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Chinese Censorship Aimed at Preventing Collective Action

Back in 2009 when President Obama paid his first visit to China, the President came out and stated that he was a “big supporter of non-censorship,” claiming that criticism helped him to better serve the needs of the American people. “The more freely information flows, the stronger society becomes as citizens can hold their governments accountable for their actions,” said Obama, adding that it allowed “people to think for themselves”.

It was clear for all to see that Obama was eluding to the belief that internet censors in China do everything they can to stem online criticism of the government and Communist Party leaders.  But are China’s censorship goals really that straightforward? Is it really their mission to remove any and all criticisms of the state?

A new study by researchers at Harvard University pours cold water on that supposition, revealing that China’s internet censorship policy is far more sophisticated than many believe. The study, led by Professor Gary King of Harvard’s Department of Government, describes ”Chinese censorship efforts as the most sophisticated attempt to censor human expression ever attempted”, but notes that China is not actually trying to suppress all criticism of the government or the Communist Party.

The systems China has in place are quite complex, with many censors actually allowing criticisms of the Beijing government and certain government officials. The study concludes that blog posts and comments that contain “negative, even vitriolic” criticisms of the government, its policies and its leaders, are often allowed. Negative posts, which were previously thought to have slipped through the net, were actually intentionally allowed to pass through.

Why does China sometimes allow criticism? Instead of trying to smother all dissent, the Chinese government’s goal is to remove comments that could incite collective action, even when those actions are not overtly political or directed against the Communist Party leaders.

Such a goal actually makes sense if you believe that political stability is Beijing’s top priority. This view is supported by the fact that China’s budget for internal security remains substantially larger than that of its defense budget. In 2010, the last year for which data is available, there were an estimated 180,000 ‘mass incidents’ in China. The Chinese government appears keen to keep these protests isolated and prevent activists from using the Internet to fan the flames of these protests. It is for this reason that Chinese censors were quick to a remove calls for a Chinese-style “Arab Spring”, a threat that many had considered to be pretty much non-existent.

China is so concerned about stability that even posts about non-political items may be censored or blocked. In the aftermath of the Fukushima crisis in Japan, rumors spread around China’s Zhejiang province that salt would be able to protect people from exposure to radiation, leading to a run on salt. Although the rumors were non-political, censors were concerned enough to step in and delete a vast number of related Internet posts.

Another finding of the study is that China believes it can benefit from allowing criticism of certain officials, especially local officials. During a highly publicized case about a high ranking Communist Party member and school official accused of the rape of 11 underage schoolgirls, Chinese censors allowed people to vent their frustrations online to prevent them taking to the streets in protest.

It’s become clear that the Chinese government has a nuanced approach to censorship, aimed at maintaining stability. Censors are willing to tolerate criticism in certain instances up until the point it could incite protests.

Jean-Loup Richet – Special Commentator to Herdict

Internet Censorship in France: should we criminalize viewers?

From now on, any person who habitually consults websites that advocate terrorism or that call for hatred and violence will be criminally punished” — Nicolas Sarkozy, March 22, 2012.

In the wake of a terrible tragedy in Toulouse in which Mohamed Merah (killed by police after a long standoff) reportedly murdered three Jewish children and four adults in southwest France, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has announced his intention to create criminal penalties for habitually visiting websites that advocate terrorism or hate crimes. While the emotions behind Sarkozy’s statement are readily understood, the message has been met with much criticism.

Using HADOPI procedures, France already has mechanisms for monitoring illegal Internet use. These laws are invasive enough that they are part of the reason why France has been on Reporters without Borders’ surveillance list for “enemies of the Internet” since 2011. If Sarkozy pursues increased Internet regulation to combat terrorism, one major risk would be over-blocking, either through the potential for abuse or by emboldening authoritarian governments in their own pursuit of internet censorship.

It seems that Sarkozy has reacted emotionally to the terrible tragedy that occurred, and that his plan has not been well thought out. First of all, the law would be easily evaded. Users could access questionable sites from a variety of locations to avoid being flagged as regular visitors. By moving from cybercafés to free hotspots or using anonymizing tools like proxy servers and VPNs, it will be hard to determine who frequents the targeted sites.

Second, it seems unlikely that further criminalizing access to hate speech or terrorist content will prevent tragedies like the one that prompted the call for further restrictions. In fact, we do not even know if Mohamed Merah frequented terrorism or hate-focused websites. The law itself would encourage those involved with terrorist groups to take further steps to disguise their browsing habits to avoid drawing attention to themselves. Furthermore, the law will be of no benefit in identifying terrorist groups or individuals who do not get information from or communicate through the Internet. Highly organized criminals who operate with a high level of sophistication will easily evade these restrictions, making the restrictions largely unhelpful for law enforcement agencies.

Third, criminalizing access to Internet content is a short sighted and ineffective solution that is more likely to restrict access to legal content than actually assist in preventing terrorism. There are a host of reasons to visit controversial sites, such as journalistic or academic research or out of mere political curiosity. To say that visiting certain websites in and of itself constitutes a crime is like saying those who regularly visit gun shops should be charged with attempted murder. Moreover, the proposal would require devoting countless man hours and resources to investigating people who are unlikely to be affiliated with or in support of terrorist groups. This could divert resources away from more established and effective enforcement methods.

Finally, Sarkozy’s proposal raises a lot of questions: who will define a “call for hatred,” compile the list of sites to be watched, and carry out this surveillance? French law tends to use an expansive definition of hate speech. In 2000, Yahoo was found guilty of violating the hate speech law by auctioning Nazi memorabilia. Actress Brigitte Bardot, an animal rights activist, was fined for racial hatred by criticizing a Muslim ceremony involving the slaughter of sheep (Eid-al-Kabir). John Galliano was fined for an anti-Semitic rant in Paris. Although such comments are shameful and reprehensible, many in France feel they fall short of being criminal. So where would Sarkozy draw the line?

Extremist violence wasn’t born on the Internet, and it is hard to make a clear connection between viewing questionable websites and committing criminal acts. A tempering of the raw emotions that arise after tragedies like the shootings in Toulouse is necessary to implement intelligent and pragmatic law enforcement strategies. Intelligence gathering is a crucial piece of the puzzle, and one that could arguably be better served by a more judicious approach to monitoring Internet activity. If France ultimately decides to criminalize browsing and block access to alleged terrorist sites, what control mechanisms will be implemented to prevent the potential abuses that could result from having such a strong grip on internet access? While Sarkozy’s comments last month raised this issue, it is clear that there are many factors that need to be carefully considered before France implements it.

Jean-Loup Richet – Special Commentator to Herdict

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