An Assessment of the UK Restructuring Moratorium

By Jennifer Payne (Linklaters Professor of Corporate Finance Law, University of Oxford)

Jennifer Payne

In a recent paper I analyze the introduction of a restructuring moratorium into the UK by the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (2020 Act). This is one of a number of permanent measures introduced by the 2020 Act that are intended to facilitate the rescue of financially distressed but viable companies. The introduction of these measures was prompted by the financial problems arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, but the restructuring moratorium has its foundations in a set of 2018 Government proposals and a 2016 Insolvency Service consultation paper.

A number of jurisdictions have introduced reforms to their debt restructuring regimes in recent years, often based on the US Chapter 11 procedure which many regard as the ‘gold standard’ of restructuring mechanisms. These include the 2017 debt restructuring reforms introduced in Singapore and the EU’s recent Restructuring Directive (Directive 2019/1023). The inclusion of a restructuring moratorium is a consistent feature in these reforms. This paper compares the UK restructuring moratorium with those introduced elsewhere and assesses whether it will be a valuable tool for financially distressed companies. This paper argues that the constraints and limitations placed on the UK restructuring moratorium, for creditor protection and other reasons, limit the potential value of this mechanism for financially distressed companies to a significant extent and that many companies will therefore have to continue to look elsewhere for protection from creditors seeking to disrupt their restructurings.

Moratoria have existed as integral aspects of mechanisms such as US Chapter 11 and UK administration for some time but the existence of a broad moratorium for use in conjunction with restructuring mechanisms is new in the UK. Moratoria are traditionally regarded as having two benefits. The first is to deal with the ‘common pool’ problem. If there is no stay, then creditors may seize assets that are useful for the carrying on of the debtor’s business and this could jeopardize the prospects of a successful restructuring. The second is that a moratorium can deal with the ‘anti-commons’ problem, i.e. it can block actions by individual creditors who are seeking to frustrate the wishes of the majority. A balance is required between the benefits to the company and the creditors as a whole on the one hand and the rights of the individual creditors on the other.

The 2020 Act introduces a new Part A1 into the Insolvency Act 1986. This provides a restructuring moratorium that is standalone and is not a precursor to an insolvency process, although it can be used in that way. It is available to be used alongside restructuring processes including schemes of arrangement, Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVAs) and the new restructuring plans (or ‘super schemes’) introduced into Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 by the 2020 Act.  In contrast to the moratorium attached to administration, the UK restructuring moratorium is debtor-in-possession and allows directors to continue to run a company, subject to the appointment of a licensed insolvency practitioner (the monitor) and other restrictions. Broadly, the effect is to impose both a constraint on the ability of creditors to assert their debt claims against the company and a constraint on initiating insolvency proceedings and other legal processes, complemented by restraints on ipso facto clauses.

Given that moratoria involve a significant constraint on creditors’ legal rights, they can be justified only where the imposition can be regarded as beneficial to the creditors as a whole, in order to rescue a viable (albeit financially distressed) business. One concern is that they can be used by directors to prop up a company which is not economically viable and is not capable of rescue. Another is that directors may utilise a restructuring to shake off liabilities which the company is capable of meeting. A number of protections are introduced by the 2020 Act to deal with these concerns, including a limit on the length of the moratorium (20 days, extendable for a further 20 days without creditor consent), eligibility requirements, the appointment of an insolvency practitioner (a monitor), a restriction on the availability of the moratorium to certain companies, and the ability of creditors to challenge the moratorium in certain circumstances. While there is no doubt that restructuring mechanisms and the moratoria that attach to them can be misused by companies and powerful financial creditors, the balance may have tipped too far in these provisions, rendering the UK restructuring moratorium much less valuable for companies than might have been hoped.

A version of this note first appeared in the Oxford Business Law Blog.

 

The Role of the Court in Debt Restructuring

By Jennifer Payne (Oxford University)

This paper examines the intervention of the law, and the role of the court, in debt restructuring, both in terms of imposing constraints on creditors and in seeking to ameliorate the potential abuses that can arise from such constraints. Three potential forms of abuse are examined: the imposition of a restructuring on dissenting creditors, which introduces the potential for wealth transfers between creditors; the imposition of a moratorium while a restructuring is negotiated, which might lead to misuse of the process by managers wishing to prop up companies that are not viable or may allow the managers of a viable business to “shake off” liabilities that the business is capable of servicing; and the imposition of debtor-in-possession arrangements, which raise the potential for new creditors to be preferred at the expense of existing creditors.  It is argued that the court’s role in protecting creditors from these three forms of potential abuse is vital, although the nature of that role differs according to the form of abuse. Recent debt restructuring reform proposals in both the UK and the EU, which adopt quite different approaches to the role of the court in this process, are examined in the light of this discussion.

The full paper is available here.

The Future of UK Debt Restructuring

By Jennifer Payne (University of Oxford – Faculty of Law)

In the UK, a number of different mechanisms exist which can be used to restructure the debt of viable but financially distressed companies. This paper assesses the debt restructuring mechanisms currently available to companies in English law and considers whether reform is needed. In particular, the paper analyses the reform proposals put forward by the UK Insolvency Service in July 2016, which recommended: (i) the introduction of an option to cramdown whole classes of creditors using a single restructuring mechanism (something which can only be accessed at present using a scheme of arrangement combined with administration); (ii) the introduction of a restructuring moratorium akin to that which is attached to administration at present, together with a new ability for companies to prevent creditors with “essential contracts” from terminating them on the basis of insolvency alone; and (iii) the introduction of provisions designed to facilitate debtor-in-possession financing, something notably absent from the current UK regime. These reforms will need to be introduced with skill and care in order to ensure that the potential benefit they can bring to financially distressed businesses is balanced appropriately with the constraints that they impose on existing creditors’ rights. The aim of the Insolvency Service’s proposals is laudable, and it is argued that reform of the UK regime is needed. In particular, the introduction of a restructuring moratorium and a cramdown facility would be beneficial. Making these changes would provide English law with a stronger and more effective debt restructuring procedure. Furthermore, such changes are required if the UK wants to remain competitive in a global market.

The full article is available here.