Gaza war shrinks the moderates
Jan 25th, 2009 by MESH
From Daniel Byman
I am writing from Jerusalem and talking to Israelis and Palestinians about the recent war in Gaza. Much of the discussion on the Israeli side understandably focuses on the restoration of Israeli deterrence and the possibility that the war lead Hamas to end its rocket attacks on Israel and crack down on other groups that try to strike on their own.
On the Palestinian side, however, the discussion focuses not only on the devastation of the war, but also on politics. In particular, Palestinians I talk to are concerned about the strength of the Palestinian moderates associated with the Palestinian Authority. Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in particular had made some progress by restoring a modicum of law and order to parts of the West Bank. The war, however, left the moderates in a familiar trap: if they sided with Hamas, they strengthened their greatest rival and bolstered an opponent to serious peace talks (as well as horrified the Israelis). Yet siding with Israel or even staying neutral inevitably painted them as collaborators.
Many Palestinians now seem to believe that Mahmoud Abbas and others tacitly supported Israel’s attacks, and with it the devastation of Gaza and the killings of hundreds of Palestinian civilians. This in turn makes it harder for the moderates to make tough political concessions to the Israelis in peace talks and weakens their long-term chances for winning the political battle with Hamas among Palestinians.
For Israel, the absence of rocket attacks may make the political damage to the already-weak moderates worthwhile. But the further decline of the moderates is still one cost that should go into the overall equation when judging the war. Indeed, the strategy of U.S. peacemakers is often to bolster the moderates at the expense of extremists: doing so will be even harder now.
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Leaving aside all the other issues that surrounded the recent fighting—the need to deter rocket attacks against Israel, the punishing restrictions imposed by Israel on the movement of goods in and out of the Gaza Strip, the humanitarian crisis, and the conduct of the war by both Hamas and the IDF—the effects of the operation on intra-Palestinian politics have been, as Daniel Byman notes, substantial.
First, he is absolutely right in noting the severe collateral damage done to the Palestinian Authority and Fatah by the recent conflict in Gaza. During the crisis President Abbas looked ineffectual at best, and collaborationist at worst. Many West Bankers with little sympathy for Hamas were profoundly disturbed by images of Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces suppressing solidarity rallies during the war, or by the obvious irrelevancy of the PA as events unfolded in Gaza.
Second, the already conflictual relationship between Fatah and Hamas has been further poisoned. Before the fighting, there were many in the ranks of both organizations who, while holding very different views, were well aware of the damage that Palestinian disunity was doing the Palestinian cause, and who therefore hoped that the gap might one day be bridged. Today, I suspect, there are rather fewer with such attitudes. Hamas activists in Gaza believe, rightly or wrongly, that Fatah personnel provided the IDF with targeting information during the fighting. I wouldn’t be surprised if some did, and it was certainly the case that the occasional senior Fatah official seemed to be urging the IDF on in anonymous comments to the media. As a result, there has been an intensified campaign of violence and intimidation by Hamas against Fatah cadres in Gaza, including detentions, torture, knee-cappings, and summary executions. What was already a Palestinian civil war of sorts has become much worse.
It is true that Hamas has signaled its willingness to see PA personnel return to the border crossings, if this would facilitate their reopening. However, it is currently insisting on PA personnel from Gaza—in other words, those who are personally vulnerable to Hamas intimidation.
In both the media and within diplomatic circles, much has been made of the forthcoming competition to rebuild Gaza, and who might gain the most from it. Would reconstruction funds channeled through the PA help to strengthen it at Hamas’ s expense? To be frank, I’m doubtful that the PA can either use those funds effectively in Gaza given Hamas control over the machinery of government there. I’m also doubtful that Israel will permit the volume of goods to move into (and out of) Gaza that would be necessary to rebuild what has been destroyed, and to restart what had become a moribund economy under previous restrictions.
For its part, Hamas will attempt to take credit for any reconstruction efforts, and may get a financial infusion for Iran to help it ameliorate the political and social impact of the war. Given the continued Israeli restrictions of goods bound for Gaza, neither will help it much.
Indeed, I think the whole debate over “who wins” from possible reconstruction misses the point. Gazans are a politically sophisticated lot, and are unlikely to be heavily swayed by Fatah, Hamas, or the international community brandishing promises of reconstruction assistance. Early indications are that the military campaign has hurt Hamas’s political standing in Gaza: while most Palestinians would regard armed resistance to Israel as legitimate, and Gazans were seething at the Israeli “siege,” many also feel that it was reckless in the extreme of Hamas to announce it would not renew the cease-fire and instead launch barrages of rockets into southern Israel, thereby provoking the Israeli assault. They won’t forgive it lightly for this.
Of course, Gazans might be prepared to forgive the movement a little (although not entirely) if the border opens, and the economy recovers. This, as well as the continued detention of Gilad Shalit, is precisely why Israel won’t fully open the border, which is why we won’t see real economic recovery.
Quite apart from the reputational blow that it has suffered in the recent confrontation, Fatah is in any case in no position to make significant political gains at Hamas’s expense given its continuing failure to undertake significant internal reforms. The Fatah’s 6th Congress has been postponed once again. At this rate, the senior leadership will all die of old age before it is ever held.
Finally, to get back to Daniel’s main point, there is no clear strategy on the part of anyone to deal with Hamas: not on the part of Israel, the US, or the PA. Sure, tactics abound—hit Hamas hard so they are deterred (Israel), isolate them until they weaken (the United States), or wait until external parties or circumstances somehow restore Fatah to its rightful place as the leading Palestinian group (Fatah). None of these really devote much thought, however, to how we best lay the groundwork now for a meaningful peace process in the future—a task that will be further complicated if the Israeli political system tilts to the right in the forthcoming elections.
Rex Brynen is professor of political science at McGill University.