Middle East Strategy at Harvard

As the presidency of George W. Bush draws to a close, MESH members have been asked to assess his legacy. What did the Bush administration do right and do wrong in the Middle East? What is the proper yardstick: Administration rhetoric or the range of the possible? Finally, as the pollsters put it, are we better or worse off in the Middle East than we were eight years ago?

MESH members’ answers will appear in installments throughout the week. We begin with responses from Michael Young, Raymond Tanter, and Philip Carl Salzman.

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Michael Young :: The question posed—What did the Bush administration do right and do wrong in the Middle East?—seems almost provocative in light of the conventional wisdom in recent years stating that the administration has done nothing right. The view is both politically tendentious and ahistorical. The administration has done both right and wrong, and in that way has pretty much replicated the behavior of its predecessors.

Iraq, of course, may seem to disprove that contention of continuity, but it also ended up being the exception confirming the rule that the administration subsequently very much behaved in the context of the international consensus on affairs of the region. In fact, almost immediately after the war ended the United States went to the Security Council to get sanction for the invasion from the United Nations.

Was Iraq a bad idea? To this day I think the forcible removal of Saddam Hussein was both necessary and meritorious. Nor do I believe it required any other justification than the fact that removing mass murderers from power is necessary and meritorious. That is why I am especially bitter over the aftermath of the war—the shoddy planning, the insufferable hubris, the indecision, and all the other American errors helping to ensure that in the future the United States will shy away from similar actions—not to say from more effective and aggressive support for those in the Arab world who continue to suffer at the hands of the region’s despots.

Lebanon was a verifiable success for the Bush administration. Never a high priority for the United States, ending the Syrian presence in the country was nonetheless something George W. Bush alone successfully pushed for, along with the French President Jacques Chirac, when all other American presidents since 1976 were willing to partly or completely subcontract Lebanon to Syria. Bush received help from the Lebanese in 2005, when they took to the streets in the hundreds of thousands to demand a Syrian pullout, but he stuck with them afterward. That alone, from my perspective, makes him worthy of a more generous legacy than he will get.

Otherwise, the administration has been all multilateral compromise. It has worked in the context of the Quartet on the Palestinian-Israeli track, and through the 5 + 1 Group and the International Atomic Energy Agency in the nuclear dispute with Iran; has backed international law and the Hariri tribunal in Lebanon, through the Security Council; and has stood by in allowing Turkey to sponsor indirect Syrian-Israeli negotiations. In Afghanistan it has worked through NATO, under UN authority.

Alas, despite the rhetoric in favor of democratization in the Middle East, the administration has largely abandoned that message, in large part because it needs the collaboration of Arab dictatorships against Iran. This makes the Bush administration today so little different from the Clinton administration when it comes to the basics of regional behavior and thinking, that what comes next in Washington (most probably an Obama administration) will seem very little different than what Bush administration turned into once the Iraq war ended.

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Raymond Tanter :: The legacy of George W. Bush rides on Iraq in the short term and Iran in the mid-term. As Iraq slid into chaos during 2006, the Bush legacy suffered as well. During 2007, Iraq was resuscitated by a U.S. surge, counterinsurgency strategy, and political reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis led by the Iranian opposition in Iraq. The surge provided more U.S. forces in Iraq to execute a counterinsurgency strategy that provided security for Iraqi civilians who, in turn, provided intelligence about Shiite militia and Sunni insurgent groups. Interviews in Iraq confirm that political reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis, as well as between former Sunni insurgents and the U.S. military, was fostered by the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group in Diyala province. This reconciliation reinforced the surge and counterinsurgency strategy.

Although the Iraqi story is still unfolding, deterioration of 2006 has yielded to significant security gains and a political bounce in Iraq. Not so for Iran. Washington’s efforts to deter and coerce the Iranian regime fall short due to infighting within the Bush administration, not much different from bureaucratic warfare about Iraq. The State Department’s approach ranges from hints to open an interest section in Tehran, to subcontracting Europeans to negotiate with Tehran, to fostering multilateral sanctions by the UN Security Council. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense reportedly draws up war plans for dismantling Iran’s nuclear weapons program. There are, in addition, American military plans for destroying the terrorist infrastructure that Tehran maintains in Iraq and for engaging in raids across the Iraqi border to eliminate the supply of sophisticated roadside-bomb technology manufactured in Iran.

Developing an approach that does not embolden the regime in Tehran or rely on problematic military strikes would require the same strong presidential leadership President Bush showed in changing course in Iraq. President Bush demonstrated rhetorical leadership on Iran when he spoke directly to the Iranian people in his 2005 State of the Union address, saying, “As you stand for your own liberty, America stands with you.” In 2006 he added, “We respect your right to choose your own future and win your own freedom. And our nation hopes one day to be the closest of friends with a free and democratic Iran.” Before President Bush leaves office, he should match his strong words with deeds that would reinforce the diplomatic option yet keep the military alternative on the table.

One way of closing the gap between rhetoric and action is to develop a third option regarding Iran, between failing diplomacy and challenging military strikes. Empowering democratic forces both inside and outside of Iran would be a step toward creating such a third option that puts pressure on the Iranian regime to rethink its pursuit of nuclear weapons and sponsorship of terrorism, before resorting to military action. Reaching out to the same Iranian oppositionists who fostered political reconciliation in Iraq is such an option.

The Mujahedeen-e Khalq is feared by Tehran. Delisting the group from the U.S. list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations would pressure Tehran on the nuclear issue, terrorism, and Iraq. Knowing the potency of this democratic opposition group, Tehran is pressuring Baghdad to extradite the leadership to Iran and disperse the rank and file. If President Bush allows Iraqi Security Forces to take control of the MEK pursuant to a Status of Forces Agreement and the MEK is destroyed, the United States will lose a valuable source of intelligence, political reconciliation gains in Iraq, and leverage against Tehran, permanently tarnishing the Bush legacy.

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Philip Carl Salzman :: It is too early, substantially too early, to judge the Middle East legacy of President George W. Bush.

Before assessing the Bush legacy in the region, we must have some idea how his initiatives and policies turn out, and how the region develops and changes over the next years. Above all, will Iraq hold together, develop democratically, and prove to be an American ally? Secondarily, will the Taliban and Al Qaeda be held off in Afghanistan, will the Afghan government gain strength, and will Afghan society evolve into a civil society? Finally, will Lebanon remain independent from Syria and avoid further civil war, and will Libya continue to regularize its behavior to international norms or return to its earlier radical and disruptive activities? At the moment, it is too early to say.

What we can say, is that the bar is very low in assessing U.S. presidential legacies in the Middle East. From 1945 until 1990, U.S. presidents were concerned above all with the Communist threat, in Europe, Latin America, and East Asia, while the Middle East was regarded as a secondary theater. American presidents acted with purpose and effect in Greece, Italy, and Europe generally, and in Korea and Latin America, and with purpose and less good effect in southeast Asia. But U.S. presidential performance in the Middle East was for the most part indecisive and weak. While Truman recognized Israel, Eisenhower undermined British, French, and Israeli efforts to counter Nasser. Carter undermined the Shah of Iran, and flinched at checking the Islamic revolutionaries, while Reagan cooperated with the Iranians in aid of conflicts in Latin America. The first Bush did stop Saddam in Kuwait, but let slip the opportunity to remove him. Clinton fiddled while American assets were repeatedly attacked by Islamists. All relied for stability upon Middle Eastern dictators. So the Middle Eastern legacies of American presidents are largely of neglect and weakness.

There are some things that can be said about the G. W. Bush legacy in the Middle East. First, he responded with decisive force against American enemies. Does anyone remember the world of experts who said that the Afghans and Iraqis could never be beaten? Yet a handful of American special forces with air power were enough to bring the Taliban down in record time. And the American military did not suffer serious threat from the Iraqi military. American military performance was extremely impressive; that legacy is clear. The civil war in Iraq has tended to obscure that, but clarity returned somewhat with the defeat of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Second, America has suffered no terrorist attacks since 2001. This is a stunning record. And yet, little credit is given for events that have not taken place.

There are also clear negatives. First, the rationale for invading Iraq was imprudently simplified for public consumption, and, although all intelligence agencies around the world were confident that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, the absence of such weapons undermined public support. “Bush lied” is a dishonest distortion, but widely accepted. Second, the defense against terrorist attacks tended to set aside, or be seen as a threat to civil liberties and constitutional rights. Perhaps this was inevitable, but striking a balance, and appearing to strike a balance, were not sufficiently achieved.

At the same time, neither the American public nor the Democratic opposition covered themselves with glory. The public appears to have a sit-com length attention span and tolerance of effort, while the Democrats flinch from defending the country and often appear to be tempted to side with the enemy. The Europeans have gone well beyond being tempted.