant depreciation vis-à-vis hard currencies such as the US dollar.

Moreover, emerging economies as a whole have also faced what economists term a “sudden stop”—i.e., a sudden outflow of foreign investment capital that had previously been flowing into these economies.  Furthermore, the public finances of governments in the emerging markets have become strained as such governments have been forced to make expenditures on economic recovery programs as well as public health responses to the pandemic.

The article discusses the implications of the global economic slowdown associated with COVID-19 for restructuring activity in the emerging markets around the globe.  In particular, the article examines how the economic slowdown may give rise to several different types of emerging market restructurings, namely, sovereign debt restructurings, corporate debt restructurings, and infrastructure project restructurings.  It also examines how the economic slowdown in the emerging markets might affect restructuring-related matters involving state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-performing loans (NPLs) in national banking systems.

The article also considers special issues associated with China’s newly prominent role as the largest official creditor to the emerging markets and developing countries and China’s sponsorship of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects around the world.  Further, the article discusses other legal and policy issues that have become more salient in recent years in the context of emerging market restructurings, such as the role of holdouts in sovereign debt restructurings as well as the relevance in corporate debt restructurings in these jurisdictions of any potential gap that may exist between insolvency/restructuring law and practice.

The full article can be found here.

Claims, Classes, Voting, Confirmation and the Cross-Class Cram-Down
by | posted in: Bankruptcy Administration and Jurisdiction, Bankruptcy Reform, Bankruptcy Roundtable Updates, International and Comparative, Legislation | 0

By Tomas Richter (Clifford Chance) and Adrian Thery (Garrigues)

Tomas Richter
Adrian Thery

Under EU Directive 2019/1023 promulgated in June 2019, the 27 Member States of the European Union must enact rules supporting preventive restructurings of businesses threatened by insolvency. The restructuring frameworks to be enacted are in a large part modelled after the U.S. Chapter 11 yet they are not carbon copies of it. Also, the 27 Member States have widely differing insolvency laws against whose background the preventive restructuring frameworks must operate, and significantly diverging institutions by which they will have to be applied. The implementation tasks will be both varied and formidable.

However, certain threshold questions are very similar across jurisdictions when it comes to particular topics relevant to corporate restructurings. In the context of agreeing to and adopting a restructuring plan, some of the key questions arise in relation to classification of investors’ claims and interests, grouping these claims and interests into classes, voting in the classes, and obtaining an official approval of the restructuring plan after investors have expressed their opinions on it via the voting mechanism.

The purpose of this first guidance note, published by INSOL Europe, is to flag some of the key issues that national legislators will want to consider in this particular context when implementing the restructuring frameworks prescribed by Title II of the Directive, and, at least at times, also to respectfully suggest which approaches, in the authors’ humble opinions, might perhaps be explored more productively than others.

The full article is available here.

Rethinking Priority: The Dawn of the Relative Priority Rule and a New ‘Best Interest of Creditors’ Test in the European Union
by | posted in: Bankruptcy Roundtable Updates, Cramdown and Priority, International and Comparative, Priority | 0

By Axel Krohn (Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg, Germany)

Axel Krohn

The European Directive on restructuring and insolvency (“Directive”), which came into force in July 2019, has triggered a series of interesting debates. The possibility for EU Member States to subject the cram-down from Article 11 to a “relative priority rule” (“EU RPR”) when implementing the Directive into national law has proven to be particularly controversial.

Despite a confusing conceptual overlap with approaches presented in the U.S., the European interpretation of “relative priority” breaks new ground. The rule stipulates that, under a restructuring plan, dissenting voting classes have to be treated merely more favorably than any junior class. Although the Directive allows national lawmakers to refrain from the EU RPR and introduce a familiar “absolute priority rule” (“APR”)—that is, that a dissenting class of creditors must be paid in full before junior parties may receive any distributions—the EU RPR has already found supporters in various jurisdictions and should therefore be thoroughly examined.

This article identifies one aspect of the cram-down that has received little attention to date. In addition to the EU RPR, the European legislature has introduced a new “best interest of creditors” test (“EU BIT”), which does not—as in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(ii)—use the value that a party could expect in a hypothetical liquidation as a comparator, but refers to the “next-best-alternative scenario.” Although the concept of combining the EU RPR and the EU BIT is coherent in theory and may even eliminate some misconceptions about the EU RPR, the interaction of the two cram-down elements is likely to raise problems in practice.

First, this article discusses the concepts of the two priority rules and traces the motives of the European legislature for introducing the EU RPR.

Three aspects in particular appear to have motivated the legislature in drawing up the rule. For one, the legislature wished to create more flexibility in plan negotiations and thus respond in particular to special needs in the restructuring of smaller businesses. The rule may bring advantages, especially when it is reasonable to enable existing shareholders to participate in the continued business by means of an equity interest. Second, with regard to some Member States, the desire has arisen to create an instrument to overcome structural blocking positions of certain preferential (priority) creditors, in particular tax authorities. Finally, there is a trend in Europe which sees in the Directive a procedure that enables a structured contractual renegotiation of debts and detaches itself from the “traditional laws of insolvency law,” including the APR.

This article then deals with the new EU BIT and examines its interaction with the EU RPR.

It is worth noting that the EU BIT plays a much more important role in an EU RPR cram-down than under an APR. By moving away from the traditional liquidation benchmark and instead linking to the “next-best-alternative scenario,” the test protects precisely the value that can be achieved from the perspective of a creditor outside insolvency without cooperating with other parties. The then remaining reorganization surplus, which is subject to the EU RPR, is that fraction of the going concern surplus which can only be achieved through the combined efforts of all parties involved, but which creditors cannot claim in an individual case of enforcement.

Despite this harmonious interaction in theory, doubts may be expressed as to whether the combination of the EU RPR and the EU BIT would work in practice. The new focus on the hypothetical next-best-alternative scenario value will likely lead to an additional stress point in plan negotiations. The EU RPR, which does not itself contain a clear guideline for the distribution of the remaining surplus, is then to be applied between two unclear values, namely the hypothetical next-best-alternative value and the presumed reorganization value. It is reasonable to assume that the resulting distributional uncertainty will cause new hold-up potential and render it difficult to realize consensual plans, especially in larger restructuring cases. Also, it seems likely that unsophisticated junior creditors will face difficulties in defending their rights adequately in view of the potentially unclear next-best-alternative scenario value, and that others will try to use this to their advantage in complex negotiations.

The full article is available here.

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