And Another Lender Blocking Provision Bites the Dust, Texas Bankruptcy Court Rules
by | posted in: Bankruptcy, Chapter 11, Jurisprudence, Secured Lenders | 0

By Adam C. Rogoff and Ashland J. Bernard (Kramer Levin)

Adam C. Rogoff
Ashland J. Bernard

One feature commonly seen in commercial lending transactions is a waiver of the borrower’s authority to file for bankruptcy without the consent of the lender. While such “blocking” provisions are generally upheld where the equity interest holders are the parties with such rights, they are generally unenforceable as a matter of public policy when such protection is given to a creditor with no meaningful ownership interest in the corporate debtor.

In a recent decision issued in In re Roberson Cartridge Co., LLC, Case No. 22-20192 (RLJ), 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 588 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. March 7, 2023), the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas denied a secured creditor’s motion to dismiss the corporate debtor’s Chapter 7 case on the grounds that the petition was filed without the requisite corporate authority. In doing so, the bankruptcy court held void as against public policy a blocking provision in the company’s governing documents, which purported to give the creditor — which held convertible debt of the debtor — the exclusive right to consent to the debtor’s bankruptcy filing. Through an analysis of the company’s governing documents under applicable provisions of the Texas Business Organizations Code, the bankruptcy court concluded that a pledge of equity by the debtor-LLC’s member did not divest the LLC’s manager from corporate authority to file for bankruptcy. Nor was the consent right enforceable with respect to convertible debt where, prior to the bankruptcy filing, the creditor had not exercised its right to convert the debt to equity (and therefore was only a creditor on the petition date). This ruling of a bankruptcy court in the Fifth Circuit joins the growing body of case law from other circuits that holds such bankruptcy-restrictive contractual provisions void as a matter of public policy.

Click here to read the full article.

Tribune II: Law Firm Perspectives
by | posted in: Avoidance, Financial Firms and Safe Harbors, fraudulent transfer, Statutory Interpretation | 0

By Xiao Ma (Harvard Law School)

Xiao Ma

On December 19, 2019, the Second Circuit issued its amended opinion in In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, 2019 WL 6971499 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2019), which held the “safe harbor” provision in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code covers Tribune Company’s payments made to public shareholders as Tribune constitutes a “financial institution” in pursuance with the Bankruptcy Code definition, and such definition includes the “customer” of a financial institution when the financial institution acts as the customer’s “agent or custodian…in connection with a securities contract”.

The Second Circuit’s opinion was controversial in light of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 883 (2018) on the scope of safe harbor, with law firms perceiving it as moving away from the position of Merit by opening new room for application of safe harbor protection. Jones Day suggests that the Tribune’s reasoning “avoided the strictures of Merit”, while Nelson Mullins finds it “shifting the focus from the financial institution as a ‘mere conduit’ to an ‘agent’.” Kramer Levin comments that the decision represents a “dramatic, and perhaps unexpected, extension of the safe harbor from the position it occupied in the immediate aftermath of Merit.” Weil calls it throwing the 546(e) safe harbor a lifeline.

Firms also find the case paving a way to protect LBO payments from subsequent attacks. King & Spalding notes that the Second Circuit’s opinion provides protection for recipients involved in LBO transaction where the debtor is the “customer” of the intermediary financial institutions. Cadwalader believes that the decision may “narrow the impact” of Merit, as market participants could structure their transaction to involve a financial institution thereby bypassing the “mere conduit” carve-out. Skadden agrees on the likely trend of structured LBOs, highlights that the customer defense is “likely to continue gaining momentum” after the Second Circuit’s decision. Parties would ensure they meet the “financial institution” and “customer” criteria methodically articulated in Tribune. “An appropriately structured principal/agent relationship could continue to shelter transfers or distributions within the ambit of section 546(e) safe harbors,” says Weil, adding that the operative facts will be key to strengthen the position.

Finally, Gibson Dunn notes that Tribune is not binding on other circuits. It remains to be seen whether such holding will be extended to different circumstances by other courts. “Some courts may find (in contrast to the Second Circuit) that the Supreme Court in Merit could not possibly have intended that its narrowing of the section 546(e) safe harbor be so easily vitiated by an argument that the Court itself acknowledged in a footnote,” says Kramer Levin.

In a prior Roundtable post, Professor Bussel noted that a plain meaning interpretation of the term “financial institution” should not include the customers of commercial banks, thus precluding a sharp change from Merit.

For Roundtable’s other posts on Tribune, see Bankruptcy Court Disagrees with Second Circuit’s Holding in Tribune, Tribune Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation Roundup. For Roundtable discussions relating to the 546(e) safe harbor, please refer to the tag #Safe Harbors.

Horizontal Gifting Upheld in Chapter 11 Plan in the Third Circuit
by | posted in: Gifting | 0

By Rama Douglas (Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP)

In Hargreaves v. Nuverra Environmental Solutions Inc. (In re Nuverra Environmental Solutions Inc.), 17-1024 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2018), a Delaware district court upheld a bankruptcy court’s ruling that the secured creditors’ “gift” of cash and stock to holders of unsecured claims pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan did not violate the confirmation standards for approving a plan under Chapter 11, even though certain classes of unsecured claims (trade and business-related unsecured claims) received larger distributions from the gift than another class of unsecured claims (noteholders). The decision focuses on the permissible effect of “horizontal” gifting whereby the disparate treatment is among separate classes of the same priority level of creditors — here, separately classified general unsecured claims.

Debtors looking to pursue a reorganization may seek to provide a recovery to certain types of creditors (such as trade) within a class, but not others. Such discrimination is not permissible for value distributed by the debtor’s estate under a plan. Gifting has been a technique — subject to criticism (especially when class skipping is involved) — to provide disparate treatment. While the Third Circuit has not ruled on gifting, this latest Delaware district court decision supports the use of horizontal gifting. Such a decision will certainly be the focus of attention by supporters and critics of gifting.

The full article is available here.

Awaiting the Second Circuit’s Decision in Marblegate
by | posted in: Workouts and Pre-Packs | 0

We anxiously await the Second Circuit’s decision in Marblegate, which was argued earlier this year. John Bessonette of Kramer Levin briefly summarizes the stakes:

“Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act provides that ‘the right of any holder of any indenture security to receive payment of the principal of an interest on such indenture security . . . shall not be impaired or affected without the consent of such holder . . . .’ Various plaintiffs used this provision this past year to successfully challenge out-of-court restructurings in Marblegate and Caesars. In both cases, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York held that § 316(b) not only protects the formal legal right to receive payment under an indenture, but also restricts non-consensual out of court debt reorganizations, even where no express terms of the indenture are violated.

“However, neither case provided a limiting principle for when out-of-court restructurings violate § 316(b), and plaintiff firms are now taking advantage of this murkiness. In the last year, three lawsuits challenging distressed exchange offers have been filed by retail holders of unsecured bonds. Each lawsuit involves an exchange offer made to qualified institutional buyers by a distressed energy company, and retail bondholders who object to their bonds being subordinated to the secured bonds issued to QIBs as part of the exchange.

“The cases are still pending and it remains to be seen whether the courts will clarify the ambiguity around § 316(b). Meanwhile, this obscure provision of the TIA will occupy a more prominent role in out-of-court debt restructurings and serve as a new weapon for plaintiffs challenging such restructurings.”

His full memo is available here.

The Roundtable has issued multiple posts on the Marblegate litigation and the Trust Indenture Act. Mark Roe wrote what the appropriate limiting principle should be for courts when invalidating exit consent transactions under section 316(b) of the Act. He further argued that courts alone cannot solve the fundamental problems: The SEC must also act. The Roundtable also covered the 28-law-firm white paper on how courts should handle that section. See our archives for more.