No Exemptions for Copy-Protection? Huh?

Am I having a braino or is this assertion (from this Wired article) incorrect?



“But the DMCA has no provision allowing exemptions in cases where software was designed with copy controls, such as encryption.


Even if the Copyright Office grants the Internet Archive’s request [for an access control exemption], under current circumstances archivists would only be able to back up software that had no built-in copy protections.”


The DMCA has no such exemption because there is no ban on circumvention of copy-protections. There is a ban on trafficking, but not on circumvention.


So what’s the problem with circumventing copy controls to archive?


Update: BTW, I’m not saying that they don’t need an exemption. They do, but for access controls. Wired’s assertion is bogus because they’re saying there’s no way you can get an exemption for circumvention copy controls, when you don’t even need one. But, do see Ernest’s comment about the conflation of access and copy controls.

They Got the Message

SunnComm won’t sue Alex Halderman … at least, not this time (via Felten). Let’s make sure there’s not a next time.

Digital Music Services News

Napster launches (see ToS for DRM info), iTunes porting to Windows, and eMusic fading.  More on all this later.

You Were Joking

This morning, I woke up to this story at kuro5hin: “Keyboard Manufacturers Named in DMCA Suit.” I couldn’t believe it. Could Alex Halderman’s report really have triggered a lawsuit? Could that lawsuit really be about the legality of the shift-key? Rubbing my eyes and reading a little closer, I realized that it was a total joke. I laughed.


That article’s a joke, but this one most certainly isn’t. (via Copyfight)


I’m glad Alex is feeling confident right now, because I’d probably be scared shitless (or at least talking more like SethF). He has some reason to be confident. I don’t see how his paper is a “device”, or how a shift key fits the language of 1201(a)(2).  And his actions likely don’t constitute circumvention if you read the statute sanely, or they fit into an exception, unless of course a judge would like to create some serious First Amendment problems.  Security research is probably our best bet when defending DMCA attacks.


But the fact that we’re even having this discussion is ridiculous. It’s a total joke. Yet I’m not laughing.

Creative Commons’ Sweet Redesign

Check out Creative Commons’ redesigned website. To get an idea of what’s new, go here.

Responses to CL ideas, and Granularity in Genre Definitions

Updated in the text below. Also, see Ernest’s comments and mine here.


As usual, Ernest provides much to chew on.  I can’t get to all of it today, in part because I am recovering from the confirmation that there is no god. (At least with the Warriors, I know what I’m getting myself into.)


1. Let me try to make something a little clearer: I’m not sure I have anything that you could call “Derek’s proposed compulsory licensing system.”  I’m throwing out ideas about different ways you could construct a CL. You could do audio-only, you could do music-only, you could do something entirely different. Sometimes I do advocate a particular position or implementation, but that doesn’t mean I have some set-in-stone, thoroughly worked-out plan.


So, when I bring up books-on-MP3 and ask about one way of implementing it, do take it as a question with a suggestion, rather than a “concrete element” of My Grand Scheme. Sorry if that wasn’t clear before.  In any case, I’ll come back to why I brought up the question a little later in this post.


2.  I don’t think I understand Ernest’s point about how sampling usage won’t make things any better. The way I am imagining things, usage would be based on playing the audio file as an audio file. If you take out the header section and turn the baudio section into a bmp, and you open, that bmp, the system would not count that as a usage. I imagine that the usage counter could tell whether you’re playing the crackly noise or displaying an image file. So if someone downloads but only uses the baudio file as an image, our downloading counting would pick it up, but our usage sampling wouldn’t – because no one would actually have used the audio (unless they actually like the sound of crackly noises, and then more power to them). If I’m wrong and this is not technically possible, then please explain.


3. Ernest asserts that I’m trying to assume away the problem by saying that punishment for misuse. Definitions for misuse are somewhat difficult to come up with. I don’t think I was assuming the problem away – I was saying that we could combat certain misuse through penalties, but I didn’t say it’d be comprehensive. And, in that way, I agree with Ernest’s sentiments here about definitions. To repeat:


“Would it be to tough to catch? Yes and no. To make this gaming technique worth your while, you probably will have to advertise in some way that the wav can be converted to something else. Otherwise, how will people know what to download?” (emphasis added)


Of course, if you don’t advertise that you are only distributing the audio just to get people to convert it, it’s much more difficult to be caught. And if you try to ban those instances, then you run the risk of people distributing the audio files to actually be consumed as audio.


4.  Ernest asserts, “Proving one of the points of my earlier post (in compulsory licensing schemes there usually isn’t any discussion devoted to pornography), Derek doesn’t discuss my other main example, which was pornography.” Frankly, I thought it was bound up in his original point about shareware authors as amateur creators who wouldn’t mind having their works freely shared on P2P networks in the first place.  So I can’t say I was avoiding a discussion of pornography, because his argument wasn’t really about compensating pornography in particular – it was about amateur producers. 


But now it seems he wants me to take the compensating pornography issue on separately. Let’s try it a little.


In his two posts, Ernest actually makes several separate claims about compensating pornography. First, porn will not be fairly compensated because of its content – politics will not allow tax money to go to porn.  Second, porn will actually be compensated too much because it will be downloaded in baudio form.


Again, I’m not sure how, if we sampled usage and compared it with the download stats, porn would be compensated more because of baudio, unless a lot of people are actually listening to the audio version.


And would porn be compensated less for political reasons? I’ve never seen a CL that advocates that. Have you? Is it an inevitability?


This is not to say that porn wouldn’t necessarily be treated differently. It could be treated differently on the basis of the economics of the porn industry, [added:] rather than to discriminate on the basis of its content. A download of porn wouldn’t necessarily pay out equal to a download of a song or a download of a typical feature film.


And here’s where I hear: that’s not fair!


Why not? Or should I say, why is it, by definition, not fair? The costs to make a movie and a song are substantially different.  Thus, if our goal is to compensate them for what revenue they’re losing or to “make them whole”, we’d have to adequately analyze the economics of each industry. To see how, for instance, Professor Fisher would examine this, see his chapter 6.


Note that Fisher suggests against extreme granularity. We could distinguish between comedies and action films, but that distinction might prove tenuous in many circumstances. Furthermore, comedies and action films, as genres, are not priced differently in the current market.


But porn and action films are often priced differently.  In many cases, the economics of the two genres are substantially different.  Perhaps this distinction would be too granular, but, given how separate the two industries are now, it’ll be a lot easier than separating comedies and action films.


My general point is: it’s not a matter of whether we distinguish on the basis of genres. Any scheme is going to have to do that. Differentiating between music and movies is a level of division. It’s just a matter of how granular we go. And, as Ernest would surely point out, each level of granularity brings with its own questions and problems – there is no perfect scheme.


[added:] Ernest makes an absurd assessment about my intentions for discussing this general point – as if I’m trying to accommodate people who would try to limit compensation for porn based on content. I did not discuss the granularity issue “in order to reduce the politically explosive issue.”


[added:] Actually, I was trying to distinguish between treating a genre or medium different on the basis of content and on the basis of economics (note: Ernest also tries to discuss that point as separate from my point about assessing production costs – really that’s just one part in the economic analysis). I wanted to make the more general point that granularity is already part of the system, and we have to decide what a reasonable level of granularity is.  Some people believe that one download/use should count the same no matter what the media/genre, so I was trying to address that. 


[added:] However, Ernest’s argument about granularity leading to content-based (discriminatory?) distinctions, weird incentives, and category problems is understandable. I don’t have a complete answer right now. I think some categorization – like books-on-MP3 – will be legitimately easier to make, but I haven’t found an underlying principle that can be applied across the board.


5. Now let’s tie this all the way back to books-on-MP3.  Ernest asked, “Indeed, if we aren’t going to define “music” for toilet flushings then why define books-on-MP3 as non-music?”


Toilet flushing, books-on-MP3, and typical songs cost different amounts to produce (and are sold at different rates, I suppose).  But categorizing toilet flushing as a separate art genre would probably lead to unnecessary disputes because it wouldn’t really be a clear distinction.


The distinction between books-on-MP3 and typical music, however, would be much clearer, I’d say.  Even this granularity in distinctions could lead to problems, but I think it’s a pretty safe and reasonable distinction because it would pick up on an established difference in current industries.  Moreover, it would pick up on our/my intuition that the spoken reading of a textual work is distinct from the creation of a musical work. (And don’t we already have the makings of this distinction in current law? Is there a composition and recording copyright for books on tape?) Again, that doesn’t make it a perfect scheme, but I do think you can reasonably decide to define books-on-MP3 differently from music without also having to define “music” for toilet flushing.


6. Ernest pokes plenty of holes in my concept of “agency.” Like I said, it risks being overbroad in many circumstances, so I don’t entirely disagree with his points.


Unfortunately, Ernest doesn’t address my suggestion of subdividing on the basis of genre. He does talk about my distinction of the “Windows noise” versus a musical song, but he only does so in the context of “agency.” Could we make a distinction between those types of sounds and typical music based on subgenre, without getting to too granular definitions?


Fire away. 🙂

Open Access for Cable?

This seems pretty huge if it sticks. For more, see this post of mine and The End of E2E.

News and Notes on CLs

1. Ernest has an interesting post about what is essentially another CL gaming technique. Frankly, I’m not really convinced that this is a huge problem. A couple of points:


First, I don’t see why the bmp/wav wouldn’t be compensable. If someone (1) downloads something that’s been converted using baudio, (2) the resulting sound is copyrightable, and (3) the user actually listens to the crackly noise, then that seems compensable. I think it’s jumping the gun to say that CLs will force us to reevaluate what is art.  If someone actually likes crackly sounds or toilets flushing, more power to them.


Second, as btempleton (who I assume is Brad Templeton) points out, this is another reason why sampling use is important. If they’re just downloading the “song” to convert it to an image, then the usage of the song would not be counted because they wouldn’t end up playing the sound.


Third, I also assume that there would be penalties for this sort of thing if you did it with intent to game the system. Would it be to tough to catch? Yes and no. To make this gaming technique worth your while, you probably will have to advertise in some way that the wav can be converted to something else. Otherwise, how will people know what to download?


Fourth, remember that Ernest talked mainly in terms of shareware developers and the like. That was a clever and important narrowing of the thought experiment. Most people wholly excluded from the CL would probably be nervous about distributing the their works in this form and encouraging others to redistribute it. After all, what’s to stop someone from redistributing it once its out of it’s .wav form? And would a court listen to the author in an infringement suit if that author had actively encouraged others to redistribute the work? Wouldn’t that be an implied license or something?


2. Scott Matthews also recently emailed me about a technique that wouldn’t really constitute gaming, but could be used in ways that might not deserve full compensation. For instance, say Google records a 4 second song that says “Welcome to Google” that everyone has streamed to them when they go to the search engine. Would we want that to be compensated like any other song? What if it were a three minute video advertisement for Company X? This is a tricky situation because the advertiser is paying the site to stream his ad and expecting compensation from people purchasing a given product – not necessarily (or plausibly) from people choosing to stream the ad. As Stan Liebowitz points out (see page 14),  there will be some peculiar situations where it’s not obvious who should be compensated.


I’ll throw out a few off the cuff thoughts about how to deal with some of these issues:


Perhaps we’d have to use some minimal requirements on what it meant for someone to be “using” a song. When Google’s “song” streams to you, maybe that doesn’t count because you didn’t click any button that said “Listen.” Likewise, we wouldn’t want automatically generated advertisements to be counted as a fully compensable stream.  Agency would be the key – what did the user do to generate the stream, and should that constitute a use of the song? You wouldn’t want to exclude songs that people really did come to a site to hear, so we’d have to be careful here.


Or, perhaps we could do some subdivision of genres (as Professor Fisher suggests might be beneficial in general). This wouldn’t be based on content but on economics – how much money should compensate any given genre? Divisions like comedy v. action movie would probably be too impractical and would not reflect the current world well, inasmuch as purchasing a ticket for a comedy costs the same as a ticket for an action flick. But divisions between song and “the sound when Windows boots up” or “the Google welcome noise” might be a little more reasonable.  You do pay different amounts for a CD than you do for a Welcome to Windows noise.


Some of these sorts of problems will be ameliorated by counting use and not just downloads.  Similarly, if you extrapolate counting downloads differently than streams that would help (since downloads are likely to be reused, whereas streams are by definition a one time only thing).


3.  One other interesting thought experiment: what about books-on-mp3? Obviously, they’re not the sounds we’d be targeting with a music-only CL. It’s a very different industry, so we’d want to adjust the tax and pay out accordingly if we want to include it in the CL at all. Would separating this genre have any horrible disadvantages? Do you agree that separating out this genre would not constitute defining what’s art in the way that classifying crackly noises and toilets flushing would?

News and Notes on DRM

1.  I want to briefly comment on the EFF’s Trusted Computing report. Really, I have very little to add aside from thanks. It’s a well-written, balanced discussion with affirmative policy recommendations – can’t ask for much more than that.


Read the whole thing, but pay close attention to this part of the DRM analysis:



“[R]emote attestation is the linchpin of DRM policy enforcement. If a remote system lacks reliable knowledge of your software environment, it can never have confidence that your software will enforce policies against you. (You might have replaced a restrictive DRM client with an ordinary client that does not restrict how you can use information.) Thus, even though other NGSCB features aid DRM implementations, only remote attestation enables DRM policies to be instituted in the first place, by preventing the substitution of less-restrictive software at the time the file is first acquired.”


So, let me try to parse that: DRM could be more effective even without remote attestation, but, if you can override the attestation, then it’s possible for you to be running a system that gets around the other security features, too. Do I have that right?


2.  Read the Trusted Computing report with this (via Felten). Given how impotent DRM is today, how long until trusted computing is implemented effectively?  Will we not see a long series of systems that can be cracked with the equivalent of a shift key before anyone gets it right?


3.  BTW, just curious: did anyone ever crack Apple iTunes’ DRM? There really isn’t much a reason to, given that you can get around it by using some utilities to convert and recompress to MP3, or by burning to CD and then reripping. But I wonder if someone did it anyway.


4. And how is WMA fairing these days? I know it was cracked a few years ago, but that hole was fixed in later versions.

A Tiered Expiration System?

I’ve recently been thinking about changes to the derivatives right. I’ve looked at compulsory licensing (in the sense of section 115) and changes to damages calculation, fair use, and/or the definition of derivative. And, of course, copyright expiration and a rich public domain would help. One idea I haven’t seen yet: having the derivative right expire prior to other rights.

Why might this be appealing? I am hypothesizing that most of the commercial derivative tie-ins happen relatively soon after the original release. You sell the movie derivative from a book when the book’s a best seller; you tie the video game and the McDonald’s toy line to the movie’s release; if you’re expecting to make money from a sequel, you make it relatively soon after; and so on. I know this doesn’t necessarily work across the board. But, when someone’s thinking about profiting from their work, for some reason banking on distributing it 25 years into the future seems a lot more plausible than banking on licensing deals that far into the future.

So maybe we’d have a sort of tiered expiration system, with the right to make derivatives falling into the public domain way earlier.

There are some substantial benefits over any system that involves a new balancing test for damages or fair use. I think it’s important that we revamp those rules, too, but I’m not sure if that’s enough. I don’t know how you get rid of the ambiguity in those sorts of tests. And in the compulsory licensing context, it would be complicated unless you restrict the right to one very specific type of appropriation. With a tiered expiration, we get a bright line rule.

Is it worth it? What would the timing be? Would it cover all derivatives (treating rap songs like expurgated films?)? Not sure right now. I’ll keep thinking about it – tell me if this idea is totally off the wall, or if you’ve seen it argued/explained elsewhere. Just throwing this out there in the midst of more research.

So Which Is It?

I hear two conflicting arguments often these days:



A) CLs are not politically feasible because the music industry (and other copyright industries) will fight it. They want a market solution that favors them – they don’t want to trust the political process to arbitrate how much money they should earn. You can’t just hand them money and tell them to go away.


B) Once a CL for music is in place, the software, movie, and book industries will inevitably be clamoring for a CL.  Software suffers from plenty of piracy, so they’ll want to jump on this solution. What does it matter that copyright is a “patchwork quilt” – we’ll just be opening it up to a whole new kind of rent seeking.


So which is it? I don’t see how the industries would (A) not want a CL unless (B) one’s already in place.


I think A is more plausible and fits reality better. If the music industry has a CL, I don’t see why the other industries will all of a sudden change their tune.  If they do, then I suppose that would mean something’s either very right (the CL’s working more efficiently and effectively than the current system) or very wrong (it’s allocating way too much money because of political or technical difficulties).  The former wouldn’t be such a bad thing; the latter isn’t such a foregone conclusion that the other industries will inevitably want a CL.

EFF on Trusted Computing

“Trusted Computing: Promise and Risk” by Seth Schoen


“Meditations on Trusted Computing” by Fred von Lohmann


Check it out – will have comments later.  News.com reports here (via Donna).

More on Nesson’s Technodefense

Regarding his own proposal for copyright holder self-help, Professor Nesson asks, “Why is first reaction to it to look for ways to condemn it rather than for ways to support its legality?”


I don’t think it’s necessarily a knee-jerk reaction, if that’s what he means. Myself, I’m somewhat closer to where Professor Fisher seems to be at on this issue, as expressed at the HLS discussion: “I don’t think it would be terrible to move in [Professor Nesson’s] direction. Actually it would be better than where we currently stand. But it would be unfortunate, on balance. Better than where we currently are, but far less good than the place we could be.”


Nesson’s question is quite similar to ones asked by proponents of the DMCA.  We’ve got this new way of protecting IP called DRM – why don’t we enact a law that supports its viability? Why is the first reaction to look at all the ways that it will hurt consumers rather than the ways it will support new business models and lead us into a thriving digitial era for consumers and producers?  This argument can be used even if you’re not talking about the DMCA and just talking about whether using DRM and trusted computing is a good direction.


And, to some extent, those advocates are right, just as Nesson is right. If you can constrain these self-help measures, and you can create DRM that isn’t totally evil and used to monopolize secondary markets (via the end of interop), and these digital music services continue to move towards reasonable prices and terms of use, then there are some benefits.  But there are also plenty of potential costs.


Riffing on this particular issue, I don’t believe that the benefit of Nesson’s self-help is worth the possible cost.  His discussion of damages doesn’t really take into account the collateral damage or the harm to innocents that I discussed earlier (Nesson and Ernest Miller on pho – Nesson: “Directing the focus of this artist’s self-protective service only against those who are actually ripping and sharing the artist’s work is not rocket science.” Miller: “It may not be rocket science, but why does the RIAA keep screwing it up?”). Perhaps he thinks those risks are acceptable.  For me, those risks are too great.


Moreover, I’m not even sure that reliance on technodefense will ultimately be an effective strategy. New DRM? It’ll get cracked. New type of DoS attacks? It’ll get duped. Subpoening by IP? They’ll anonymize. Nesson claims spoofing is effective, but is there any proof that it’s slowed down downloaders?


And that’s where my main fear comes from. A technological arms race can only have one result: going nuclear. It won’t end with this limited self-help ability. Each new type of defense will incrementally accumulate into something resembling Professor Fisher’s “property” scenario.  Like he said, in some ways, that’s better than where we’re at now. But it’s nowhere near optimal. 


Maybe limited technodefenses will annoy enough people that piracy falls to “reasonable” rates, maybe not. Sometimes I have hope that I’m wrong, and that somehow these lawsuits and competition between digitial music services will magically solve everything, without a lot of intrusive technological defense systems, but I have my doubts.


Update: Professor Felten has a fine post on this matter. His testimony last year was one place that solidified my thinking about the “arms race” idea, so a proper cite is in order.  Look to Donna and Frank, among others, for more.

House to Vote on CARP Revision Bill

So I was wondering about legislative process reform and came upon this, from kurthanson.com (via Joseph Lorenzo Hall on the dig-copyright mailing list):



“A bill intended to reform the copyright arbitration process known as CARP has passed the House Judiciary Committee, and will next go to the full House of Representatives for a vote.”


“H.R. 1417, the ‘Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act,’ addresses criticism that the current CARP system is unnecessarily expensive, that arbitrators often lack the necessary expertise to render fair decisions, and that CARP decisions tend to be inconsistent and unpredictable. It was this system that produced the widely-panned Internet webcast royalty determination in February of 2002.”


Go to Thomas for more. See here and here for prior discussion.

Designing Litman’s Lawyer Into the Legislative Process

Professor Jessica Litman uses a neat rhetorical device to discuss copyright law. She asks you to imagine a lawyer whose job it is to defend the public’s interest in copyright, and then ask that lawyer whether the public should accept a given copyright bargain.


Litman uses this device to point out how little of copyright is designed from this perspective. As she outlines in her book Digital Copyright, copyright law is often designed in backroom deals by lawyers and lobbyists and then handed over to Congress for rubber stamping. Because it is “devised by copyright lawyers,” copyright law is “inevitably copyright-centric” ignoring other elements of information policy:



“In addition to free speech concerns, information policy takes account of issues related to equity, competition, ensuring a diversity of viewpoints, securing ready and affordable access to important sources of information–all issues that are at best tangential to copyright law and in some cases wholly alien.”


In the end, Litman is incredibly cynical about bettering copyright by lobbying Congress. For that reason, she doesn’t provide any clear way of changing the legislative progress. (See Pam Samuelson’s review of the book, noting this point.)


So, as we continue Congressional hearings on P2P, I wonder: is there reason for hope? Has anything changed since Litman’s analysis, which centered around the DMCA? 


As I’ve said before: (correct me if I’m wrong, but) we have more public interest lobbying groups  than ever to attack these issues.  There are more organizations fighting on many different fronts. We are also gaining legislative allies. Even the tech companies, once so unwilling to step up on these issues, are getting involved (note: I don’t agree with everything the ADP stands for – I’m just glad that more tech groups are making themselves heard in Congress.) And the general public seems to be paying more attention, too. That gives me some hope.


With this in mind, what more can be done to design Litman’s lawyer into the legislative process?

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