Quiet dogs in Iraq
Sep 2nd, 2009 by MESH
From Mark T. Kimmitt
Inspector Gregory: “Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”
Holmes: “To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”
“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes.
The situation in Iraq appears much the same: suspiciously quiet. The recent attacks against the foreign and finance ministries attracted little more than a one-day story in the press. Yet, these attacks could be a precursor to more violence, and should give pause to those that believe the job in Iraq is done. Despite progress, there remains a significant number of unresolved grievances such as the status of Kirkuk, distribution of oil revenues, inadequate incorporation of the Sons of Iraq into the security services and, in general, a “winner-take-all” attitude by the Maliki government. Any of these could lead to a reversal on the ground and a renewal of widespread violence.
Others would suggest the opposite. They point to noteworthy reductions in attacks against, and casualties among American forces, the easing of widespread tensions between the Sunni and Shi’a communities, and a general war-weariness which often precedes a long-term reduction in violence.
So which side is right? Is Iraq on the verge of backsliding, or is it moving towards a normal, albeit rocky, political situation which militates for the final departure of U.S. troops in 2011? Will 2010 be the year when it all falls apart or finally comes together? Will Iraq transform itself into a relatively pluralistic nation at peace with itself and its neighbors, and remain an ally of the United States?
On this, the United States cannot sit idly by and allow the situation to determine its own path. U.S. involvement in shaping and achieving an outcome positive to our interests is critical. However, one wonders if this can happen, given the comparatively laissez-faire policy embraced since the elections. I believe the current situation argues for more administration effort, and a return to direct administration involvement in order to ensure a “soft landing” in Iraq. If the goal remains the drawdown of all combat brigades by June 2010 and the complete withdrawal of all troops by the end of 2011, the administration must devote more time and effort to the problem.
The administration in general and President Obama in particular must reinforce a message and reinforce a policy which demonstrates that success in Iraq remains a national priority. The current message seems to be, “we’ve won in Iraq, so let’s move on to Afghanistan” or, dangerously, “we never should have been there, so let’s get out as quickly as possible.” Those who criticized the “forgotten and unresourced war” in Afghanistan and now devote full attention to that effort risk making the same mistake in reverse. Too rapid a shift of focus, resources and priorities from Iraq to Afghanistan, and failure to devote the required time and high-level effort to working through the unfinished business, put the hard-won gains in Iraq in peril. Despite the 2008 election rhetoric, this administration inherited the responsibility for success in Iraq. Pretending it doesn’t exist, bleeding it of needed resources or failing to rally public support for the remaining hard work abrogate the responsibilities that came with the election victory.
While Afghanistan remains an important priority, it cannot be at the expense of Iraq. For a reminder of this, I often turn to an editorial published by Professor Eliot Cohen in 2003. In talking about leaving Iraq prematurely, he noted:
Cut-and-run cannot be disguised, and the price to be paid for it would be appalling. No one else would take on the burdens of Iraq; talk of handing it over to the United Nations or NATO is wishfulness, not strategy. Whatever one’s view of the war’s rationale, conception, planning or conduct, our war it remains, and we had best figure out how to win it.
While there has been tremendous progress since Eliot Cohen wrote this in 2003, there is still work to be done. And we had best figure out how to do it.
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On the basis of an opinion piece published this week (here), I’ve been asked to comment on Mark Kimmitt’s post. This won’t make for interesting reading since I agree with virtually everything the general says.
Still, perhaps I can go further than Gen. Kimmitt in my criticism of the Obama administration, and add one (very lightly) dissenting comment. The criticism first. Gen. Kimmitt is diplomatic in describing the growing American disinterest toward Iraq as a “comparatively laissez-faire policy.” In fact it’s much worse than that. The administration, I believe, has a fundamental psychological problem in dealing with a war it dislikes, which it associates with a former president it dislikes even more.
Gen. Kimmitt writes: “Despite the 2008 election rhetoric, this administration inherited the responsibility for success in Iraq. Pretending it doesn’t exist, bleeding it of needed resources [and] failing to rally public support for the remaining hard work abrogate the responsibilities that came with the election victory.” What he’s saying is that Iraq is an American problem, not a Republican or a Democratic one. How true; how painfully obvious, except to the Obama people. There are significant U.S. strategic interests in Iraq that require more attention and staying power than the current team in Washington has been willing to provide.
My own view of the United States’ role in Iraq is defined more by Middle Eastern politics and realities than domestic American ones. In strategic terms, I still have great trouble understanding how an administration among whose priorities is the containment of Iran, feels that this can be achieved by focusing so doggedly on a withdrawal from Iraq. We can all agree, supporters and opponents of the Iraq war alike, that from a balance-of-power perspective, George W. Bush’s removal of the Baath regime removed a regional counterweight to Iran, while also creating an Iraqi political vacuum that Tehran has exploited very successfully.
Iraqi nationalism notwithstanding, Iran today holds many of the more powerful levers in Iraq, so that an America bent on sending its troops home (or to Afghanistan) is essentially doing two things: removing that counterweight to Iran that Bush and the U.S. military struggled for years to re-establish after the initial post-2003 fiasco; and ceding to Iran a major political role in Iraq that American efforts were never quite successful in overturning. Iraq is the Middle East’s Germany, a country at the region’s center with a panoptical eye on everything going on around it. That’s why the United States cannot afford to be so lax when it comes to grasping country’s strategic importance for its own interests. Washington fought a war against Iraq to deny it a hegemonic role in the Gulf; surely it now makes sense to defend its Iraqi stake in order to deny Iran such a role.
This brings me to my dissent with Gen. Kimmitt, even if I believe we are closer on this than his post suggests. The general expresses his arguments in the context of the U.S. withdrawal: “If the goal remains the drawdown of all combat brigades by June 2010 and the complete withdrawal of all troops by the end of 2011, the administration must devote more time and effort to the problem,” he writes. In all honesty (and I noticed his use of the conditional), the American effort in Iraq, if it is to be at all successful, must avoid artificial deadlines. When Iran or Syria or Al Qaeda sees the United States adhering to deadlines, their instinct is to push the Americans out twice as quickly to secure their pound of meat in the aftermath.
But worse, Washington’s Arab allies, fearing that the outcome of the U.S. departure will be the rise of a regionally powerful Iran that ultimately seeks to topple their own regimes, have also quietly encouraged measures preventing the consolidation of stability in Iraq. The only weapon that the Sunni Arab states can employ against Iran and the Shiite-dominated order in Iraq is Sunni sectarianism. Syria has also exploited this, allowing jihadists from the Gulf to pass through its territory to attack Iraqi targets, in the hope that this will increase its own bargaining position regionally. However, at any moment that sectarian genie can turn around and wreak terrible havoc on the region. Surely the United States can do better, given such dangers, than to put all its energies into an efficient getaway.
The Obama administration needs to get over its obsession with ending its Iraq mission as soon as possible. We need to be practical: the president cannot easily reverse his Iraqi policy today; but he can give it a new impetus and sense of priority, while fudging over deadlines. As a starter, the United States must work with the Iraqis and the Kurds to build up barriers in Iraq to Iranian power. That’s easier said than done, perhaps, but it is doable. To re-enter Iraqi cities is not a good idea, but the United States does need to bring home to the Iraqis themselves that their country’s future is an American strategic concern, and that the United States cannot leave until it is reassured that Iraq can stand on its own against Iranian influence. Much more can and must be done to reconcile the Sunni minority with the Shiite majority in Iraq, just as more can be done to reconcile the Sunni Arab world with the Shiite-dominated order in Iraq.
Washington alone has the means to sponsor such action and work with the Iraqi government to establish a stable, pluralistic, and ultimately sovereign order in Iraq. A volatile Iraq that finds itself being fought over by the countries of the Middle East is the worst alternative a U.S. administration can contemplate. The irony is that most of the states in the region fear the consequences of such an outcome, even as they facilitate it. Iraq matters to America, and proof of this is that Iraq so perceptibly matters to everyone else in the region, who evidently don’t have the short attention span that leading administration figures seem to have.
Michael Young is a member of MESH.
Brig.-Gen. Mark T. Kimmitt comments that one side sees Iraq marching toward stability, while the other sees the quiet before the storm resulting from the numerous unresolved issues that could blow up across the country. “Which side is right?” he asks. Answer: neither. Iraq is not irreversibly marching on a path of progress, but it is not necessarily destined to blow up in another orgy of violence either. Iraq is in the throes of transition from one form of political rule to another, but that transition is far from consolidated.
One of the key markers in a transition is the first peaceful transfer of power from one government to the next. That has not yet happened, although it may after elections at the beginning of 2010. Some of the country’s thorniest issues have yet to be resolved. The very reason for the delay in dealing with them lies in the great stakes that various parties have in the issues and the complexity of finding a way out of the thicket that is acceptable to all.
There are no good solutions to these issues. The only solutions that are palatable (barely) to all parties are second- or third-best to each group. There is no way for these issues to be solved until greater trust is built between parties and greater legitimacy is earned by the government.
Trust and legitimacy are hard to come by in Iraq. With an election looming around the corner, many are holding off on their bargaining, hoping a more favorable political slate will improve their hand next year. The current parliament has lost what little effectiveness it had as coalitions fracture and new groupings begin to form ahead of the elections. New political groupings seem to be based less on shared positions on key issues than on jockeying for power in a contest to gain greater governmental spoils. None of the existing or evolving coalitions is based around a desire to tackle the remaining contentious issues, the most prominent of which are the status of Kirkuk, true Sunni-Shi’a reconciliation, greater incorporation of Sunnis into government forces and ministries, and revision of the constitution. Each of these issues is a potential flashpoint that could easily lead to renewed violence if left unresolved. In particular, battle lines are being drawn between Arabs and Kurds over Kirkuk, and the lingering insurgent/terrorist violence against Shi’as reminds us that the Sunni-Shi’a wound is far from healed.
America’s military presence has reduced the violence in Iraq just about as much as it can. Continued provision of security by Iraqi and American troops will help to maintain the status quo, to prevent backsliding, and to shield the political field to allow more time for growth. The permanent reduction of violence and the removal of the flashpoints enumerated above requires political reconciliation on the part of the Iraqis.
In light of this analysis, I would ask what elements of American national power can be used to shape the political outcomes that will lead to long-term stability in Iraq? Kimmitt and Michael Young speak of dedicating resources and not prematurely turning our attention away from Iraq. I will not comment on policy, but I would ask them to define what resources are needed and how they propose that those resources should be used to achieve a specific end. And what end is it, specifically, that we should be trying to affect? Obviously we want a stable Iraq, free of Iranian influence, but our operational goals must be more narrowly defined to allow us to use our elements of power intelligently. What do we need to get right in conjunction with what they see us as doing wrong?
Peter J. Munson is a Marine officer and author of Iraq in Transition: The Legacy of Dictatorship and the Prospects for Democracy. His views are his own and do not reflect the position of the Marine Corps or the Department of Defense.
First, declining news coverage of Iraq is not a good indicator of government policy. After all, the news business is (increasingly) a business, and it has been more and more difficult to justify the ongoing heavy costs of maintaining and protecting a large bureau in Iraq more than six years after the fall of Saddam. This is especially so at a time when the economic model for news coverage is disintegrating.
Second, what I detect is not so much U.S. government disinterest in Iraq as a reluctant concession that our influence is diminishing. When I saw Prime Minister Maliki here in Washington last month, it was striking how little he was seeking the approval of his audience. He unapologetically explained what he was doing, and he didn’t ask for help. Some Iraqis have told me that his demeanor was an act brought on by the political realities of Iraq. I’m not so sure; even politicians with a big axe to grind care how they are perceived by their audience, and Maliki struck me as utterly indifferent.
When I speak with Iraqis about what specifically it is that they want the United States to do, they’re generally dumbfounded. They want things better, and they make an assumption that the United States can help. They want the United States to forge agreement. They want the United States to reign in the excesses of the various parties. But how?
For years I have been struck by the remark of a senior American who traveled to Iraq in the summer of 2003. He came back talking about the “birth defects of the occupation”; how so many profound errors had been made so early on that Iraq’s upside potential would be forever handicapped. That is not an excuse to “cut and run,” but in fact, no one I know is calling for that. It is a suggestion that we need to right-size our expectations of what can happen in Iraq and how much capacity we will have to shape it.
George Will weighs in on this in today’s Washington Post.
Jon Alterman is a member of MESH.
Gen. Mark T. Kimmitt’s provocation on Iraq and the responses so far have generated a useful debate—one I wish were louder in the rest of Washington. I am particularly concerned about the post-2010 environment in Iraq. It is not clear to me what level of U.S. influence the United States seeks to maintain in Iraq after the withdrawal of its forces. Do we want an over-the-horizon presence (or, given the large number of U.S. troops on the Arabian peninsula) a neighboring presence? Do we want a near-constant rotation of brigades for “training” exercises so there is almost always a ground contingent there? If, as Michael Young suggests, a spike in the violence would warrant additional intervention, should we push for ensuring this capability? Given the likely weaknesses in Iraq’s air and conventional ground forces, what sort of security guarantee is appropriate? And finally, if Al Qaeda reasserts itself in parts of Iraq with support from local leaders, do we want the right to conduct unilateral operations on a significant scale?
The answers to these questions should shape the nature of the U.S. withdrawal and the decisions we make in this process. The Iraqi government is unlikely to agree to much of the above, particularly overtly, but there are often ways to work around formal declarations. My hope is that there are some people working on these issues even as Afghanistan sucks the oxygen out of the room.
Daniel Byman is a member of MESH.