Arbitrate? You Can’t Make Me! Rejection Trumps Arbitration, Says Texas Bankruptcy Court
by | posted in: Bankruptcy, Chapter 11 | 0

By Ronit J. Berkovich (Weil Gotshal & Manges) and Eric Einhorn (Weil Gotshal & Manges)

Eric Einhorn
Ronit J. Berkovich

In a recent decision, In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.,1 the Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Texas held that a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract with an arbitration clause precludes the court from compelling the debtor to arbitrate—notwithstanding the strong federal policy supporting enforcement of arbitration clauses, even in bankruptcy.  Although rejection of a contract constitutes a breach and may give rise to a claim for monetary damages, the Court found that specific performance of an arbitration clause was not an appropriate remedy post-rejection.  Highland provides an example of how bankruptcy courts may disregard contractual provisions—including an agreement to specifically perform—where they may irreconcilably conflict with the policy of the Bankruptcy Code.

The full article is available here.

The Aftermath of a Complicated Breakup: Third Circuit Holds Stalking Horse Bidder in Terminated Transaction May Assert Potential Administrative Expense Claim Notwithstanding Disallowance of Its Termination Fee
by | posted in: Bankruptcy, Bankruptcy Administration and Jurisdiction, Priority | 0

By Ronit J. Berkovich (Weil)

Ronit J. Berkovich

In a recent decision, In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 7400 (3d Cir. 2021) (“EFH II”), the Third Circuit held that a stalking horse may assert an administrative expense claim under section 503(b)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code for certain transactional expenses, even when it is not entitled to a termination fee.

In EFH II, the debtors terminated a merger agreement with a stalking horse and the stalking horse applied for payment of a termination fee.  After the application was denied, the stalking horse filed an administrative expense application for costs incurred in attempting to complete the merger.  In response, various bondholders jointly filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment.  After the Delaware Bankruptcy Court granted the bondholders’ motions, the Third Circuit ruled that the administrative claim should not have been denied without further factual inquiry because the stalking horse plausibly alleged that it benefited the estate by providing information, accepting risks, and paving the way for a later successful deal.

 In so holding, the Third Circuit applied a broad standard for pleading a plausible administrative claim under section 503(b)(1)(A).  Going forward, it may be harder to obtain denial of an administrative expense application in the Third Circuit without a discovery process and evidentiary hearing.  While this decision establishes an alternative means for stalking horses to recover certain transactional expenses, its actual impact remains to be seen, as parties can draft provisions in transactional documents to address the scope of recoverable administrative claims.

The full article is available here.

Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Examined: La Paloma
by | posted in: Bankruptcy Administration and Jurisdiction, Bankruptcy Roundtable Updates, Jurisprudence | 0

By Ronit J. Berkovich and Fraser Andrews (Weil)

Ronit J. Berkovich
Fraser Andrews

On January 13, 2020, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued an opinion in In re La Paloma Generating Company, LLC., Case No. 16-12700 [Adv. Pro. No.19-50110], which examined the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the context of an intercreditor agreement (ICA) governing the relationship between the First Lien Lender (First Lien Lender) and the Second Lien Lenders (Second Lien Lenders) to the Debtors.  The bankruptcy court held a party cannot be in breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under New York law when merely enforcing a contractual right, in this case the First Lien Lender enforcing the ICA.

The full article is available here.

Triangular Setoff Impermissible Under Section 553: No Contracting or Theorizing Around It, Section 553 Requires Mutuality
by | posted in: Bankruptcy Roundtable Updates, Priority | 0

By Ronit J. Berkovich, Andriana Georgallas and Aarti Gupta (Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP).

In a recent decision, In re Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., No. 18-10518 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 13, 2018), Judge Kevin Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware analyzed setoff under section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Setoff is a contractual or equitable right that allows entities that owe each other money to apply their mutual debts against each other.  Whether a party has a setoff right is a twofold inquiry.  First, the party seeking setoff must acquire such right prepetition under applicable nonbankruptcy law.  Second, once the party establishes its setoff right, the party must meet the requirements of section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, namely: (1) the party seeking setoff must be a “creditor” and (2) that party must have a “mutual debt” where that party’s debt to the debtor arose prepetition and that party’s claim against the same debtor arose prepetition.

In In re Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., Judge Gross held that the mutuality requirement must be strictly construed, declining to find mutuality in a triangular setoff between the debtor, a parent entity that owed the debtor money, and that entity’s subsidiary, which was a creditor.  Specifically, Judge Gross held that there is no contractual exception to the mutuality requirement and that mutuality may not be satisfied under a third-party beneficiary theory.

The full article is available here.

Insider Status and U.S. Bank v. Village at Lakeridge
by | posted in: Avoidance, Cramdown and Priority, fraudulent transfer, Insider Status | 0

By Ronit J. Berkovich and David Li (Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP).

The U.S. Supreme Court, in U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. ___ (2018), offered plenty of hints on an important topic while simultaneously ruling very little about it.  In chapter 11, whether a creditor qualifies as an “insider” can have enormous implications on a range of issues, including plan confirmation, fraudulent transfer and preference analyses, and severance payment and employee incentive/retention plan (KEIP/KERP) approvals.  Lakeridge involved a dispute as to whether the bankruptcy court properly determined in confirming a plan that the sole impaired accepting creditor (the romantic partner of one of the debtor’s officers) was not a “non-statutory” insider.  If the creditor actually were such an insider, then the chapter 11 plan should not have been confirmed.

In granting cert to hear the case, the Supreme Court expressly declined the opportunity to address whether the Ninth Circuit articulated the correct legal test to determine if a person qualifies as a non-statutory insider.  Instead, the Supreme Court granted cert only to answer the narrow question of whether the Ninth Circuit applied the correct standard of review to the lower court’s determination.  Justice Kagan, writing for the Court, kept to that script by simply affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision to apply a clear error standard of review.  Concurrences by Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor, however, each acknowledged shortcomings in the legal test the Ninth Circuit applied and each appeared to invite lower courts to consider alternative approaches.  As a whole, Lakeridge provides little binding guidance, and practitioners can expect further development in non-statutory insider law by the Courts of Appeals.

The article is available here.