Syria, Israel, and Bush
Mar 25th, 2009 by MESH
From David Schenker
Earlier this month, the Saban Center at Brookings published a monograph by Itamar Rabinovich titled Damascus, Jerusalem, and Washington: The Syrian-Israeli Relationship as a U.S. Policy Issue. Rabinovich, a distinguished Israeli academic and former diplomat, has been a longtime analyst of the Israeli-Syrian peace track. Based on the title, I had expected to read a proposal for how Washington might best advance Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations.
But the paper doesn’t make a proposal. Instead, the study focuses on the history of the Israeli-Syrian track and the U.S.-Syrian bilateral relationship since 1974, concluding with four short scenarios of how that relationship might evolve.
Rabinovich is a highly regarded historian of Syria (he has just published a very readable collection of his essays on the subject), and there is little with which to quibble in his description of U.S.-Syria-Israel dealings from 1974 to 2001. But his analysis of Bush-era Syria policy rests on a subtle presumption that the Bush administration erred in refusing to engage with Damascus. The stage is set in the preface, where Rabinovich critiques the Bush administration’s policy “neither to engage with nor attack [Syria], but to seek soft ways of penalizing it [that] failed to work.”
Rabinovich could have been a bit more charitable. After all, Israeli efforts to engage Damascus in the 1990s (in which he took part) not only failed to deliver any benefits, but resulted in the strengthened position of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the erosion of Israeli deterrence. But the main problem with this paper is that the author tends to downplay the Syrian contribution to the impasse in U.S.-Syrian relations, by a method that might be described as argument by elision and omission. Here are a few examples.
• Syria in Iraq. Rabinovich notes that in September 2008, Secretary of State Rice commended the Syrians for (in Rabinovich’s words) “taking serious steps to seal their border with Iraq.” “In contrast to Rice,” he complains, “Bush persisted with his anti-Syrian, anti-Asad view and conduct.”
In fact, Bush had good cause to “persist.” The very month when Rice made her comment, Maj.-Gen. John Kelly, Commander of MNF-West in Iraq, said this in a press conference:
The Syrian side is, I guess, uncontrolled by their side… The Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi intelligence forces feel that al Qaeda operatives and others operate, live pretty openly on the Syrian side… Syria is problematic for me but, more importantly, for the Iraqis because it doesn’t seem that there’s much being done on the other side of the border to assist this country in terms of maintaining the border and the integrity of, you know, Iraqi sovereignty.
It was immediately subsequent to Rice’s praise of Syria’s border measures that the United States launched a commando strike that killed a senior Al Qaeda operative on Syrian territory.
Syria’s role in abetting the killing of Americans in Iraq was probably the central issue in the U.S. approach to Syria during the Bush years. Bush “persisted” not because he was “anti-Syrian” or “anti-Asad,” but because progress in Iraq depended on persistence against its opponents, which Syria chose to become. Even Bush’s critics now acknowledge that such U.S. persistence in Iraq has paid off.
• Syria-Iran. Rabinovich cites the President’s September 2007 UN General Assembly address, claiming that Bush “lump[ed] it [Syria] together with Iran.” In English, one “lumps together” unlike things that should rightly be separated. But in retrospect, Bush’s rhetorical linkage of Damascus to Tehran was well warranted. The speech came just weeks after the discovery and September 7, 2007 destruction of the illegal Syrian nuclear facility in Kibar. As it turns out, if recent reports are to be believed, the North Korean-built facility was financed by Iran.
In fact, it has been Syria which has been keen to “lump” itself with Iran, and which has issued repeated assurances that it will not be “de-lumped.” As Syrian President Bashar al-Asad explained just last month, Syria-Iranian relations
are firm and continuously improving; they are strategic relations, which have proved their efficiency and importance in all of the issues which our region has been passing through since the Revolution in Iran in 1979. They are not transitory relations.We have no option but to be in a stable and enduring relation[ship].
Last September, Press TV reported that Asad compared Syria’s relations with Iran to Israel’s relations with the United States. “Israel’s demand [that Damascus cut ties with Tehran] ,” he said, “is the equivalent of Syria requesting Israel to break its relations with the United States.” Could Syrian and Iran be more closely “lumped” together?
(Parenthetically, Rabinovich misattributes the reason the Bush administration revealed the details of the Kibar operation in spring 2008. He says the administration released this information to “embarrass the Syrians and their North Korean suppliers.” But the Bush administration didn’t embark on a gotcha effort to embarrass anyone. The precipitating cause of the revelation was Congressional demands for information on the Israeli strike. If there was a secondary motive, it had to do with putting pressure on Iran.)
• Pelosi visit. When Rabinovich discusses House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s pilgrimage to Damascus in 2007, he merely notes that it provoked President Bush, and caused “a brief strain in the relationship” between the United States and Israel, which endorsed the trip. He doesn’t mention the regrettable and predictable aftermath of the visit: the incarceration of several leading members of Syrian civil society. The Bush administration didn’t oppose such legitimizing gestures out of pique, but in the full realization that the price would be paid by Syrians.
Omissions in the monograph extend beyond presentation of Bush policy, to two other crucial points: Syria’s relationship to Hezbollah, and Israeli opinion on the Golan.
• Syria-Hezbollah. Rabinovich treats the 2006 war with Hezbollah as an isolated incident, as though Syria were uninvolved. There is no mention whatsoever of the weapons that Syria provided directly from its own arsenal to the Shiite militia, including, most prominently, the Syrian-produced 220 mm rocket—one of which hit the main train station in Haifa, killing ten Israelis—and the Syrian provision of top-of-the-line Russian anti-tank Kornet missiles to Hezbollah that disabled several IDF Merkava tanks, killing several IDF soldiers. Damascus played a crucial role in building Hezbollah’s impressive arsenal, eventually deployed against Israel during the 2006 war. One wouldn’t know that from this paper.
• Golan. Rabinovich notes that in Israel’s most recent election campaign, “right wing parties were vociferous in their opposition to withdrawal from the Golan Heights,” as though such opposition were a fringe sentiment. He does not mention that this is widely believed to be the predominant opinion of Israelis. In fact, according to polling, the vast majority of Israelis would rather divide Jerusalem for peace with Palestinians than return the Golan for a Syria deal.
The concluding section on “Lessons for the Obama Administration” similarly seems to argue by omission. Instead of discussing the elephant in the room—the nature and likelihood of a potential Syrian reorientation or the kind of changes Syria would have to effect to make a deal with Israel feasible—Rabinovich refers to unnamed Syrian officials who have “alluded to the position that Syria’s alliance with Iran is not fixed and that it is mostly a result of Washington’s rejection of Syria.”
It’s a remarkable line—blaming Syria’s relationship with Iran entirely on Washington—yet Rabinovich lets it stand uncontested. He could have identified dozens of other quotes by the same officials—even by President Asad himself—claiming that the alliance is fixed, and is based on shared objectives. “We do not belong to those states which build temporary, transitional or circumstantial relations,” Asad told Iranian TV in September. “We do have our principles, and interests; thus the factors binding Syria and Iran are increased and more solid day by day.” Why isn’t that also worth quoting?
In summation, the triangle of relations that Rabinovich attempts to describe is enormously complex. Yet from reading this paper, one gets the sense that Israel and Syria might already have a peace treaty, were it not for President Bush. Rabinovich knows far too much about Syria not to know better. One hopes that his next paper will shift the focus to decision-making in Damascus.
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5 Responses to “Syria, Israel, and Bush”
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I was genuinely sorry to read David Schenker’s post on my paper. There are no two ways about it: either I cannot write or he cannot read.
I do not intend to go point by point, but most of Mr. Schenker’s complaints are based on a misreading of my text. To take one example, he complains that I imply that the Bush administration bore the blame for the impasse with Syria by not engaging Damascus. He then quotes the sentence from the paper which criticizes the administration for failing to take a clear course of either taking on Syria in an effective fashion or engaging it. I do criticize the administration for taking a middle course, which lacked the cutting edge and effectiveness of a clear-cut policy.
I could proceed, point by point, to demonstrate that Mr. Schenker either misunderstood me or quoted me out of context in order to impose his bias on the subject matter. I urge those interested in the subject to read the paper (click here), and see for themselves.
Underlying the post is the implicit assumption that I am “soft” on Syria, allow the Syrians to get away with their misdeeds, etc. I am a former negotiator with Syria but I am not “soft” on Syria. I do not think that one could read my paper and walk away with the feeling that I have a benign view of Syria’s record or that I wish to “give away the store” to the Syrians.
One thing is true: I do not offer a prescription for dealing with Syria now. I was invited by the Saban Center to write the particular paper that I wrote. Policy recommendations for the current time are an altogether different matter.
Itamar Rabinovich was Israel’s chief negotiator with Syria.
After reading the exchange between David Schenker and Itamar Rabinovich, as well as Ambassador Rabinovich’s paper, I hope he can further clarify his responses, beyond dismissing Schenker’s points as a misreading.
In the West, it is tempting for officials to place blame for diplomatic failure more on predecessors or successors, rather than on their adversary. It appears that Rabinovich treats the Syrian regime too much as a passive template. The decision not to progress in peace lies more in Damascus than in Washington.
Rabinovich writes: “The dominant strand in the Bush Administration’s Middle East policy reversed the Clinton approach and replaced it with a mixture of ideology and Realpolitik…. In immediate terms, the new strategy meant a loss of interest in both the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian tracks of the peace process.” At best, this is an oversimplified reading.
The Bush administration did not lose interest, but it valued accountability. The Clinton administration tried to flip Syria but, by the end of their term, officials acknowledged that Asad appeared more interested in winning concessions through process than ever reaching peace. Meanwhile, the frequency of shuttle devalued it as a tool. “Doing nothing” does not mean a lack of interest, but rather a decision to determine Syrian intentions and base relations on Syrian behavior rather than simply its rhetoric.
Perhaps Rabinovich sees the Bush approach as too laced with ideology, but this is backward. To embrace engagement as always positive and to read sincerity into an opponent’s engagement undercuts reality and, indeed, is a far more destructive ideological prism. Bush certainly embraced an end to Syrian terrorism—Damascus’ protection of Imad Mughniyeh certainly calls into question Syrian assistance in the war on terrorism—but, when it came to peace, that decision rests solely in Damascus and, as I’ve outlined here, abandoning rejectionism is not a decision I believe Asad will make, although I understand Rabinovich interprets Syrian history and strategic interests differently.
As a side note, to criticize Bush for not embracing the Baker-Hamilton Commission report is unfair; the Commission was flawed. Certainly, Rabinovich—a veteran official of different administrations—understands how politicians and officials gerrymander commissions to reach conclusions. The report’s section on Syria—not run through the Commission or its experts—was written Edward Djerejian, a former U.S. ambassador to Syria, who has personal interest in lifting sanctions on Syria. In retrospect, Bush appears wise to have rejected many of its Iraq recommendations and instead embrace the surge. As to engaging Iran, the Bush administration did this with, at best, checkered success.
David Schenker is also right to note that Pelosi’s visit to Syria, rather than advancing dialogue, undercut the pressure upon which effective diplomacy is based. If Congressional dialogue was effective, U.S. Senator Arlen Specter might have something positive to show for his 15 tax-payer funded trips to Damascus.
That said, I am in awe of Rabinovich’s expertise and experience. While he writes, “Policy recommendations for the current time are an altogether different matter,” I would certainly encourage him to outline these at some point, even if they are not covered in his Saban Center paper.
Michael Rubin is a member of MESH.
I would like to thank Michael Rubin for his thoughtful comments.
My understanding of the Bush policy is as follows. Clinton’s policy was predicated on an effort to reach Arab-Israeli peace while containing Iran and Iraq. The Bush policy reversed the logic by trying to subdue the two rogue elephants in the eastern part of the Middle East, expecting that once this happened, it would be easier to promote Arab-Israeli peace. The ideological dimension lay in the expectation that the spread of democracy in the region would transform it.
In this context I would like to say that in my view the Bush administration was right to reject the Baker-Hamilton report. As for the Pelosi trip to Damascus, I see it as a political step designed to show President Bush after the Democratic victory in Congress that he could not make foreign policy on his own. Gingrich did the same to Clinton after November 1994 when he suspended the debt relief to Jordan.
As for Syrian conduct, the litany of misdeeds is long, and is detailed in the paper: the conduct in Iraq and Lebanon, supporting Hezbollah and Hamas, building a nuclear reactor with North Korean help, etc. It is also important that the Asads have always tried to straddle the line. Both the United States and Israel have had a hard time dealing with this penchant.
The Saban paper was an “analysis paper,” and as such did not offer policy advice. But when it comes to the present, I would say the following. The key question is whether Syria is willing to reorient its policies, build a new relationship with Washington, make peace with Israel, distance itself from Iran, stop supporting Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad and respect Lebanon’s sovereignty (realizing that Syria will always have a great deal of influence in Lebanon). This can only be established through two coordinated channels of U.S.-Syrian and Israeli-Syrian negotiations (or pre-negotiations). Israel should insist on direct negotiations. The Syrians will probably try to straddle the line, and the task of the U.S. and Israeli policy-makers and negotiators is going to be particularly arduous.
Itamar Rabinovich was Israel’s chief negotiator with Syria.
I thank Ambassador Rabinovich for his response, with which I find nothing to argue. However, I would like to press Ambassador Rabinovich or David Schenker—or any other MESH members—further.
Ambassador Rabinovich writes: “The key question is whether Syria is willing to reorient its policies, build a new relationship with Washington, make peace with Israel, distance itself from Iran, stop supporting Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad and respect Lebanon’s sovereignty (realizing that Syria will always have a great deal of influence in Lebanon). This can only be established through two coordinated channels of U.S.-Syrian and Israeli-Syrian negotiations (or pre-negotiations).” I agree that “The Syrians will probably try to straddle the line,” but:
(a) What criteria should Washington and Jerusalem use to determine Syrian sincerity and in what time frame? After all, open-ended engagement is an invitation to delay and devalues diplomacy’s impact.
(b) What parallel methods of coercion should support diplomacy? Sanctions, other forms of pressure?
(c) What policy should be pursued if Washington and Jerusalem again conclude that Damascus is insincere?
To call for (re)engagement without considering these other factors—something I’d argue the Obama administration appears guilty of across the board with regard to Syria and other adversarial states—can be counterproductive.
Michael Rubin is a member of MESH.
I welcome Professor Rabinovich’s earlier response to my post. Our disagreement, I believe, is not on being tough or soft on Syria. The fact that the Syrians are not today dipping their toes in the Sea of Galilee is because the Israelis kept to certain red lines in their past negotiations, and I am sure that Professor Rabinovich was a central actor in keeping Israel vigilant to those red lines.
Moreover, our disagreement is not over the wisdom or efficacy of Bush administration policy. Indeed, I do not disagree with much of what Rabinovich writes about the shortcomings of the policy, in particular, his observations that the administration “did not always speak or act with one voice,” and that Washington’s credibility suffered as a result of “empty threats.”
Rather, I believe the core of our disagreement is over whether engagement is essentially a one-way or two-way conversation. For example, in my previous post, I cited three comments from Asad on key policy issues; in Professor Rabinovich’s Saban Center paper, President Bush, Prime Minister Olmert, UN Special Envoy Terje Rod Larsen, and Saban Center Director Martin Indyk are quoted, but no Syrian official is ever quoted.
The distinction is important because it underscores a central problem with the current debate on engagement with Syria: So many in Washington are so busy listening to themselves and the Israelis that they have stopped listening to what the Syrians are saying. In this surreal debate, people are no longer analyzing from a shared base of evidence.
Truth be told, I have been broadly supportive of the Administration’s preliminary handling of the engagement with Syria. But to discuss engagement—or the trilateral relationship between Jerusalem, Damascus, and Washington—without even looking at what the Syrians themselves are saying about strategic reorientation, presents an incomplete and, I believe, misleading picture.
In the context of engagement, I think Michael Rubin asks the right questions. The Obama administration has set out to “test” Syria. Yet the Syrians ostensibly are saying publicly that they intend to fail the test. How are we going to judge the outcome and in what timeframe?
Based on our experience with Damascus, it’s safe to say that the process will not be quick, and that Syria will be playing for time. As such, the NSC/State NEA needs to set some explicit benchmarks regarding discernable changes of behavior, and be clear when expectations are not met. In the meanwhile, until sufficient changes in Syrian policy are effected, sanctions should remain in place. If engagement doesn’t achieve results, the Obama administration should have in place a contingency plan, including, among other options, a return to the Bush-era policy of pressure and isolation. (My colleague John Hannah articulated this point in fuller detail during a talk last month).
I have written a paper discussing Washington’s preliminary outreach to Syria for the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (here). The paper assesses how Syria has responded, both in actions and words, to the Administration’s new policy of engagement.
I thank Michael and Professor Rabinovich for their comments. Professor Rabinovich has written an important and useful paper on U.S.-Israel-Syrian engagement. It is not, in my view, the final word on the topic. Nor, I assume, is this thread.
David Schenker is a member of MESH.